A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Yep, he does, i.e. in the sense you use that term. Not in the sense Mercutio or Stimpson use the word consciousness. As I have repeatedly tried to show you, your position certainly seems to differ from theirs on this point.

Really? How? Can you summarize the Dennett and Mercutio/Stimpy positions in a couple of sentences?

Well, Paul, I have already replied to a similar point on this thread. If there are new positions which can't be reduced to the known categories, I would like to know them. By the way, I find it very strange that a materialist does not object to reducing consciousness to the category of brain processes, but resists categorical reduction of philosophical positions.

Perhaps my position can be reduced to an existing one, but since I don't understand the existing ones, I don't know. Therefore I ask that the conversation be about the issues, rather than about categorization. I resist categorical reduction because I do not know whether you are reducing my position to one that reflects my position!

Reduction of position has nothing to do with reduction of consciousness.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Slim said:

So conscious intent would turn out to be like the demon. (make sense?)

I understand that was his analogy, but it doesn't make sense to me. Saying that there is nothing in the brain that has the semantic properties we attribute to beliefs is simply arguing with the definition of belief, isn't it? It's not like I think there are a bunch of belief-creatures in my brain.

~~ Paul

 

[slimshady2357]

Slim said:
I understand that was his analogy, but it doesn't make sense to me. Saying that there is nothing in the brain that has the semantic properties we attribute to beliefs is simply arguing with the definition of belief, isn't it? It's not like I think there are a bunch of belief-creatures in my brain.

~~ Paul

Oh, I think I see what's happening. I took the comparison to be one of efficaciousness, not existence. People thought demons made them do something (say, kill) and people think their beliefs, desires, conscious intent makes them do things (say go to university to study math).

Adam

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But their beliefs and desires do make them do things, by the very definitions of those words. Whatever the underlying mechanisms are that drive us, we call the composite of those mechanisms terms like beliefs and desires.

He must think that a belief, for example, is something much more concrete than I do. Something that supposedly has specific attributes that we might not find upon further investigation. Something physical like a demon, with wings and a pointy tail and an evil smile.

~~ Paul

 

[slimshady2357]

But their beliefs and desires do make them do things, by the very definitions of those words. Whatever the underlying mechanisms are that drive us, we call the composite of those mechanisms terms like beliefs and desires.

He must think that a belief, for example, is something much more concrete than I do. Something that supposedly has specific attributes that we might not find upon further investigation. Something physical like a demon, with wings and a pointy tail and an evil smile.

~~ Paul

Somehow I doubt he really believes that

It sounds to me like you've already undergone the "ontologically radical theory change" of the sort which "awaits the theoretical posits of folk psychology" to me, Paul

Adam

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

A change so radical, so preposterous, so overwhelmingly subtle that I don't even realize I've undergone it!

Here is my hypothesis: Philosophers have spent so much time trying to figure out how everything works that they have endowed harmless folk psychological terms such as belief with mass quantities of attributes, properties, semantics, and inuendo. The terms have become so laden that they now represent concrete demons in the minds of these philosophers. Indeed, then, these demons may eventually turn out to be nonexistent. But that will only be because they were promoted to demons in the first place.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

What's it going to be, Paul?

Paul,

Here is my hypothesis: Philosophers have spent so much time trying to figure out how everything works that they have endowed harmless folk psychological terms such as belief with mass quantities of attributes, properties, semantics, and inuendo. The terms have become so laden that they now represent concrete demons in the minds of these philosophers. Indeed, then, these demons may eventually turn out to be nonexistent. But that will only be because they were promoted to demons in the first place.

I don't think that's the eliminative materialist's point. His rejection of uneliminable psychological concepts is more fundamental. It's aimed at any claim that we subjectively experience anything at all. In other words, there is no essential difference between a subjective experience and a non-subjective neurological process in the brain. Neither would be qualitative and both could be seen as mindless neurological processes. Eliminative materialism is about the complete elimination of psychology as anything more than an abstract, functionalist description of a purely physiological neurology. All our common understanding of our subjective minds (consciousness) would be folk psychology, in that it should be completely replaced by 'scientific', eliminative materialist concepts.

Indeed, then, these demons may eventually turn out to be nonexistent. But that will only be because they were promoted to demons in the first place.

But then the question becomes, Paul: Do you accept that you have conscious experiences? Or is "conscious experiences" just an abstract term for non-conscious, non-subjective and non-qualitative brain processes? In the first case, you are definitely not an eliminative materialist. In the second you are, and I'd have to apologize to have put you in another category

Titus

 

[Mercutio]

Nah, I think Paul hit it exactly right.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: On and on and on

Paul,

This analogy is completely false, of course. We're not talking about where we locate our subjective experiences, we're talking about the fact that we don't experience our subjective experiences as part of non-subjective physical processes in the brain. Or at least, I was talking about the latter.

But anyway, we've all been here so many times before, so...

Regards,

Titus

Dear Titus,

I would like to submit to you that this is merely argument by assertion.

A materialist would say hat all thoughts and perceptions are a consequence of physical process and while you have leaborated some complex philosophies it all seems to come down to one thing.

You assume without proof that subjective experiences are some sort of 'subset' unrelated to brain activity. They are just as wonderful, even if they are the product of a chemical mish mash in the haed.

Why then do chemicals and brain injury alter the subjective experience? If there is this 'subjective other thing' that is some sort of emergent property then it should be independant of the brain process. It would appear that it is dependant.

Sincerely and with all respect

 

[Titus Rivas]

Reduction and understanding

Paul,

Reduction of position has nothing to do with reduction of consciousness.

Both are attempts to grasp parts of reality. Reduction to known categories, unless a new category is required, is part and parcel of cognition.

Titus

 

[Dancing David]

A change so radical, so preposterous, so overwhelmingly subtle that I don't even realize I've undergone it!

Here is my hypothesis: Philosophers have spent so much time trying to figure out how everything works that they have endowed harmless folk psychological terms such as belief with mass quantities of attributes, properties, semantics, and inuendo. The terms have become so laden that they now represent concrete demons in the minds of these philosophers. Indeed, then, these demons may eventually turn out to be nonexistent. But that will only be because they were promoted to demons in the first place.

~~ Paul

Boom!

Could you warn us barnacles before you fire the photon torpedos, First Mate P.?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Hi David

Hi Dancing David,

Let me begin by saying I'm flattered by your nomination, eventhough you withdrew it

You assume without proof that subjective experiences are some sort of 'subset' unrelated to brain activity.

I don't claim that subjective experiences are completely unrelated to brain activity during physical life. I'm an interactionist dualist, not an idealist like Ian or Hammegk. So for me the brain is (irreducibly) real, and the impact the brain has on the mind is real, just as the mind is (irreducibly) real and the impact the mind has on the brain is real.

Why then do chemicals and brain injury alter the subjective experience? If there is this 'subjective other thing' that is some sort of emergent property then it should be independant of the brain process. It would appear that it is dependant.

Please note, David, that we're currently discussing eliminative materialism, though Ian's paradox does seem to relate more to emergent materialism or emergent dualism. Have you read my paper against epiphenomenalism yet (sorry, I don't remember)? If so, you can see that there are analytical arguments for the position that the conscious mind is not a passive, epiphenomenal by-product of the brain. In that sense it's clear that the brain is partly dependent on consciousness.

Not to mention empirical (as well as analytical) evidence for the ultimate independence of consciousness.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Paul, I think the writer was comparing consciousness (basically most or all mental states) to the demon under the elminative materialist view.



So conscious intent would turn out to be like the demon. (make sense?)

Adam [/B]

No.

I have read the whole web page that Paul linked to, and I still have no idea what could possibly be meant by the assertion that beliefs don't exist.

I also see nothing wrong with demons as an explanatory mechanism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

But their beliefs and desires do make them do things, by the very definitions of those words. Whatever the underlying mechanisms are that drive us, we call the composite of those mechanisms terms like beliefs and desires.

He must think that a belief, for example, is something much more concrete than I do. Something that supposedly has specific attributes that we might not find upon further investigation. Something physical like a demon, with wings and a pointy tail and an evil smile.

~~ Paul

A demon needs to be physical in that it is directly perceivable? If so I would reject them as an explanatory "mechanism".

 

[slimshady2357]

No.

I have read the whole web page that Paul linked to, and I still have no idea what could possibly be meant by the assertion that beliefs don't exist.

I also see nothing wrong with demons as an explanatory mechanism.

Well I haven't read the whole page (I'll try today) but I still think it was just poorly worded but meant that consciousness as an explanation for behaviour would go the way of the demon.

From Titus,

Eliminative materialism is about the complete elimination of psychology as anything more than an abstract, functionalist description of a purely physiological neurology. All our common understanding of our subjective minds (consciousness) would be folk psychology, in that it should be completely replaced by 'scientific', eliminative materialist concepts

I don't think he is actually saying beliefs don't exist, just that they are not what they seem to be. I'm not sure why this would be hard for Paul to accept, to me it's similar to him telling you that consciousness does not exist (as you see it, as something seperate from brain processes), he isn't saying that the conscious experiences don't exist at all, he's merely saying they aren't what they seem to be (to you). But I'll read the rest of the page, perhaps I'm way off base.

Adam

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

I don't think that's the eliminative materialist's point. His rejection of uneliminable psychological concepts is more fundamental. It's aimed at any claim that we subjectively experience anything at all. In other words, there is no essential difference between a subjective experience and a non-subjective neurological process in the brain. Neither would be qualitative and both could be seen as mindless neurological processes.

But what does "no essential difference" really mean? I would agree that there is no difference, but that neurological processes are experienced subjectively as what we call consciousness. Do you think he is trying to say that we don't really have the internal experiences that we call consciousness? That's absurd.

I think you're confusing the experience of consciousness with the explanation of consciousness. Or someone is.

But then the question becomes, Paul: Do you accept that you have conscious experiences? Or is "conscious experiences" just an abstract term for non-conscious, non-subjective and non-qualitative brain processes?

I think that we have subjective, qualitative internal experiences as a result of brain processes. They are internal and subjective because our brains are inside our heads, not floating about somewhere.

~~ Paul

 

[slimshady2357]

Ok, I've ben reading the page Paul linked to (quickly, because I really have to get to work!) and this nugget surprised me!

The reason mental states are irreducible is not because they are non-physical; rather, it is because mental states, as described by common-sense psychology, do not really exist.

I'm going to read more thoroughly later, but it looks strange to me.

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well I haven't read the whole page (I'll try today) but I still think it was just poorly worded but meant that consciousness as an explanation for behaviour would go the way of the demon.

Yes that's right, he did say that.

I don't think he is actually saying beliefs don't exist, just that they are not what they seem to be. I'm not sure why this would be hard for Paul to accept, to me it's similar to him telling you that consciousness does not exist (as you see it, as something seperate from brain processes), he isn't saying that the conscious experiences don't exist at all, he's merely saying they aren't what they seem to be (to you). But I'll read the rest of the page, perhaps I'm way off base.

No, I understood it as saying that beliefs definitely don't exist. Which of course is quite clearly absurd.

Anyway, further down on the page he says this:


Although most discussions regarding eliminativism focus on the status of our notion of belief and other propositional attitudes, some philosophers have endorsed eliminativist claims about the phenomenal or qualitative states of the mind. For example, Daniel Dennett (1978) has argued that our concept of pain is fundamentally flawed because it includes essential properties, like infallibility and intrinsic awfulness, that cannot co-exist in light of a well-documented phenomenon know as "reactive disassociation". In certain conditions, drugs like morphine cause subjects to report that they are experiencing excruciating pain, but that it is not unpleasant. It seems we are either wrong to think that people cannot be mistaken about being in pain (wrong about infallibility), or pain needn't be inherently awful (wrong about intrinsic awfulness). Dennett suggests that part of the reason we may have difficulty replicating pain in computational systems is because our concept is so defective that it picks out nothing real.


So if we agree with Dennet that a pain need not be unpleasant (and I think we have to agree) and also that we cannot be sure that we are in pain (has my toothache really gone?), then the concept of pain is ill-defined and . .er . .therefore doesn't exist! Maybe the same goes for belief. We might . .er . .believe we have beliefs, but we don't really.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Hi David

I don't claim that subjective experiences are completely unrelated to brain activity during physical life. I'm an interactionist dualist, not an idealist like Ian or Hammegk.

Obviously I do not deny that conscious states are limited by brain states whilst we subsist through our brains.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Do you think he is trying to say that we don't really have the internal experiences that we call consciousness? That's absurd.

Yes I agree. Utterly absurd. So much for materialism. Come and embrace idealism with me