A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Experients

Good post BillyJoe. I agre with a lot of your sentiments.

quote:
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Originally posted by Titus Rivas
Well, if the experient is nothing more than the structure of its mind, it really can't be an experient!
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(I think you mean structure of its brain)
Does it make a difference if I say "the experience is nothing more than structure and function of the brain" or "the experience is nothing more than processes in the brain?


quote:
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Originally posted by Titus Rivas
In other words, if you don't accept that there is an entity which experiences its subjective experiences.....
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In other words, an entity separate from the brain? An entity that has taken up residence in the brain? An entity that uses the brain's structure and function to its own ends?

I've wondered about this. From the materialist perspective can there be an *I* which has experiences? It's really weird to deny that there is an *I*.

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Originally posted by Titus Rivas
In other words, if you don't accept that there is an entity which experiences its subjective experiences, rather than being equal to those experiences, you don't really accept those subjective experiences either. Because for a subjective experience we need to have a subject who undergoes that experience.
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And why is that necessarily so?
Why is it mot possible that the processes going on inside the brain is what constitutes these experiences?

Hmmmm yes, I would have thought this would be what most materialists would believe.

At the very least it is more parsimonious - we don' have to assume the existence of an entity separate from the brain for which we have no evidence.

quote:
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Originally posted by Titus Rivas
There are two options:

- either we reject that there is an experient, and therefore also that there are subjective experiences. This is the kind of eliminative materialism defended by Daniel C. Dennett in his book Consciousness explained
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This sounds like the p-zombie argument.

Yes I'm confused on this issue as well.

Dennett specifically denies the possibility of the existence of p-zombies. He doesn't deny subjective experiences, he just rejects certain explanations for subjective experiences (such as experients as separate from brain)


quote:
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Originally posted by Titus Rivas
- or we accept that there is an experient, who undergoes subjective experiences rather than being equal to those subjective experiences.
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I still cannot see why experiences cannot just BE the brain processes. Maybe we haven't completely explained that they could be but I think we are a lot closer to that than explaining the existence of entities separate from the brain.


quote:
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Originally posted by Titus Rivas
I thought that Ian was trying to show that a materialism which accepts the reality of subjectivity leads to a paradox in his thought experiment.
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Yes indeed.

Billy

Materialism must accept subjective experiences. After all, materialists themselves have subjective experiences. It's a matter of explaining what these subjective experiences are.


quote:
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Originally posted by Titus Rivas
Any other kind of materialism amounts to a type of eliminative materialism.
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I doubt that anyone could be an eliminative materialist if this means denying the subjective experiences that we all know we have (I'm using lose language here). If eliminative materialism, however, means "eliminating the entity that is supposed to have taken up residence in my brain", then I am an eliminative materialist until proven otherwise.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Dennett's zombies etc.

Hi Billy Joe and Ian,

As I've understood it, the fact that Dennett denies the possibility of p-zombies (philosophical zombies) has nothing to do with his presumed acceptance of qualia as commonly defined. The question of p-zombies is related to the thought experiment of David Chalmers about a physically identical world in which there would be no conscious experients.
In the usual sense, Daniel C. Dennett does not accept the reality of qualia nor of experients. If you don't believe this, please (re)read his Consciousness Explained.

It is simply impossible (from a rational standpoint anyway) to accept the reality of subjective, qualitative experiences and simultaneously claim that they don't really exist but just amount to non-subjective non-qualitative brain processes. From a rational point of view, one should either accept the (ultimate, if you like objective) reality of subjective awareness and experients, which is incompatible with claiming that they (objectively, ultimately) really are something else; or reject the reality of subjective awareness and experients. The latter is done by Dennett and his followers. Of course, this is utterly absurd, but at least it is coherent. To put it a bit less respectfully: there is some logic in his madness. Mercutio's system of thought seems to be quite similar to Dennett's in this respect. By the way, Mercutio, you may hold that your views are more parsimonious, but parsimony is only one of the criteria we need in rational philosophy or science. Parsimony is worthless if a theorist abuses the principle in order to protect it against evidence. Thus, eliminative materialism is more parsimonious than dualism but only by ignoring all the evidence provided by introspection. Dismissing introspection as a valid source of information, is like saying that a person who does not write flawlessly should be called an illiterate.

The only type of materialists which can accept the ultimate reality of really subjective, qualitative consciousness and experients are emergent materialists which believe in something extra, created by the brain, but not located in the brain as just another type of brain process. Note that I'm not exactly claiming that theirs is a rational position either by the way.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Mr Sensible]

Re: Dennett's zombies etc.

As I've understood it, the fact that Dennett denies the possibility of p-zombies (philosophical zombies) has nothing to do with his presumed acceptance of qualia as commonly defined. The question of p-zombies is related to the thought experiment of David Chalmers about a physically identical world in which there would be no conscious experients.
In the usual sense, Daniel C. Dennett does not accept the reality of qualia nor of experients. If you don't believe this, please (re)read his Consciousness Explained.

It is simply impossible (from a rational standpoint anyway) to accept the reality of subjective, qualitative experiences and simultaneously claim that they don't really exist but just amount to non-subjective non-qualitative brain processes. From a rational point of view, one should either accept the (ultimate, if you like objective) reality of subjective awareness and experients, which is incompatible with claiming that they (objectively, ultimately) really are something else; or reject the reality of subjective awareness and experients. The latter is done by Dennett and his followers.

Hello Titus,

Materialists take the eminently reasonable approach that everything we directly, or indirectly, perceive through the senses exhausts reality. I think I speak for most of us when I say that advocating entities which exist, but which cannot be detected by any means whatsoever, is really not the rational approach. In addition all the scientific evidence points to the complete and total dependency of the mind on the brain. To dismiss all this evidence is to turn your face against reality. Depressing as it might be, I think we need to accept the fact that we are material creatures living in a material world.

This is not to deny that conscious experiences are not a bit of a challenge or even a bit of a problem for the materialist. But I really do not believe that materialists need to be as radical as to dismiss the existence of conscious experiences altogether. A reductionist materialist can say that conscious experiences exist, but they are the very same thing as processes in the brain. Alternatively we can say that conscious experiences are simply a function of brain processes. Just as a person can receive quite radically differing visual sense impressions of an object depending on the distance and particular perspective in which she views it, so material processes can appear to be radically different depending if we're considering from the outside in terms of the brain processes, or considering those brain processes, but viewed from the inside, ie conscious experiences.

Simply because 2 aspects of an entity appear to be so radically different needn't entail that there is more than one entity involved.

 

[Loki]

Titus,

If you don't believe this, please (re)read his Consciousness Explained.

Ian hasn't read Dennett - he makes a point of not reading pro-materialist books, since they are obviously wrong to begin with.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Did I describe yoru paradox in my posts from a few days ago? Is the problem the "Ian1 is wholly Ian1, and Ian2 is wholly Ian2" point? If so, what do you think I've my comments?

You just said :

(BillyJoe wrote) : We have to assume that Original Ian knows all the details and implications of the situation he is in.
If he does not get duplicated, he reasons (knows) that, after the movie finishes, the probability of him being Original Ian is 100%.
If he does get duplicated, he reasons that, after the movie finishes, he is either Original Ian or Duplicate Ian with an equal probability of each. So the probability of him being Original Ian is 50%
Ian says that this change from 100% to 50% probability is a paradox that materialists need to resolve.

(Ian wrote) : Yes that's the gist of it

So the paradox is that in scenario A (no duplication) Orginal Ian knows 100% he is original, but in scenario B Original Ian will reason that he really can't tell, so he may be either?

What's the problem here? In Scenario A Original Ian *knows* he is the only one, therefore he is correct to reason that he is the original. In Scenario B Original Ian *knows* that there is now two Ians, and that both Ians will be identical - therefore, both Ians will reason that there is now a 50% chance they are the duplicate. Why is there a change from 100% to 50%? Because there was a change in the universe (a second instance of Ian occurred), but insufficant information is available to each Ian for them to correctly determine their correct status. Since they are bright enough to realise that (a) something changed and (b) they don't have all the relevant details, they (correctly) conclude they can no longer be 100% sure which one they are.

But let me add something here - I don't think this would happen! After the duplication, *both* Ian's would be convinced they are the Original. Sure, they might try to 'imagine' that they can't be sure, but each would have a continuous memory of entering the room, turning on the TV, and sitting down to wait. This sense of "continuity" would be so (intuitively) strong that I think each Ian would say "well, I know how the experiment has been constructed, so I guess I have to admit I might be the duplicate - but deep down, I know I'm not. After all, I haven't moved from this spot for over an hour."

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus,


Ian hasn't read Dennett - he makes a point of not reading pro-materialist books, since they are obviously wrong to begin with.

I confess I'm guilty of supposing someone as being obviously wrong who denies the existence of conscious experiences.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I confess I'm guilty of supposing someone as being obviously wrong who denies the existence of conscious experiences.

I'd say that as one lacking first-hand experience with Dennett's arguments, you are guilty of supposing that you are qualified to make the call one way or the other as to whether he is right or wrong. In refusing to read his books, you are relying on conclusions made by others, and are thus subject to being led astray by those who would, for instance, place him neatly in the eliminative materialist box (despite Dennett's specifically addressing this failure to completely understand his arguments).

One who has not read the complete argument is likely to see a statement such as: "In the usual sense, Daniel C. Dennett does not accept the reality of qualia nor of experients." -- and think he has understood Dennett's position, when in fact he has not, not having had the benefit of exposure to the expanded form of what is meant by: "In the ususal sense".

 

[Interesting Ian]

I'd say that as one lacking first-hand experience with Dennett's arguments, you are guilty of supposing that you are qualified to make the call one way or the other as to whether he is right or wrong. In refusing to read his books, you are relying on conclusions made by others, and are thus subject to being led astray by those who would, for instance, place him neatly in the eliminative materialist box (despite Dennett's specifically addressing this failure to completely understand his arguments).

One who has not read the complete argument is likely to see a statement such as: "In the usual sense, Daniel C. Dennett does not accept the reality of qualia nor of experients." -- and think he has understood Dennett's position, when in fact he has not, not having had the benefit of exposure to the expanded form of what is meant by: "In the ususal sense".

I have absolutely no interest in reading a book entitled "consciousness explained". Consciousness is not the type of existent which can be "explained". My life is finite and there are plenty of books to read. I do not intend to read those books which could not possibly achieve what they claim to achieve. Would you read a book claiming that 1 + 1 actually equals 3?

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Dennett's zombies etc.

By the way, Mercutio, you may hold that your views are more parsimonious, but parsimony is only one of the criteria we need in rational philosophy or science. Parsimony is worthless if a theorist abuses the principle in order to protect it against evidence. Thus, eliminative materialism is more parsimonious than dualism but only by ignoring all the evidence provided by introspection. Dismissing introspection as a valid source of information, is like saying that a person who does not write flawlessly should be called an illiterate.

The "evidence provided by introspection", if we dredge way back into this thread, turns out to be the same thing I called "private behavior", and nothing more. I have never denied that we see, that we think, that we feel, that we remember. I simply challenge your view that the private nature of these actions makes them subjective and beholden to different laws than objective behavior.

I do not ignore any of the evidence (I could use that claim in my garden to scare away the birds). That you think I do shows merely that you do not understand my position.

If I "explain" walking by pointing to the mechanics of muscle, bone and nerve, is there anyone who seriously would argue that I still have not addressed the "process" or the "essence" of walking? (on this thread, maybe, now that I think about it.) If I explain sight by pointing to the well-known functions of the retina, visual pathways, occipital lobe, feature detectors, etc. (it is extraordinarily complex, but it is not magic), and if I can point to verbal areas, association areas, the incredible and growing amount that we do know about our brain's processing, what have I not said that is left for "consciousness"? Seriously, in all the talk on p-zombies, I have yet to know what aspect of my life you say cannot be explained without invoking "consciousness"!

You make it sound as if I am missing a huge chunk somewhere. Where? What? I assure you, I cannot see that I am ignoring any evidence whatsoever! Please point to any effect (at all!) of consciousness that I cannot say is thinking, feeling, hearing, remembering, seeing, or any of the other things my body does perfectly well by itself.

What is more, the example we were speaking of was of language learning. Your point was that

Parents implicitly use reasoning by analogy: they know that they have subjective experiences themselves and also know what the species-specific expressions are for many of them. So they extrapolate the regular relations between their inner states of mind and their behavior to the behavior they see in their children. All communication about subjective experiences only makes sense to us, because we have subjective experiences.

"Regular relations between their inner states and their behavior"...the example I gave was of someone misjudging their hunger; we also have an entire line of research in social cognition on "misattribution of arousal". When our "mental states" and our behavior disagree, it is our behavior that is right (e.g., I was hungrier than I thought). This extrapolation is learned, in exactly the manner I wrote earlier in this thread. That it is faulty is the result (predicted, I add) of having no external referent for the label. Then you go on to "the behavior they see in their children". This is exactly right. The behavior. Not the internal mental state, because that is inaccessible. Once again, to the extent that there is a disconnect between "mental state" and behavior, it is behavior that rules the day. Of course we react to our children's behavior, rather than their minds. This is how they learn the (again, predictibly faulty) connection between these internal states and the labels they eventually use for them.

Please tell me how my "ignoring the evidence provided by introspection" makes your analysis any better. What did I miss? Again, you sound as if it is a glaring error. I am sorry, but I cannot see it.

Rear Admiral M
(thanks, Loki, I feel so much more authoritative when I write that....oh, that's right, on this forum authority and two bucks might get you a cup of coffee...)

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Mr. Sensible said:

Materialists take the eminently reasonable approach that everything we directly, or indirectly, perceive through the senses exhausts reality.

Well, I know it exhausts me, that's for sure!

Welcome, Mr. Sensible.

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

So the paradox relies only on the fact that Ian can't seperate himself from the dulicate. Although he experimenter should know which is which, thats why I think it is an ethics question. One of the two bodies is Ian from the pre duplication, the other is the dupre. From an external POV.

 

[Dancing David]

Go Admiral M!

 

[Titus Rivas]

Detection of subjectivity or brain-mind identity?

Mercutio,

but which cannot be detected by any means whatsoever,

Well, what about introspection then?
We never detect any private behavior which would really be identical to brain processes. We never detect that our own subjective experiences are identical to brain processes. The only thing we really detect are those very same subjective experiences. That's why idealism is a rational position, and eliminative materialism is not. The only type of inference I make in this context is about the reality of a physical world, not about consciousness, as consciousness is the only thing no one in his right mind should seriously doubt.

Well, I see we come full circle again. But then again, we're still talking about Interesting Ian's (possible) paradox .

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Mr. Sensible,

Welcome to this thread!

Simply because 2 aspects of an entity appear to be so radically different needn't entail that there is more than one entity involved.

Some pages ago, I already referred to this paper of mine about the identity theory, entitled Kant's Error .

Dymanic, in what sense would you say that Dennett is not an eliminative materialist? In my view, he does not accept that there really are aspects of the mind which would constitute a hard problem for materialism. According to Dennett, such aspects would just be an illusion and nothing more than that. Then, he rejects the so called Cartesian theater and the experient. And he embraces cognitive functionalism in the reductionist sense. What have I missed what would not adequately characterize him as an eliminative materialist? Or are you referring to his functionalism which would be ontologically neutral? In general, it is ontologically neutral in that in theory it can be adopted by theorists with different ontologies. However, in his case this ontology amounts to eliminative materialism, as far as I know.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Message to our Captain

Ian,

I have absolutely no interest in reading a book entitled "consciousness explained". Consciousness is not the type of existent which can be "explained". My life is finite and there are plenty of books to read. I do not intend to read those books which could not possibly achieve what they claim to achieve. Would you read a book claiming that 1 + 1 actually equals 3?

Sometimes it might be quite interesting to read such a book, yes . But more generally I also would have other priorities. However, in this case, as I have said before, it's very important to clearly define the types of materialism which would get into trouble by your paradox.

Argh, I'd welcome some fresh anti-materialist arguments to cure the defficiencies so often encountered in sailors of the Western philosophical seas.

Greetings from a sleepy (it's about 6 AM over here)

Titus

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

Dymanic, in what sense would you say that Dennett is not an eliminative materialist? In my view, he does not accept that there really are aspects of the mind which would constitute a hard problem for materialism. According to Dennett, such aspects would just be an illusion and nothing more than that. Then, he rejects the so called Cartesian theater and the experient. And he embraces cognitive functionalism in the reductionist sense. What have I missed what would not adequately characterize him as an eliminative materialist? Or are you referring to his functionalism which would be ontologically neutral? In general, it is ontologically neutral in that in theory it can be adopted by theorists with different ontologies. However, in his case this ontology amounts to eliminative materialism, as far as I know.

*Sigh* ...okay, he's an eliminative materialist. My problem with saying so is not so much that this observation is incorrect as that it is incomplete. I get a little frustrated sometimes with all this endless obsession with categorization of various thinkers. The approach seems to be that if we can just drop a guy into a pre-defined box, we can reference all his ideas as 'just some more of this-or-that sort of thing', without bothering much with what he actually has to say -- the main import of his argument being the degree to which he threatens the boundaries of the category into which we have already placed him.

My commenting on this is probably the social equivalent, in philosophical circles, of blowing one's nose on one's sleeve -- so I'll try to be open-minded to explanations of why it is such a valuable tool, holding suspended my suspicions that it is partly shortcut, and partly rhetorical device (it is certainly effective as such a device, whether intentional or not -- in no time at all, we are led right away from the man's arguments into a discussion of the merits of the category we insist he belongs in).

Dennett's own answer to the question begins with, "I do resist the demand for a single, formal, properly quantified proposition expressing the punch line of my theory. Filling in the formula (x) (x is a conscious experience if and only if...) and defending it against counterexamples is not a good method for developing a theory of consciousness, and I think I have shown why".

As one who obviously has examined Dennett's arguments in detail, I would acknowledge your right to categorize as you wish, which is why I did not address my comments to you directly. My point really was that such a right is non-transferable. Do you feel that Dennett has the right to resist being so classified?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Classification

Dynamic said:

As one who obviously has examined Dennett's arguments in detail, I would acknowledge your right to categorize as you wish, which is why I did not address my comments to you directly. My point really was that such a right is non-transferable. Do you feel that Dennett has the right to resist being so classified?

Well, yes, I even hold that anyone has the right to resist being classified in this or any other way. I mean, there could be reasons not expressed yet or even ineffable ones that would go against the particular classification in question. However, others also have the right to "resist the resistance". Unless Dennett shows on what points his position(s) falls outside the scope of eliminative materialism, he simply hasn't given us any rational reason not include him in this category. We may respect his resistance in that we keep an open mind towards possible arguments that his resistance is well-founded after all.

By the way, classification is more than just labelling for the sake of labelling. Without classification we'd personally have to study every individual philosopher's position (or at least the publications of each and every individual philosopher since time immemorial) rather than the distinguishable currents or type of positions they represent.
As intelligent human beings, most philosophers will be quite interesting. But from the perspective of philosophical progress we should concentrate on possible new arguments or theories. An example of such a new argument could be Ian's paradox, and we're still in the process of finding out if it makes sense or not.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Well, what about introspection then?
We never detect any private behavior which would really be identical to brain processes. We never detect that our own subjective experiences are identical to brain processes. The only thing we really detect are those very same subjective experiences. That's why idealism is a rational position, and eliminative materialism is not.

I detect plenty of private behavior and subjective experience that could be identical to brain processes. The reason you don't is because you imagine your subjective experiences to be from a different source. It is similar to teaching a child that his mind is in his stomach. He would say "Of course my subjective experiences are not in my head!"

The immaterialists are fond of saying that a piece of brain meat cannot give rise to subjective experience. Whether you are correct or not, it is certainly the case that we aren't going to feel as if our subjective experience is the operation of a machine.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

On and on and on

Paul,

detect plenty of private behavior and subjective experience that could be identical to brain processes. The reason you don't is because you imagine your subjective experiences to be from a different source. It is similar to teaching a child that his mind is in his stomach. He would say "Of course my subjective experiences are not in my head!"

This analogy is completely false, of course. We're not talking about where we locate our subjective experiences, we're talking about the fact that we don't experience our subjective experiences as part of non-subjective physical processes in the brain. Or at least, I was talking about the latter.

But anyway, we've all been here so many times before, so...

Regards,

Titus

 

[hammegk]

The immaterialists are fond of saying that a piece of brain meat cannot give rise to subjective experience.

Hmmmm. IMO non-materialists say that 'assuming materialism=true' does not prove it true, and go on to point out logical inconsistencies inherent in your belief in materialism/atheism/naturalism. For example, the non-reductive nature of "life" coupled with the difficulty in defining "life", and at the highest level, HPC.

Meanwhile *I* think -- the one (objective to me) indisputable fact.