A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[BillyJoe]

Re: Re: Re: Experients

Ian,
(sorry, missed the thread yesterday)

I've wondered about this. From the materialist perspective can there be an *I* which has experiences? It's really weird to deny that there is an *I*.

It depends on what you mean by an *I*. Certainly an *I* separate from the brain is inconsistent with materialism. But an *I* as an illusion produced by processes in the brain is not.

By an illusion I mean something similar to the checker-board illusion where the shades of grey can be shown to be identical but we really do perceive them as being different. The shades of grey seem to be something that they are not. Similarly the *I* seems to be something it is not. But, in a very real sense, both the different shades of grey (hell, we can see them right there in front of our eyes) and the *I* (here *I* am sitting here posting this thread) really are there - but not in the magical sense implied by the dualist philosophy.

BillyJoe

 

[BillyJoe]

Meanwhile *I* think -- the one (objective to me) indisputable fact.

Yes, but what is the *I* that thinks? That is the point.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Discovering madness amidst Dennett's logic

Paul,

But what does "no essential difference" really mean? I would agree that there is no difference, but that neurological processes are experienced subjectively as what we call consciousness. Do you think he is trying to say that we don't really have the internal experiences that we call consciousness? That's absurd.

Yes, that's exactly what he's trying to say, Paul. And it is absurd. I'm glad you agree with that. If you manage to stick to this sound judgement , you'll move away from eliminative materialism.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[slimshady2357]

Yes I agree. Utterly absurd. So much for materialism. Come and embrace idealism with me

I agree, that's why I still don't think that's what they're saying

If it was that absurd, would there really be this much written on the subject?

I think Ian's quote above points to the fact that they are not denying our actual experiences, only many of the attributes that are assigned to them.

But I do admit, the terminology they use on that page.... sometimes it seems to be saying directly that my experience of pain does not exist. Sometimes it seems to be saying that 'there is a list of attributes that common-sense folk psychology assigns to the mental state 'pain', there is no real world existent which fits these attributes, therefore the mental state 'pain' as described by folk psychology does not exist.

And instead a neurological explanation of your mental state of 'pain' is needed.

So there are causal and semantic attributes given to the word 'belief' in folk psychology which are not true of what is really going on for a eliminative materialist. But then, as the page suggests, isn't this really just reductive materialism?

It certainly starts to get very strange (I think the page uses 'controversial' once) when they get to the 'radical' ontological change type of eliminative materialism. There's where I get the feeling they are denying that mental states exist at all

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

No, I understood it as saying that beliefs definitely don't exist. Which of course is quite clearly absurd.

Anyway, further down on the page he says this:


Although most discussions regarding eliminativism focus on the status of our notion of belief and other propositional attitudes, some philosophers have endorsed eliminativist claims about the phenomenal or qualitative states of the mind. For example, Daniel Dennett (1978) has argued that our concept of pain is fundamentally flawed because it includes essential properties, like infallibility and intrinsic awfulness, that cannot co-exist in light of a well-documented phenomenon know as "reactive disassociation". In certain conditions, drugs like morphine cause subjects to report that they are experiencing excruciating pain, but that it is not unpleasant. It seems we are either wrong to think that people cannot be mistaken about being in pain (wrong about infallibility), or pain needn't be inherently awful (wrong about intrinsic awfulness). Dennett suggests that part of the reason we may have difficulty replicating pain in computational systems is because our concept is so defective that it picks out nothing real.


So if we agree with Dennet that a pain need not be unpleasant (and I think we have to agree) and also that we cannot be sure that we are in pain (has my toothache really gone?), then the concept of pain is ill-defined and . .er . .therefore doesn't exist! Maybe the same goes for belief. We might . .er . .believe we have beliefs, but we don't really. [/B]

Some further thoughts about this issue of pain. Is a pain defined in part by its unpleasant nature? You would think so. But as Dennet points out, it can't be. So the pain is merely the sensation, but what then is the unpleasantness? Surely the interpretation by the mind of the sensation? But within materialism the mind is just brain processes. So in those circumstances in which people experience pain, but it isn't unpleasant, their brain processes must differ in a characteristic way from those whose experience of pain is one of a regular unpleasant nature. Is that right?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Materialism: Mindless

Hi Adam,

If it was that absurd, would there really be this much written on the subject?

Well, yes. I'll tell you something of a secret of mine I believe that eliminative materialism is the only coherent materialist system, as it doesn't have to face the efficacy of subjective experiences, implied by the recognition that they are real. As I show in my paper written with Dr. Hein van Dongen, Exit Epiphenomenalism, identity theory is just as incoherent as epiphenomenalism. (Also see: Kant's Error). All the attention given to eliminative materialism is therefore explicable by this simple fact, that it's the only serious candidate left after you've tested the imaginable rational materialist systems on their inner logic. (Note that I don't consider emergent materialism which allows for conscious efficacy as a rational system. If you want to know my reasons for doing so, just ask ).
That's why I have been saying that the battle has been decided already. Materialism is simply out of the question. The only way to save their faces is a blunt denial of consciousness. Thank god that much of the debate is quite esoterical and that science is still being identified with materialism, so that hardly anyone within the in group seems to find out, or at least dares express his serious doubts.

In skeptical circles the desperate denial just mentioned can particularly be found in the grande dame and "anti-parapsychologist"Susan Blackmore.

Just say goodbye to this rudiment of the past, would be my advice. You may find doing so to be a whole lot more interesting and meaningful than you think. And us non-materialists can always use a few clever minds to expand our insights into reality.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

So if we agree with Dennet that a pain need not be unpleasant (and I think we have to agree) and also that we cannot be sure that we are in pain (has my toothache really gone?), then the concept of pain is ill-defined and . .er . .therefore doesn't exist! Maybe the same goes for belief. We might . .er . .believe we have beliefs, but we don't really.

Well, as diabolical as it is to say, Ian's right here. The mistake is unconditionally to associate intrinsic awfulness with pain. Who did that? Some philosopher, I bet. If the average guy on the street were told "Hey, know what? With drugs you can feel pain but not think it so terrible," I doubt he'd be surprised at all.

Yes I agree. Utterly absurd. So much for materialism. Come and embrace idealism with me.

Hold your horses, my friend. So much for some philosphers, perhaps, but that's about it.

Titus said:

Yes, that's exactly what he's trying to say, Paul. And it is absurd. I'm glad you agree with that. If you manage to stick to this sound judgement , you'll move away from eliminative materialism.

You know, there is a fundamental problem with this definition of eliminative materialism: It sounds like a philosophical standing, but it is subtly laden with a scientific question. It suggests that there may be nothing in our brains that corresponds to various subjective experiences. Well, perhaps not, but first we need to find out if there is. It's a kind of conditional philosophy: I will be an eliminative materialist if we find out in the future that there is nothing to consciousness. But what if we find out that there are specific brain processes that generate beliefs? Then I'm not an eliminative materialist, I'm some other kind?

As is so typical with philosophy, things would be better served by waiting.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Some further thoughts about this issue of pain. Is a pain defined in part by its unpleasant nature? You would think so. But as Dennet points out, it can't be. So the pain is merely the sensation, but what then is the unpleasantness? Surely the interpretation by the mind of the sensation? But within materialism the mind is just brain processes. So in those circumstances in which people experience pain, but it isn't unpleasant, their brain processes must differ in a characteristic way from those whose experience of pain is one of a regular unpleasant nature. Is that right?

Sounds right to me, and another case where subjective experience is altered by brain function. In my previous post, I agreed with you and said we shouldn't unconditionally associate awfullness with pain. Of course, there is another route: We could come up with a different word for pain-like sensations that don't feel awful under drugs. We could call that pleasure-pain or something.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Well, yes. I'll tell you something of a secret of mine I believe that eliminative materialism is the only coherent materialist system, as it doesn't have to face the efficacy of subjective experiences, implied by the recognition that they are real.

This is the sort of crap that pisses me off, Titus. This is why I say you are shoehorning me into a metaphysic to which I do not subscribe.

What is the name of the kind of materialism to which I subscribe? Have you written a paper showing it to be incoherent? I think you're just trying to trim the shrubbery so that the only materialist position left is silly.

If the only brand of eliminative materialism is this hard, silly brand, then I am not an eliminative materialist. I don't know what I am, and I don't really care. But don't gloat that my only choice now is dualism.

Person: Ouch!

Hard Eliminative Materialist: That wasn't really pain.

Person: But it hurt!

HEM: You just thought that it hurt.

Person: That's what pain is, you buffoon!


~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Choice

Cool down, Paul

This is the sort of crap that pisses me off, Titus. This is why I say you are shoehorning me into a metaphysic to which I do not subscribe.

I was not specifically talking about you on this point, but about materialism in general. I sincerely hold that the only (largely) internally coherent type of materialism is eliminative materialism. It is still absurd because it clashes with all the types of evidence we can have, as all evidence is only available to us through our subjectivity. (It also is absurd for wider analytical reasons, which I won't consider here.)

What is the name of the kind of materialism to which I subscribe? Have you written a paper showing it to be incoherent? I think you're just trying to trim the shrubbery so that the only materialist position left is silly.

I'm not sure what the name is, as you don't seem to be sure yourself what type of materialist you would be. But please believe me if I say I'm being sincere about my views. In fact, I have written paragraphs about emergent materialism (in a Master's thesis and a book), though I haven't translated them yet into English. The main problem with emergent materialism is that it starts with a definition of anorganic matter as completely non-subjective, and ends up ascribing (irreducible, uneliminable) subjectivity to that same non-subjective matter as soon as it develops into a complex system like the brain. This is incoherent as the subjective experiences can by definition never exist "in" non-subjective brain processes. So if matter really evolves into subjectivity through its complex quantitative organization, as emergent materialists believe, it loses its non-subjective character (in that very same subjectivity). It stops being the original mindless matter and transforms into something else. At the same time, the brain and its complexity remain where they were, i.e. completely embedded in the physical world. So the brain and its complexity cannot be where the subjective experiences are or vice versa. So in what sense should subjective, qualitative experiences be material? They aren't non-subjective and they can't be located in the brain. That's one reason why emergent materialism is incoherent.

don't know what I am, and I don't really care.

In my world, this translates as: I don't care what reality looks like. But then, what are you doing here, other than amusing us with your wit and friendliness? It appears to me that you're passionately interested in these matters.

But don't gloat that my only choice now is dualism.

I don't, as first of all, you still have a whole bunch of irrational choices , and secondly, I consider idealism a rational choice as well.

Peace,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus said:
This is the sort of crap that pisses me off, Titus. This is why I say you are shoehorning me into a metaphysic to which I do not subscribe.

What is the name of the kind of materialism to which I subscribe? Have you written a paper showing it to be incoherent? I think you're just trying to trim the shrubbery so that the only materialist position left is silly.

If the only brand of eliminative materialism is this hard, silly brand, then I am not an eliminative materialist. I don't know what I am, and I don't really care. But don't gloat that my only choice now is dualism.

Person: Ouch!

Hard Eliminative Materialist: That wasn't really pain.

Person: But it hurt!

HEM: You just thought that it hurt.

Person: That's what pain is, you buffoon!


~~ Paul

LMAO!

Perhaps you might be attracted to the idea that the mind is to the brain as software is to hardware in a computer, or the image on your monitor is to the underlying processes generating that image?

 

[Mercutio]

Pain and behavior

The "pain problem" is not new. It is also not a problem. For those of you with access to a decent library, the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences has an excellent discussion on the topic (B&BS has an interesting format--one or two presented papers and many responses to those papers are included in the issue). The abstract from this particular article:

Discusses sensory pain (a direct function of the intensity of pain stimuli) and psychological pain (modifiable by hypnotism, placebos, and the sociocultural setting). According to physiological and cognitive theory, psychological and sensory pain are both internal processes, with the former influencing the latter as central processes influence peripheral processes. According to behavior theory, sensory pain is a reflex, while psychological pain is an instrumental act; both are overt behaviors. It is suggested that there is no basis for the claim by antibehaviorist philosophers and psychologists that behaviorism, because it cannot explain pain, is less capable of explaining mental phenomena than physiology or cognition. Comments are offered by G. Ainslie, J. H. Atkinson and E. F. Kremer, D. J. Bernstein, K. Campbell, W. C. Clark, W. E. Fordyce, J. Foss, M. Genest, G. Graham, G. Harman, J. Jaynes, P. Kitcher, H. Lacey, J. D. Loeser, A. W. Logue, W. I. Matson, R. Melzack, H. Merskey, T. R. Miles, G. Pepeu, U. T. Place, K. G. Shaver and J. J. Herrman, C. P. Shimp, D. C. Turk and P. Salovey, and P. D. Wall. A response from the author is included. (3 p ref)

 

[hammegk]

If the only brand of eliminative materialism is this hard, silly brand, then I am not an eliminative materialist. I don't know what I am, and I don't really care. But don't gloat that my only choice now is dualism.

Aren't all of us here discussing "what we are"? Another place to answer the eliminative materialist question is considering the life / non-life boundry (if such exists). What is the meaning of "emergent property"? Reductionism can certainly destroy life.

Hmm, Titus may have beat me to it. I need to see if I think I understand his last post.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Calming down now ...

Titus said:

So if matter really evolves into subjectivity through its complex quantitative organization, as emergent materialists believe, it loses its non-subjective character (in that very same subjectivity). It stops being the original mindless matter and transforms into something else. At the same time, the brain and its complexity remain where they were, i.e. completely embedded in the physical world. So the brain and its complexity cannot be where the subjective experiences are or vice versa. So in what sense should subjective, qualitative experiences be material? They aren't non-subjective and they can't be located in the brain. That's one reason why emergent materialism is incoherent.

This is where we disagree and where we'll have to leave things, I guess. Nothing transforms into anything else. The brain processes produce feelings that we call subjective consciousness. These are not transformations and they don't need to be.

You are rejecting anything but hard eliminative materialism simply because you proclaim "consciousness just has to be something other than a product of the brain!"

In my world, this translates as: I don't care what reality looks like. But then, what are you doing here, other than amusing us with your wit and friendliness? It appears to me that you're passionately interested in these matters.

I care what reality looks like, but I don't care what you call it, nor do I care to fit in some preconceived slot. Well, actually, I don't care what reality looks like all that much, but it's fun to talk about. What does thinking I know reality do for me, anyway?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

So if matter really evolves into subjectivity through its complex quantitative organization, as emergent materialists believe, it loses its non-subjective character (in that very same subjectivity). It stops being the original mindless matter and transforms into something else. At the same time, the brain and its complexity remain where they were, i.e. completely embedded in the physical world. So the brain and its complexity cannot be where the subjective experiences are or vice versa. So in what sense should subjective, qualitative experiences be material? They aren't non-subjective and they can't be located in the brain. That's one reason why emergent materialism is incoherent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


This is where we disagree and where we'll have to leave things, I guess.

Come on Paul. The thread is still young! It was only started 9 weeks ago

 

[Dancing David]

Titus,

the problem with the language you are using is that it is not the brand of materialism that i subscribe to.

I do not believe that consiousness is an emergent phenomena , I believe that it is a dependant phenomena. It does not arise from the brain, and reide over it in some sort of quasi metaphysical state.

Consiousness is wholly dependant on the braind, it is totaly dependant on the brain, it is the processes in the brain.

I have reasons to say that the 'qualities of reality that can not be reduced' argument is one that is totaly semantic and just bogus.(Respectfuly bogus but a fake none the less). I will start a post on this in philosphy later.

I ahev to say that i don't buy into the epiphenomena or the peri phenomenalism, I state that uncatergoricaly human consiousness is totaly dependant on brain phenomena. This does not exclude the possibilty that other forms of consiousness could not exist. But I sate that human awareness is totaly dependant on the brain.

I ahve read your reincanation argument, if you show me a modern child who without cross contamination can verify dates and observances that could not have been know through any other means then i will believe in reincarnation. And you will have proved that awareness is not dependant on biology.

Sincerly

But insure what to call myself. Probably a semi eliminative materialst who believe in dependant consiousness.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Entelecheia

Hi Hammegk,

Reductionism can certainly destroy life.

You probably mean the reduction of organic, living tissue to lifeless, dead matter. It's an altogether different question whether the death of an organism entails the death of a personal mind as well. Life in the organical, vital sense and life in the mental, psychical sense are two different concepts, even if they may seem to be related. If I'm not mistaken, according to Aristotle's 'hylemorphic' system, the psyche is the life force or entelechy even in plants. Not so in modern systems such as that of Descartes.

Could your own position by any chance be termed a form of panpsychistic idealism, for example related to the system of A.N. Whitehead?

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Here it is. Here's the paragraph from the eliminative materialism article that summarizes what I've been trying to say:

While many defenders of folk psychology insist that folk psychology is explanatorily strong, some defenders have gone in the opposite direction, arguing that it is committed to far less than eliminativists have typically assumed (Horgan, 1993; Horgan and Graham, 1991; Jackson and Pettit, 1990). According to these writers, folk psychology, while indeed a theory, is a relatively "austere" (i.e., ontologically non-committal) theory, and requires very little for vindication. Consequently, these authors conclude that when properly described, folk psychology can be seen as compatible with a very wide range of neuroscientific or cognitive developments.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Ontologically neutral

Paul,

Consequently, these authors conclude that when properly described, folk psychology can be seen as compatible with a very wide range of neuroscientific or cognitive developments.

Well, that's less surprising than it may seem. For instance, Daniel C. Dennett also uses some folk psychology concepts as shorthand for functional (computational) neurological processes. It's not the labels (words) which make the difference, but their meaning. BTW, I don't hold that folk psychology is always totally right, but the ontological debate is about subjective experiences, and on this point folk psychology is right most of the time.

We're not involved in an ontologically neutral discussion here, Paul. On the contrary, the debate in this thread precisely concentrates on ontology.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Brain processes + ?

Paul,

The brain processes produce feelings that we call subjective consciousness. These are not transformations and they don't need to be

Well, what is it going to be, Paul? Mere brain processes plus more brain processes, or brain processes plus their non-cerebral or supra-cerebral or extra-cerebral products (i.e. something else than brain processes)?

Titus