A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Mercutio]

You know what I find amusing is that no-one has even remotely addressed my paradox, including Win and Titus, yet you claim I have been defeated in the debate.

{shakes head sadly}

Hey! Whatever happened to "you understand, but you disagree. " Near as I can tell, several posters understood what you were saying, but did not see a paradox there.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Unless people are willing to answer my question, is there really any further purpose to discussing it?

No, no point at all as far as I can see. No one but you can understand what you mean, and you don't care to try and explain it any more. Okay. I just had the impression that the change in direction for this thread had (conveniently) enabled you to avoid any actual admission of error.

It's clear that you still insist you are able to perceive an argument of such amazing insight that *everyone else* fails to even understand the question, let alone the answer. I see no value in continuing, given that premise...

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,


No, no point at all as far as I can see. No one but you can understand what you mean, and you don't care to try and explain it any more. Okay. I just had the impression that the change in direction for this thread had (conveniently) enabled you to avoid any actual admission of error.

It's clear that you still insist you are able to perceive an argument of such amazing insight that *everyone else* fails to even understand the question, let alone the answer. I see no value in continuing, given that premise...

Well, it certainly seems to me that people do not fully understand my point. And I get the impression you're appealing to popularity again. In other words, because everyone disagrees with me, it is very likely I am in error.

Conceivably I might be. But if so I am wholly unable to see how. So what do you expect me to do? To say yes, I am in error, even though I am unable to understand why??

I suggest this might be why human beings throughout history have believed in the most absurd things. Too frightened of pointing out the obviously absurd.

Sorry matey, but I'm not playing that game.

And I'm convinced I'm right.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That's because I, for one, do not understand what you think the paradox is. Is it that there are two Ians who both think exactly the same thing? Is it that they both don't know who will be killed, but the experimenters do know? I don't have a clue.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

That's because I, for one, do not understand what you think the paradox is. Is it that there are two Ians who both think exactly the same thing? Is it that they both don't know who will be killed, but the experimenters do know? I don't have a clue.

~~ Paul

Then what can I say? I've explained the paradox fully already. I just find it incredible that no-one is capable of understanding the essential paradox. Oh well. This is why the subject isn't being discussed anymore. I mean what's the point?

If people really want to continue discussing this question, then I do so only on the proviso that people answer the question I asked Win. And I want everyone to answer the question who has criticized me on this point, which will be just about everyone who's contributed to this thread recently.

The question is:

Now do you think it would be irrational for me to decline being duplicated in my thought experiment? I would say that materialism and epiphenomenalism would require it to be irrational (albeit perhaps understandable from the psychological perspective).

 

[Win]

Ian:

You know what I find amusing is that no-one has even remotely addressed my paradox, including Win and Titus, yet you claim I have been defeated in the debate.

First off, I'm not trying to defeat you.

Now then, there is no paradox.

It's not irrational, in your thought experiment, to get duplicated. Neither materialism nor epiphenomenalism (so-called) would suggest that it is.

Again, the problem stems from your mistaken intuition that one of the post dup Ians "really" is you. Note, mistaken intuition. As I said before, only when you assume that some kind of substantial consciousness adheres to the body to you get the problem of "where does it go." And neither materialism nor epiphenomenalism (gackh, I hate that term) holds that there is one.

Only a substance dualist would confront problems as a consequence of your thought experiment.

Hooray, you've demonstrated the incoherence of substance dualism, Ian.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

So what do you expect me to do?

Oh, I don't know - agree to disagree might be as good as it will get. However, if I find that *everyone* in a thread, including people who's opinion I have a fair respect for, are telling me I'm wrong, I provisionally assume that there's a very real chance I'm wrong. And I try to explain, using different terms perhaps, what the issue is - in the hope that clarification will finally arrive.

...then I do so only on the proviso that people answer the question I asked Win.

Can you repeat the question? I'm having a hard time finding it in this thread.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Epiphenomenalism is incoherent, Win!!

And neither materialism nor epiphenomenalism (gackh, I hate that term) holds that there is one. (...) Only a substance dualist would confront problems as a consequence of your thought experiment.

Hooray, you've demonstrated the incoherence of substance dualism, Ian.

Now has he really ? Not that he knew of.

Win, you should know by now that it's epiphenomenalism (not substance dualism) which is incoherent .
I'd appreciate it if you finally reacted to my paper. If you can offer no rebuttal, but wouldn't want to admit that the arguments against your position are sound either, I'd accept that for an answer. But then, you couldn't say anymore that epiphenomenalism is the best type of dualism. In my opinion if you reject substance dualism or any other type of interactionist dualism, you should change your nickname "The Dualist" into either "The Idealist" or "The Eliminative Materialist". There really is no other rational option and I've repeatedly shown this in quite a conclusive way on this thread.

Let's have some real argumentation, okay ?

Titus

 

[Loki]

... I've repeatedly shown this in quite a conclusive way on this thread.

Let's have some real argumentation, okay

(Gets popcorn, settles into chair in front of monitor) Okay, let the show commence...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

If people really want to continue discussing this question, then I do so only on the proviso that people answer the question I asked Win. And I want everyone to answer the question who has criticized me on this point, which will be just about everyone who's contributed to this thread recently.

Yes sir, master Ian! We are your intellectual slaves.

~~ Paul

 

[slimshady2357]

Then what can I say? I've explained the paradox fully already. I just find it incredible that no-one is capable of understanding the essential paradox. Oh well. This is why the subject isn't being discussed anymore. I mean what's the point?

I think you're right, there just hasn't seemed a point for a while now. But at least there has been some interesting side discussions at times

If people really want to continue discussing this question, then I do so only on the proviso that people answer the question I asked Win. And I want everyone to answer the question who has criticized me on this point, which will be just about everyone who's contributed to this thread recently.

The question is:

Now do you think it would be irrational for me to decline being duplicated in my thought experiment? I would say that materialism and epiphenomenalism would require it to be irrational (albeit perhaps understandable from the psychological perspective).

Ignoring the ethical problems of agreeing to have a person killed (albeit one that was created by you), I would say a materialist that doesn't go for the money must have too much already

(oh, this assumes you mean your thought experiment about watching the movie!)

Two quick reasons.

You know that your brain, your instantiation of 'you' is going to live for sure anyway, so why not. Temporary confusion isn't going to stop that.

And it doesn't matter anyway. Even if you changed the experiment, so that the one killed is chosen from the duplicate or the original randomly, I wouldn't care. Show me the money

Adam

 

[BillyJoe]

If people really want to continue discussing this question, then I do so only on the proviso that people answer the question I asked Win.

The question is:

Now do you think it would be irrational for me to decline being duplicated in my thought experiment? I would say that materialism and epiphenomenalism would require it to be irrational (albeit perhaps understandable from the psychological perspective).

Now do you think it would be irrational for me to decline being duplicated in my thought experiment?

Yes.

I would say that materialism....would require it to be irrational

Yes.

albeit perhaps understandable from the psychological perspective

Yes, it's counterintuitive.

If people really want to continue discussing this question, then I do so only on the proviso that people answer the question

Okay, my turn: Ian 1 and Ian 2.....who the hell are "you"?

BillyJoe.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Another attempt

Ian,

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but wouldn't (non-reductive) materialists and epiphenomenalists just say that the original person would be one realisation of a certain pattern, and that the dupiclate would be another realisation of the same pattern.
Let's assume that (non-reductive) materialists and epiphenomenalists accept that a brain can be aware of its own existence. Now, that would involve a notion that you're this specific brain and not any other structurally and functionally identical brain. Assuming that a 'conscious brain' has a natural interest of surviving as this particular brain, it does make an important difference whether you're going to survive yourself or whether someone else with the identical psychological structure and content is going to survive.

Have I missed something? If so, please tell me what it is.

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Interesting point, Titus. Why is this restricted to nonreductive materialists?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Another attempt

Ian,

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but wouldn't (non-reductive) materialists and epiphenomenalists just say that the original person would be one realisation of a certain pattern, and that the dupiclate would be another realisation of the same pattern.
Let's assume that (non-reductive) materialists and epiphenomenalists accept that a brain can be aware of its own existence. Now, that would involve a notion that you're this specific brain and not any other structurally and functionally identical brain. Assuming that a 'conscious brain' has a natural interest of surviving as this particular brain, it does make an important difference whether you're going to survive yourself or whether someone else with the identical psychological structure and content is going to survive.

Have I missed something? If so, please tell me what it is.

Titus

Er . . so assuming you are a materialist, you wouldn't agree to being duplicated and receiving the £10,000,000? Or you would agree but you would hold that you couldn't possibly find yourself leaping from the original you to duplicate you? And what about the star trek transporter? It seems to be a consequence of your position that you wouldn't use it since you would not literally be the person that appears at the other end.

BTW what does non-reductive materialism mean? Also why do you equate reductionistic materialism with elimintivism? Note I'm not saying that you're wrong to do so. But it seems to me that people don't normally equate these 2 positions.

 

[BillyJoe]

Re: Another attempt

Titus,

Let's.....accept that a brain can be aware of its own existence. Now, that would involve a notion that you're this specific brain and not any other structurally and functionally identical brain. Assuming that a 'conscious brain' has a natural interest of surviving as this particular brain, it does make an important difference whether you're going to survive yourself or whether someone else with the identical psychological structure and content is going to survive.

I think this is Ian's point.

It does not make sense fron the point of view of materialism though.

Of course once those brains with "identical psychological structure and content" begin to diverge........

BillyJoe.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian:



First off, I'm not trying to defeat you.

Now then, there is no paradox.

It's not irrational, in your thought experiment, to get duplicated. Neither materialism nor epiphenomenalism (so-called) would suggest that it is.

Right, so you'd be perfectly happy to be duplicated and have your duplicate killed afterward? (if we ignore the ethical implications).

Again, the problem stems from your mistaken intuition that one of the post dup Ians "really" is you. Note, mistaken intuition.

And does either of the post-dup Ians also have a mistaken intuition that they are not the other Ian?

As I said before, only when you assume that some kind of substantial consciousness adheres to the body to you get the problem of "where does it go." And neither materialism nor epiphenomenalism (gackh, I hate that term) holds that there is one.

Yes, the problem only arises because I'm making the silly assumption we're all not p-zombies.

Only a substance dualist would confront problems as a consequence of your thought experiment.

Hooray, you've demonstrated the incoherence of substance dualism, Ian. [/B]

Producing a living duplicate would seem to me to very powerfully suggest that either materialism or epiphenomenalism is correct. But a non-materialist/epi would surely tend to deny that you would get a living duplicate! (although this is not to deny they would necessarily say a teletransporter wouldn't work). So this thought experiment proves no such thing. Unless you have any arguments against the notion that on duplication you would simply get a corpse?

BTW, do you still disagree with me over the free will thing? Or are our "differences" only apparent?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Answers to Ian and BillyJoe

Ian said

Er . . so assuming you are a materialist, you wouldn't agree to being duplicated and receiving the £10,000,000? Or you would agree but you would hold that you couldn't possibly find yourself leaping from the original you to duplicate you?

Assuming I'm a materialist, I wouldn't agree no, as the duplicate I wouldn't be me. It goes against the very materialistic concept of a survival drive to be satisfied with a mere copy of myself.

And what about the star trek transporter? It seems to be a consequence of your position that you wouldn't use it since you would not literally be the person that appears at the other end.

Yes, that's right, if I were a materialist, I wouldn't do it.

BTW what does non-reductive materialism mean?

Well, as I have said before you may approach the issue of reductionism from two angles. One is the nomothetical one, meaning that the laws of the mind can be reduced to the laws of the brain. The other is the ontological one, which means that the mind is really nothing but certain processes in the brain.

Also why do you equate reductionistic materialism with elimintivism?

Quite simple. Reductive materialism in the ontological sense states that anything mental can be regarded as purely physical processes in the brain. That means that there are no psychological concepts which can't ultimately be ontologically reduced to neurological concepts. Any claims that there is more to the mind than neurology, would be wrong. So that any non-physical aspects ascribed to the mind in general, or consciousness in particular (in casu qualia) would simply be non-existent. They can be eliminated from a rational world view, as they would be mere illusions or rudiments of an outdated supernaturalist outlook on man.

Note that I'm not saying that you're wrong to do so. But it seems to me that people don't normally equate these 2 positions.

That's because there are really two kinds of reductionism as I explained before: (1) reduction of one kind of (regularities in) processes to another kind of (regularities in) processes and (2) reduction of one type of reality (consciousness)to another type of reality (physical reality).

BillyJoe said:

It does not make sense fron the point of view of materialism though.

Why not? Individual survival in the biological sense is about the survival of one and the same organism. Not just about the survival of a certain structure.

Titus

 

[Dancing David]

Quote from Interesting Ian

The question is:

Now do you think it would be irrational for me to decline being duplicated in my thought experiment? I would say that materialism and epiphenomenalism would require it to be irrational (albeit perhaps understandable from the psychological perspective).


YOU REQUIRE it to be irrational, that is an interesting demand. Fie I say, I shall not pay your ransom. Why not let materialism and epiphenom decide for themselves. This is why you lack integrity Ian, you insist on telling other people what they must think and then you argue with them based on your fallacious argument. But what else can you expect from a philosopher?

Why does materialsim require it to be irrational?

If as a materialist you belive that it is wrond to kill life needlessly, then it it not an irational choice at all.

If as a materialist you believe that the other body will be you but with a seperate consiousness, then it would not be irrational at all.

If as a materialst you belive that it would be wrong to profit from the suffering of another, then it would not be irrational at all.


The only way it would be irrational is to believe that the other person is not the same as you because it has magic doohickey that makes it you!

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Another attempt

Originally posted by Titus Rivas
Let's.....accept that a brain can be aware of its own existence. Now, that would involve a notion that you're this specific brain and not any other structurally and functionally identical brain. Assuming that a 'conscious brain' has a natural interest of surviving as this particular brain, it does make an important difference whether you're going to survive yourself or whether someone else with the identical psychological structure and content is going to survive.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I think this is Ian's point.

It does not make sense fron the point of view of materialism though.

Yes this is right. It does not make sense from the point of materialism. The 2 Ian's simply must be identical in order for materialism to be true. But they're not. From the perspective of Ian1 he is wholly Ian1 and not at all Ian2. From the perspective of Ian2 he is wholly Ian2 and not at all Ian1. Therefore materialism is refuted.