A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[hammegk]

....That limits the discussion of free will and consiousness to behaviors.

So while there is speculation about other events, they can not be addressed by materialism.

I.E. Materialism is TRUE, that proves Materialism to be TRUE.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Answers to Ian and BillyJoe

II
Er . . so assuming you are a materialist, you wouldn't agree to being duplicated and receiving the £10,000,000? Or you would agree but you would hold that you couldn't possibly find yourself leaping from the original you to duplicate you?
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Assuming I'm a materialist, I wouldn't agree no, as the duplicate I wouldn't be me. It goes against the very materialistic concept of a survival drive to be satisfied with a mere copy of myself.

Er . .I think you're way out on a limb here Titus. I don't think any of the materilists on here agree with you, nor Win, nor myself!

And of course my refutation of materialism wouldn't work then either

 

[Interesting Ian]

Quote from Interesting Ian


Now do you think it would be irrational for me to decline being duplicated in my thought experiment? I would say that materialism and epiphenomenalism would require it to be irrational (albeit perhaps understandable from the psychological perspective).
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YOU REQUIRE it to be irrational, that is an interesting demand. Fie I say, I shall not pay your ransom. Why not let materialism and epiphenom decide for themselves. This is why you lack integrity Ian, you insist on telling other people what they must think and then you argue with them based on your fallacious argument. But what else can you expect from a philosopher?

If you continue to say I lack integrity you will be the very first person ever to go on my ignore list.

I was giving my understanding of materialism and confirming that other people agree with it. I get the impression everyone does apart from you and Titus. OK, that's fine.

Why does materialsim require it to be irrational?

Be best if a materialists responds to your question here. Any materialists care to respond?

If as a materialist you belive that it is wrond to kill life needlessly, then it it not an irational choice at all.

Go back to my thought experiment. I explicitly ask people for the sake of argument to ignore the ethical implications. How could we ever argue anything if people insist in introducing irrelevant distractions??

If as a materialist you believe that the other body will be you but with a seperate consiousness, then it would not be irrational at all.

If as a materialst you belive that it would be wrong to profit from the suffering of another, then it would not be irrational at all.

Please ignore the ethical implications!

 

[Titus Rivas]

The experient within non-reductive materialism

Er . .I think you're way out on a limb here Titus. I don't think any of the materialists on here agree with you, nor Win, nor myself!

The trouble is that we may still be talking about different things.

What type of materialism did you have in mind?

Obviously not a reductive/eliminative materialism, as such a materialism wouldn't even accept the existence of irreducible consciousness, i.e. subjective experiences that cannot be regarded as identical to physical processes in the brain.

So I guess you're aiming at a non-reductive materialism (in the ontological sense), i.e. a type of emergent materialism which claims that the brain creates a non-quantifiable phenomenal field. Now, such a irreducibly subjective phenomenal field would have to involve the same kind of irreducible experient as accepted by substance dualism and idealism. In other words, it makes sense even within non-reductive, emergent materialism and epiphenomenalism to speak of an irreducible experient which would not be one and the same in the original and the duplicate Ian.

Please note that I'm not defending either epiphenomenalism (god forbid) or any other type of emergentism.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: The experient within non-reductive materialism

The trouble is that we may still be talking about different things.

What type of materialism did you have in mind?

Obviously not a reductive/eliminative materialism, as such a materialism wouldn't even accept the existence of irreducible consciousness, i.e. subjective experiences that cannot be regarded as identical to physical processes in the brain.

So I guess you're aiming at a non-reductive materialism (in the ontological sense), i.e. a type of emergent materialism which claims that the brain creates a non-quantifiable phenomenal field. Now, such a irreducibly subjective phenomenal field would have to involve the same kind of irreducible experient as accepted by substance dualism and idealism. In other words, it makes sense even within non-reductive, emergent materialism and epiphenomenalism to speak of an irreducible experient which would not be one and the same in the original and the duplicate Ian.

Please note that I'm not defending either epiphenomenalism (god forbid) or any other type of emergentism.

Titus

Hi Titus,

I think everyone on here (apart from you and maybe David) are holding the view that under any materialist position and also under epiphenomenalism, the duplicate literally is you .

Moreover I think everyone believes that should they use a star trek transporter type device, then the person appearing at the other end will be them in every sense of the word.

And I think this is right. If you are duplicated then both the original and duplicate are equally you under any type of materialist based metaphysic.

 

[hammegk]

Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

Yes this is right. It does not make sense from the point of materialism. The 2 Ian's simply must be identical in order for materialism to be true. But they're not. From the perspective of Ian1 he is wholly Ian1 and not at all Ian2. From the perspective of Ian2 he is wholly Ian2 and not at all Ian1. Therefore materialism is refuted.

Do you contend your brain-ego-id is your *self*? Or does Atman=Brahman? Or something else?

I see your 100%/50% problem/paradox. How do you think your experiment fares under idealistic monism?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Still fail to see the relevance

I think everyone on here (apart from you and maybe David) are holding the view that under any materialist position and also under epiphenomenalism, the duplicate literally is you .

What I still don't understand is the following.

(1) If you don't believe that consciousness really exists, you're an eliminative materialist. Now, it seems that even for an eliminative materialist the original and the duplicate Ian would be two identical Ians rather than just one. There would be two independent, though identical organisms both labelled Ian.

(2) If you do believe that consciousness really exists, you aren't an eliminative materialist. The experient in this case cannot be reduced to (or identified with) physical processes in the brain. It is merely the product of such physical processes. Now, it seems that within this view two experients may be identical in all respects, except for the fact that they're two experients and not just one. The point is in my opinion that as soon as you accept the reality of experients, no two experients can be the same experient. Regardless of whether the concept of an non-reducible, real experient is part of emergent materialism, epiphenomenalism, emergent dualism, substance dualism or idealism. What I'm trying to say is that the problem does not really seem to be a problem for any system which accepts the reality of a self or experient (as more than just a physical structure in the brain).

Can you help me out? A specific answer to these points would be most welcome.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Another attempt

Do you contend your brain-ego-id is your *self*? Or does Atman=Brahman? Or something else?

I see your 100%/50% problem/paradox. How do you think your experiment fares under idealistic monism?

The duplicate is only a physical duplicate so you wouldn't duplicate the self. I think you'd get a corpse. I wouldn't definitely say that a star trek transporter type of device wouldn't work though.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Still fail to see the relevance

What I still don't understand is the following.

(1) If you don't believe that consciousness really exists, you're an eliminative materialist. Now, it seems that even for an eliminative materialist the original and the duplicate Ian would be two identical Ians rather than just one. There would be two independent, though identical organisms both labelled Ian.

(2) If you do believe that consciousness really exists, you aren't an eliminative materialist. The experient in this case cannot be reduced to (or identified with) physical processes in the brain. It is merely the product of such physical processes. Now, it seems that within this view two experients may be identical in all respects, except for the fact that they're two experients and not just one. The point is in my opinion that as soon as you accept the reality of experients, no two experients can be the same experient. Regardless of whether the concept of an non-reducible, real experient is part of emergent materialism, epiphenomenalism, emergent dualism, substance dualism or idealism. What I'm trying to say is that the problem does not really seem to be a problem for any system which accepts the reality of a self or experient (as more than just a physical structure in the brain).

Can you help me out? A specific answer to these points would be most welcome.

Titus

Titus, as far as I can understand it the above is irrelevant. There is no paradox if you insist that you are the original and not at all the duplicate. If you're right the paradox doesn't apply. So there isn't a problem. On the other hand I think that the position you advocate is clearly not a materialist one. A materialist would have no qualms about using a teletransporter and also pocketing a million pound in my thought experiment.

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Re: Still fail to see the relevance

A materialist would have no qualms about using a teletransporter and also pocketing a million pound in my thought experiment.

What a gyp! It used to be 10 million!

Still no paradox though

But Hammy said he understands it. Hey Hammy! Can you take a shot at explaining it?

Maybe a new perspective that sees a paradox will help.

Adam

 

[ceptimus]

Perhaps we ought to graft in a real paradox that will satisfy us materialists?

We plan to duplicate Beauty after putting her to sleep by chemical means...

Ian is told the duplicate will be killed one day this week, but the duplicate won't know which day till the executioner comes...

The superior being places $1000 in one box for the duplicate, and either $0 or $10,000,000 in the other box depending on...

I'm sure you get the idea.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Hi Ian

If you're right the paradox doesn't apply. So there isn't a problem. On the other hand I think that the position you advocate is clearly not a materialist one. A materialist would have no qualms about using a teletransporter and also pocketing a million pound in my thought experiment.

My point is I guess that you first need to have a clear definition of materialism to be able to show that there is a problem.

If a materialist does not accept a real, un-eliminable first-person perspective (and therefore an un-eliminable self) the paradox (or contradiction) can't arise. But then, you would have to point out exactly what types of materialism would entail an unsolvable paradox in your thought experiment.

Titus

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

If a materialist does not accept a real, un-eliminable first-person perspective (and therefore an un-eliminable self) the paradox (or contradiction) can't arise.

I've been gnawing on the idea of the first-person perspective actually being an internalized third-person perspective. If 'consciousness' is no more than a construct which may have potential utility in predicting behavior in others, it may be little more when turned inward, despite access to more information about the current state of the system under examination (and this not even always true; others are sometimes better able to assess our moods and predict our behavior than we ourselves are, and our own constructs are often very dependent on observations others make about us).

 

[Interesting Ian]

Perhaps we ought to graft in a real paradox that will satisfy us materialists?

We plan to duplicate Beauty after putting her to sleep by chemical means...

Ian is told the duplicate will be killed one day this week, but the duplicate won't know which day till the executioner comes...

The superior being places $1000 in one box for the duplicate, and either $0 or $10,000,000 in the other box depending on...

I'm sure you get the idea.

Er . . no . . I have no idea what you're talking about

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Re: The experient within non-reductive materialism

Hi Titus,

I think everyone on here (apart from you and maybe David) are holding the view that under any materialist position and also under epiphenomenalism, the duplicate literally is you .

Moreover I think everyone believes that should they use a star trek transporter type device, then the person appearing at the other end will be them in every sense of the word.

And I think this is right. If you are duplicated then both the original and duplicate are equally you under any type of materialist based metaphysic.

Hi Ian, But I consider my ethics to be based upon my logic! So when you ask if something is irrational then it will get into ethics. The two ians are the same but divergent because of location.

It would be irrational to agree to have a copy of myself killed because I wouldn't want to caus eth other me to suffer.

A materialst would say they are same except one has a real history and the other only has a history from thier first person perspective.

The body at the end of the star trek transporter is you except ofr the location.

If you stop saying what it is that you think a materialist should believe and actualy listen to what people write, then you and your arguments will have integrity. But if I just make statements like, immaterialism says that an elephants is a cookie and that is just absurd then I lack integrity.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Yes this is right. It does not make sense from the point of materialism. The 2 Ian's simply must be identical in order for materialism to be true. But they're not. From the perspective of Ian1 he is wholly Ian1 and not at all Ian2. From the perspective of Ian2 he is wholly Ian2 and not at all Ian1. Therefore materialism is refuted

Well, I've been discussing this in past posts, but not sure if you agreed this was the key issue. You seem pretty clear about this, so I'll try and offer my explanation again. Your argument/paradox boils down too :

1. The 2 Ian's simply must be identical in order for materialism to be true.
2. From the perspective of Ian1 he is wholly Ian1 and not at all Ian2. From the perspective of Ian2 he is wholly Ian2 and not at all Ian1.
3. Therefore, since materialism says they must be identical, yet they aren't identical, materialism fails.

But you're wrong Ian. They are identical, even in their first person perspective. In #2, you point to the first person perspective of each and say "they have differing first person perspectives". No, they don't. You are using the 3rd person labels "Ian1" and "Ian2" when you switch to the first person view - and this is where you are going wrong. We agree that they can't actually tell if they are "Ian1" or "Ian2" - in fact immediately after duplication they both "feel" that they are Ian1. If they stop and think carefully for a moment they will realise that this "feeling" might be wrong - the only *fact* they actually know is "I'm me, not him". This is the true nature of their first person perspective. If you rewrite the labels "Ian1" and "Ian2" you can see it clearer...

"2. From the perspective of Ian1 he is wholly this body and not at all that body. From the perspective of Ian2 he is wholly this body and not at all that body".

So their first person perspectives *are identical*.

Again, if you and I are both placed inside identical white rooms containing a single glass, we may both simultaneously experiecne the thought "that glass is half full". We have (momentarily) identical first person experiences. However, that doesn't mean that there is really only one glass! Same deal with the two Ians. Both have the identical thoughts "that other body is not me!" and "this body is me" even thought the subjects (the bodies) of the identical thoughts is different.

Really Ian, stop and think for a moment - there is not a contradiction here!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Loki, that isn't what Ian thinks is the paradox, I don't think. Ian?

~~ Paul

 

[Loki]

Paul,

You may be correct - Ian hasn't addressed this when I've posted it in the past, so perhaps it is in fact completely irrelevant. If so, then I'm back to having no idea at all what he thinks the problem is.

I originally thought it was something to do with "which duplicate is really me", but he's denied several times that the issue is anything to do with the relationship between "pre-dup" Ian and "post-dup" Ians.

Ian? Care to share?

 

[slimshady2357]

Er . . no . . I have no idea what you're talking about

He's just kidding around Ian

The last two are classic paradoxs you might have (and I have) found in the Puzzles section at various times

Didn't you see the huge thread on Newcomb's Paradox in the R&P section way back when? (The one where a perfect predictor offers you a choice between boxes, one with $1000 and a box with either $1,000,000 or nothing depending on how you choose? (there is more to the puzzle than that!))

Anyway, it was a laugh for me, thanks ceptimus

Adam

 

[Mercutio]

I've been gnawing on the idea of the first-person perspective actually being an internalized third-person perspective. If 'consciousness' is no more than a construct which may have potential utility in predicting behavior in others, it may be little more when turned inward, despite access to more information about the current state of the system under examination (and this not even always true; others are sometimes better able to assess our moods and predict our behavior than we ourselves are, and our own constructs are often very dependent on observations others make about us).

It is an idea worthy of gnawing on...just to add some roughage, remember that the labels we use to identify our internal states had to be taught to us by people with no access to those states; thus in a very real sense our own self-knowledge is grounded in third-person perspective. If our first-person perspective were the more accurate of the two, we would not ever have to utter the phrase "gee, I guess I was hungrier than I thought" (or "not as hungry as I thought", or trade "hunger" for any number of things we are supposed to know through first-person experience).