A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Titus Rivas]

Idealism would be the only rational choice

Adam said:

How about non-interactive parallelism?

Such a way out is more than just an imaginary answer without followers. In fact, I covered it in my papers Exit Epiphenomenalism and
Why the efficacy of consciousness cannot be limited to the mind.

I've conclusively shown that parallellism is not an option. If brain processes would show no interaction, I would definitely opt for idealism. I can't knowingly believe in what does not correspond with logic, in this case materialism. So the brain etc. would simply have to be an illusion, in the same sense materialists declare subjectivity to be an illusion. If we needed to delete one item from our world view (either the brain or consciousness), the only rational choice would be to do away with the brain! I'm being perfectly honest about this.

Titus

 

[slimshady2357]

Adam said:
Such a way out is more than just an imaginary answer without followers. In fact, I covered it in my papers Exit Epiphenomenalism and
Why the efficacy of consciousness cannot be limited to the mind.

I've conclusively shown that parallellism is not an option. If brain processes would show now interaction, I would definitely opt for idealism. I can't believe in what does not correspond with logic, in this case materialism. So the brain etc. would simply have to be an illusion, in the same sense materialists declare subjectivity to be an illusion. If we needed to delete one item from our world view (either the brain or consciousness), the only rational choice would be to do away with the brain! I'm being perfectly honest about this.

Titus

I'm well aware that you are.

When I have time I'll check out your claims as to proving parallelism is 'not an option'.

Since neither one of the brain or consciousness would be determined or influenced in any way by the other, I'm having trouble seeing how you're going to show that.

Unless you just mean it's rather silly, in which I case I would whole-heartedly agree

Adam

 

[Titus Rivas]

Theoretical psychology

Mercutio.

gack...sorry, I'll get off the soapbox. Anyway, just out of curiosity, what's your area?

I've been trained as a generalist rather than a specialist. I'm a theoretical psychologist who's been taught to focus on theoretical discussions within psychology. My own orientation is on a combination of (a dualist reinterpretation of) humanist psychology with elements from cognitivism. And as a dualist, I fully accept the role of the brain in 'incarnated' mental functioning. During my psychology studies, special interests of mine have been and continue to be: theoretical animal psychology, especially the areas of animal consciousness and wellfare and mental evolution, the reconciliation of humanist psychology with cognitive psychology, theories in personality and clinical psychology, general theoretical psychology and of course theoretical parapsychology. My interest in animal welfare has made me study lots of papers on animal behavioral studies. As a student I even did a survey of recent Dutch experiments in which they used animals for behavioral and physiological studies, in order to find out for what kind of purposes animals are usually 'sacrificed'. I'm an animal rights activist by the way.

That should give you a general picture.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Dismissing parallellism

Hi Adam,

Since neither one of the brain or consciousness would be determined or influenced in any way by the other, I'm having trouble seeing how you're going to show that.

Just to summarize my arguments:

(1). Parallellism implicitly states that we can know that there is a real, irreducible mind and a real, irreducible brain.
(2). One of the claims of parallellism is that the mind is not influenced by the brain.
(2a). If the mind is not influenced by the brain, we cannot know that there is a brain.
(2b). If we ourselves hold that we cannot know that there is a brain, we can't (even implicitly) state that we know that there is a real, irreducible brain.
(2c) Thus, parallellism is an incoherent position.
(3). The other claim of parallellism is that the brain is not influenced by the mind.
(3a). If the brain is not influenced by the mind, we cannot meaningfully express our theories about the mind by physical means, such as speech and writing.
(3b). Parallellism as shared in the intellectual debate should be meaningfully expressable by physical means, such as speech and writing.
(3c). As parallellism cannot be expressed meaningfully in the intellectual debate, it can't be a candidate within that intellectual debate, let alone win that debate.
(3d). However, parallellists implicitly claim that their position is a meaningfully expressable one, which should not only take part in the intellectual debate, but even win the battle.
(3e). Therefore, parallellism is an incoherent position.

Satisfied?

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus,

Nice summary of your "argument against parallelism". Can you offer the same for your "materialism is irrational"? It would help me greatly to understand where you're coming from...

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Theoretical psychology

Mercutio.
*snip*

That should give you a general picture.

Best wishes,

Titus

Thank you very much.

(BTW, I see on your page that you are a vegan? If you are ever out this way, I have a very dear friend who just happens to be the best vegan cook on this or any planet...to die for, I tell you.)

 

[Titus Rivas]

First argument for Loki: Epiphenomenalism

Here's my argument against epiphenomenalism again, Loki, as formulated in my paper:


(1) Epiphenomenalism uses the concept of consciousness, as it states that there is such a thing as consciousness, which has got properties that are not material, etc.

(2) Epiphenomenalism thus holds that its concept of consciousness refers to a real part of reality, namely to the (presumably) epiphenomenal but irreducible world of mental experience.

(3) We have to be aware that even if the concept of consciousness had been innate, the reality to which it refers -consciousness- could only be established through introspection, i.a. by establishing that there are such things as conscious experiences. Epiphenomenalism starts from the reality of consciousness and it is based on the (introspective) evidence for the existence of conscious experiences.

There may be an innate concept of consciousness or not, in any case epiphenomenalism uses subjective experiences as a touch stone for such a concept. After all, it is absurd to think that the reality of something might be established on the basis that we have a concept of that entity (take for example the case of the unicorn). The only valid reason for supposing there really are conscious experiences is therefore the introspective observation that there are such experiences. If nobody would introspectively observe subjective experiences, there would be no reason to suppose that there really would be such a thing as consciousness.

Epiphenomenalism is forced therefore to found its unconditional acceptance on an introspective contact with that very same consciousness. Such a contact, however, equals a causal effect by consciousness upon the conceptualization processes of the
one that contemplates his or her subjective experiences through introspection.
By the way, it is not necessary to conceive of the impact of consciousness in this process as a conscious 'act'. It suffices to conceive it as a 'factor', comparable to the causal status of an object perceived during the process of perception. In this respect, we might rephrase Berkeley by saying: 'percipi est movere' (to be perceived is to move). This view clearly contrasts
with that of David Chalmers who seems to believe a real entity can make a difference for our knowledge without at the same time exerting a causal influence. Chalmers seems to
overlook the fact that in order to have a realistic concept of something that entity must be somehow represented in memory (be it mental or neural) which means that the non-causal influence on knowledge postulated by him must in the end have a really causal effect after all.

(4) Thus epiphenomenalism internally contradicts itself. It states that there would be a valid reason to postulate mental experiences, but proclaims at the same time that these experiences are completely unknowable, by denying them any
causal impact. The inevitable conclusion therefore is that epiphenomenalism should be disqualified for good.

Yours truly,

Titus Rivas, First Mate

 

[Loki]

Titus,

Perhaps I'm asking for something you don't have? I was after your general "materialism is irrational" argument. Not sure if that means the "eliminative materialism" or perhaps the "emergent materialism"? Which do you feel is revelant? You seem to use the term "materialsm" as a fairly strong catch-all phrase, so I assumed you had a "one size fits all" argument? Or do you have individual arguments against each particular "flavour"?

 

[Titus Rivas]

My first Argument against the Identity Theory

In my paper Exit Epiphenomenalism I also give a first argument against the identity theory, which I shall reformulate here:

(1) Identity theory implicitly claims that we can know that there are two perspectives towards the conscious mind. One would be the first person, subjective perspective. The other one the third person, objective perspective. The first person perspective amounts to what conscious mind appears to be (irreducible subjectivity). The third person perspective amounts to what the conscious mind really is (brain processes).
(2) Identity theory is right in claiming that only real entities can have a real impact on the real world.
(3) As (according to identity theory) consciousness as seen from the first person perspective is not real, but only apparent, it cannot have a real, but exclusively an apparent impact on the real world.
(4) Thus, Identity theory holds that we can really (rather than just apparently) know that there is a first person perspective, while it implies that we cannot really (rather than just apparently) know that there is a first person perspective.
(4a) Therefore, identity theory is an incoherent position.

Regards,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Flavours, but not as in qualia

Or do you have individual arguments against each particular "flavour"?

Against the main flavours anyway, Loki.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

My second argument against the Identity Theory

Here's my second argument against the Identity Theory, as given in this paper:


(1) Identity theory holds that consciousness as seen from the first person perspective is only apparent, rather than a real part of the real world, which can only be approached through the third person perspective.
(2) However, the first person perspective (which delivers a picture of consciousness as it appears to be) must be a real part of the real world, as otherwise Identity Theory would not claim that consciousness can be seen from a first person perspective as well as a third person perspective.
(3) If the first person perspective is a real part of the real world, then consciousness as it appears to be must be a real part of the real world as well, as the first person perspective really leads to a picture of consciousness as it appears to be.
(3a) In other words, there really is a way we experience consciousness from the first person perspective, not just apparently.
(3b) This means, the way we experience consciousness from the inside is a real part of the real world.
(4) If consciousness as seen from the first person perspective is a real part of the real world, it cannot be merely apparent.
(5) Therefore, Identity Theory is incoherent.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus,

You know, the weidest thing just happened...I just read your anti-identity theory summary, and I think you've just convinced me that epiphenomenalism is correct!! Gasp! Win, where are you - I think I finally get what you've been trying to tell me.

I need to think about this .....

 

[Titus Rivas]

Identity Theory and Epiphenomenalism

Loki,

You know, the weidest thing just happened...I just read your anti-identity theory summary, and I think you've just convinced me that epiphenomenalism is correct!! Gasp! Win, where are you - I think I finally get what you've been trying to tell me.

Well, you must have skipped my anti-epiphenomenalism argument then. You were probably only looking for my arguments against materialism. Please read it now . If you're convinced by my first anti-identity theory argument, you should equally be convinced by my anti-epiphenomenalism argument. Both possess the same analytical structure.

Cheers,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Arguments against Eliminative Materialism

My main argument against Eliminative Materialism is not an analytical argument, but based on introspection. Everything we learn from introspection contradicts Eliminative Materialism. We can see that our experiences are subjective and qualitative. They cannot be reduced to anything non-subjective and non-qualitative. For me, as well as for epiphenomenalists, parallellists and identity theorists, that's quite enough to accept that there are subjective experiences, or "a first person perspective" as Identity Theory would put it.

We can think of analytical arguments against Eliminative Materialism though they may be more complex than against the other positions I've tried to tackle. For example, most rational minds would accept that all the evidence we have about reality reaches us through subjectivity. We have no way of passing by our subjectivity and reach out for some kind of sources of information about the physical world without the use of our subjectivity. Any result from 'objective' physical measurements by any physical apparatus still needs to appear in our subjective minds in order for us to accept that we've taken notice of it. So, in this sense all our knowledge is based in consciousness (not in the sense that everything we know is conscious for example, but in the sense that for us to accept that we know some physical fact, it first must have passed through our conscious minds). Now, if you deny consciousness, you thereby deny our capacity to know anything at all. However, eliminative materialism implicitly claims it knows (in the normal sense) that there is a physical world.

More formally:
[COLOR= Blue](1) Eliminative Materialism denies that we (really) have qualitative, subjective experiences
(1a) According to Eliminative Materialism (we can know that) there really is a physical world.
(2). For conscious, rationally acceptable knowledge we need subjective awareness.
(3) If we delete consciousness from our world view, we imply that we can have no conscious, rationally acceptable knowledge as commonly understood.
(4) Thus, Eliminative Materialism either has to accept that we can know nothing whatsoever, which would make it an incoherent position.
(5) Or it has delete to conscious knowledge from its world view as well, which would mean it has to come up with a completely new definition of knowledge. [/COLOR]

That pretty much sums up my problems with Eliminative Materialism. Problems which are more than enough reason to discard the position without second thoughts.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Vegan Cook

Mercutio,

I see on your page that you are a vegan? If you are ever out this way, I have a very dear friend who just happens to be the best vegan cook on this or any planet...to die for, I tell you.

Yes, I've been a vegan for about 19 years now. Wonderful that you know a vegan cook and that he or she is very dear to you. We need such embassadors .

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Reminding Ian of his Idealism

Ian,

Yes this scenario would seem to prove the world is physically closed. This is quite definitely contrary to my beliefs and I would most probably adopt some sort of materialist based metaphysic

Physical world? What physical world, Ian? Accprding to idealism, as I've understood it, the physical world would be just another manifestation of the mind. For idealism there is no real, irreducible physical world outside mental ('ideal') reality. So, the apparently closed nature of the physical world does not constitute a serious threat to the idealist world view.

Or does your idealism hold something else?

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus,

Well, you must have skipped my anti-epiphenomenalism argument then.

No, I got it. Just don't agree.

If you're convinced by my first anti-identity theory argument, you should equally be convinced by my anti-epiphenomenalism argument.

No, you misunderstand me. I'm not convinced by your anti-Identify argument at all. While I was framing a possible reply as to why I feel your Identity argument is flawed, a light bulb went off regarding ephiphenomenalism. You're right in that the two arguments have a similar analytic structure - in fact, at this moment in time I'm seeing the two positions as "close cousins". As I said, more thought required...

 

[Titus Rivas]

The how of interaction

Loki,

The interaction problem is asking "how" - your answer is "it does". I guess that's not incoherent, just avoiding the question? Is the "soul/brain" interaction affected by distance? By time? Does it work by "rearranging atoms"?

Well, for me, the interaction problem is first of all a question about the logical possibility or tenability of the concept of interaction. Is it possible that there is a world order (consisting of natural laws) that makes it possible for physical and non-physical entities to interact with another? The usual answer is: No, because there would be no physical mechanism that could account for it. But that answer is irrelevant, as the very point about interactionism is that not all natural regularities or mechanism are based on physical mechanisms.

As to the how of interaction, I believe that some forms may turn out to seem a whole lot more 'magical' than most materialists can take seriously. For example, there is (unacceptable to materialists, naturally ) naturalistic as well as experimental evidence for a phenomenon called intrasomatic psychokinesis. This would basically consist of a local impact from specific images about aspects of the body on those very aspects. The most spectacular instance is seen in cases of children who claim to recall a previous life in which they were (for example) brutally murdered, and who show birthmarks or birth defects corresponding to the lethal wounds at the end of their claimed previous life. For more information, see: this paper by Dr. Ian Stevenson.

More generally, I distinguish between the following forms of interaction between mind and matter:

- Somatogenic impact of the brain on normal processes of perception, cognition, memory, etc.
- Intrasomatic 'normal' psychgenic impact of the mind on the expression of emotions, psychomotoric actions, etc.
- Intrasomatic 'paranormal' psychogenic impact of the mind as seen in the birthmarks just mentioned.
- Extrasomatic psychogenic impact of the mind on the physical world, ranging from spontaneous outbursts of poltergeist or RSPK (seen for example in the well documented case of Rosenheim ) to micro-PK (as studied for example by Dr. Helmut Schmidt).

Apart from this, I also hold that it's logically conceivable that there is a direct interaction between two minds, or telepathy, so that I don't have any particular reason to be unusually skeptical about the evidence for this phenomenon.

Within interactionism, the study of PSI is only a natural pursuit. A particularly skeptical outlook on such research is therefore alien to me.

That should do, I suppose.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus,

My main argument against Eliminative Materialism is not an analytical argument, but based on introspection. Everything we learn from introspection contradicts Eliminative Materialism.

Well, that's as plain as can be :

1. Information about consciousness gained from introspection is must be true.
2. This information contradicts Eliminative Materialism.
3. Therefore, Eliminative Materialism is false.

Any idea which premise I'm having trouble with??

 

[Titus Rivas]

What eliminative materialism wants us to believe

1. Information about consciousness gained from introspection is must be true.
2. This information contradicts Eliminative Materialism.
3. Therefore, Eliminative Materialism is false.

Any idea which premise I'm having trouble with??

Yep, with the first one, but then again you should make it more specific it so that it really becomes my own premise. As follows:

1. Information about the existence (or presence at any moment in time) of subjective experiences gained from introspection must be true.

Eliminative materialism is saying:

1. All information about consciousness (even about its existence or presence at any moment in time) gained from introspection must be false.

Any idea why I'm having trouble with this premise?

In my not very humble opinion, if any debunking of a position is ever justified it should be in this case, of the false prophet of Eliminative Materialism which amounts to nothing less than an insult for people who believe in rational thought. EM is a charicature of rationalism.

Regards,

Titus