A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

The immaterialists are fond of saying that a piece of brain meat cannot give rise to subjective experience.

Emmm . .I don't believe I have said that. Reality can be or do what it likes. I cannot a priori rule out this possibility.

I do take issue though with people who either say:

a) Consious experiences do not exist.

or

b) They are one and the very same thing as neural processes or are a function of such processes without providing reasons to support this position.

Of course if you say that brain meat gives rise to conscious experiences wouldn't that imply that conscious experiences are somethiong separate, albeit dependent on the brain? Wouldn't this be epiphenomenalism?

 

[Mercutio]

Re: On and on and on

Paul,

This analogy is completely false, of course. We're not talking about where we locate our subjective experiences, we're talking about the fact that we don't experience our subjective experiences as part of non-subjective physical processes in the brain. Or at least, I was talking about the latter.

Oh, come on! We also don't experience sunrise as the turning of the earth! We also, of course, experience many things that seem, subjectively, to be different somehow from our objective explanations. Now, if you want to insist that the subjective is your bedrock, fine. But if you do, do not expect to be able to build a science on it. There are too many times when your subjective bedrock will be to shaky to build on.

You see. I see. You infer conscious experience from your seeing. I don't. I need more than the fact that I was taught to use words like "consciousness" under these conditions to tell me that "consciousness" is any more real than a rising sun.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I do take issue though with people who either say:

a) Consious experiences do not exist.

or

b) They are one and the very same thing as neural processes or are a function of such processes without providing reasons to support this position.

Without providing reasons to support this position? What difference does that make? Unless I have misunderstood you, your position is that any such arguments may be dismissed unheard, based on your a priori conclusion that they must be flawed.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Are you kidding me?

Mercutio,

Do you really believe your own words?

Or are you just kidding me?

It would be but an old joke which has lost much of its charm!

Anyway, we had both made our points many pages ago.

Titus

 

[ceptimus]

Re: Are you kidding me?

Mercutio,

Do you really believe your own words?

Or are you just kidding me?

Titus

What a strange post Titus. Were you perhaps drunk when you wrote that?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Re: Re: Are you kidding me?

What a strange post Titus. Were you perhaps drunk when you wrote that?

Not exactly, I tried to be generous about the whole matter...
What Mercutio was saying is that some of us infer rather than know that we are conscious human beings, and that the (so called) inference would be false for all of us.

Some skeptics may find belief in parapsychological phenomena irrational, but in my honest (rather than humble) opinion they lose all intellectual authority if they seriously believe in the non-existence of consciousness. That's why I supposed that Mercutio was just joking

Titus

 

[hammegk]

Without providing reasons to support this position? What difference does that make? Unless I have misunderstood you, your position is that any such arguments may be dismissed unheard, based on your a priori conclusion that they must be flawed.

Hmm. I would say the a priori dismissal occurs because every "argument" put forward is contingent on the truth that "the objective physical world" exists. Idealists are discussing the truth of that axiom.

I do not know what dualists say to your point.

Just my 2cts.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

This analogy is completely false, of course. We're not talking about where we locate our subjective experiences, we're talking about the fact that we don't experience our subjective experiences as part of non-subjective physical processes in the brain. Or at least, I was talking about the latter.

I was not attempting to make an analogy to the location of our subjective experiences. I was only pointing out that one's (learned) knowledge of how those experiences supposedly are can influence one to believe that that's really how they are.

Ian said:

Of course if you say that brain meat gives rise to conscious experiences wouldn't that imply that conscious experiences are somethiong separate, albeit dependent on the brain? Wouldn't this be epiphenomenalism?

It might if I used certain definitions of give rise to, conscious experience, or epiphenomenalism. However, I do not claim that the experiences have no influence on the brain. Perhaps I'm one of those semi-epiphenomenalists people are talking about. Yeah, that's it.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus, I presume you mean:

Some skeptics may find belief in parapsychological phenomena irrational, but in my honest (rather than humble) opinion they lose all intellectual authority if they seriously believe in the non-existence of [irreducible] consciousness.

Just want to make sure that I'm losing my intellectual authority due to what I actually think, not some generalized version of it.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Without providing reasons to support this position? What difference does that make? Unless I have misunderstood you, your position is that any such arguments may be dismissed unheard, based on your a priori conclusion that they must be flawed.

I'd feel ill-disposed to take note of any arguments which attempt to demonstrate I do not have conscious experiences. I know that I have conscious experiences even though I might grant it possible that there is no I in the normally understood meaning of the word.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Paul,

I was only pointing out that one's (learned) knowledge of how those experiences supposedly are can influence one to believe that that's really how they are.

But we don't just think we have subjective experiences because we've supposedly learnt that we have, do we? Or would you seriously hold that we only believe we undergo subjective experiences because we've swallowed a fairytale that we do? If so, you'd be an eliminative materialist after all.

Perhaps I'm one of those semi-epiphenomenalists people are talking about. Yeah, that's it.

Even a semi-epiphenomenalist wouldn't be the same as an eliminative materialist, Paul. Your position would involve something extra, denied by several others on this thread.

Just want to make sure that I'm losing my intellectual authority due to what I actually think, not some generalized version of it.

Well, if you were a (semi)epiphenomenalist rather than an eliminative materialist, your irrationality would be a lot more limited

Anyway, philosophy should be about positions. I just made my point about the loss of intellectual authority, because some skeptics who are eliminative materialists think they are Reason in person. I wasn't talking about anyone in particular by the way (such as Mercutio for example).

It's the end of rationality if you deny consciousness. And it's very peculiar to witness (as an outsider) somebody basing his whole skeptical, presumably rigorously rational outlook on life upon such a denial. Though I'm not a skeptic, I do consider myself a rationalist. However, I can hardly blame someone who dismisses rationality if he's confronted by eliminative materialists claiming that the denial of irreducible, uneliminable consciousness is the real foundation of being a rational person. In that sense, it's one of the main social tasks of a real rationalist to unmask eliminative materialism as an irrational position, in order to protect rationality's reputation.

It's one thing to be skeptical, but if you want to be a rational skeptic you can't be an eliminative materialist. If a particular brand of skepticism depends on eliminative materialism, it should be ignored by rational non-skeptics and rational skeptics alike.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Re: Re: Are you kidding me?

Not exactly, I tried to be generous about the whole matter...
What Mercutio was saying is that some of us infer rather than know that we are conscious human beings, and that the (so called) inference would be false for all of us.

If you truly understood what I said, the above would be true, and yet would not deny any of what you infer to be "conscious experience".

Some skeptics may find belief in parapsychological phenomena irrational, but in my honest (rather than humble) opinion they lose all intellectual authority if they seriously believe in the non-existence of consciousness. That's why I supposed that Mercutio was just joking

Once again, and simply, pretty please, tell me what consciousness is over and above the private behaviors I have mentioned. I think it is crystal clear to all but perhaps 2 or 3 who read this thread that I am perfectly serious. I think (but cannot know) that Ian and hammegk understand my view, but disagree with it.

And, for the record, I do not find belief in parapsychological phenomena irrational. I find it an understandable result of naturally biased perceptual processes and a lifetime of being told that our consciousness follows different rules.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Extra

Hi Mercutio,

If you truly understood what I said, the above would be true, and yet would not deny any of what you infer to be "conscious experience".

Well, that's quite impossible, as what I supposedly infer to be conscious experience has that "extra" property of being irreducibly subjective and qualitative which is left out in your philosophy.

Once again, and simply, pretty please, tell me what consciousness is over and above the private behaviors I have mentioned.

Isn't that what most of this thread is about? I thought I had mentioned qualia and subjectivity from the very start.

I think (but cannot know) that Ian and hammegk understand my view, but disagree with it.

I think I undestand it perfectly as well, but find it very hard to take it seriously. Precisely because you strike me as a rational person.

And, for the record, I do not find belief in parapsychological phenomena irrational. I find it an understandable result of naturally biased perceptual processes and a lifetime of being told that our consciousness follows different rules.

Again, I wasn't specifically referring to your personal views about paranormal phenomena. By the way, understandable is not the same as "not irrational'''. I find many if not all delusions of a psychotic patient understandable but I do consider all of them irrational.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

But we don't just think we have subjective experiences because we've supposedly learnt that we have, do we? Or would you seriously hold that we only believe we undergo subjective experiences because we've swallowed a fairytale that we do? If so, you'd be an eliminative materialist after all.

I didn't say we think we have subjective experiences only because we learned that we do. I said that our feeling about what those experiences are really like may be learned.

Even a semi-epiphenomenalist wouldn't be the same as an eliminative materialist, Paul. Your position would involve something extra, denied by several others on this thread.

There's such a thing as a semi-epiphenomenalist?! Yes, now that you mention it, I do remember such a term. I thought I made it up!

Well, if you were a (semi)epiphenomenalist rather than an eliminative materialist, ...

Does an eliminative materialist hold that there is no such thing as subjective experiences, or does he hold that there are, but that they are reducible?

Anyway, philosophy should be about positions.

You mean like in the Kama Sutra?

It's the end of rationality if you deny consciousness.

Titus, don't you think it would be helpful if you use irreducible when you mean irreducible? No one denies that we're conscious!

It's one thing to be skeptical, but if you want to be a rational skeptic you can't be an eliminative materialist.

Especially if you're not sure what it means.

What is it with immaterialists and the demand for position? It's creepy.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

What is it with immaterialists and the demand for position? It's creepy.

~~ Paul [/B]

Titus is not an immaterialist. He believes in the existence of a material reality. But he also believes in the existence of consciousness which is not reducible to physical matter.

It is I and Hammegk who are the immaterialists.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Positions, attractive and other

You mean like in the Kama Sutra?

No, as this treatise isn't about logic; in fact two opposites can be perfectly combined in the system described in it...

There's such a thing as a semi-epiphenomenalist?! Yes, now that you mention it, I do remember such a term. I thought I made it up!

I have never heard of it, but it might mean something like non-reductive, emergent materialism which does allow for conscious efficacy.

Does an eliminative materialist hold that there is no such thing as subjective experiences, or does he hold that there are, but that they are reducible?

I'm afraid you're still confusing reduction in the nomothetic sense with elimination in the ontological sense. An eliminative materialist holds that consciousness in the qualitative, subjective sense does not really exist. Read Dennett if you don't believe me.

No one denies that we're conscious!

It's only understandable that you think so. But you're wrong.

What is it with immaterialists and the demand for position? It's creepy.

It might be if the positions would be in the Kama Sutra after all... . But what else could the difference be between what you call immaterialism (or non-materialism) and materialism, than a difference in philosophical position?

Regards,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Titus is not an immaterialist. He believes in the existence of a material reality. But he also believes in the existence of consciousness which is not reducible to physical matter.

Point taken. What is it with Ian, Hammegk, Titus et al and the demand for position? It's creepy!

Titus said:

No, as this treatise isn't about logic; in fact two opposites can be perfectly combined in the system described in it...

The Kama Sutra remark was a joke.

I'm afraid you're still confusing reduction in the nomothetic sense with elimination in the ontological sense. An eliminative materialist holds that consciousness in the qualitative, subjective does not really exist. Read Dennett if you don't believe me.

Looking up nomothetic ... whatever. Do you mean "[irreducible] consciousness in the qualitative, subjective" sense? As a separate ontological existent? Does Dennett really deny reducible consciousness?

But what else could the difference between what you call immaterialism (or non-materialism) and materialism be, than a difference in philosophical position?

I use those words so we can talk. I don't give a damn what you officially dub yourself. The insistence on categories only confuses matters, because people assume that all the official categories exhaust all the possibilities.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Titus said:
The Kama Sutra remark was a joke.

And my remarks were...?

Looking up nomothetic ... whatever.

Huh?

Do you mean "[irreducible] consciousness in the qualitative, subjective" sense? As a separate ontological existent?

As something real which cannot be really seen as something else than itself.

Does Dennett really deny reducible consciousness?

Yep, he does, i.e. in the sense you use that term. Not in the sense Mercutio or Stimpson use the word consciousness. As I have repeatedly tried to show you, your position certainly seems to differ from theirs on this point.

I use those words so we can talk. I don't give a damn what you officially dub yourself. The insistence on categories only confuses matters, because people assume that all the official categories exhaust all the possibilities.

Well, Paul, I have already replied to a similar point on this thread. If there are new positions which can't be reduced to the known categories, I would like to know them. By the way, I find it very strange that a materialist does not object to reducing consciousness to the category of brain processes, but resists categorical reduction of philosophical positions.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Eliminative Materialism

In an effort to understand what the heck eliminative materialism is, I read some of this page:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/#1

I found this paragraph:

Eliminative materialists claim that an ontologically radical theory change of this sort awaits the theoretical posits of folk psychology. Just as we came to understand that there are no such things as demons (because nothing at all like demons appear in modern accounts of strange behavior), so too, eliminative materialists argue that various folk psychological concepts -- like our concept of belief -- will eventually be recognized as empty posits that fail to correspond with anything that actually exists. Since there simply is nothing that have the causal and semantic properties we attribute to beliefs (and many other mental states) it will turn out that there really are no such things.

I find the analogy odd. Demons are concrete things that were taken as the cause of mental illness, but turned out not to be. Belief is a generic term that can be applied to whatever mechanism turns out to be the reason for strongly holding an idea. I guess he must picture a belief as something more concrete, like a demon.

~~ Paul

 

[slimshady2357]

Paul, I think the writer was comparing consciousness (basically most or all mental states) to the demon under the elminative materialist view.

Since there simply is nothing that have the causal and semantic properties we attribute to beliefs (and many other mental states) it will turn out that there really are no such things

So conscious intent would turn out to be like the demon. (make sense?)

Adam