Interesting Ian
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Win said:
Yes that's right.
No.
Do you feel that I have provided a satisfactory relationship should materialism be true?
A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities
Yes that's right.
No.
Do you feel that I have provided a satisfactory relationship should materialism be true?
Interesting Ian
Unregistered
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Win said:
Determined by my "identity"? What do you mean by "identity"? My choices are determined (as in the sense of my ultimate decision) by what I want to do.
If libertarian free will is incoherent are you able to explain why this is so?
Ian:
No. Not really. There's a bit more to it than that.
Also, I don't see how you reconcile this with your assertion that one of the Ians is "you" and the other not.
Yes.
Briefly, one's identity determines one's actions as completely as any law of physics. In situation X, Win does Y, because he's Win. Were he to do Z, he wouldn't be Win.
No. Not really. There's a bit more to it than that.
Also, I don't see how you reconcile this with your assertion that one of the Ians is "you" and the other not.
Yes.
Briefly, one's identity determines one's actions as completely as any law of physics. In situation X, Win does Y, because he's Win. Were he to do Z, he wouldn't be Win.
Interesting Ian
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Win said:
{shrugs}
Beats me what this "bit more" could conceivably be. So what else is there?
I don't reconcile it. This is the paradox and why materialism is false. If they were both me literally, then in my thought experiment I outlined before, it would be irrational for me not to agree to be duplicated since the prospect of me receiving £10,000,000 is just as sure as if I underwent the same experiences (watching GroundHog's Day), but without being duplicated.
My self together with other influences (ie state of brain and environment) determines what I do. I have the capacity to choose whatever I want to do and people will judge what sort of person I am by my actions. But my essence or self is not to be equated with my very actions. I do the actions that I do because of my self, but I could in principle act contrary to my perceived character. An actor doesn't suddenly literal get his self changed whilst s/he is acting.
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
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I wrote the code. I am Coder the Coderian.
~~ Paul
~~ Paul
Ian:
A law-like development from x to x+n. But that's beside the point. I'm more interested in -
For the materialist, there is no paradox. Both satisfy the criteria, both are Ian.
Only because you insist that one of the two post dup Ians is "really" you, do you perceive a paradox. Neither, or both, have the right to the title "really you."
Do you understand this?
The bolded part puts paid to the idea of "libertarian free will." If you do what you do because of your self, your self determines what you do. You're actions are just as determined by your identity as they are by the laws of physics. You're just as much a slave. Libertarian free will is incompatible with the idea of the individual, which, ironically, it is designed to validate.
The only kind of free will that exists is the ability to make a choice, unconstrained, in the moment. We all have that, whether materialism is true or not.
A law-like development from x to x+n. But that's beside the point. I'm more interested in -
For the materialist, there is no paradox. Both satisfy the criteria, both are Ian.
Only because you insist that one of the two post dup Ians is "really" you, do you perceive a paradox. Neither, or both, have the right to the title "really you."
Do you understand this?
The bolded part puts paid to the idea of "libertarian free will." If you do what you do because of your self, your self determines what you do. You're actions are just as determined by your identity as they are by the laws of physics. You're just as much a slave. Libertarian free will is incompatible with the idea of the individual, which, ironically, it is designed to validate.
The only kind of free will that exists is the ability to make a choice, unconstrained, in the moment. We all have that, whether materialism is true or not.
Interesting Ian
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Win said:
There is no paradox for the materialist, for the simple reason that he's not considering the situation from the first person perspective.
Of course. I always have done right from the very beginning. Now do you think it would be irrational for me to decline being duplicated in my thought experiment? I would say that materialism and epiphenomenalism would require it to be irrational (albeit perhaps understandable from the psychological perspective).
As I have said, ultimately my self chooses what to do. If by determines you're thinking of the word as being synonymous with chooses, then that is fine. Ultimately I choose to do what I do because of everything that I am. Does this mean I couldn't possible have chosen otherwise? No, it just means that I make my particular choices because of my disposition at the time. To say that I do not have libertarian free will because of my own dispositions and wants is to misunderstand what libertarian free will means (or at least my understanding of it). I have free will meaning that the choice is ultimately entirely up to me.
But why believe that our choices necessarily must unfold according to some specific algorithm? My wants and desires dictate my behaviour, and we have no reason to suppose that such consequent behaviour will just happen to coincide with some specific algorithm. I do not act according to some predefined rule, rather my actions are finally determined in the moment.
To clear up any possible misunderstanding. I do not deny that a being with an infinite understanding of my very essence could not unfailingly predict how I will act in a given context. But this is not determinism and as far as I am concerned, doesn't contradict libertarian free will.
It seems like other people you are making determinism so broad that libertarian free will cannot exist by definition. But saying that determinism is true is then vacuous. It doesn't actually say anything.
A person may become very skilled in the operation of a complex piece of machinery, and despite having limited knowledge of the low-level details of its design, will often develop a fine sensitivity to every nuance of its performance. In describing these nuances, he will attribute to the machine a personality and a gender (invariably female), and he will speak of the machine's various moods, and what it likes and doesn't like. He may name it something like Lucy or Nellie-Belle, and talk to it, sometimes coaxing, sometimes cursing.
None of this means, of course, that the machine actually has a personality, and If pressed, he will confess that it is all a bit of lighthearted fiction. But when the machine happens to be a human brain, something more interesting occurs.
I submit that a human being is born without a 'self'; that the self is a fictitious construct adopted as a convenient means of interpreting the complexity of the collective outputs of a host of competing sub-processes in the brain. An infant learns to use this construct from others around him who have more experience in devising and utilizing such constructs, and the particular construct he forms for what he learns to call "me" is based in large part on what is imposed on him by others. Over time, he learns to direct the process to at least some extent, defining (or re-defining) himself by his actions.
He achieves this by developing an internal representation of the third-person perspective, and substituting this for the actual approval or disapproval of others; he becomes aware of what others think of him when they are watching, and when they aren't, of what they would think if they were.
None of this means, of course, that the machine actually has a personality, and If pressed, he will confess that it is all a bit of lighthearted fiction. But when the machine happens to be a human brain, something more interesting occurs.
I submit that a human being is born without a 'self'; that the self is a fictitious construct adopted as a convenient means of interpreting the complexity of the collective outputs of a host of competing sub-processes in the brain. An infant learns to use this construct from others around him who have more experience in devising and utilizing such constructs, and the particular construct he forms for what he learns to call "me" is based in large part on what is imposed on him by others. Over time, he learns to direct the process to at least some extent, defining (or re-defining) himself by his actions.
He achieves this by developing an internal representation of the third-person perspective, and substituting this for the actual approval or disapproval of others; he becomes aware of what others think of him when they are watching, and when they aren't, of what they would think if they were.
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
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Hammegk asked:
Ian said:
Well said, Dymanic.
~~ Paul
A little better than that. I'd give myself a low B-.
Ian said:
And how did those wants and desires come to be the way they are?
If you don't think it's that broad, you have to explain the mechanism by which the broad hand of determinism is halted at your doorstep, and by what other free-will mechanism decisions are made in the house of your soul.
Well said, Dymanic.
~~ Paul
Interesting Ian
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Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Not well said, Dymanic.
Interesting Ian
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Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Paul,
Regardless of whether they should appropriately be described as libertarian free will or not, you need to explain why my beliefs regarding free will are incoherent.
I do not know what you mean by determinism. Remember I believe that all change in the world is brought about by some Will or other who could act otherwise. Physical laws, as in the description of the character and change of our mental contents as provided by the 5 senses, are simple due to the Will of a metamind.
Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
Ian, there is a simple reason that there is no paradox in the duplication.
From the first person they are identical, but since awareness id dependant on physical processes it just means that you have two machines with the same program and divergent futures. No biggie, the ian who sat in the chair and just watched the movies gets the money. The ian who just appeared in the chair and gets taken away dies.
I would not be duplicated myself.
I am a firm believer in materialism and I believe in libertarian free will.
From the first person they are identical, but since awareness id dependant on physical processes it just means that you have two machines with the same program and divergent futures. No biggie, the ian who sat in the chair and just watched the movies gets the money. The ian who just appeared in the chair and gets taken away dies.
I would not be duplicated myself.
I am a firm believer in materialism and I believe in libertarian free will.
Interesting Ian
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What does determinism mean
Could anyone give me a comprehensive definition of determinism so that I can enlighten people as to whether I believe that all change in the universe is either determined or intrinsically random? And please do not use terms like causality without also comprehensively defining what the term means.
Thanks.
Could anyone give me a comprehensive definition of determinism so that I can enlighten people as to whether I believe that all change in the universe is either determined or intrinsically random? And please do not use terms like causality without also comprehensively defining what the term means.
Thanks.
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
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Ian said:
I don't know what we mean by determinism, either. I just don't understand what raw mechanisms are available to make decisions other than algorithms and randomness. If you could state another mechanism that you think underlies free will, I'd be happy to consider it.
~~ Paul
So how does the metamind decide what Ian will eat for breakfast?
I don't know what we mean by determinism, either. I just don't understand what raw mechanisms are available to make decisions other than algorithms and randomness. If you could state another mechanism that you think underlies free will, I'd be happy to consider it.
~~ Paul
Interesting Ian
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Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
What do you mean by "mechanism"?
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
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Ian asked:
Look, when you make a decision to act, there has to be some process by which you came to the decision. I can think of algorithmic processes and random processes. You apparently have a third type.
~~ Paul
I mean the processes by which decisions are made. You say you do things because you want to. How are your wants determined?
Look, when you make a decision to act, there has to be some process by which you came to the decision. I can think of algorithmic processes and random processes. You apparently have a third type.
~~ Paul
In your opening post in this thread, you suggested Galileo as the author of the concept 'primary and secondary qualities'. Actually I think that was Robert Boyle, but it was Galileo who first concluded that objects tend to resist a change in velocity. This was later formalized by Newton as his First Law of Motion: An object at rest will remain at rest and an object in motion will remain in motion unless acted upon by an external force.
This means that the positions and vectors of balls on a billiard table are determined entirely by previous events. This doesn't mean that they are, in practice, accurately predictable at long range; even simplifying things by using theoretically perfect balls and table, and ignoring such factors as wind, temperature, etc., measurements and calculations can never be made to infinite precision. So regardless of the degree of precision to which you are working, deviations below that resolution will propagate upward to large deviations in the long run.
Extrapolating this to human behavior translates to the claim that "It's billiard balls all the way down". Unfathomable complexity and imperfect precision may make accurate prediction impossible, but that doesn't mean the results are not entirely deterministic, just that for all intents and purposes, they might as well be.
I am not convinced that any such thing as 'intrinsic randomness' exists -- but then, I am less than entirely comfortable with my grasp of quantum theory.