A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Determinism in the general sense

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(I'm going by the definition of determinism that Dymanic supplied),
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By that definition, I obviously couldn't be a determinist either, Ian. The trouble is that the definition is based on physicalism.

This is the problem isn't it? A lot of the time people don't have a clear idea of what particular words mean and end up arguing at cross purposes. This is why I asked what the word determinism means. But then I was given an incorrect definition!

But what about psychological laws and a nature of the soul? Do you believe that such may exist?

I'm not entirely clear what is meant by psychological laws. I have never studied psychology before and know nothing about it. If I see a £20 note in the street and I do not see who has dropped it, then I will pick it up and keep it for myself. Is that a psychological law? Would you or anyone else seriously suggest my free will is compromised because people can predict I will pick it up and keep it??

And yes souls have a nature and are distinguishable.

Determinism is the position that there is a cause or factor behind any (physical, psychological, social, cultural, etc.) event. It shouldn't be seen as synonymous to physicalism.
For example qualia are completely non-physical, but they are causal factors all the same.

Well if that is so I have to confess that I am now completely clueless as to what libertarian free will means. I just cannot imagine a person subscribing to LFW denying that their behaviour is determined by what they want to do!

 

[hammegk]

A perfectly legitimate rejoinder. One which could be used an awful lot in this thread.

Which of a rock's behaviors are you claiming I might call consciousness, and why do you think I might do this?

Sure. The most obvious "conscious" behavior is exhibited when it rolls down the hill courtesy of gravity, or splits courtesy of ice freezing. Behaviors as much as yours or mine, although ours appear to depend on more subtle causative forces. And who will ever know the wondrous thoughts a rock envisions; or doesn't?

Materialists may yet find an as yet "unknown" force -- which would make it also physical. Ergo, same problem; everything is/must be programmed.

Idealists can go with "consciousness is what-is" if they so desire. And if they do, fewer conundrums remain without possibility of any answer to "why?". LFW remains a conundrum in any case.

 

[Mercutio]

Sure. The most obvious "conscious" behavior is exhibited when it rolls down the hill courtesy of gravity, or splits courtesy of ice freezing. Behaviors as much as yours or mine, although ours appear to depend on more subtle causative forces. And who will ever know the wondrous thoughts a rock envisions; or doesn't?

But note that we don't even call equivalent human behaviors "conscious". If you are pushed off a cliff, we do not say you made the conscious decision to fall. If you are beheaded via guillotine, you do not consciously decide to let your head fall into the basket.

In our language community, we tend to make different explanations for actions with obvious external causes. Anything with an external referent is publicly available, and much easier to agree on. We get into trouble when we talk about private behaviors, where the causality is much more subtle. Just as any sufficiently advanced technology is said to be indistinguishable from magic, any sufficiently subtly-caused behavior is indistinguishable from free will.

But I digress. (I've been writing, then deleting, a number of different approaches here; I think I'll just wait to see your next objection and then address it.)

 

[hammegk]

But note that we don't even call equivalent human behaviors "conscious". If you are pushed off a cliff, we do not say you made the conscious decision to fall. If you are beheaded via guillotine, you do not consciously decide to let your head fall into the basket.

True. The question we are discussing is "why not?". What is the difference?

In our language community, we tend to make different explanations for actions with obvious external causes. Anything with an external referent is publicly available, and much easier to agree on. We get into trouble when we talk about private behaviors, where the causality is much more subtle. Just as any sufficiently advanced technology is said to be indistinguishable from magic, any sufficiently subtly-caused behavior is indistinguishable from free will.

Hmm. Where did "free will" come from? You apparently don't think you have any, and what is the differentiation criteria between "subtle" and "not-so-subtle" anyway? Gravity is about as "subtle" as forces get; physicists haven't even demonstrated that gravitons exist.

Private behavior; what is that? If I close my eyes -- and am reasonably adept at control of my body (think biofeedback training) -- and remain comfortably reclined in my chair, have I lost consciousness?

Behavior is the only clue you will ever receive about my internal "state-of-consciousness".

But I digress. (I've been writing, then deleting, a number of different approaches here; I think I'll just wait to see your next objection and then address it.)

 

[Loki]

hammegk,

(Not wishing to cut across anything Mercutio may wish to say but...)

The question we are discussing is "why not?".

I'd say the main reason why we don't wish to use the term "consciousness" to apply to external/involuntary actions like "rocks rolling" or "people falling" is beause it reduces the term to virtual meaninglessness.

What is the difference?

As undefined as the term "consciusness" continues to be, there seems little point in extending any definition to include "any possible physical behaviour".

Is this really the entire point being made here ? :

Materialist : "Phenomenal consciousness occurs only when physical processes like 'memory' and 'awareness' occur".
InterestingHammegk : "But why can't phenomenal consciousness also occur when physical processes like 'rolling rocks' occur?".
Materialist : "Perhaps they can - but observation seems to show a clear link between 'normal consciousness' behaviours, and 'phenomenal consciousness' behaviours. "

 

[Mercutio]

True. The question we are discussing is "why not?". What is the difference?

The difference is precisely what you allude to below; when a behavior is not publically available we have been raised to treat it as having some special status.

Hmm. Where did "free will" come from? You apparently don't think you have any, and what is the differentiation criteria between "subtle" and "not-so-subtle" anyway? Gravity is about as "subtle" as forces get; physicists haven't even demonstrated that gravitons exist.

You are right--I don't think free will exists, although I will grant without question that it feels like it does. We can demonstrate experimentally (and have done so) that our behavior--even the words we choose to speak--can be influenced by manipulating the environment, and that we need not be aware of the manipulation for it to influence us. There are countless potential influences on our behavior at virtually all times--when we artificially manipulate one or more, we can see this influence (though, of course, we cannot absolutely say that the same influence holds true outside of our artificial manipulation. Of course, we cannot absolutely disprove its influence either.).

The differentiation between subtle and not-so-subtle is in the eye of the language community, and changes from culture to culture. We see free will where another culture might see the hand of fate. When we see an action that does not appear to have sufficient environmental cause, we assume an internal causation. We used to do the same thing with the weather; a complex system did not appear to behave according to easily-observed influences, so it must be the result of some conscious force--a god, in this case.

Private behavior; what is that? If I close my eyes -- and am reasonably adept at control of my body (think biofeedback training) -- and remain comfortably reclined in my chair, have I lost consciousness?

Private behavior is simply that which is not, even in principle, observable by more than one person. You observe your thinking, but I cannot. I am alone in this room typing, but in principle you could spy on me. Thinking, feeling, remembering, etc. are private behaviors.

Have you lost consciousness? Remember, I'm the one who never said you had it to begin with . Actually, more below on this tricky problem--when exactly are you conscious or not, and how do you know?

Behavior is the only clue you will ever receive about my internal "state-of-consciousness".

Agreed. What is more, your behavior, and the feedback you got from others regarding your objectively observable behavior, is the only way you learned to speak about your "internal state-of-consciousness". How did you learn about thinking? Your parents (and others) called some of the things you did "thinking", or at least the product of "thought". How did they know? Your publicly observable behavior.

The trick, of course, is that they could not give perfect feedback. No one could; thinking is private behavior. So you grow up (as we all do) with a fuzzy definition of consciousness, of thinking, of love, of any of the behaviors or categories of behaviors that lack an easy external referent.

So we have a fuzzily defined group of behaviors that we have defined "consciousness." We have other, less fuzzily defined groups of behavior we call "communicating" or "getting from point A to point B", or "writing". I don't accuse the rock of writing, nor of communicating. I don't accuse it of being conscious. Its observable behaviors simply do not match the ones I (or you, despite your apparent confusion) have learned to call "being conscious".

 

[hammegk]

I'd say the main reason why we don't wish to use the term "consciousness" to apply to external/involuntary actions like "rocks rolling" or "people falling" is beause it reduces the term to virtual meaninglessness.

As undefined as the term "consciusness" continues to be, there seems little point in extending any definition to include "any possible physical behaviour".

Er, yes, but materialism/atheism does exactly that for "consciousness". Perhaps we should discuss life vs non-life?

Materialist : "Phenomenal consciousness occurs only when physical processes like 'memory' and 'awareness'occur".
InterestingHammegk : "But why can't phenomenal consciousness also occur when physical processes like 'rolling rocks' occur?".
Materialist : "Perhaps they can - but observation seems to show a clear link between 'normal consciousness' behaviours, and 'phenomenal consciousness' behaviours. "

We are discussing the statement:
quote:
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Consciousness is defined by our thinking, feeling, remembering; it does not cause them.
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When did "awareness" slip through the door? My "thoughts" and my "awareness/selectivity of those thoughts" is the crucial difference. And I don't understand the distinction you are making with " 'normal consciousness' behaviours, and 'phenomenal consciousness' behaviours. ". "Behavior" is, or is-not.

BTW, any comment on my "consciousness when I'm at rest" question? Does yours disappear when you sleep? If you think so, why?

 

[Loki]

hammegk,

but materialism/atheism does exactly that for "consciousness".

I must be failing to understand you - you think that materialism/atheism says that "all physical processes" are "consciousness"?

When did "awareness" slip through the door? My "thoughts" and my "awareness/selectivity of those thoughts" is the crucial difference.

Or isn't a real difference, perhaps?

And I don't understand the distinction you are making with " 'normal consciousness' behaviours, and 'phenomenal consciousness' behaviours. "

Okay - use your terms then - 'external' versus 'internal' behaviours

BTW, any comment on my "consciousness when I'm at rest" question? Does yours disappear when you sleep? If you think so, why?

In one sense, yes. If "consciousness" is a label assigned to a group of behaviours, and in a given state some of these behaviours are absent, then I would say that "consciousness" is also absent. I'd point to the statement "the blow on the head rendered him unconscious" as an example of what Mercution os trying to convey about the meaning of "consciousness".

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

The trouble is that the definition is based on physicalism

What I offered was an example (not really a definition) based on physicalism (actually, on physics, though I do not deny that I intended to imply physicalism).

The example was of a deterministic interpretation of the physics behind events on that favorite device for thought experiments, the idealized billiard table. If you want a really busy model, you can go ahead and include such things as friction, variations in air density, and the effects of Jupiter's gravity, but the deterministic stance is simply that there are reasons, and reasons for the reasons; nothing happens 'just because'.

I agree that you could even include the will of Allah, or the psychokinetic efforts of Uri Geller in your model and still be within bounds as far as determinism is concerned as long as you were prepared to provide explanations for their motivations, but physicists would still ask for further reduction of the mechanics of such effects (that is, if you could even get their attention by demonstrating that such effects were actually having an influence).

Free will seems to ask for a special exemption; a temporary pass to a realm outside physics where billiard balls can make sudden left turns; where decisions can be made and then carried back inside where they can be applied according to the rules.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Free will seems to ask for a special exemption; a temporary pass to a realm outside physics where billiard balls can make sudden left turns; where decisions can be made and then carried back inside where they can be applied according to the rules. [/B]

Billiard balls aren't conscious so their behaviour will be able to be described by the laws of physics. I suggest this is not so for people.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Billiard balls aren't conscious so their behaviour will be able to be described by the laws of physics. I suggest this is not so for people.

It would seem that what you are suggesting is that brains (being made of ordinary matter) obey the laws of physics, but that they may be influenced by consciousness, acting as an external force. If a similar force were applied to one of the balls on our billiard table, we might observe sudden, unexplainable changes in the trajectories of the balls. Once you have made that leap, it seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that consciousness might act on rocks, or anything else. What's so special about brains?

 

[hammegk]

I must be failing to understand you - you think that materialism/atheism says that "all physical processes" are "consciousness"?

That is the implication of Idealism, although from a materialist point of view what is said is "consciousness is physical processes". Or more correctly, "Life" is a set of physical processes.

Once we have "life", change via blind evolution, or by design(I'd say intent) has resulted in us sitting somewhere typing, now.

Or isn't a real difference, perhaps?

Just the difference between a finite Turing machine with appropriate feedback capabilities, and a "living" entity.

Okay - use your terms then - 'external' versus 'internal' behaviours

OK. The trouble here is that you cannot differentiate my "behavior" -- it either occurs, or doesn't. Meanwhile, *I* continue to make choices whenever *I* deem it appropriate.

In one sense, yes. If "consciousness" is a label assigned to a group of behaviours, and in a given state some of these behaviours are absent, then I would say that "consciousness" is also absent. I'd point to the statement "the blow on the head rendered him unconscious" as an example of what Mercution os trying to convey about the meaning of "consciousness".

And my point is you will never know if *I* am conscious & playing possum, or am truly "unconscious".

Our real difficulty here is that materialists want to use "consciousness" at the human realm (and down to some level of life's complexity) whereas I do not see how to draw the line life vs. non-life.

 

[Mercutio]

And my point is you will never know if *I* am conscious & playing possum, or am truly "unconscious".

This is precisely the crux of the matter. We learn a term (consciousness) for a category of behaviors that we cannot precisely know. It is as if we learned about the color "red" from a color-blind person--sometimes it is this, at other times it is this. No wonder "consciousness" is seen as having special, magical status. It is seen as undefineable, when in fact it is simply poorly defined (though necessarily so).

Our real difficulty here is that materialists want to use "consciousness" at the human realm (and down to some level of life's complexity) whereas I do not see how to draw the line life vs. non-life.

I don't want to use "consciousness" at all! And the life vs. non-life debate figures how? I am not following...

 

[BillyJoe]

I do not see how to draw the line life vs. non-life.

That is not surprising seeing as there is nowhere to draw a line.
If anything, this supports materialism wouldn't you think?
Start off with non-life, move through gradual almost imperceptible changes and, at some point, we can definitely say that there is life. But where did it start? Nowhere. But it just gradually got there all the same.

BillyJoe.

 

[Dancing David]

Just as any sufficiently advanced technology is said to be indistinguishable from magic, any sufficiently subtly-caused behavior is indistinguishable from free will.

Wow, that is the greates paraphrase of Arthur C. Clarke ever, and quite a challenge to my belief in free will. More pondering!

The question is how are you defining causal, in the chain of events sense or in the pre destinantion sense.

 

[Dancing David]

Fie on consious fie, fie on consious fie.

The magic phrase for private behaviors is that they are irreducable. Not that they really are , just that it is the new age phrase for the sanctuary of 'god's domain'.


On life and no life:

drawing the boundary for life and non life is not going to get antwhere for the idea of what is awareness.

1. I draw the boundary very low for life, any chemicals or set of chemical which given appropriate materials can replicate itself. So by my definition prions and viruses and RnA and DnA are life forms.

2. But this buys into the gradation argument for free will and consiousness(Fie on consious fie, fie on consious fie).
A prion can fold other similar proteins into a form of itself, this is replication. But there is no free wil or consiousness.
A virus can make copies of itself if it borrow some other organisms xerox machine. this is life but no free will or consiousness.
A fungus can replicate itself, but soes it have the internal structure to have free will or consiousness. A small maybe.
A bacteria can replicate itself, it probably has rudimentary awareness of it's surroundings. But can it make a choice or is it predestined to behave in a certain fashion in a certain setting?
A tree can replicate itself, it probably has peripheral awareness, in that cells can be dry and create an osmotic force, but it isn't likely to be aware by the human definition. Probably predestined to boot. More complexity does not always lead to free will.
Then the pinnacle of creation a tree shrew! It can reproduce, if it has a mate. It can motivate in it's enviroment in response to external stimuli. It is aware and can even learn:definite consiousness. It may make different choices presented with the same situation:definite free will.

This gradation argument does not address the rock issue, when we find a away to communicate with rocks we can ask them. This also does not address Mercutio's subtle causality.

The point of this is the following
There is no free will or consiousnesss! Not in the way that you can point to a rock, and say 'rock'. They are phraeses that denote a complex series of behaviors! They do not exist outide of the behaviors. And so while we can speculate outside the behaviors, it gives no meaningful communication !
At least intospection can do that! There is meaning in speculation, but materialist can only discuss what is subject to scientific verification. That limits the discussion of free will and consiousness to behaviors.

So while there is speculation about other evenst, they can not be addressed by materialism.

 

[Loki]

So has Ian abandoned the "paradox", or is he content to let the conversation move away from the wreckage of his "arguments"?

 

[Interesting Ian]

So has Ian abandoned the "paradox", or is he content to let the conversation move away from the wreckage of his "arguments"?

I presume you are kidding? I was waiting for Win to answer my question. Nobody else has answered it

Honestly Loki, if I felt I was wrong I would admit it. But I'm not wrong.

Let's face it, this thread keeps changing its subject matter all the time. Unless people are willing to answer my question, is there really any further purpose to discussing it?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What was your question again?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

So has Ian abandoned the "paradox", or is he content to let the conversation move away from the wreckage of his "arguments"?

You know what I find amusing is that no-one has even remotely addressed my paradox, including Win and Titus, yet you claim I have been defeated in the debate.

{shakes head sadly}