A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Titus Rivas]

The other way round

Mercutio,

...just to add some roughage, remember that the labels we use to identify our internal states had to be taught to us by people with no access to those states; thus in a very real sense our own self-knowledge is grounded in third-person perspective.

No sirree, the labels parents teach their children aren't meant to refer to non-subjective brain states or behavior, but to their first person-subjective states. Parents implicitly use reasoning by analogy: they know that they have subjective experiences themselves and also know what the species-specific expressions are for many of them. So they extrapolate the regular relations between their inner states of mind and their behavior to the behavior they see in their children. All communication about subjective experiences only makes sense to us, because we have subjective experiences. Tiring as this may be, it should never be forgotten that eliminative materialism is ludicrous (Or to speak in the style of the equally repetitive Roman orator Cato the Elder: Materialismus delendus est.)

Wouldn't it at least be interesting to consider freeing your mind from such absurdities? Why is rationality so often replaced by irrational superstitions (most of all materialism) when it comes to the mind ?

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus,

Tiring as this may be, it should never be forgotten that eliminative materialism is ludicrous

I don't think I hold to eliminative materialism - never quite sure, because the term seems to shift depending upon who's arguing about it - but it seems no less plausible/rational than dualism.

Wouldn't it at least be interesting to consider freeing your mind from such absurdities?

If you'd convinced me that it was an absurdity, I 'd probably agree! I'm sure you feel you've made your case, and it's clear that (despite the slight tongue-in-cheek nature of your language) you think the only reason I'd reject your claim of absurdity is because I'm clinging to an "irrational superstition". What can I say? I read what you post (and the two essays you've linked to), and I'm not convinced. Perhaps your arguments seem irrefutable (to you) in the same way that Ian thinks his duplicator scenario is *clearly* correct (to him)?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Convictions

Loki said:

What can I say? I read what you post (and the two essays you've linked to), and I'm not convinced. Perhaps your arguments seem irrefutable (to you) in the same way that Ian thinks his duplicator scenario is *clearly* correct (to him)?

Or perhaps in the same way that materialist are convinced of their views? Leaving ontological agnostics aside, we'll all be similarly convinced of our arguments. The question is if the arguments are solid from a neutral, logical point of view.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

No sirree, the labels parents teach their children aren't meant to refer to non-subjective brain states or behavior, but to their first person-subjective states. Parents implicitly use reasoning by analogy: they know that they have subjective experiences themselves and also know what the species-specific expressions are for many of them. So they extrapolate the regular relations between their inner states of mind and their behavior to the behavior they see in their children.

Once again urging us to ask how it is that everyone's irreducibly subjective experiences are so stunningly similar and why the correlation between subjective experience and behavior is so predictable.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

The question is if the arguments are solid from a neutral, logical point of view.

Well, we all seem to be just as convinced of the logical arguments. The power of logic collapses at the feet of muddy definitions.

~~ Paul

 

[BillyJoe]

Re: Answers to Ian and BillyJoe

Why not? Individual survival in the biological sense is about the survival of one and the same organism. Not just about the survival of a certain structure.

But if that "individual" is constituted by that "certain structure".......

BillyJoe

 

[BillyJoe]

Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

Ian,

Yes this is right. It does not make sense from the point of materialism. The 2 Ian's simply must be identical in order for materialism to be true. But they're not. From the perspective of Ian1 he is wholly Ian1 and not at all Ian2. From the perspective of Ian2 he is wholly Ian2 and not at all Ian1. Therefore materialism is refuted.

There are two of them, therefore materialism is false.

BillyJoe
(Jokes aside, this is all your argument amounts to from the point of view of a materialist)

 

[ceptimus]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

There are two of them, therefore materialism is false.

BillyJoe
(Jokes aside, this is all your argument amounts to from the point of view of a materialist)

Well said, BillyJoe.

 

[hammegk]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

Well said, BillyJoe.

Ignoring of course the 100%/50% problem, which could as easily become a 100%/.001% problem if enough dups are made.

Originally posted by Loki

I don't think I hold to eliminative materialism - never quite sure, because the term seems to shift depending upon who's arguing about it - but it seems no less plausible/rational than dualism.

I'd say eliminative materialism makes more sense than dualism, although in the end neither make as much sense as idealistic monism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

Ignoring of course the 100%/50% problem, which could as easily become a 100%/.001% problem if enough dups are made.

What is the 100%/50% problem? Is it that different people have different probabilistic perspectives? Does the Monty Hall problem have the same issue?

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Re: The other way round

No sirree, the labels parents teach their children aren't meant to refer to non-subjective brain states or behavior, but to their first person-subjective states. Parents implicitly use reasoning by analogy: they know that they have subjective experiences themselves and also know what the species-specific expressions are for many of them. So they extrapolate the regular relations between their inner states of mind and their behavior to the behavior they see in their children. All communication about subjective experiences only makes sense to us, because we have subjective experiences. Tiring as this may be, it should never be forgotten that eliminative materialism is ludicrous

Your explanation adds two levels of inference to mine, but doesn't explain anything any better. In fact, mine would predict that concepts for which there is not clear environmental referent would be harder to define than those with clear environmental referents; this is, of course, the case. Your explanation does not make this prediction (at least, as I understand it--if you have an internal concept you are translating, what does it matter if there is a clear referent?) So, if I am not mistaken, my explanation is both more parsimonious and more thorough than yours. Tiring as it may seem...

 

[ceptimus]

A materialist doesn't see the 50% / 100% paradox. He understands that the duplicate will appear in an identical room, and that each Ian will then be unable to tell whether they are the original or the duplicate.

Before the test, the materialist Ian thinks, 'If I agree to this test, "I" stand a 50% chance of getting the money, and a 50% chance of being killed.'

The materialist Ian thinks, 'If "I" do get killed, it doesn't matter really, as I know there will still be another "me" who is now extremely wealthy.'

We've been saying this for several pages now. The duplicator is strange and unfamiliar to us. The effects of the duplicator are strange and unfamilar to us. Is this a paradox to us? No.

 

[ceptimus]

To perhaps add something to Mercutio's theme of how children are taught, and come to believe in vaguely defined things. I offer the analogy of the French liver.

Frenchmen often complain about their livers. They will say, 'I have an ache in the liver', or 'That meal last night disagreed with my liver', and so on. An Englishman, and, I suspect, an American doesn't know what they're talking about. We have upset stomaches, acid indigestion and so on - these are our terms, and we have no idea what a pain in the liver would feel like.

But Frenchmen are quite sincere in their beliefs. Presumably when a French child is sick, or runs to his mother complaining of an ache, he is told, 'I warned you those sweets would upset your liver'.

If anyone has young children and wishes to try a cruel and unusual experiment on them, I suggest that whenever a child complains of a headache, he should be told, 'That is because your consciousness is spinning the wrong way. Normally, our consciousness spins clockwise, but sometimes it turns the other way for a while, and that's what you are feeling right now.'

A child raised in such a manner might be ready to make some interesting posts in a forum like this in about 15 years time.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

...the labels parents teach their children aren't meant to refer to non-subjective brain states or behavior, but to their first person-subjective states. Parents implicitly use reasoning by analogy: they know that they have subjective experiences themselves and also know what the species-specific expressions are for many of them. So they extrapolate the regular relations between their inner states of mind and their behavior to the behavior they see in their children. All communication about subjective experiences only makes sense to us, because we have subjective experiences.

It has been proposed that the impressive language aquisition capabilities of young children result from structures in the brain dedicated to this purpose. These structures are specialized enough to provide the necessary efficiency, and at the same time flexible enough to adapt to any ambient language environment (even one characterized by a plethora of ists and isms).

In short, (something roughly analagous to) hardware designed to support (something roughly analagous to) software, the details being provided by input from the environment.

But language is essentially contrivance. It is only by mutual agreement that words mean what they do. Language then might be thought of as a 'virtual' construct. Words have utility, but should not be confused with the things they represent.

I propose that the 'self' is similarly a virtual construct, and that the human brain has evolved to operate with such a construct on board.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ceptimus said:

If anyone has young children and wishes to try a cruel and unusual experiment on them, I suggest that whenever a child complains of a headache, he should be told, 'That is because your consciousness is spinning the wrong way. Normally, our consciousness spins clockwise, but sometimes it turns the other way for a while, and that's what you are feeling right now.'

A child raised in such a manner might be ready to make some interesting posts in a forum like this in about 15 years time.

I'm roaring here. I'm having trouble controlling my hysterical laughter.

~~ Paul

 

[BillyJoe]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

hammegk,

Ignoring of course the 100%/50% problem...

Wrong scenario.

We were discussing the scenario where Original Ian is vapourized as he is scanned and then two Duplicate Ians (Ian1 and Ian2) are created (that is to say, mechanically put together).

There is no 100%/50% problem here.

Instead we have with the amazing conclusion offered that because there are two of them (Ian1 and Ian2), materialism is false. You might as well say "here is a hydrogen atom and here is another hydrogen atom.....hey, materialism is false!"
If, according to materialism, consciousness is a physical process in a brain, then the situation with Ian1 and Ian2 is no different than the situation with the two hydrogen atoms. From the point of view of materialism, they are both pairs of physical objects differing only in complexity.

BillyJoe.

 

[BillyJoe]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

hammegk,

Ignoring of course the 100%/50% problem...

Wrong scenario.

We were discussing the scenario where Original Ian is vapourized as he is scanned and then two Duplicate Ians, Ian1 and Ian2, are created (that is to say, mechanically put together).

There is no 100%/50% problem here.

Instead we have with the amazing conclusion offered that because there are two of them (Ian1 and Ian2), materialism is false. You might as well say "here is a hydrogen atom and here is another hydrogen atom.....hey, materialism is false!"
If, according to materialism, consciousness is a physical process in a brain, then the situation with Ian1 and Ian2 is no different than the situation with the two hydrogen atoms. From the point of view of materialism, they are both physical objects differing only in complexity.

BillyJoe.

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

Ignoring of course the 100%/50% problem, which could as easily become a 100%/.001% problem if enough dups are made.
[/B]

What is the 100%/50% problem??

Seriously, can you explain it Hammegk? I would honestly like to know.

I posted an explanation way earlier in the thread on why I don't think it is a problem at all.

In the example both Ians have the exact same mental states (which materialism predicts) and the change in percentages is due to change in information. Original Ian goes from knowing he is the only Ian alive to knowing there is two Ians and also knowing that he cannot possibly know whether he is original Ian or not. He knows only original Ian will be saved, he simply lacks the information on whether he IS original Ian. This is also predicted by materialism. Where is the problem?

Original Ian above is the Ian after duplication that stands in a particular relation to pre-duplication Ian, that is, he becaome post-duplication Ian in a different way than duplicate Ian (the normal way, time passing, as opposed to using a duplicator). Both Ians are unaware of which one they are, but the fact remains that they came to be post-duplication Ian in different ways.

Adam

 

[hammegk]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

.....the fact remains that they came to be post-duplication Ian in different ways.

Adam

And this is the point where answers differ. Win posed it a different way: "given ian(t), what is his reltionship to ian(t+dt)?".

C, Heisenberg, Planck limits, etc imply to me that 1 of the dups must be more nearly "Ian" than is the 'other' dup. And that is the 100/50 problem.

I agree if all of TLOP is suspended and there IS NO differentiation between the 2, then the problem is only ethical -- to us -- but what do I1 & I2 think?.

Hmm, not much clarity there, sorry.

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

And this is the point where answers differ. Win posed it a different way: "given ian(t), what is his reltionship to ian(t+dt)?".

It's hard to get to the heart of the confusion.

Let's call subjective-Adam the sense of identity which I have. The 'me' that *I* feel me to be.

In the subjective-Adam sense of identity, post duplication Duplicate-Adam (dup-Adam(t + dt)) is in the same relationship to pre-duplication Adam (Adam (t)) as Original-Adam (orig-Adam (t + dt). This is because I don't think of these molecules in my body as being an integral part of *me*.

This is why post duplication, both consciousness' have the right to call themselves Adam.

C, Heisenberg, Planck limits, etc imply to me that 1 of the dups must be more nearly "Ian" than is the 'other' dup. And that is the 100/50 problem.

Hmmm, I'm not sure what you mean by that

Those all sound like physical reasons, wouldn't materialism take these into account? So any difference or projected difference between them would be accounted for by materialism. Or did you mean something else?

I agree if all of TLOP is suspended and there IS NO differentiation between the 2, then the problem is only ethical -- to us -- but what do I1 & I2 think?.

They think exactly the same things. They both think 'I'm not that Ian, I'm this Ian'.

I still don't see the problem *shrug*

Hmm, not much clarity there, sorry.

That's ok, I'm just trying to understand the problem. You and Ian are the only ones who see it so far, so I was hoping you could explain it.

Adam