A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Is your point about eliminative materialism or not?

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Did he indeed. Perhaps you would be good enough to explain the difference between seeming to have an experience and really having an experience?
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Wow, perhaps you recall that I don't agree with Stimpson

I think I should be aware of that by now! lol But you're giving materialists arguments so I really should respond to you the same way as if Stimpy or other materialists had said it. Sorry if you thought I was being a bit stroppy.

My point is not that Stimpson is right, but that this is simply the crux of his and for example Dennett's position: that it may seem that we have conscious experiences but that we really don't. I had written a paper to show that this line of reasoning is absurd, remember?

Yes don't worry But you might be accused of attacking a strawman here. BillieJoe asserts that Dennet does belief that consciousness exists.

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Certainly there are physical processes that occur in human beings that don't occur in boulders. One can call such certain physical processes as "consciousness" if one wants. Alternatively I could call certain physical processes that boulders undergo as "conscious" and the physical processes constitutive of a person as not conscious. Excuse me, but what exactly is this supposed to demonstrate?
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What this was supposed to demonstrate is that on this point Stimpson seems to be consistent. Which, again, is not the same as saying that he's right, as he obviously is not.

Well I genuinely don't understand why he is. Do we define consciousness as being present purely from behaviour? Or are we talking about special physical processes, or what? A boulder does something, it rolls down hills. It's behaviour can be described by physical laws. Likewise, if the physical world is closed, our behaviour too can be completely described by physical laws. So what's the crucial distinction between us and a boulder? On the face of it we should describe either both of them as conscious or neither of them as being so.

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So if a boulder is wholly non-conscious, why aren't we all p-zombies?
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What I meant to stress is that to an eliminative materialist we ARE!

Well I find it difficult to believe that eliminitivist materialists would affirm this.

 

[AmateurScientist]

Ian,

I've only just now dropped into this thread for a quick look, so I hope you'll forgive me for not having read most of it.

In the last two pages or so, at least, I have been most impressed with your handling of questions posed to you and your responses to opposing arguments. The Ian I had grown used to often was drunk and abusive in his responses. What I have seen lately betrays your strong intellect and reasoning. The insults are mostly absent. Your arguments work much better without them.

Please keep it up, even if you are on the wrong side of the debate.



AS

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,

I've only just now dropped into this thread for a quick look, so I hope you'll forgive me for not having read most of it.

In the last two pages or so, at least, I have been most impressed with your handling of questions posed to you and your responses to opposing arguments.

Oh well you know, that's me

 

[Interesting Ian]

I don't know whether to quibble about "consciousness" or "necessitates" here. This particular set of brain activities has been labeled "consciousness".

Who has done this labelling? When I use the word consciousness I am referring to the standard meaning, namely the actual, qualitative feel of awareness.

We can't say they necessitate consciousness, or give rise to consciousness, or any other relationship that implies one thing (processes) is causing another (consc). Rather, these processes (perception, thought, feeling, memory) have simply been labeled "consciousness".

But do you believe that we are all p-zombies then? That no-one has ever been conscious? (in the standard definitions sense)

The rock's action has been labeled "rolling." Do we ask whether, when you think, you might actually just be rolling? Again, the confusion comes because of an assumed special status for "consciousness".

Well ok, if neither boulders or human beings are conscious, I can't argue with you.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Who has done this labelling? When I use the word consciousness I am referring to the standard meaning, namely the actual, qualitative feel of awareness.

So am I. But that "standard meaning" does not imply that consciousness is something irreducibly nonphysical. You're just assuming it does.

1 a : the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself b : the state or fact of being conscious of an external object, state, or fact c : AWARENESS; especially : concern for some social or political cause
2 : the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought : MIND
3 : the totality of conscious states of an individual

But do you believe that we are all p-zombies then? That no-one has ever been conscious? (in the standard definitions sense)

No.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

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Paul, I don't really know what eliminitivist materialism means. Moreover, even if I did, I don't think it would be possible to define it not using those words.
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Then why on Earth did you ask us to vote about it?

So I could ask the people who declare they are EM's what it means, and then I could decide whether the paradox is applicable.

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Well they wouldn't say that. Anyway it's clear that from the perspective of each Ian they are not identical.
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Haven't you been saying that both Ians are identical? In particular, that both have exactly the same thoughts about the fact that one is the original and one is the duplicate?

Yes they are identical in that sense, from the third person perspective. But for each Ian, the other Ian is effectively a different person. Just a person who acts and thinks exactly like them.

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Yes that's the argument. What is special about the physical events going on in the brain which somehow necessitates consciousness?
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Necessitates? What is special about the brain is that it gives rise to subjective experiences that we call consciousness. Exactly like the movement of air molecules in the atmosphere gives rise to what we call wind. Are we concerned that a boulder is not windy?

Nah, wouldn't like boulders to be windy. It's bad enough that people are.

Anyway, wind can be derived from the movement of air molecules. Likewise we might be able to derive our behaviour from the physical processes occurring in the brain. But we can't derive consciousness. Unless you either deny its existence or declare it to be one and the same thing as physical processes.

 

[Interesting Ian]

A brain is a machine that produces what we call consciousness in the same way that a television set produces what we call "picture and sound". If you can find any boulders that work well as TV sets, you'd make a fortune.

I absolutely agree with this providing you change the word consciousness to mind and providing the word "produce" doesn't imply generate.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

But we can't derive consciousness. Unless you either deny its existence or declare it to be one and the same thing as physical processes.

It is a product of physical processes. Is that what "one and the same thing as" means?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

It is a product of physical processes. Is that what "one and the same thing as" means?

~~ Paul

I don't know. But if consciousness is a product of physical processes why is the physical process of rolling down a hill excluded?

 

[AmateurScientist]

I don't know. But if consciousness is a product of physical processes why is the physical process of rolling down a hill excluded?

Because consciousness is not a product of just any physical process; it's one of only certain narrow sets of physical processes.

As far as we can tell, rolling down a hill has no causal relationship with consciousness.

AS

 

[Interesting Ian]

Because consciousness is not a product of just any physical process; it's one of only certain narrow sets of physical processes.

As far as we can tell, rolling down a hill has no causal relationship with consciousness.

AS

Ah right! So certain special physical processes are required. But what is it about such processes that they produce consciousness where as other processes don't?

 

[ceptimus]

I absolutely agree with this providing you change the word consciousness to mind and providing the word "produce" doesn't imply generate.

Sorry Ian, you've lost me here. I could swap the words 'mind' and 'consciousness' and equally swap the words 'produce' and 'generate'. You could write down all the possible (four) permutations of the sentence, and they would all mean substantially the same thing to me.

I obviously attatch different meanings to these words than you do. I'd be interested to know from other posters whether they think changing these words makes any difference to the meaning for them.

 

[ceptimus]

Ah right! So certain special physical processes are required. But what is it about such processes that they produce consciousness where as other processes don't?

This is a chicken and egg question. What is special about the processes is that they produce what we choose to call consciousness.

In the same way, the processes inside your computer cause what we call, 'a working computer'.

[edit: I just realised I used the word 'cause' in one sentence and 'produce' in the other. These mean the same thing to me in this context. Change either or both of them to any of: 'produce', 'generate', 'cause', and the meaning is the same (to me)]

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian asked:

Ah right! So certain special physical processes are required. But what is it about such processes that they produce consciousness where as other processes don't?

It is the case by definition of the word consciousness. The experience of our brain processes is called consciousness. Our brain processes could have produced substantially different experiences and we could still have called them consciousness. A dolphin might call his mental experiences weee wooo, which best translates into consciousness in H. sapiens English, even though his experiences are quite different.

Now, if what you really want to ask is how the brain produces the particular mental experiences we have, you'll have to wait patiently for the neurophysiologists to do their thing.

~~ Paul

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But if consciousness is a product of physical processes why is the physical process of rolling down a hill excluded?

If combustion is a product of physical processes, why does hydrogen burn and helium doesn't?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Sorry Ian, you've lost me here. I could swap the words 'mind' and 'consciousness' and equally swap the words 'produce' and 'generate'. You could write down all the possible (four) permutations of the sentence, and they would all mean substantially the same thing to me.

I obviously attatch different meanings to these words than you do. I'd be interested to know from other posters whether they think changing these words makes any difference to the meaning for them.

I'm referring to my famous television set analogy of the mind/brain/self.

 

[Dancing David]

I don't know. But if consciousness is a product of physical processes why is the physical process of rolling down a hill excluded?

It is not that consiousness is excluded. Before you gave an answer that stated that consiousness is awareness. And that for some reason that is irreducable.

I would assume that this is for some reason it is therefore not open to investigation by science. Meaning that consiousness can not be defined from the totaly observational, because at some level it is beyond explanation.

But there is a process that is called perception, is there not? At some point I feel that both the materialist and idealist have to agree that perception occurs.

From the idealist viewpoint there is a perception occuring, is there not? Otherwise there can not be interaction with the 'realm of the senses'.

Perception has been discussed endlessly, into the interaction of photons with receptors and or the irreducale nature of qualia. Which is basicaly an argument of certainty. If there is not an ability to explain it totaly then there are questions about how the interaction occurs.

Which gets me to the point, excluding the ontology issues, both the idealist and the materialist agrees that consiousness exists.

There are sensory perceptions!

When discussion occurs where the two sides are talking, there is still the issue of the fact that sensory perceptions exist.

There are physical bodies associated with sensory impressions, but only reports of them, the sensory impressions.

If a rock rolls down a hill and a sensory perception rolls down a hill the only difference is that the rock at this point is unable to give a report of it'e sensory perceptions.

Asking if something that does not have sensory perception exists, is a speculative question.

When the rock tells me that it has rolled down the hill, then we can discuss the validity of introspective report of it's rolling down the hill.

 

[Interesting Ian]

This is a chicken and egg question. What is special about the processes is that they produce what we choose to call consciousness.

I know you think they do, but why do they? How many times must I ask?

In the same way, the processes inside your computer cause what we call, 'a working computer'.
[/B]

But it's not the same way is it, because that would only explain our function or behaviour, not the qualitative feel of conscious experience.

 

[Interesting Ian]

But if consciousness is a product of physical processes why is the physical process of rolling down a hill excluded?
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If combustion is a product of physical processes, why does hydrogen burn and helium doesn't?

I don't know, but I'm sure it can be given a scientific explanation. Do you believe you can do likewise for phenomenal consciousness without presupposing the materialist metaphysic?

 

[Interesting Ian]

I don't know, but I'm sure it can be given a scientific explanation. Do you believe you can do likewise for phenomenal consciousness without presupposing the materialist metaphysic?

And of course even if you do presuppose materialism this still doesn't address the question of why humans are conscious and boulders aren't. What does materialism have to say about this?

BTW I note you ignored my question about whether it was me or Stimpy who was right about the twin paradox in relativity.