A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

But the libertarian position is that our actions are not rigidly determined, but that we have the capacity to make genuine choices. Thus even though we in fact chose to do A, we could have done B.

But what made us choose A? Something determined that genuine choice, or it was random. Free will is an illusion.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian said:
But what made us choose A? Something determined that genuine choice, or it was random. Free will is an illusion.

~~ Paul

I'm not sure what you mean by determined. My general disposition at a given time? Well yeah. When I say that I believe in free will I'm obviously not denying that my choices are not "determined" by what I want to do. But a particular choice is not inevitable. You can argue that whichever I ultimately choose, A or B, it's because I wanted to choose that, and therefore I am a hapless puppet of my own desires. But then you're making the definition of determinism so broad so as to rule out libertarian free will by definition. A shallow victory surely?

 

[Suggestologist]

Actually, it is very convenient to speak of "consciousness", as it is convenient to speak of "sunrise". Both are natural products of our language-community, and we understand one another when we use them. But the fool on the hill sees the sun going down and the eyes in his head see the world spinning round (I always wanted to use that line). Sunrise and sunset are not the true story. Neither is "consciousness".

Sunrise and sunset are merely labels. As compound words, they may tell false stories, but they still have real and valid referents.

No, once again it is reacting to her smile. I can only infer a "consciousness" from my feeling, thinking and remembering--to then attribute feeling, thinking and remembering to "consciousness" is circular. Consciousness is defined by our thinking, feeling, remembering; it does not cause them.

Perhaps the relationship is more cybernetic and less cause-effect than you now understand?

I think I addressed this above. I include feeling, remembering, thinking, and probably a few more that escape me at present, in the category of behaviors that we label "consciousness". (I also don't like talking about "replaying memories" for similar reasons. It makes it sound like a memory exists separate from our remembering. All we do is replay this thing that exists...where? We infer "memories" from our remembering--they don't exist separately from remembering. I don't know if that helps or hurts in explaining my views on "consciousness".)

Ok. Then let's talk about encoding and reviving memories?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

I'm not sure what you mean by determined. My general disposition at a given time? Well yeah. When I say that I believe in free will I'm obviously not denying that my choices are not "determined" by what I want to do. But a particular choice is not inevitable. You can argue that whichever I ultimately choose, A or B, it's because I wanted to choose that, and therefore I am a hapless puppet of my own desires. But then you're making the definition of determinism so broad so as to rule out libertarian free will by definition. A shallow victory surely?

A number of components contribute to your decision: memories, desires, current environment, other people, and so forth. In which component is the free will hiding? And by what "laws of free will" does this freedom contribute to the decision?

I just cannot picture decision components that aren't either algorithmic or random.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Sunrise and sunset are merely labels. As compound words, they may tell false stories, but they still have real and valid referents.

My point exactly. I do not deny what you call consciousness, not at all. I simply say that the way we talk about it is a "false story".

Perhaps the relationship is more cybernetic and less cause-effect than you now understand?

I am not following you here. I believe I was arguing against causation here; I did not say that consciousness was causal or caused, but that it was defined by a particular set of private behaviors. "Cybernetic" rings a bell, but not a clear one, so I will admit ignorance of the term.

Ok. Then let's talk about encoding and reviving memories?

"Encoding" follows the same metaphor as storage. It has been a tremendously useful metaphor for memory research, but comes with its own set of blinders. Which, I suppose, fits with my previous point; the language we use to talk about consciousness, or memory, or thought, determines to a huge extent the way we "feel" that it works. The intuitively obvious is intuitively obvious only because we have been raised to think so.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian said:
A number of components contribute to your decision: memories, desires, current environment, other people, and so forth. In which component is the free will hiding? And by what "laws of free will" does this freedom contribute to the decision?

I just cannot picture decision components that aren't either algorithmic or random.

~~ Paul

You would need to explain why decisions necessarily need to follow algorithms or be random. Incidentally this random issue is interesting. Why don't you apply similar reading to the random process and say something can't genuinely be random? After all one might argue there must must be a factor which compels an event to happen one way or another.

Anyway, lets imagine I'm very thirsty. I therefore have the desire to quench my thirst. Therefore almost certainly I will get myself a drink, say a pint of pineapple squash. Does this mean I don't have free will?

I would say it does not have this implication. After all I can consciously reframe from having my drink. Although all my behaviour might be heavily influenced by all sorts of factors, I would say at the end of the day that *I* am the final arbiter of what my behaviour will be. So the component in which the free will is "hiding" is the *I*.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

You would need to explain why decisions necessarily need to follow algorithms or be random. Incidentally this random issue is interesting. Why don't you apply similar reading to the random process and say something can't genuinely be random? After all one might argue there must must be a factor which compels an event to happen one way or another.

My explanation is that I can't think of any other way that a component could contribute to a decision, other than algorithmically or randomly. If you can think of one, I will certainly consider it. When I hear "free will," my brain locks up.

I agree that something that appears to be random might not actually be random. However, I can at least picture a random influence on decision making.

Anyway, lets imagine I'm very thirsty. I therefore have the desire to quench my thirst. Therefore almost certainly I will get myself a drink, say a pint of pineapple squash. Does this mean I don't have free will?

No, but it certainly isn't a compelling example of free will.

I would say it does not have this implication. After all I can consciously reframe from having my drink. Although all my behaviour might be heavily influenced by all sorts of factors, I would say at the end of the day that *I* am the final arbiter of what my behaviour will be. So the component in which the free will is "hiding" is the *I*.

If you're going to hide free will in the already magical, opaque domain of your brand of consciousness, then I won't be able to address it any better than everything else we've discussed. Yet I can't help wondering how this *I* of yours makes its supposedly free decisions. *I*'s desires might arise algorithmically, they might be random, or they might be . . . ?

~~ Paul

 

[BillyJoe]

*I*'s desires might arise algorithmically, they might be random, or they might be . . .?

I think A.G. Cairns-Smith might have the answer.

BillyJoe
(Sorry, just messing around )

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Anyway, lets imagine I'm very thirsty. I therefore have the desire to quench my thirst. Therefore almost certainly I will get myself a drink, say a pint of pineapple squash. Does this mean I don't have free will?

Interesting choice of examples there.

After all I can consciously refra[in] from having my drink.

Sure about that? Ever tried? What's the longest you ever went without drinking (by choice)?

...I would say at the end of the day that *I* am the final arbiter of what my behaviour will be. So the component in which the free will is "hiding" is the *I*.

You're basically saying you have a little man inside your head that makes all the decisions. I don't see how that changes anything; we can fairly ask the same questions about randomness, determinism, and algorithmicity with regard to the details of his decision-making processes.

 

[BillyJoe]

You're basically saying you have a little man inside your head that makes all the decisions.

Oh no, I don't think *I*an is merely a homunculus, he is truely a m*I*racle man.

BillyJoe.

 

[Win]

Titus:

Sorry not to have given you my critique of your paper yet; press of events and all that. But I will get to it soon, when I can give it some serious attention.

And I'm looking in fairly regularly, so Ian, you could answer my question without fear of my missing your answer.

 

[Ziggurat]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Anyway, lets imagine I'm very thirsty. I therefore have the desire to quench my thirst. Therefore almost certainly I will get myself a drink, say a pint of pineapple squash. Does this mean I don't have free will?

I would say it does not have this implication. After all I can consciously reframe from having my drink.

And how exactly do you distinguish between having what you consider free will and simply having a much more complicated algorithm for determining whether or not to drink than simply whether or not you're thirsty?

I think we run into a variant of the old Turing problem whenever we try to delve into our own conciousness: if we ARE algorithmic, that doesn't mean we can show that we are. Of course, it would make little difference in daily life to know either way.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
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So why endow people with consciousness and not rocks?
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Loki
I think the way you have phrased this question reveals your error. Materialism doesn't "define consciousness", then find things in the real world that fit the label. The label is created after observing the physical behaviour.

Interesting.

A rock moves down a hill - the term "rolling" is coined to describe this physical behaviour. Humans are observed thinking and exchanging ideas. The term "consciousness" is coined to descrive this set of behaviours.

OK let's forget about the word consciousness. Are rocks phenomenally conscious?

Why don't we endow 'rocks' with consciousness? Because they exhibit *none* of the characteristics we associate with it.

This is true, but doesn't at all address the question of what the materialists position is on whether or not rocks are phenomenally conscious.

You might think that the physical process of the brain constitutes the entirety of 'consciousness' (materialists), or that the brain is a necessary component but supplimented by additional 'stuff' (Win's dualism), or that the brain is a 'experience limiter' installed by the metamind to keep you from seeing the "real world" (Titus' idealism). In any of these cases, at least *part* of the definition of "consciousness" is "brain processing". Rocks don't have brains, rocks aren't conscious.

Could you point to any dictionary definition which states that at least part of the definition of consciousness is brain processing? As I say, if you define consciousness this way, then saying rocks are not conscious is irrelevant to what I'm really asking. I will just say do materialists think that rocks are phenomenally conscious? If not then why not given that human beings are?

Now, Win offers the thought that you really mean to ask "why do brain processes generate qualia, why doesn't 'rolling' generate a quale (what it is like to be a rock rolling)". And I'd probably go with his dualist answer - that qualia require self awareness, which requires information processing, which requires a complex set of physical processes (neurons, etc) to do the computations. None of these prerequisites reside in rocks, therefore consciousness (and qualia) cannot reside in rocks.]

OK that's absolutely fine. So it's information processing. But presumably not all information processing? What about a good chess computer? Is that conscious at all? If not then why not?

 

[Interesting Ian]

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After all I can consciously refra[in] from having my drink.
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Sure about that? Ever tried? What's the longest you ever went without drinking (by choice)?

I've never tried it. But clearly I could do so. Of course there will come a point when my need to drink is so great that I will find it extremely difficult to resist drinking. So what?

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...I would say at the end of the day that *I* am the final arbiter of what my behaviour will be. So the component in which the free will is "hiding" is the *I*.
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You're basically saying you have a little man inside your head that makes all the decisions. I don't see how that changes anything; we can fairly ask the same questions about randomness, determinism, and algorithmicity with regard to the details of his decision-making processes.

You have to stop looking at the world with materialist eyes and see the world as I see it. The little man is the self. There is no other self. This self makes all the decisions but is clearly influenced in those decisions by ones environment and physical states of brain. The point here though is that even though external influences (environment and states of brain) may be identical, I submit I could have chosen otherwise than what I did. If you then counter that I did do a particular course of action, and therefore by definition I am determined, then fair enough. This though simply amounts to I do what I do (all other things being equal) because of what I am. But I do not believe that libertarian free will entails that I do what I do because of no reason at all or because of what I'm not!

 

[Interesting Ian]

And how exactly do you distinguish between having what you consider free will and simply having a much more complicated algorithm for determining whether or not to drink than simply whether or not you're thirsty?

I cannot prove that a particular complicated algorithm cannot completely describe my behaviour. But 2 points here. It certainly seems to be the case that I could have done other than what I did. Secondly, I have absolutely no reason to suppose my behaviour can be described by some complex algorithm. The main point here, that people are disputing, is my contention that the notion of libertarian free will is a coherent one.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Win,

If materialism is correct then the only relationship that could obtain between the self of today and the self of yesterday are memories, and a similar physical state of the brain. Not the very same actual physical "stuff" or location of the brain though.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

You have to stop looking at the world with materialist eyes and see the world as I see it. The little man is the self. There is no other self. This self makes all the decisions but is clearly influenced in those decisions by ones environment and physical states of brain.

You have done nothing but push the problem one level deeper. You have to explain what this "free will" is, since you appear to claim it is something other than algorithmic or random. What is this will? Why is it free? How are decisions made under free will? What does it mean to "just make a choice"?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Paul, is there any purpose to this? I have already explained my position. If you do not understand it yet I don't think you ever will.

Ian said:
You have done nothing but push the problem one level deeper. You have to explain what this "free will" is,

The capacity to choose. Just like how you define free will except my free will can't be described by an algorithm.

since you appear to claim it is something other than algorithmic or random. What is this will?

The ability of the self to act in the world.

Why is it free?

Because that's its nature.

How are decisions made under free will?

By a disposition to behave in one way or another.

What does it mean to "just make a choice"?

To do what one wants to do.

 

[Win]

Ian:

If materialism is correct then the only relationship that could obtain between the self of today and the self of yesterday are memories, and a similar physical state of the brain. Not the very same actual physical "stuff" or location of the brain though.

Let's look into this a bit.

When you say memories and a "similar physical state" constitute the relationship between self of today and self of tomorrow, presumably you mean that any entity at time x+n can be considered "the same self" as an entity at time x iff that entity has memories of being the entity at time x and a "similar physical state."

So, both post dup Ians are "the same self" as the pre dup Ian.

Or is there something else involved?

 

[Win]

Oh, and just to stay up with the conversation:

Aren't your choices determined by your identity, Ian?

Even if materialism is false, so-called libertarian free will is incoherent.