A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What confuses me about this conversation is that, of all people, mental monists are the ones who might assume that rocks are conscious. After all, everything is just consciousness. This leads me to think that the monists among us are having trouble thinking of consciousness as something other than a separate existent.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Just reading through these posts now. Just want to clear up one or two points of misunderstanding.

I think you're wrong on this Win - the terms for this particular discussion are Ian's. You and I might agree, but unless I've misunderstood him in the past, Ian *clearly* includes things such as "emotion" and "memory" in the category of "non-physical" consciousness.

Yes I do, but with all this is a rock conscious business, I am considering the question from the materialist framework. So I am assuming that things such as emotion are physical.

I gather that you mean "observation of 'external' conscious behaviours doesn't support opinions about phenomenal consciousness".

Both rocks and peoples' behaviour unfold according to physical laws (because materialism is true). So why endow people with consciousness and not rocks? Something to do with complexity and information I gather. But I suspect the only reason people say this is because they feel other people are conscious, note their complexity, then jump to that link. So it starts of with a feeling. A feeling derived from observation and certainly not logically derived from observation.

Since I can't actually fully define consciousness, I'm forced to concede (I guess) that even under materialism rocks may have some sort of consciousness - just not much like what we normally think if. But I must say that I find this to be a fairly meaningless discussion about "consciousness", and still can't see why materialism would "suffer" from this assumption anymore than any other metaphysical position.

No I don't think materialism suffers at all! I'm just trying to tease apart materialist assumptions.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
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I want to know with what justification you reject the idea that a rolling boulder is conscious.
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Loki
By observation :

1. As best we can tell/detect/observe at this point in time consciousness only occurs when certain physical processes occur.
2. These physical processes do not occur in rocks
3. Therefore, rocks aren't conscious.

I addressed this above. You're begging the question.

This makes for an eminently falsifiable position - simply demonstrate consciousness attached to a set of physical processes such as that found in a rock.

Don't be silly. How could we demonstrate consciousness? We cannot demonstrate consciousness, not even in people.

I'd have thought this question is far more relevant to an Idealist. Since you beleive that consciousness/self *can* and *does* occassionally take a wander away from the physical processes it usually hangs out with, why wouldn't it/they occassionally stop by a rock and try "experiencing being a rock" for a while?

Well they could do.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
I don't think a complex machine and a conscious being have anything to do with each other. We presumably don't operate through a machine in the afterlife.
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Cep
I don't believe in an afterlife. I think if you could show that an afterlife existed, that would disprove materialism.

Yes.

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When I use the word consiousness I mean being aware, not a complex state. It causes confusion if you use a differing definition of consciousness to everyone else
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I'm trying to give my (materialist) view of what consciousness is - I thought that was what you were asking? If we must presuppose that consciousness only exists in the idealist sense, we won't make any progress here.

I was just employing the everyday definition. Would it help if I said "phenomenal consciousness" to avoid confusion in the future?

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Right, ok. So a thermostat would be very slightly conscious. Don't you feel this is somewhat implausible? What profound thoughts does it have? It's too hot or it's too cold?
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No. That would be like saying that a grain of sand is very slightly enormous.

I don't understand. Are you asserting a thermostat is entirely devoid of any consciousness? That contradicts what you said before.

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So basically consciousness is information?
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Close - but information can be a static thing - words in a book, or magnetic domains on a hard drive. Consciousness is a process.

OK, then consciousness is information processing.

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Okie dokie. BTW in saying that consciousness are an emergent phenomenon, you're not subscribing to epiphenomenalism are you? I mean is that which emerges itself physical or not?
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I'm sorry I don't understand these philosophy terms. I don't know what epiphenomenalism is. I'll go and try to find out though, after I've posted this response.

I just want to know if phenomenal consciousness itself is physical or not. I understand thet whichever you choose here, that phenomenal consciousness arises from physical processes.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

I just want to know if phenomenal consciousness itself is physical or not. I understand thet whichever you choose here, that phenomenal consciousness arises from physical processes.

What does this question mean, exactly? Is computation, as performed by a computer, physical?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ceptimus said:

I don't believe in an afterlife. I think if you could show that an afterlife existed, that would disprove materialism.

Only if the mechanism was ultimately impossible to determine, or was determined to involve supernatural influences.

~~ Paul

 

[Dymanic]

Materialism rocks!

What consciousness is: an emergent property of the electrochemical states of a large number of neurons in the brain -- information in action. (Let's add "information" to the list of difficult-to-define terms.)

How consciousness is achieved: new inputs in the form of raw sensory data co-mingle with data stored in memory, this combination comprising new electrochemical states which, along with the system-wide chemical changes they invoke, are themselves subject to re-collection as new raw sensory data.

Why consciousness exists: it can be an effective tool for some organisms by enabling them to make reasonable assumptions about the world around them, and to choose actions based on those assumptions that will tend to enhance their chances for survival and reproduction. This goal-oriented aspect of consciousness is one thing that makes it hard for me to see as meaningful any claim that it continues to exist once the business of surviving and reproducing is finished -- once you're dead, you'll have no more use for consciousness than would a rock.

 

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

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Originally posted by BillyJoe

We now have Ian 1 and Ian 2. For an instant immediately after duplication Ian 1 and Ian 2 are identical to (but not the same as) each other and they are both identical to (but not the same as) original Ian at the instant immediately before vapourization.
In another sense, Original Ian lives on in both Ian 1 and Ian 2 (Each of them individually feel that they are Original Ian).
In both senses, however, there is nowhere for poster Ian to go. Poster Ian cannot go anywhere because he is simply a process in a particular brain as are Ian 1 and Ian 2.

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yep

This answer seems to conflict with your statement that Original Ian, after duplication, is either Ian 1 or Ian 2. How is this possible if you agree that Original Ian (Poster Ian) can't go anywhere because he is simply a process in a particular brain?

BillyJoe

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian said:
What does this question mean, exactly? Is computation, as performed by a computer, physical?

~~ Paul

Yes

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Materialism rocks!

What consciousness is: an emergent property of the electrochemical states of a large number of neurons in the brain -- information in action. (Let's add "information" to the list of difficult-to-define terms.)

How consciousness is achieved: new inputs in the form of raw sensory data co-mingle with data stored in memory, this combination comprising new electrochemical states which, along with the system-wide chemical changes they invoke, are themselves subject to re-collection as new raw sensory data.

Why consciousness exists: it can be an effective tool for some organisms by enabling them to make reasonable assumptions about the world around them, and to choose actions based on those assumptions that will tend to enhance their chances for survival and reproduction. This goal-oriented aspect of consciousness is one thing that makes it hard for me to see as meaningful any claim that it continues to exist once the business of surviving and reproducing is finished -- once you're dead, you'll have no more use for consciousness than would a rock.

Dymanic I don't understand all this. You say consciousness is an emergent property. By what you say, this emergent property is causally efficacious (as consciousness is causally efficacious) and therefore this emergent property itself is physical. Right?


Now materialism entails the world is physically closed ie all change in the Universe can be described by appropriate scientific theories employing entities which play fruitful roles. Anything which doesn't play a fruitful role is not needed by the theory, and according to materialism, therefore doesn't exist. To put it more simplistically, all change in the Universe can be understood by an unbroken chain of physical cause and effect. Right?

Now this seems to imply that only those existents which anyone with appropriate faculties and instruments could verify could be deemed to exist, or at least play fruitful roles in such theories. In other words everything from the third person perspective. So you need to say that phenomenal consciousness itself is publicly observable ie discernible from the third person perspective. But ones raw experiences are not publicly observable neither in the sense that one can directly observe my raw experiences, nor that my raw experiences can play any fruitful role in our theories regarding the world. I mean presumably it is the electrochemical states and ones environment which completely determines our behaviour. So your view that consciousness plays some causally efficacious role doesn't hold up.

You seem to be confusing phenomenological consciousness with functional states of the brain Everything you assign to consciousness could equally be achieved by a p-zombie.

BTW, I myself of course do not believe the physical world is closed. I believe in libertarian free will.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Now this seems to imply that only those existents which anyone with appropriate faculties and instruments could verify could be deemed to exist, or at least play fruitful roles in such theories. In other words everything from the third person perspective. So you need to say that phenomenal consciousness itself is publicly observable ie discernible from the third person perspective. But ones raw experiences are not publicly observable neither in the sense that one can directly observe my raw experiences, nor that my raw experiences can play any fruitful role in our theories regarding the world. I mean presumably it is the electrochemical states and ones environment which completely determines our behaviour. So your view that consciousness plays some causally efficacious role doesn't hold up.

Once more around the wheel.

I cannot directly experience your experiences, but I can observe the results of those experiences. For example, I can talk to you about them. The fact that you constantly tell me about your "raw experiences" means they play a causally efficacious role.

If all we're ever going to do is talk-talk-talk about the fact that we cannot literally experience one another's consciousnesses, we really might as well go home. We also cannot literally experience being a worm or an atom or a rock, yet we can infer the characteristics of those things. You elevate your consciousness to a special place just because it happens to be the one thing you experience inside your head.

~~ Paul

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

You say consciousness is an emergent property. By what you say, this emergent property is causally efficacious (as consciousness is causally efficacious) and therefore this emergent property itself is physical. Right?

Certainly at least as causally efficacious within the system that produces it as anything else within the system, if not more.

Physical? If you pluck or strike a taut steel string, it will vibrate with a certain frequency, and those vibrations will be transmitted to the surrounding air. If a number of such strings are plucked or struck in certain combinations, a certain property may emerge in the pattern of collected vibrations which, after entering an ear, may trigger a cascade of events inside a brain which result in the vibrations being interpreted as "music". Or not, depending on taste (as John Cage demonstrated). The substrate is physical; that is, describable as patterns of interaction between matter and energy -- which includes the vibrations themselves. But whether what emerges is music or just noise is hopelessly subjective and semantic.

all change in the Universe can be understood by an unbroken chain of physical cause and effect. Right?

Right.

Everything you assign to consciousness could equally be achieved by a p-zombie.

Good point.

you need to say that phenomenal consciousness itself is publicly observable ie discernible from the third person perspective

Ok, in principle, I'll say that. Obviously, we do not yet have the appropriate faculties and instruments, but what is presently being done even with the crude technology presently available might surprise you.

I mean presumably it is the electrochemical states and ones environment which completely determines our behaviour. So your view that consciousness plays some causally efficacious role doesn't hold up.

It holds up fine if you give up on the idea of consciousness being something 'special' that somehow magically exists independent of space and time. It's simply a matter of some of the brain's outputs being fed back in as inputs.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian said:
Once more around the wheel.

I cannot directly experience your experiences, but I can observe the results of those experiences. For example, I can talk to you about them. The fact that you constantly tell me about your "raw experiences" means they play a causally efficacious role.

Well you would certainly think so, but it's not me denying libertarian free will.

Dymanic said it's an emergent phenomenon. In other words something over and above the particular electrochemical state of the brain. So phenomenal consciousness should be discernable from the 3rd person perspective, correct? Now we can see neurons firing and what have you, but if this is not consciousness then how do we detect it?

And I don't understand this claim that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon yet it is still physical. This means I think that he's saying consciousness cannot be analysed in terms of the physical activity leading to it ie it is a holistic phenomenon. Are you sure you want to agree with Dymanic here?

 

[Dancing David]

The problem is this,

In materialism it is not emergent in that it is over and above the rules of the game.

It is emergent in only that it is a product of the material events. It is the material events, there is no transcendant quality.

If a rock has consiousness it is not emergent, it is dependant. On the structure that leads to the rocks awareness.

If a human being has consiousness it is not emergent, it is dependant.

There may be emergant consiousness. Human consiousness is dependant, not emergant.

So qualia for humans are not emergent or irreducable, they are dependant on the biological system that leads to them.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Well you would certainly think so, but it's not me denying libertarian free will.

Huh? I don't even know what LFW is.

Dymanic said it's an emergent phenomenon. In other words something over and above the particular electrochemical state of the brain. So phenomenal consciousness should be discernable from the 3rd person perspective, correct? Now we can see neurons firing and what have you, but if this is not consciousness then how do we detect it?

We can certainly discern consciousness in another person, not to mention ourselves. We can ask them about it, correlate brain function to it, alter it, destroy it, and so forth. What we cannot do is experience another person's consciousness, just as we cannot experience what it is like to be wind or rain or a rock.

And I don't understand this claim that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon yet it is still physical. This means I think that he's saying consciousness cannot be analysed in terms of the physical activity leading to it ie it is a holistic phenomenon. Are you sure you want to agree with Dymanic here?

I'm not sure what it means for a property to be physical. The property is a result of physical processes, but the conceptual property itself is not physical. A computer's computing is physical, but computation is a concept.

In the case of consciousness, it's probably simplest to say that the complex function of the brain is experienced by the brain in ways that we collectively call consciousness.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Hi Win (Repeating my question about Epiphenomenalism)

Though this may seem slightly off-topic with regard to the main sub-thread (Ian's thought experiment and its possible consequences), I'd like to repeat my question to Win. What do you think of my argumentation against Epiphenomenalism as presented in this paper?? In my not so humble opinion the acknowledgement of non-reducible qualia must rationally lead to an acknowledgement of their causal efficacy and a causal effect upon the physical world. Such a efficacy is irreconcilable with epiphenomenalism, but also with identity theory. It's reconcilable with radical dualism and idealism.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Forgetting the many and varied side trrals for a moment...

So why endow people with consciousness and not rocks?

I think the way you have phrased this question reveals your error. Materialism doesn't "define consciousness", then find things in the real world that fit the label. The label is created after observing the physical behaviour. A rock moves down a hill - the term "rolling" is coined to describe this physical behaviour. Humans are observed thinking and exchanging ideas. The term "consciousness" is coined to descrive this set of behaviours.

Why don't we endow 'rocks' with consciousness? Because they exhibit *none* of the characteristics we associate with it.

You might think that the physical process of the brain constitutes the entirety of 'consciousness' (materialists), or that the brain is a necessary component but supplimented by additional 'stuff' (Win's dualism), or that the brain is a 'experience limiter' installed by the metamind to keep you from seeing the "real world" (Titus' idealism). In any of these cases, at least *part* of the definition of "consciousness" is "brain processing". Rocks don't have brains, rocks aren't conscious.

Now, Win offers the thought that you really mean to ask "why do brain processes generate qualia, why doesn't 'rolling' generate a quale (what it is like to be a rock rolling)". And I'd probably go with his dualist answer - that qualia require self awareness, which requires information processing, which requires a complex set of physical processes (neurons, etc) to do the computations. None of these prerequisites reside in rocks, therefore consciousness (and qualia) cannot reside in rocks.

 

[Loki]

Titus,

Such a efficacy is irreconcilable with epiphenomenalism, but also with identity theory.

I've read your paper - can you expand on the "problem" with identity theory? I couldn't quite grasp what was being said (not all that surprising to me when epiphenomenalism is under discussion).

 

[Titus Rivas]

The self-defeating nature of identity theory

Loki,

I've read your paper - can you expand on the "problem" with identity theory? I couldn't quite grasp what was being said (not all that surprising to me when epiphenomenalism is under discussion).

Let me first stress that I'm talking about the materialist identity theory, which states that consciousness certainly seems different from physical processes in the brain from a so called subjective, first person perspective, but that from a so called "objective", third person perspective it really is identical with such processes. Identity theory, being a variant of materialism, is by definition physicalist. Meaning that all the subjective experiences we have are always caused by physical processes seen from a third person perspective, and never by other subjective experiences. Subjective experiences only appear to be different from the physical processes they really are identical to. Similarly, subjective experiences only appear to be caused by other subjective experiences, whereas they exclusively can be the result of the only causally efficacious entities imaginable, i.e. objective (physical) entities instead of their mere subjective appearance.
Now, if identity theory were right, we could never attain any knowledge about our subjective experiences qua subjective experiences, i.e. as seen from our first person perspective. Because subjective experiences wouldn't be causally efficacious they could never cause any cognitive processes that would result in the conceptualization of them in conceptual memory.
Thus, identity theory as defined above is an incoherent, self-defeating theory, It implicitly states that we know we have subjective experiences from a first person perspective, and at the same time holds that subjective experiences as experienced from a first person perspective can't ever be known, as they can't have any causal effect on our knowledge.

The only logically coherent form of materialism is therefore eliminative materialism, which simply denies that we have any subjective experienes whatsoever. On the other hand, eliminative materialism is an absurd, irrational theory as it actually denies the only thing we can be absolutely sure of.

Therefore, the only coherent and rational theories within the philosophy of mind are radical interactionist dualism and idealism.

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus,

We are wandering a little here, but I (personally) still struggle with epipehenomenalism and related topics, so...

Because subjective experiences wouldn't be causally efficacious they could never cause any cognitive processes that would result in the conceptualization of them in conceptual memory.
Thus, identity theory as defined above is an incoherent, self-defeating theory, It implicitly states that we know we have subjective experiences from a first person perspective, and at the same time holds that subjective experiences as experienced from a first person perspective can't ever be known, as they can't have any causal effect on our knowledge

I read this, and think I understand what you are getting at (seems simple enough!) - that identity there says "subjective" isn't causal, yet says that our knowledge of them can only happen if they are causal?

But you also said...

Subjective experiences only appear to be different from the physical processes they really are identical to. Similarly, subjective experiences only appear to be caused by other subjective experiences, whereas they can only be the result of the only causally efficacious entities thinkable..

Isn't this a resolution - the causal effect comes from the underlying physical processes?