A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[ceptimus]

(concerning ceptimus's computer analogy)

But it's not the same way is it, because that would only explain our function or behaviour, not the qualitative feel of conscious experience.

Are you talking about self-awareness here? Is that the crucial difference, for you, between a very complex machine and a conscious being?

I believe that a sufficiently complex computer, maybe one made in a hundred years time, could be self-aware, and that it would then be 'conscious'.

That's what I was trying to say earlier when I ranked the rock, ant, fish and so on in order of the compexity of the brain function. Once the brain function reaches a certain level of complexity, I call that consciousness. It (for me) doesn't have to either be there or not be there - it can be present in any amount from zero (rocks) up to one (me). I think self-awareness and consciousness are emergent phenomena, related to the complexity of the brain's function.

How do we measure complexity? Well, one measure of the complexity of an object is the amount of data required to document it fully. Imagine, in the future, neurophysiologists have figured out exactly how some animals brains work, down to the last detail. They have written concise books, one for each animal. Now if the book for a frog was 500 times as long as the book for a worm, then I would say the frog was 500 times more conscious than a worm.

Human pride would cause us to hope that the human brain book would be longer than any other animal's.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

I know you think they do, but why do they? How many times must I ask?

That's one of the main appeals of materialism for me - it doesn't require a why! "Just does" works fine for materialism. Materialism attempts to explain "how" a set of physcial processes produces/causes/generates consciousness - but there is no "why". "Pure dumb luck" is an acceptable answer IMO.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I know you think they do, but why do they? How many times must I ask?
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That's one of the main appeals of materialism for me - it doesn't require a why! "Just does" works fine for materialism. Materialism attempts to explain "how" a set of physcial processes produces/causes/generates consciousness - but there is no "why". "Pure dumb luck" is an acceptable answer IMO.

I'm obviously not being clear enough in my question. I want to know with what justification you reject the idea that a rolling boulder is conscious. I also want to know with what justification the materialist has for supposing human beings are conscious. Obviously you can't declare that materialism doesn't have to answer these questions! LOL

It seems to me that everyone is presupposing without any attempt at justification, that human beings are conscious, but not rolling boulders. Well ok, Ceptimus has attempted some sort of an answer.

PS Incidentally I don't think it makes sense in the context of materialism to ask how physical processes produce consciousness. Do you agree?

 

[Loki]

Ian,

I'm obviously not being clear enough in my question.

No, you're being quite clear.

I want to know with what justification you reject the idea that a rolling boulder is conscious.

By observation :

1. As best we can tell/detect/observe at this point in time consciousness only occurs when certain physical processes occur.
2. These physical processes do not occur in rocks
3. Therefore, rocks aren't conscious.

This makes for an eminently falsifiable position - simply demonstrate consciousness attached to a set of physical processes such as that found in a rock.

I'd have thought this question is far more relevant to an Idealist. Since you beleive that consciousness/self *can* and *does* occassionally take a wander away from the physical processes it usually hangs out with, why wouldn't it/they occassionally stop by a rock and try "experiencing being a rock" for a while?

I also want to know with what justification the materialist has for supposing human beings are conscious.

Well ok, Ceptimus has attempted some sort of an answer.

And I quite agree with his answer. I'm not sure why you feel it's unsatisfactory.

Incidentally I don't think it makes sense in the context of materialism to ask how physical processes produce consciousness. Do you agree?

No, I think I disagree. Not sure exactly what you're getting at though - can you be more clear as to your objection? By "how" I meant an understanding of the cause and effect chain.

 

[ceptimus]

Well ok, Ceptimus has attempted some sort of an answer.

Thank you I try my best.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
But it's not the same way is it, because that would only explain our function or behaviour, not the qualitative feel of conscious experience.
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Are you talking about self-awareness here? Is that the crucial difference, for you, between a very complex machine and a conscious being?

I don't think a complex machine and a conscious being have anything to do with each other. We presumably don't operate through a machine in the afterlife.

I believe that a sufficiently complex computer, maybe one made in a hundred years time, could be self-aware, and that it would then be 'conscious'.

WOW! A 100 years time! Well, we'll probably both be dead by then but perhaps we could still meet up in 2103 in our future incarnations to see how much progress has been made LOL

That's what I was trying to say earlier when I ranked the rock, ant, fish and so on in order of the compexity of the brain function. Once the brain function reaches a certain level of complexity, I call that consciousness.

When I use the word consiousness I mean being aware, not a complex state. It causes confusion if you use a differing definition of consciousness to everyone else

It (for me) doesn't have to either be there or not be there - it can be present in any amount from zero (rocks) up to one (me). I think self-awareness and consciousness are emergent phenomena, related to the complexity of the brain's function.

Right, ok. So a thermostat would be very slightly conscious. Don't you feel this is somewhat implausible? What profound thoughts does it have? It's too hot or it's too cold?

How do we measure complexity? Well, one measure of the complexity of an object is the amount of data required to document it fully.

So basically consciousness is information?

Imagine, in the future, neurophysiologists have figured out exactly how some animals brains work, down to the last detail. They have written concise books, one for each animal. Now if the book for a frog was 500 times as long as the book for a worm, then I would say the frog was 500 times more conscious than a worm.

Human pride would cause us to hope that the human brain book would be longer than any other animal's.

Okie dokie. BTW in saying that consciousness are an emergent phenomenon, you're not subscribing to epiphenomenalism are you? I mean is that which emerges itself physical or not?

 

[ceptimus]

I don't think a complex machine and a conscious being have anything to do with each other. We presumably don't operate through a machine in the afterlife.

I don't believe in an afterlife. I think if you could show that an afterlife existed, that would disprove materialism.

When I use the word consiousness I mean being aware, not a complex state. It causes confusion if you use a differing definition of consciousness to everyone else

I'm trying to give my (materialist) view of what consciousness is - I thought that was what you were asking? If we must presuppose that consciousness only exists in the idealist sense, we won't make any progress here.

Right, ok. So a thermostat would be very slightly conscious. Don't you feel this is somewhat implausible? What profound thoughts does it have? It's too hot or it's too cold?

No. That would be like saying that a grain of sand is very slightly enormous.

So basically consciousness is information?

Close - but information can be a static thing - words in a book, or magnetic domains on a hard drive. Consciousness is a process. The greater the complexity of the process, the greater the consciousness. But remember, even the most complex non-living processes we know, say the entire internet, has only a tiny level of compexity compared to brains. So if we were to say that the internet was slightly conscious, we'd be back to the thermostat, or grain of sand thing.

Okie dokie. BTW in saying that consciousness are an emergent phenomenon, you're not subscribing to epiphenomenalism are you? I mean is that which emerges itself physical or not?

I'm sorry I don't understand these philosophy terms. I don't know what epiphenomenalism is. I'll go and try to find out though, after I've posted this response.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian exclaimed:

WOW! A 100 years time! Well, we'll probably both be dead by then but perhaps we could still meet up in 2103 in our future incarnations to see how much progress has been made LOL

You say that as if 100 years is a long time.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian exclaimed:
WOW! A 100 years time! Well, we'll probably both be dead by then but perhaps we could still meet up in 2103 in our future incarnations to see how much progress has been made LOL
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You say that as if 100 years is a long time.

No, just the thought of a conscious computer in 100 years time. LOL No chance!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If it says it's conscious, should we believe it?

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

So the real problem is that ian wants to set groundrules , and then just go, well you ignored the groundrules.

there are a number of issues:

The How of consiousness is very important to the materialist.

The What of consiousness is very important to the materialist.

First point:

All things called consiousness are a series of simpler events, they are reducible, this pont will always be one for discussion.

When Ian defines consiousness as awareness, he is using a very vauge definition.

Does he mean the actual experience of 'red' that our brain produces when the receptors in our eyes react to a certain wavelength?

Does he mean the cognitive process? That is red;
which also involves the comparison and associaton of
Does he mean the cognitive process of memory?

Does he mean the noetic expeience: I am alive?

For each act of 'qualia' there are goinf to be cognitive processes, otherwise there would be no need for the brain.

Can you see without your eye?

Can you percieve without a brain?


I still want to know how idealism allows for the fragmentation of self into different bodies, and how it explains drunken-ess.

 

[Win]

Ian:

I know I'm a hit and run poster on this thread, and you're doing yeoman's work answering everyone else's questions, but I was hoping you might address my little query, to wit: What's the relationship between Ian of right now and Ian of yesterday morning?

Aside from the hangover.

Loki:

By observation:

1. As best we can tell/detect/observe at this point in time consciousness only occurs when certain physical processes occur.

2. These physical processes do not occur in rocks

3. Therefore, rocks aren't conscious.

Rather not.

First off you're equivocating on consciousness. The kind of consciousness we're talking about, phenomenal consciousness, is never observed.

Instead:

1. I'm conscious.

2. I believe (or better, you believe) that phenomenal consciousness is a physical consequence of what's going on in my brain.

3. Rocks don't have brains.

Therefore, rocks aren't conscious.

As you can see, it's not by observation that you conclude that rocks aren't conscious. It's by assumption.

 

[Win]

It's by assumption.

Something materialism is excellent at.

 

[Loki]

Win,

I often have this feeling that I mean what you say!

As you can see, it's not by observation that you conclude that rocks aren't conscious. It's by assumption.

But isn't my assumption *at least* partially based upon observation?

1. I observe/direct-access/introspect my own consciousness;
2. I observe I have a brain.
3. I observe what *appears to be* similar if not. identical "conscious behaviours" in you.
4. I observe you have a brain.
5. I observe a complete lack of "conscious behaviours" in rocks.
6. I observe that rocks don't have a brain.

I therefore (tentatively) conclude that brains and consciousness are linked in some way. In fact, don't we all agree on this? Based upon observation, we conclude that brain and mind have a relationship? The rest of the discussion is simply about the nature of the relationship?

Ian's asking "why do you believe there's a relationship between brains and minds, but not between rocks and minds?" I'd still say (even after reading your comment) that observation supports the brain/mind relationship, and rejects the rock/mind relationship. As far as I can see under dualism, mysterianism, idealism, materialism, frankoism and Schwarzeneggerism we can't (currently) *prove* rocks aren't conscious (ie, they "know what it's like to be a rock" ), we can only assume/conclude this based upon observation.

 

[Win]

Loki:

But isn't my assumption *at least* partially based upon observation?

In the sense that we observe "conscious behaviours," yes. But that's why I said you were equivocating. All those behaviours are explicable in terms of processes that have nothing to do with phenomenal consciousness.

I think that brains and phenomenal consciousness are linked because of a hunch I have about information and the nature of phenomenal consciousness. You conclude brains and phenomenal consciousness are linked because materialistic explanations have done a good job at making sense of lots of other things.

Ian's asking "why do you believe there's a relationship between brains and minds, but not between rocks and minds?" I'd still say (even after reading your comment) that observation supports the brain/mind relationship, and rejects the rock/mind relationship. As far as I can see under dualism, mysterianism, idealism, materialism, frankoism and Schwarzeneggerism we can't (currently) *prove* rocks aren't conscious (ie, they "know what it's like to be a rock" ), we can only assume/conclude this based upon observation.

And I'd have to disagree. Observation supports neither. A panpsychist would argue that rocks have a rudimentary consciousness, as you say, what it's like to be a rock. Perfectly respectable position. Tempts me sometimes.

As to direct-access to our own consciousnesses, that isn't something we "observe." Even so, knowing that you have phenomenal consciousness doesn't connect that phenomenal consciousness to a brain. Only after you've made that leap, phenomenal consciousness comes from brains, can you start to draw any conclusions about rocks.

 

[Loki]

Win,

But that's why I said you were equivocating. All those behaviours are explicable in terms of processes that have nothing to do with phenomenal consciousness.

I think you're wrong on this Win - the terms for this particular discussion are Ian's. You and I might agree, but unless I've misunderstood him in the past, Ian *clearly* includes things such as "emotion" and "memory" in the category of "non-physical" consciousness.

Observation supports neither.

I gather that you mean "observation of 'external' conscious behaviours doesn't support opinions about phenomenal consciousness".

I think that brains and phenomenal consciousness are linked because of a hunch I have about information and the nature of phenomenal consciousness.

But if you observed a banana typing (coherent) messages on your keyboard you'd be forced to reconsider the brain/mind link wouldn't you? The absence of any such observations gives you a fair degree of confidence in your hunch?

A panpsychist would argue that rocks have a rudimentary consciousness...

Since I can't actually fully define consciousness, I'm forced to concede (I guess) that even under materialism rocks may have some sort of consciousness - just not much like what we normally think if. But I must say that I find this to be a fairly meaningless discussion about "consciousness", and still can't see why materialism would "suffer" from this assumption anymore than any other metaphysical position.

 

[Win]

Loki:

I think you're wrong on this Win - the terms for this particular discussion are Ian's. You and I might agree, but unless I've misunderstood him in the past, Ian *clearly* includes things such as "emotion" and "memory" in the category of "non-physical" consciousness.

OK. Even so, you can't observe an emotion or a memory in the way I think Ian would define those as examples of (phenomenal) consciousness.

So, I think my point stands, viz: You can't *observe* consciousness.

I gather that you mean "observation of 'external' conscious behaviours doesn't support opinions about phenomenal consciousness".

Yes.

But if you observed a banana typing (coherent) messages on your keyboard you'd be forced to reconsider the brain/mind link wouldn't you? The absence of any such observations gives you a fair degree of confidence in your hunch?

Maybe. More importantly, I'd be forced to reconsider some of my ideas about the motive powers of bananas.

Seriously, observations about what things do doesn't tell us anything about what they experience. P-zombies, robot doubles, blah, blah.

Since I can't actually fully define consciousness, I'm forced to concede (I guess) that even under materialism rocks may have some sort of consciousness - just not much like what we normally think if. But I must say that I find this to be a fairly meaningless discussion about "consciousness", and still can't see why materialism would "suffer" from this assumption anymore than any other metaphysical position.

Well, because it happens to be materialism's conclusion in this regard - brains make phenomenal consciousness. And assuming your conclusion is frowned upon in certain circles.

 

[Loki]

Win,

Seriously, observations about what things do doesn't tell us anything about what they experience.

Hmmm...the point I was making is that "observations about what things don't do does tell us something about what they experience."

In other words, since a rock exhibits *no* observable behaviours consistent with consciousness, we can conclude it has no experiences either.

Well, because it happens to be materialism's conclusion in this regard - brains make phenomenal consciousness.

Okay, now I'm just getting confused...

Ian might ask "what reason do you have for saying that 'expericences' only happen when 'brain processes' happen? Why can't 'experiences' happen when other physical processes like "rocks rolling' happen?"

Win would answer something like "because 'experiences' are the output from proto-physical processes that only come into play when certain physical processes occur".

Then Ian would say "but why do these proto-physical processes only occur when *some* physical processes occur - why don't they occur when a rock rolls?"

You'd answer "Because I assume they don't".

Ian (and I) would say"Ah ... but that's just assuming your conclusion".

And assuming your conclusion is frowned upon in certain circles.

You need to get out more

 

[Win]

Loki:

You need to get out more

So true, brother. I will do so, right after this.

Hmmm...the point I was making is that "observations about what things don't do does tell us something about what they experience."

In other words, since a rock exhibits *no* observable behaviours consistent with consciousness, we can conclude it has no experiences either.

I don't think there are any behaviours that can be described as "consistent with (phenomenal) consciousness." Since there aren't any, a rock can't lack them.

Ian might ask "what reason do you have for saying that 'expericences' only happen when 'brain processes' happen? Why can't 'experiences' happen when other physical processes like "rocks rolling' happen?"

Win would answer something like "because 'experiences' are the output from proto-physical processes that only come into play when certain physical processes occur".

Then Ian would say "but why do these proto-physical processes only occur when *some* physical processes occur - why don't they occur when a rock rolls?"

You'd answer "Because I assume they don't".

Ian (and I) would say"Ah ... but that's just assuming your conclusion".

First off, I'd answer something like "because phenomenal consciousness is consequence of the dual aspect of information, so it happens only when information is getting processed."

Ian asks . . .

I'd answer: Well, I suppose it's possible that panpsychism is true. I'm interested in developing a theory of phenomenal consciousness, and looking at phenomenal consciousness as an aspect of information seems promising, for a variety of reasons that I won't bore you with unless you ask. In any event, it seems more promising an avenue than panpsychism.

 

[Loki]

Win,

don't think there are any behaviours that can be described as "consistent with (phenomenal) consciousness."

I suspect a confusion over the (my) meaning of "consistent with", but is it really worth trying to continue this line of thought?

I'd answer: Well, I suppose it's possible that panpsychism is true. I'm interested in developing a theory of phenomenal consciousness, and looking at phenomenal consciousness as an aspect of information seems promising, for a variety of reasons that I won't bore you with unless you ask. In any event, it seems more promising an avenue than panpsychism

I'd agree with this if by "aspect of information" you meant something like "emergent property of information" ( I suspect you don't!).