A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

In your opening post in this thread, you suggested Galileo as the author of the concept 'primary and secondary qualities'. Actually I think that was Robert Boyle, but it was Galileo who first concluded that objects tend to resist a change in velocity. This was later formalized by Newton as his First Law of Motion: An object at rest will remain at rest and an object in motion will remain in motion unless acted upon by an external force.

This means that the positions and vectors of balls on a billiard table are determined entirely by previous events. This doesn't mean that they are, in practice, accurately predictable at long range; even simplifying things by using theoretically perfect balls and table, and ignoring such factors as wind, temperature, etc., measurements and calculations can never be made to infinite precision. So regardless of the degree of precision to which you are working, deviations below that resolution will propagate upward to large deviations in the long run.

Extrapolating this to human behavior translates to the claim that "It's billiard balls all the way down". Unfathomable complexity and imperfect precision may make accurate prediction impossible, but that doesn't mean the results are not entirely deterministic, just that for all intents and purposes, they might as well be.

I am not convinced that any such thing as 'intrinsic randomness' exists -- but then, I am less than entirely comfortable with my grasp of quantum theory.

Thank you Dymanic. In that case I am not a determinist.

BTW my understanding is that a straightforward interpretation of QM does entail intrinsic randomness.

 

[Interesting Ian]

[quote:
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What do you mean by "mechanism"?
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I mean the processes by which decisions are made. You say you do things because you want to. How are your wants determined?

My wants are determined by my environment and my brain state and my essential self.

Look, when you make a decision to act, there has to be some process by which you came to the decision. I can think of algorithmic processes and random processes. You apparently have a third type.

There's the process of deliberating between various alternatives and then acting.

 

[Suggestologist]

Anyway, lets imagine I'm very thirsty. I therefore have the desire to quench my thirst. Therefore almost certainly I will get myself a drink, say a pint of pineapple squash. Does this mean I don't have free will?

I would say it does not have this implication. After all I can consciously reframe from having my drink. Although all my behaviour might be heavily influenced by all sorts of factors, I would say at the end of the day that *I* am the final arbiter of what my behaviour will be. So the component in which the free will is "hiding" is the *I*.

From: The Potent Self by Moshe Feldenkrais:

"Words need careful definitions to avoid conveying the exact opposite of what one intends to convey. I am eating because I am hungry; am I spontaneous, or am I acting under the compulsion of hunger? I see or smell an appetizing tidbit, and I reach out for it; am I acting spontaneously, or am I compelled by the promise of gratification? Thus, there is no general agreement as to whether the origin of my urge is internal or external. And, more importantly, no agreement as to whether the action ensuing is spontaneous or compulsive. [...]

"Spontaneity is a subjective and relative notion, and only a trained observer can tell whether a given action is spontaneous or compulsive. It depends on the internal sensation of resistance experienced while acting or inhibiting action. Thus, we may habitually refer to somebody as "Darling," yet experience internal reluctance-which robs the word of sincerity. There will be no delay or hesitation in pronouncing the word; even so, we will consider the action compulsive because of the inner resistance accompanying it. The amount of resistance depends largely on our earlier experience and formed habits of thought."

 

[ceptimus]

My wants are determined by my environment and my brain state and my essential self.



There's the process of deliberating between various alternatives and then acting.

Your previous thermostat example fits the above description quite nicely:

* Its environment is the temperature of the room.
* Its essential self is the setting on the dial.
* Its brain state is whether it currently has the heating switched on or off.
* Its action is to change from on to off or vice-versa.
* It's 'deliberation' is the balance of forces between a spring, a bi-metallic strip and a magnet (the magnet introduces a bit of hysteresis, so it doesn't switch on and off too rapidly).

It's all quite deterministic in principle, but in practice, even the thermostat designer couldn't predict exactly when the device will switch, accurate to the second. Two 'identical' thermostats (as near identical as you could make them) wouldn't switch at exactly the same instant. But no one (I hope) would claim there is something going on inside the thermostat that physics can't explain.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Your previous thermostat example fits the above description quite nicely:

* Its environment is the temperature of the room.
* Its essential self is the setting on the dial.
* Its brain state is whether it currently has the heating switched on or off.
* Its action is to change from on to off or vice-versa.
* It's 'deliberation' is the balance of forces between a spring, a bi-metallic strip and a magnet (the magnet introduces a bit of hysteresis, so it doesn't switch on and off too rapidly).

It's all quite deterministic in principle, but in practice, even the thermostat designer couldn't predict exactly when the device will switch, accurate to the second. Two 'identical' thermostats (as near identical as you could make them) wouldn't switch at exactly the same instant. But no one (I hope) would claim there is something going on inside the thermostat that physics can't explain.

You seem to forget I'm not a materialist and do not believe thermostats are conscious. Least of all that it has free will.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: What does determinism mean

Could anyone give me a comprehensive definition of determinism so that I can enlighten people as to whether I believe that all change in the universe is either determined or intrinsically random? And please do not use terms like causality without also comprehensively defining what the term means.

Thanks.

Well, although I am a mechanist and a materialist, I am not much of one for determinism.

My main battle with it is from the view point of evolution, take something as complex as consiousness, speech or walking upright. Those who are of a deterministic mind bent will say that x changes occured so that consiousness, speech or walking upright could occur.
This notion is related to the idea of progress , which has no place in evolution. each of the small changes that led to the three complex states occured randomly and then were met with reproductive follow through.
You can not look at an organism and say that it evolved this to do this thing, because that is not the way evolution works. Something random happens and then the change is beneficial or not. So to say that women are meant to sit around and care for babies because of evolution is a good example of blind determinism.

Determinism is also the idea that for evry complex event there is a away to reductively determine each event that makes up the more complex event. for some determinists the tape will play the same each time you reset the event, for others it means that there is a set of events that can be determined but there is potential to change each time the event is replayed.

So for an event like making a consious choice, shall I have this nice european beer or this watery sweet american stuff, the two kinds of determinists wil disagree. One will say that you were predestined to chose that drink, but others will say that there re factors that can be deteremined, but that they have an element of randomness in them.

I believe in the mechanical possibility for free will to exist. the brain is not digital, it is organic , messy, probalistic and reverberating. Given the random and probalistic nature of the brain I think there is plenty of room for free will.

But then when I don't take my Zoloft, I loose my free will and become compulsive, this is why I know I have free will, because I have lost it in the past.

I don't know where Paul would stand on this, I think that there are unique algorithims for each individual who has a brain, and that the alogorithims do involve a fair amount of random chance. Because the organic nature of the brain, a single neuron will not always fire under a single set of circumstances, it is more a probability thing.

 

[Loki]

Mercutio,

Consciousness is defined by our thinking, feeling, remembering; it does not cause them.

I like this!

 

[Loki]

Paul,

I wrote the code. I am Coder the Coderian.

Thanks, I feel better now....

 

[hammegk]

The laws of physics and the boundry conditions of the universe.

Ummm. Body, perhaps, but how do you square that with *you*?
I.E. The Soul, Ian's Self, my *I*. Or are you no longer a dualist?

Your answer could make perfect sense to an Idealist, at any rate.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

This is true, but doesn't at all address the question of what the materialists position is on whether or not rocks are phenomenally conscious

I hesitate to talk for "materialism" on this issue, but my first thought is that since "phenomenal consciousness" seems to be either a by-product, or at least closely linked, to "regular consciousness" then rocks wouldn't have it. But again, perhaps thermostats and rocks *are* phenomenally consciousness but lack any suitable means of expressing this.

What is the point here, Ian? Again, materialism doesn't work by defining "phenomenal consciousness", then searching the world for suitable examples.

We examine rocks; we find an never before seen set of physical processes in the rock that seem (somehow) to produce "phenomenal consciousness"; we conclude that rocks, like people, have "feelings". What does this mean for materialism? I can't see your point...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

My wants are determined by my environment and my brain state and my essential self.

Ah, so this "essential self" must be the other mechanism. How does it decide things?

There's the process of deliberating between various alternatives and then acting.

How does this deliberation work?

You seem to forget I'm not a materialist and do not believe thermostats are conscious. Least of all that it has free will.

And yet their operation seems to fit your descriptions above. This is probably because you haven't defined essential self and deliberation.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Mercutio,
I like this!

Thank you. It is an extraordinarily simple concept, but it is not the way we are brought up to think. Most folk will dismiss it out of hand.

 

[hammegk]

Mercutio,

I like this!

What else could a materialist/atheist possibly say? As usual, assume materialism true, and then "prove" materialism true. By this criteria, the boulder while rolling down the hill is conscious too.


BTW, Paul, Idealists have the same problems with "free will". The only difference is that Ian, and *I*, think we have it -- whatever it is -- and others including you do not agree.


Question for a mathematician: Can the choice of any member of a bounded set be "random"?

 

[Mercutio]

What else could a materialist/atheist possibly say? As usual, assume materialism true, and then "prove" materialism true. By this criteria, the boulder while rolling down the hill is conscious too.

First, I make no claims of proving materialism. This merely addresses "consciousness" after having assumed materialism. Secondly, if you honestly think my explanation would also suggest that a rolling boulder is conscious, you have not understood it.

 

[hammegk]

First, I make no claims of proving materialism. This merely addresses "consciousness" after having assumed materialism.

Then my rejoinder is "so what?".

Secondly, if you honestly think my explanation would also suggest that a rolling boulder is conscious, you have not understood it.

OK, I like to be educated. Where did I mis-understand the logical implications of your remarks?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Dualism and determinism

Hi Win,

I'm really looking forward to your comments on my paper.

More generally, I'd like to stress that non-materialism isn't synonymous with non-determinism. My own argumentation in Exit Epiphenomenalism aims at physicalism rather than determinism.

It is possible to be a psychological determinist or an interactionist determinist, both positions differing from physicalism in that they acknowledge irreducible psychogenic factors. Thus, the will, desires, emotions and (rational and irrational) thought may all play an irreducible psychogenic role which as such cannot be reduced (not even ultimately) to any physical factors.

In other words, it is not necessary to believe in non-determinism to be a non-materialist or non-physicalist.

More generally, I understand the reason why a lot of people strongly believe in a free will, as they rightly acknowledge the active role their irreducible inner life plays in their actions.
Rationally the concept of a really free (non-determined) will seems a strange notion though. It would require us to act without any motive. All conceivable motives, including the most lofty and rational ones, would be irreconcilable with this kind of freedom.
You might think that freedom lies in the capacity of choosing between motives. But then again, you would need a motive to make the choice required.
Even if you choose to do something for no particular reason, you're still motivated to make this choice, so that in this sense even this choice is not free.

Without motives there can't be any kind of (rational or irrational) choice.
Ultimate freedom of the will would suggest we choose without motives.
Therefore it seems ultimate freedom of the will is an incoherent notion, since choice without motive can't exist.

Again, this question is completely separate from the question of physicalism.

Titus

 

[Mercutio]

Then my rejoinder is "so what?".

A perfectly legitimate rejoinder. One which could be used an awful lot in this thread.

OK, I like to be educated. Where did I mis-understand the logical implications of your remarks?

Certainly. First, clear up one thing for me. Which of a rock's behaviors are you claiming I might call consciousness, and why do you think I might do this? I'd rather not take the chance that I might address a straw argument.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Dualism and determinism

Ultimate freedom of the will would suggest we choose without motives.
[/B]

Only if you equate ultimate freedom of the will with intrinsic random bodily movements, which is clearly absurd. No, one can deny one is determined (I'm going by the definition of determinism that Dymanic supplied), and indeed have "ultimate freedom of the will", and yet for their behaviour to be entirely predictable to someone who knows them well.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Determinism in the general sense

(I'm going by the definition of determinism that Dymanic supplied),

By that definition, I obviously couldn't be a determinist either, Ian. The trouble is that the definition is based on physicalism.

But what about psychological laws and a nature of the soul? Do you believe that such may exist?

Determinism is the position that there is a cause or factor behind any (physical, psychological, social, cultural, etc.) event. It shouldn't be seen as synonymous to physicalism.
For example qualia are completely non-physical, but they are causal factors all the same.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

A lot of confusion about the free will business.

I just need to stress that simply because a persons behaviour is predictable this cannot in any conceivable way reduce his or her free will. Otherwise the better someone knows you the less free will you would have!


So what is the difference between determinism where we can be very confident that if we release a stone it will fall, and a situation say where we imagine a person is in a room with 2 exits, one leading to instant death and one leading to freedom, and we can be extremely confident that he will choose the exit leading to freedom?

Well although one might argue that the particular behaviour of the stone and the particular behaviour of the person are both inevitable, they are inevitable in a differing sense. In the case of the stone falling, the stone has no choice. It is not within the capacity of the stone to choose to not fall. It cannot conceivably do anything else but fall assuming that physical laws describe the contents of our sensory perceptions. This is unlike the case of the person in a room because he has the capacity to choose to go through either exit even though he will inevitably choose the exit leading to freedom. This is what I understand libertarian free will means. Not to act randomly but to have the capacity to choose so that one could conceivably act in a differing way from the action one chooses.