A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Eliminative materialism and identity

II
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No difference between the 2 cases provided materialists hold that rocks are conscious. I would have thought they should do, but puzzlingly someone like Stimpy denied this earlier on in this thread. I think the only thing he said was that people are more complex or something like that (I asked him why a boulder rolling down a hill isn't conscious). But I don't see why complexity in itslef should magically ex nihilo produce consciousness. So if we are conscious yet rocks or boulders mysteriously aren't, then talking about rocks is not comparable.
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Titus
But Stimpson's point as I understood it was not that we are conscious in an irreducible and as he would call it mysterious way and a boulder is not. He just holds that the kind of physical processes he names consciousness don't occur in boulders.

Certainly there are physical processes that occur in human beings that don't occur in boulders. One can call such certain physical processes as "consciousness" if one wants. Alternatively I could call certain physical processes that boulders undergo as "conscious" and the physical processes constitutive of a person as not conscious. Excuse me, but what exactly is this supposed to demonstrate?

So in his ontology there is no question of one physical entity possessing irreducible consciousness and another possessing none. In his view, both entities are completely physical and neither of them possessing any non-physical properties.

So if a boulder is wholly non-conscious, why aren't we all p-zombies?

Besides, one rock or boulder would not be the same as the other rock or boulder.

Yup, just like I'm not the same as you. So what?

So it doesn't take consciousness to be a different (rather than the exact same) object eventhough one has the same properties as the other.

Sentence devoid of meaning.

 

[Interesting Ian]

In short, your paradox is :

1. Materialism does not distinguishing Ian 1 from Ian 2 ("They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.")
2. They distinguishable subjectively.
3. Therefore materialsim must be false.

You'd agree with this?

Well, I'll assume this is accurate enough, since you seemed to agree with BillyJoe. As I said yesterday, I don't think this is a paradox at all - there are two points you are failing to consider (from a materialist point of view).

First, location. I don't think you'll like this argument, since you've been declaring "location" irrelevant. Still, I feel it's a point you are wrong on. "Location" is vital in understanding "why" the subjective difference exists. The reason that Ian1 can say "I'm me" and that Ian2 is "not-me" is because he understands "location". If you can imagine (somehow) a world in which your "self" had no sense of "location in the physical world", or was not "attached to this body" then I think you'd have no reason to say "Ian2 is not-me".

Why do you think this?

In seems to me that the ability to distinguish between *your* location, and *everything else* is an essential part of the self.

So you've said before, and to which I disagreed. The most I reckon you can claim is that it's ones environment. Do you actually have any arguments to support your position?

So a sense of location is integral in the self. Since Ian1 can see that Ian2 is at a different location, it is this difference alone that establishes the "me/not-me" differentiation. Objectively they differ in location. Subjectively they differ in location. No paradox.

Bollock.

Second, identical contents. You might (how knows!) find this more acceptable. Under materialism, two identical brains produce two identical streams of consciousness - the contents are the same. If the contents of Ian1's stream includes "this is *me*, that's *not-me*", then we would expect that Ian2's brain would also contain the same contents. Objectively, the two streams are the same. Subjectively, the two streams are the same. No paradox.

Objectively the 2 streams are the same. Subjectively they are the same for anyone apart from the 2 Ians. From either Ian's perspective, they are not the same.

Imagine the two identical Ians in two identical rooms. They both look at a TV set and see a favourite movie. Both streams of consciousness will contain the the thought "gee, that's a nice TV set". The "thought" in each stream is the same, but the TV set it refers to is not - Ian1's thought refers to the set in room1, Ian2's thought (which is identical to Ian1's) refers to the set in room2. Same thing with the "me/not-me" though. Ian1's "that's not me" thought refers to Ian2. Ian2 has the identical thought, but it refers to Ian1. Identical thoughts, different refernants. No paradox.

If you think there's no paradox then you don't understand what I've been saying.

 

[Mercutio]

Objectively the 2 streams are the same. Subjectively they are the same for anyone apart from the 2 Ians. From either Ian's perspective, they are not the same.

I had a nice long reply about this earlier, which got lost in the ether somewhere...so I'll keep this short.

Do you agree that, from any perspective other than either Ian's, there is no paradox?

(Of course, I do not mean that you must abandon the idea that the subjective is the proper viewpoint for this...I ask hypothetically.)

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian asked:

So if a boulder is wholly non-conscious, why aren't we all p-zombies?

We are, if you don't acknowledge that consciousness can arise from brain processes. It certainly can't arise from anything else, by definition.

Yup, just like I'm not the same as you. So what?

Neither are the two Ian copies the same as each other.

Loki said:

So a sense of location is integral in the self. Since Ian1 can see that Ian2 is at a different location, it is this difference alone that establishes the "me/not-me" differentiation. Objectively they differ in location. Subjectively they differ in location. No paradox.

and Ian replied:

Bollock.

Aren't we assuming materialism here? Are you saying that the product of a brain process is not "connected to" the brain in a particular person at a particular place?

Objectively the 2 streams are the same. Subjectively they are the same for anyone apart from the 2 Ians. From either Ian's perspective, they are not the same.

But they are not the same in precisely the same way in both Ians!

If you think there's no paradox then you don't understand what I've been saying.

We all admit we don't understand what you're saying.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

I had a nice long reply about this earlier, which got lost in the ether somewhere...so I'll keep this short.

Do you agree that, from any perspective other than either Ian's, there is no paradox?

Yes that's right. Providing of course we're still assuming that materialism correctly depicts reality.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

The most I reckon you can claim is that it's ones environment. Do you actually have any arguments to support your position?

I don't think you understood what I was trying to convey. You ask if there an argument to support the the idea that 'location' is part of 'selfwareness'? Well, I work backwards - first, try to imagine what a "sense of self" would be like if it didn't include a location. What would it mean to say that your "self" can be at every point in the universe simultaneously? I can't conceive of what than might entail - it certainly seems to me that any "self" that is capable of being "aware" of two physical locations at the same time is quite different to what I perceive as my "self". So, it seems reasonable to conclude (tentatively) that a sense of "I am *here*" is a key part of my "self".

Let me put the question back to you - do you have any reason to believe that (under materialism, remember) the "self" can meaningfully exist independantly of a physical location? If not, then don't we have to agree that "wareness of location" is a basic tenet of "self"?

Oh, and in case you're confused by the use of the term "location" I don't mean that the self has to know it's physical location (ie, "I'm in London") - simply, that it can differentiate between it's location, and everything else. In other words, it can perceive itself as separate to other physical things. In this sense, "everything else" is "that which isn't me".

(Mercutio wrote) : Do you agree that, from any perspective other than either Ian's, there is no paradox?

(Ian wrote) : Yes that's right.

Again, though, the "difference" that each Ian perceives is the same for each Ian!

Ian1's perspective allows him to say "That object over there (Ian2) is not-me".
Ian2's perspective allows him to say "That object over there (Ian1) is not-me".

Both perspectives contain the exact same contents - they simply refer to different external objects.

Would you agree :

Ian1's perspective allows him to say "That object over there (glass in Room 1) is the glass I put there before duplication".
Ian2's perspective allows him to say "That object over there (glass in room 2) is the glass I put there before duplication".

Same thought, two glasses. No paradox.

If you think there's no paradox then you don't understand what I've been saying.

Or you haven't thought it through. Don't the posts of Titus or Win cause you to even pause for a moment and consider if *perhaps* you are misjudging your position?

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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Objectively the 2 streams are the same. Subjectively they are the same for anyone apart from the 2 Ians. From either Ian's perspective, they are not the same.
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But they are not the same in precisely the same way in both Ians!

Yes, a kind of symmetry exists between the 2 Ians. But remember under materialism the 2 Ians should be identical in all ways. Yet Ian1 only experiences out of one of the Ians bodies, and vice versa for the other Ian. So even though the physical constitution of each Ian is absolutely identical, I (say Ian1) find myself only experiencing out of one Ian, and not at all the other. So from Ians1's perspective, and indeed Ian2's perspective, there is an unbalance between the 2 Ians. What I want to know is how materialism explains this given that each Ian must be identical in absolute all ways? Only by there only really being one Ian's consciousness experiencing out of both bodies so it seems to me.

So basically looking at the situation from outside the 2 Ian's, thgey are both absolutely identical. But this is obviously not the case from the perspective of each Ian. I mean each Ian will care more about himself and his own fate than the the fate of the other Ian for a kick off.

 

[Loki]

So from Ians1's perspective, and indeed Ian2's perspective, there is an unbalance between the 2 Ians. What I want to know is how materialism explains this given that each Ian must be identical in absolute all ways?

There is no"imbalance" between their perspectives - the perspectives are identical in all ways. Each refers to the experiences available to him as "mine" and to the other Ian's experiences as "yours".

But this is obviously not the case from the perspective of each Ian. I mean each Ian will care more about himself and his own fate than the the fate of the other Ian for a kick off.

If it helps (I doubt it) put a number on this "cares more about" attibute :

Ian1 "cares about" : (a) himself 80%, (b) the other Ian 20%
Ian2 "cares about" : (a) himself 80%, (b) the other Ian 20%

Where's the difference Ian? The both have identical contents in their streams of consciusness. These stream *can* be identical, yet refer to different things.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Is your point about eliminative materialism or not?

Ian,

Did he indeed. Perhaps you would be good enough to explain the difference between seeming to have an experience and really having an experience?

Wow, perhaps you recall that I don't agree with Stimpson My point is not that Stimpson is right, but that this is simply the crux of his and for example Dennett's position: that it may seem that we have conscious experiences but that we really don't. I had written a paper to show that this line of reasoning is absurd, remember?

Certainly there are physical processes that occur in human beings that don't occur in boulders. One can call such certain physical processes as "consciousness" if one wants. Alternatively I could call certain physical processes that boulders undergo as "conscious" and the physical processes constitutive of a person as not conscious. Excuse me, but what exactly is this supposed to demonstrate?

What this was supposed to demonstrate is that on this point Stimpson seems to be consistent. Which, again, is not the same as saying that he's right, as he obviously is not.

So if a boulder is wholly non-conscious, why aren't we all p-zombies?

What I meant to stress is that to an eliminative materialist we ARE!

Yup, just like I'm not the same as you. So what?

The point I tried to make is that both two identical boulders and two identical selves may have completely identical properties without being the same entity. In boulders this can't be due to something non-physical, so why should non-identity between selves necessarily be ascribed to something non-physical? The point can't be that selves are non-physical in the first place. They are, but that's what eliminative materialists are denying.

I would be interested in hearing your argument that the notion we have experiences relies upon certain assumptions

Perhaps I should have said that within the argument you present the notion that we have experiences is a premiss, rather than a conclusion. I share the premiss, but it is something we directly know through introspection, not a conclusion we draw from any argument.

All in all, are you saying that your argument aims at showing that non-eliminative (or emergent) materialism is incoherent? Because you can't prove that eliminative materialism is incoherent by claiming that it is inconsistent with ackacknowledging the existence of consciousness. Eliminative materialism precisely amounts to denying the existence of consciousness in the irreducible, uneliminable or -what its adherents would call- "mysterious" or "supernatural" sense. They don't accept that we really are experients. See Dennett's remarks on the Cartesian theatre etc.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Is your point about eliminative materialism or not?

All in all, are you saying that your argument aims at showing that non-eliminative (or emergent) materialism is incoherent? Because you can't prove that eliminative materialism is incoherent by claiming that it is inconsistent with ackacknowledging the existence of consciousness. Eliminative materialism precisely amounts to denying the existence of consciousness in the irreducible, uneliminable or -what its adherents would call- "mysterious" or "supernatural" sense. They don't accept that we really are experients. See Dennett's remarks on the Cartesian theatre etc.

Best wishes,

Titus
[/B]

I have said right at the beginning that I presuppose we are not p-zombies and that we have conscious experiences. My argument clearly fails for people who deny this!

And on that note could I ask how many of the materialists here would describe themselves as eliminitive materialists? A show of hands please

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

But remember under materialism the 2 Ians should be identical in all ways.

They are identical in all ways, modulo the undeniable facts that they are in two different places and that there are two copies of them. Part of their streams of consciousness is the symmetrical experience of their positions and the symmetrical knowledge of the existence of the other Ian.

What I want to know is how materialism explains this given that each Ian must be identical in absolute all ways?

Their streams of consciousness are equal for a nanosecond. This is not the same as being identical=same in every possible way!

~~ Paul

 

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

Okay, three points with which you claim to be true.....

(1) Objectively, Ian 1 and Ian 2 are totally physically indistinguishable (let's drop the location bit for a moment)

(2) Subjectively, there is a difference because Ian 1 locates himself in this body here and not in the body of Ian 2 over there (and ditto for Ian 2)

(3) I (poster Ian) can only be one or the other even though I don't know which one (Ian 1 or Ian 2).


The problem, I think, is with point (3)

In a sense, poster Ian no longer exists. That was Original Ian before the duplication/vapourization. The molecules that comprised Original Ian are now floating around in the air. We now have Ian 1 and Ian 2. For an instant immediately after duplication Ian 1 and Ian 2 are identical to (but not the same as) each other and they are both identical to (but not the same as) original Ian at the instant immediately before vapourization.
In another sense, Original Ian lives on in both Ian 1 and Ian 2 (Each of them individually feel that they are Original Ian).
In both senses, however, there is nowhere for poster Ian to go. Poster Ian cannot go anywhere because he is simply a process in a particular brain as are Ian 1 and Ian 2.


BTW, in a related matter, Dennett (and Stimpy) do not deny consciousness. Dennett talks about the "user illusion", the illusion that you are "using" your brain. In fact, he says, "you" are a product (or process) of that brain so, in reality, that brain is using "you".


BillyJoe

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

And on that note could I ask how many of the materialists here would describe themselves as eliminitive materialists? A show of hands please.

I'll be most happy to vote after you define eliminative materialism without using the unqualified terms consciousness or experience.

I'm beginning to see where you think the paradox is. You seem to think that the two Ians are not identical because they both locate "me" inside themselves and not in the other Ian. Would the paradox disappear if Ian 1 said "I am the real Ian and Ian 2 is not," while Ian 2 said "Ian 1 is the real Ian and I am not"?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian said:
I'll be most happy to vote after you define eliminative materialism without using the unqualified terms consciousness or experience.

Paul, I don't really know what eliminitivist materialism means. Moreover, even if I did, I don't think it would be possible to define it not using those words.

I'm beginning to see where you think the paradox is. You seem to think that the two Ians are not identical because they both locate "me" inside themselves and not in the other Ian. Would the paradox disappear if Ian 1 said "I am the real Ian and Ian 2 is not," while Ian 2 said "Ian 1 is the real Ian and I am not"?

~~ Paul

WEll they wouldn't say that. Anyway it's clear that from the perspective of each Ian thye are not identical. Think back to my thought experiment. If I happen to find myself as the duplicate I will be executed rather than receiving the £10,000,000. If the 2 Ians are identical even from the perspective of each Ian, then the duplicate Ian would not be bothered at all if he dies so long as original Ian receives the money. I doubt I would feel that way! LOL

At the very minimum me (the duplicate) being bothered would be irrational.

 

[Dancing David]

From the materialist POV:
The two Ian's are identical only at the time of the duplication.

a. they diverge in physical terms from there on.

b. they diverge in consious terms from there on.

c. they occupy different locations.

d. Because they are not Bose-Einstien consendate, they will have diffrent percewption, due to the physical divergence they will have different perception. After the duplication, they are similar but not identical.

The pardox is only for the two Ians, in that they can not tell who is whom without the outside frame of reference.

There is no paradox from the materialist POV, only from the idealist POV.

Yes, i am a p-zombie, since I can not prove to others that I am consious.



On the boulder issue :

If a materialist says that consiousness is a product of brain events. This means that there is a complex series of events that lead to awareness, they involve detection, verification, eleimination and amplification, leading to perception. While there is only a tentative basis for understanding perception it is becoming well understood.

To say:

a. brain events are physical events that lead to consiousness

b. a boulder rolling down a hil is a physical event

c. therefore a boulder rolling down the hill is consious.

Is that right?

Is that really the arguement?


Titus: gald to see you back!

 

[Interesting Ian]

David
To say:

a. brain events are physical events that lead to consiousness

b. a boulder rolling down a hil is a physical event

c. therefore a boulder rolling down the hill is consious.

Is that right?

Is that really the arguement?

Yes that's the argument. What is special about the physical events going on in the brain which somehow necessitates consciousness?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Okay, three points with which you claim to be true.....

(1) Objectively, Ian 1 and Ian 2 are totally physically indistinguishable (let's drop the location bit for a moment)

(2) Subjectively, there is a difference because Ian 1 locates himself in this body here and not in the body of Ian 2 over there (and ditto for Ian 2)

(3) I (poster Ian) can only be one or the other even though I don't know which one (Ian 1 or Ian 2).


The problem, I think, is with point (3)

In a sense, poster Ian no longer exists. That was Original Ian before the duplication/vapourization. The molecules that comprised Original Ian are now floating around in the air.

Yes, but remember we as materialists don't think it's the actual physical stuff which leads to consciousness but rather physical processes.

We now have Ian 1 and Ian 2. For an instant immediately after duplication Ian 1 and Ian 2 are identical to (but not the same as) each other and they are both identical to (but not the same as) original Ian at the instant immediately before vapourization.
In another sense, Original Ian lives on in both Ian 1 and Ian 2 (Each of them individually feel that they are Original Ian).
In both senses, however, there is nowhere for poster Ian to go. Poster Ian cannot go anywhere because he is simply a process in a particular brain as are Ian 1 and Ian 2.

yep

 

[Mercutio]

Yes that's the argument. What is special about the physical events going on in the brain which somehow necessitates consciousness?

I don't know whether to quibble about "consciousness" or "necessitates" here. This particular set of brain activities has been labeled "consciousness". We can't say they necessitate consciousness, or give rise to consciousness, or any other relationship that implies one thing (processes) is causing another (consc). Rather, these processes (perception, thought, feeling, memory) have simply been labeled "consciousness".

The rock's action has been labeled "rolling." Do we ask whether, when you think, you might actually just be rolling? Again, the confusion comes because of an assumed special status for "consciousness".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Paul, I don't really know what eliminitivist materialism means. Moreover, even if I did, I don't think it would be possible to define it not using those words.

Then why on Earth did you ask us to vote about it?

WEll they wouldn't say that. Anyway it's clear that from the perspective of each Ian thye are not identical.

Haven't you been saying that both Ians are identical? In particular, that both have exactly the same thoughts about the fact that one is the original and one is the duplicate?

Yes that's the argument. What is special about the physical events going on in the brain which somehow necessitates consciousness?

Necessitates? What is special about the brain is that it gives rise to subjective experiences that we call consciousness. Exactly like the movement of air molecules in the atmosphere gives rise to what we call wind. Are we concerned that a boulder is not windy?

We are switching willy-nilly between the original scenario and the scenario where the original Ian is killed. I think this is confusing people.

~~ Paul

 

[ceptimus]

Yes that's the argument. What is special about the physical events going on in the brain which somehow necessitates consciousness?

A brain is a machine that produces what we call consciousness in the same way that a television set produces what we call "picture and sound". If you can find any boulders that work well as TV sets, you'd make a fortune.