A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Titus Rivas]

Dependent or identical?

Hi Dancing David,

I ahev to say that i don't buy into the epiphenomena or the peri phenomenalism, I state that uncatergoricaly human consiousness is totaly dependant on brain phenomena. This does not exclude the possibilty that other forms of consiousness could not exist. But I sate that human awareness is totaly dependant on the brain.

What is it going to be, David, is consciousness only completely dependent on brain processes, as in epiphenomenalism or identical to brain processes? If the latter, "dependence" would be too weak a term I'd say. It would amount to a part of the brain being dependent on... well, itself!
So are you talking about dependence (epiphenomenalism) or identity? And what about my arguments against both these positions?

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

We're not involved in an ontologically neutral discussion here, Paul. On the contrary, the debate in this thread precisely concentrates on ontology.

If that were the case, then all the materialisms would be equivalent, because they all postulate one ontological existent. I think this debate is mostly about semantics.

Well, what is it going to be, Paul? Mere brain processes plus more brain processes, or brain processes plus their non-cerebral or supra-cerebral or extra-cerebral products (i.e. something else than brain processes)?

Brain processes plus their entirely cerebral products. Physical stuff can have processes that produce products, all of which have the same ontological status. Air undergoes a process with light that produces blue sky, none of which requires ontological shenanigans.

I suspect you think you've already done this, but you should state categorically that in your opinion anything called consciousness, regardless of qualifiers, is a separate ontological existent that refutes materialism. Because all we're doing here is talking past one another. I think there is something called consciousness that is nothing more than the result of brain processes.

What is it going to be, David, is consciousness only completely dependent on brain processes, as in epiphenomenalism or identical to brain processes?

What does it mean for an effect to be identical to the process that produces it? What does that word identical really mean?

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Brain processes + ?

Paul, Well, what is it going to be, Paul? Mere brain processes plus more brain processes, or brain processes plus their non-cerebral or supra-cerebral or extra-cerebral products (i.e. something else than brain processes)?

Why plus anything? If I describe walking in terms of muscle, bone and nerve, do you require the addition of an animus? Why the extra magic alongside the behavior of the brain?

Don't bother answering, I completely understand your objection. It is that irreducible quality that you have avowed, that the behavior of the brain does not explain. Why? Because you say so.

 

[ceptimus]

Are you interested in how your computer works? Is the software actually running on the microprocessor? Surely the microprocessor can only process individual instructions? So perhaps it could be said that processing a stream of instructions constitutes the software? But if the instructions are only carried out one at a time, can the software as a whole be said to exist in any meaningful sense?
Obviously there are exactly five different explanation categories that can apply:

Single stream processing
Collective code concept
Instruction stream theory
Reductive electronics
Dynamic program flow execution paradigm

Clearly four of the above explanations are utterly absurd, laughably inconsistent and just downright stupid. If you care to explain to me how you think a computer works, I'll tell you which of the above five categories exactly describes your explanation, and then point out why you're wrong.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Darn it Ceptimus, now this is the kind of thing that really irks my muffins! You have completely ignored emergent program flow phenomenalism.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Relevance of ontology

Paul (et al.),

To avoid too much repetition, I'll just respond to these remarks:

If that were the case, then all the materialisms would be equivalent, because they all postulate one ontological existent. I think this debate is mostly about semantics.

I don't agree of course. Matter is two different things for an eliminative materialist and for an emergent materialist. The latter believes that matter can get an irreducible subjective and qualitative dimension by gaining in complexity. So it does not deny consciousness in the qualitative sense.
And identity theorists distinguish two perspectives, one of which is absent in eliminative materialism.

The debate is about very real, essential issues.

Titus

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Dependent or identical?

Hi Dancing David,

What is it going to be, David, is consciousness only completely dependent on brain processes, as in epiphenomenalism or identical to brain processes? If the latter, "dependence" would be too weak a term I'd say. It would amount to a part of the brain being dependent on... well, itself!
So are you talking about dependence (epiphenomenalism) or identity? And what about my arguments against both these positions?

Best wishes,

Titus

I mean dependant in that the phrase consiousness refers to a series of phenomena that are all brian process. It is not emergent, it is dependant, it is brain processes. In your sense I would say that the label consiousness applies to a number of things that are brain processes and therefore is identical to a number of brain processes.

I would say that most of your arguments have been semantic in nature, you say that qualities can not be represented by brain processes , I say that they can. When I have presented the fuzzy logic nature of cognition, you have just said 'well that can not be', all human experince comes down to a brain process, a brain process is the subjective, objective and experient.

As I said my reasons for feeling that way will be presented in another thread in Philosphy.

Can epiphenom apply solely to physical processes without the need for magic gobbldey gook? I would say epiphenom as long as it is understood that there are only brian processes.

And despite your sig line, there is no proof for consiousness that is not identical to organic processes.

 

[Dancing David]

Titus , I would like to point out that the Admiral, the Ex O. and the barnacle have all stated that consiousness is identical to the brain process.

You can have phenomena that are the product of phenomena with introducing the magic of irreducable, as the Admiral said:

Only because you say so,

which is what I mean when I say your argument is semanatic. It has not been proved either way that qualia are irreducable, but there is a growing body of evidence to link them to brain process.

To just state that they have to be irreducable does not make them so.

Peace

 

[Titus Rivas]

Wrong!

Dear Dancing David,

If you really believe that my arguments are only semantical after everything I've said, I won't spend more energy on trying to convince you of your very basic error. Let me just say you couldn't be more mistaken. Arguments? They are all on this thread already. It's not my fault that you still don't get it, okay?

Take care,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Confused thinking

Just this last point:

No, an epiphenomenon can't be just another brain process! Of course not! The whole point in calling something an epiphenomenon is that it is a byproduct of physical brain processes, rather than just another physical brain process.
The epiphenomenon would possess properties which would make it non-efficacious. Whether the conscious mind is an epiphenomenal non-physical dimension to the brain or an entity in its own right, is another question, but as a presumed epiphenomenon it does not make sense to identify it with just another completely physical process in the brain.

I'm afraid it's this kind of confusion among materialists which sooner or later makes many non-materialists unwilling to continue discussing these issues with them. Now would that apply as name calling? I'd just say, confusion is part of the intrinsic make-up of materialism. There must be something that makes intelligent people believe in such a blatantly incoherent system as materialism. But this is another subject and besides I've already shared some of my views on this phenomenon.

Truth has to do with a correspondence between theory and reality, not with the counting of noses. Not even on a skeptical forum.

Greetings,

Titus

 

[ceptimus]

Titus,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but you seem to be saying.

1. Materialism is blatently incoherent.
2. The explanations as to why this is so are hidden in this thread.
3. You are unable, or unwiling to give a consise summary of the reasons.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Corrections

Hi Ceptimus,

Correct me if I'm wrong

I will. It should read:

1. Materialism is blatently incoherent.

2. The explanations as to why this is so, can easily be found in this thread.

3. I'm unable, i.e. unwiling to give yet another concise summary of the reasons.

Not bad, but some corrections were in place

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Confused thinking

I'm afraid it's this kind of confusion among materialists which sooner or later makes many non-materialists unwilling to continue discussing these issues with them.

It does come down to some strange beliefs sometimes....

It's like trying to discuss the interaction problem with a Dualist.

Adam

 

[Titus Rivas]

Hi Adam,

It's like trying to discuss the interaction problem with a Dualist.

If that were all, it would be less frustrating. The interaction problem is mainly a problem if you aren't used to non-physical causes and non-physical natural laws within your world view, because of irrational prejudices rather than reason.
The interaction problem has nothing to do with inherent incoherence, of the kind shown by materialism.

So the parallel is quite assymetrical I'm afraid. There may be frustration in both cases, but in both cases it's the materialist who's creating it by his stubborn unwillingness to follow basic rules of reasoning .

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[slimshady2357]

Hi Adam,


If that were all, it would be less frustrating. The interaction problem is mainly a problem if you aren't used to non-physical causes and non-physical natural laws within your world view, because of irrational prejudices rather than reason.
The interaction problem has nothing to do with inherent incoherence, of the kind shown by materialism.

So the parallel is quite assymetrical I'm afraid. There may be frustration in both cases, but in both cases it's the materialist who's creating it by his stubborn unwillingness to follow basic rules of reasoning .

Best wishes,

Titus

Hmmm, somehow both the tone and content of your post don't surprise me

Adam

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The only explanation I've found here for why materialism is incoherent is because it simply must be the case that consciousness is different. I guess that's not compelling for some of us.

If that were all, it would be less frustrating. The interaction problem is mainly a problem if you aren't used to non-physical causes and non-physical natural laws within your world view, because of irrational prejudices rather than reason.

Yes, getting used to inexplicable, magical nonphysical causes is what you have to do, all right, because there certainly isn't any evidence or rationale for them.

Summary: Consciousness just has to be different and it affects the physical through an undescribable process. But ain't materialism incoherent!

There may be frustration in both cases, but in both cases it's the materialist who's creating it by his stubborn unwillingness to follow basic rules of reasoning.

Uh oh, we're entering the Interesting Zone.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Just a fascinating reply

Paul,

Uh oh, we're entering the Interesting Zone.

I thought we were leaving it .

But maybe Ian can take us back to it, as his name suggests.

No hard feelings ,

Titus

 

[BillyJoe]

Flying Colours

Shout if you will, but that just won't do.
I, for one, would rather follow softer options.
I'll take the easy line; another sip of wine,
and if I ignore the face you wore it's just a way of mine
to keep from flying colours.

Don't lay your bait while the whole world waits
around to see me shoot you down It's all so second-rate.
When we can last for days on a loving night;
or for hours at least on a warm whisper given.
You always pick the best time to rise to the fight.
To break the hard bargain that we've driven.
Once again we're flying colours.

I thought we had it out the night before,
and settled old scores, but not the hard way.
Was it a glass too much? Or a smile too few?
Did our friends all catch the needle match
did we want them to?
In a fancy restaurant we were all aglow,
keeping cool by mutual permission.
How did the conversation get
to where we came to blows?
We were set up in a red condition
and again we're flying colours.

Shout but you see it still won't do.
With my colours on I can be just as bad as you.
Have I had a glass too much? Did I give a smile too few?
Did our friends all catch the needle match,
did we want them to?
We act our parts so well, like we wrote the play.
All so predictable and we know it.
We'll settle old scores now, and settle the hard way.
You may not even live to outgrow it!
Once again we're flying colours, flying colours.

(Jethro Tull "The Broardsword and The Beast")

 

[ceptimus]

Re: Corrections

Hi Ceptimus,

I will. It should read:

1. Materialism is blatently incoherent.

2. The explanations as to why this is so, can easily be found in this thread.

3. I'm unable, i.e. unwiling to give yet another concise summary of the reasons.

Not bad, but some corrections were in place

Best wishes,

Titus

Thank you for your corrections. Perhaps you might take the time to point me towards the posts in the thread (maybe the top five or top ten, or even just the page numbers) that best summarise your position?

 

[Titus Rivas]

A recent example

Well Ceptimus,

Here's an example just to please you.

Two pages ago I said:

It is simply impossible (from a rational standpoint anyway) to accept the reality of subjective, qualitative experiences and simultaneously claim that they don't really exist but just amount to non-subjective non-qualitative brain processes. From a rational point of view, one should either accept the (ultimate, if you like objective) reality of subjective awareness and experients, which is incompatible with claiming that they (objectively, ultimately) really are something else; or reject the reality of subjective awareness and experients. The latter is done by Dennett and his followers. Of course, this is utterly absurd, but at least it is coherent. To put it a bit less respectfully: there is some logic in his madness. Mercutio's system of thought seems to be quite similar to Dennett's in this respect. By the way, Mercutio, you may hold that your views are more parsimonious, but parsimony is only one of the criteria we need in rational philosophy or science. Parsimony is worthless if a theorist abuses the principle in order to protect it against evidence. Thus, eliminative materialism is more parsimonious than dualism but only by ignoring all the evidence provided by introspection. Dismissing introspection as a valid source of information, is like saying that a person who does not write flawlessly should be called an illiterate.

That should refresh your memory, and if not you might try looking for posts of mine which include words like materialism, identity theory or epiphenomenalism. Good luck!

Titus