A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,

I think I also finally understand what you have been trying to say.
Consider this version....

Original Ian is duplicated twice as Duplicate Ian 1 and Duplicate Ian 2 (or simply Ian 1 and Ian 2) and original Ian is vapourized in the process.
Now let's consider Ian 1 and Ian 2.....

From the objective POV:
"They are physically absolutely indistinguishable."

From the subjective POV:
The (objectively identified) Ian 1 knows he is this Ian here and not that Ian over there because, well, he is this Ian here looking at that Ian over there and not that Ian over there looking at this Ian right here.
And ditto for the (objectively identified) Ian 2

This alone, from your POV (I'm talking about poster Ian now), must be sufficient to refute materialism. Materialism does not distinguishing Ian 1 from Ian 2 ("They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.") but they ARE distinguishable subjectively, therefore materialsim must be false (because it fails to account for the subjective POV).


BillyJoe

Yes that's right. You've got it

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas
- There is absolutely no subjectivity according to reductive materialism. So this point would only make sense if you accepted subjective experiences all along, i.e. if you weren't a materialist from the start. That would amount to begging the question. Titus
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Surely this is not correct. How can subjective experiences be denied. After all we are all here having them.

Yes indeed. I simply cannot understand what it means to deny that we have subjective experiences eg I see redness before me now.

Seems to me that we have a little bit of a reversal of positions here in that materialists are arguing for non-materialism and non-materialists are arguing for materialism

 

[Interesting Ian]

If you're asking wherre the paradox is then you clearly haven't understood it! There shouldn't be a 50/50 chance of me being executed! I just can't believe how stupid everybody is!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Me, too! I haven't understood it either. Can you explain it?


~~ Paul

Ummmm . .explain what? Why I only have a 50/50 chance? It's because at the end of the film I might discover that I am duplicate Ian even though there was nothing within my ongoing experiences to suggest anything unusual.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Billy said:

Materialism does not distinguishing Ian 1 from Ian 2 ("They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.") but they ARE distinguishable subjectively, therefore materialsim must be false (because it fails to account for the subjective POV).

and Ian replied:

Yes that's right. You've got it.

This is so boluxed up. First of all, they are distinguished objectively because there are two of them. The two happen to be equal for a nanosecond, but there are two distinct Ians. Next, so what if they subjectively distinguish themselves from each other? A mouse sitting on the dashboard of one of two absolutely identical cars also distinguishes the one its in from the other one. Hell, so does a camera sitting on the dashboard. Finally, we are assuming materialism, right? So materialism is distinguishing the two Ians by virtue of the subjective mechanisms in the brains of each Ian. Only if you assume that subjectivity is outside of materialism would you say that "materialism fails to account for the subjective POV."

For all intents and purposes, neither the objective or subjective view can distinguish one Ian from the other, because neither Ian has a special position. The only difference between the two views is that the subjective one is saying "I'm me and he's him" and the objective one is saying "there they are." If an observer stood next to one of the Ian's and said "I'm next to this Ian and not next to the other one," how is that fundamentally different from the subjective viewpoint?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Ummmm . .explain what? Why I only have a 50/50 chance? It's because at the end of the film I might discover that I am duplicate Ian even though there was nothing within my ongoing experiences to suggest anything unusual.

Of course there was. The original Ian was told that the duplicate(s) would die. If he thought about things for a moment, he would realize that, after duplication, all the Ians won't know if they are the duplicates. It is this lack of information that results in the 50/50 chance. From the experimenter's viewpoint, he knows which Ian will live and which will die. Hence, different probabilities.

If that is a paradox, then all multi-viewpoint probabilistic scenarios are paradoxes. For example, the Monty Hall problem is a paradox.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

BillieJoe
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Materialism does not distinguishing Ian 1 from Ian 2 ("They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.") but they ARE distinguishable subjectively, therefore materialsim must be false (because it fails to account for the subjective POV).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Titus
There are two problems with this position:

Nonsense!

- There is absolutely no subjectivity according to reductive materialism.

They surely don't deny that. It makes no sense to deny that we have experiences since we appear to have them.

So this point would only make sense if you accepted subjective experiences all along, i.e. if you weren't a materialist from the start. That would amount to begging the question.

Like when one mathematically proves something, someone else saying your proof begs the question because you are implicitly presupposing 1+1 = 2.

- Being identical means two very different things. I'm sure scholastic philosophy developed special terms for this, but I'm not aware of them (not in this incarnation anyway )

(a) possessing the same properties.

(b) being one and the same thing.

For example two freshly piinted identical editions of Darwin's The Origen of Species would be identical in the first sense, they posses the same properties. However, they wouldn't be identical in the second sense, of being one and the same thing.

If materialism supposes the former, then for a particular physical configuration of the brain, you could have an infinite number of identical but distinct selves. This means that the totality of physical facts regarding my body do not at all determine me. This contradicts materialism.

 

[ceptimus]

If you're asking wherre the paradox is then you clearly haven't understood it! There shouldn't be a 50/50 chance of me being executed! I just can't believe how stupid everybody is!

Maybe I'm on to something here. I just found these definitions of 'Paradox' over at hyperdictionary.com.

paradox, n. A tenet or proposition contrary to received opinion; an assertion or sentiment seemingly contradictory, or opposed to common sense; that which in appearance or terms is absurd, but yet may be true in fact.

Now under these definitions, I can accept that Ian has demonstrated a paradox.

I habitually use the word in a more mathematical context, where it is used to label something that is logically self-contradictory. Without getting into maths here, the most concise statement that I would view as paradoxical is the famous:

I always lie.

I still don't think Ian has demonstrated that sort of paradox. The situation he describes is certainly bizarre, but of course that is just the outcome of using this wonderful duplicator machine, which none of us is used to.

I suppose, three hundred years ago, before the invention of the aeroplane, people might have found the idea of going across the Atlantic in less than a day, and without using a boat, paradoxical?

 

[slimshady2357]

Interesting idea ceptimus, but I think Ian is using it the 'strong' sense.

He has used the phrases "logical inconsistency" and "logical contradiction" in this thread when referring to the problem he sees with the duplicator.

I'm not sure he's used those phrases since he started saying 'paradox', but he certainly was at the start.

Adam

P.S. I love your new avatar

 

[Titus Rivas]

Paul,

Of course there is subjectivity, it just isn't this ephemeral irreducible thing you keep talking about. If you dismiss subjectivity because it is "only an emergent property of the brain," then you have to dismiss wind because it is only an emergent property of air molecules.

Oh no, there is the same confusion again What have I got myself into ?

Note that I was talking about irreducibility in the ontological sense, as explained in a post some pages ago.

By reductive materialism, I usually mean eliminative materialism. Emergent properties are usually seen as part of the theory of emergent materialism, not reductive materialism. Both emergent and reductive materialism hold that consciousness is caused by physical processes, the difference being that emergent materialism accepts the fact that there is an irreducible mind.

I gathered that the type of materialism we were talking about was eliminative materialism, not emergent materialism (or for that matter epiphenomenalism).

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Selves and rocks

Ian,

If materialism supposes the former, then for a particular physical configuration of the brain, you could have an infinite number of identical but distinct selves. This means that the totality of physical facts regarding my body do not at all determine me. This contradicts materialism.

But let's see if this wouldn't hold also for a number of identical but distinct rocks. Would the fact that the rocks aren't one and the same rock also mean that the totality of physical facts regarding their 'body' do not at all determine a particular rock? If not, what's the difference between the two cases (i.e, within a materialistic framework which doesn't acknowledge ultimate ontological differences between rocks and selves,as both would be nothing but physical structures)?

I'm getting a bit excited about this, because if you're wrong about this, it might set you on a different (though still idealist) track and if you're right after all (which I doubt very much I must say) it would be a new argument against materialism.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Proof?

Ian,

They surely don't deny that. It makes no sense to deny that we have experiences since we appear to have them.

Well, I remember having read somewhere that Stimpson said we seem to have them but we don't really have them. They would be no more than illusions, i.e. not real at all.

Like when one mathematically proves something, someone else saying your proof begs the question because you are implicitly presupposing 1+1 = 2.

No, like when one is trying to prove the existence of God, by an argumentation which presupposes the existence of God. For example like a Bible Belt preacher who claims we have to accept that (his) God exists, because "He said so himself in his Holy Bible". 1+1= 2 is an analytical truth which does not rest on any empirical assumptions.
Though I do agree, as you know already, that the irreducible existence of consciousness itself disproves materialism. The trouble is that eliminative materialists such as Stimp don't acknowledge the "un-eliminable" existence of consciousness. So you can't prove they're self-defeating by introducing into the argument the very thing they want to deny. What I'm trying to say is: they're quite obviously wrong, but not for this particular reason.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Interesting idea ceptimus, but I think Ian is using it the 'strong' sense.

He has used the phrases "logical inconsistency" and "logical contradiction" in this thread when referring to the problem he sees with the duplicator.

I'm not sure he's used those phrases since he started saying 'paradox', but he certainly was at the start.

Adam

P.S. I love your new avatar

As I have kept saying and explaining over the past 10 pages or so, the idea that there are 2 streams of consciousness which are the full sense both me is incoherent. Nothing that anyone has said has changed my mind one iota. Nor could they say anything which would change my mind. People are looking at the situation merely objectively. The only way their argument would be correct would be if I am a p-zombie. But I am not. Therefore they and you are wrong. It's as simple as that.

Deal with it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Selves and rocks

But let's see if this wouldn't hold also for a number of identical but distinct rocks. Would the fact that the rocks aren't one and the same rock also mean that the totality of physical facts regarding their 'body' do not at all determine a particular rock? If not, what's the difference between the two cases (i.e, within a materialistic framework which doesn't acknowledge ultimate ontological differences between rocks and selves,as both would be nothing but physical structures)?

Titus [/B]

No difference between the 2 cases provided materialists hold that rocks are conscious. I would have thought they should do, but puzzlingly someone like Stimpy denied this earlier on in this thread. I think the only thing he said was that people are more complex or something like that (I asked him why a boulder rolling down a hill isn't conscious). But I don't see why complexity in itslef should magically ex nihilo produce consciousness. So if we are conscious yet rocks or boulders mysteriously aren't, then talking about rocks is not comparable.

 

[slimshady2357]

As I have kept saying and explaining over the past 10 pages or so, the idea that there are 2 streams of consciousness which are the full sense both me is incoherent. Nothing that anyone has said has changed my mind one iota. Nor could they say anything which would change my mind. People are looking at the situation merely objectively. The only way their argument would be correct would be if I am a p-zombie. But I am not. Therefore they and you are wrong. It's as simple as that.

Deal with it.

Very close to the raving of a lunatic! Nice one Ian

Perhaps you can start using all CAPS and lots more of this --> little guy too

And just so you know, materialism uses the objective, third person reality to determine identity.

Your paradox simply vanishes altogether when you stop viewing the self in an idealist way. Perhaps someday you will be able to make that perspective shift and be able to deal with it yourself

Adam

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

I gathered that the type of materialism we were talking about was eliminative materialism, not emergent materialism (or for that matter epiphenomenalism).

Whether it is or not, I still don't understand why you insist on saying:

There is absolutely no subjectivity according to reductive materialism.

There is subjectivity. It's just not irreducible.

Well, I remember having read somewhere that Stimpson said we seem to have them [experiences] but we don't really have them. They would be no more than illusions, i.e. not real at all.

Come on! Again, you say "experiences" when you mean "irreducibly subjective experiences."

Ian said:

As I have kept saying and explaining over the past 10 pages or so, the idea that there are 2 streams of consciousness which are the full sense both me is incoherent.

Oh, is that what you've been trying to say? I thought it had something to do with probabilities. I'd ask you why it's incoherent, but first define me.

But I don't see why complexity in itslef should magically ex nihilo produce consciousness.

Why not?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Very close to the raving of a lunatic! Nice one Ian

Perhaps you can start using all CAPS and lots more of this --> little guy too

And just so you know, materialism uses the objective, third person reality to determine identity.

Your paradox simply vanishes altogether when you stop viewing the self in an idealist way. Perhaps someday you will be able to make that perspective shift and be able to deal with it yourself

Adam

I have maintained at the outset that I take it as a basic axiom that we are not p-zombies and there are conscious experiences. Otherwise my argument doesn't work. Are you suggesting that begs the question?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Eliminative materialism and identity

Ian said

No difference between the 2 cases provided materialists hold that rocks are conscious. I would have thought they should do, but puzzlingly someone like Stimpy denied this earlier on in this thread. I think the only thing he said was that people are more complex or something like that (I asked him why a boulder rolling down a hill isn't conscious). But I don't see why complexity in itslef should magically ex nihilo produce consciousness. So if we are conscious yet rocks or boulders mysteriously aren't, then talking about rocks is not comparable.

But Stimpson's point as I understood it was not that we are conscious in an irreducible and as he would call it mysterious way and a boulder is not. He just holds that the kind of physical processes he names consciousness don't occur in boulders. So in his ontology there is no question of one physical entity possessing irreducible consciousness and another possessing none. In his view, both entities are completely physical and neither of them possessing any non-physical properties.

Besides, one rock or boulder would not be the same as the other rock or boulder. So it doesn't take consciousness to be a different (rather than the exact same) object eventhough one has the same properties as the other. Again, would this type of non-identity be an argument against materialism, even if the entities involved are completely physical?

Titus

 

[Loki]

Ian,

You didn't reply to my attempt to explain (To DD) the "paradox", so I'm not sure if I've got it or not. However...

(BillyJoe wrote) : I think I also finally understand what you have been trying to say.
...
This alone, from your POV (I'm talking about poster Ian now), must be sufficient to refute materialism. Materialism does not distinguishing Ian 1 from Ian 2 ("They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.") but they ARE distinguishable subjectively, therefore materialsim must be false (because it fails to account for the subjective POV).

(Ian wrote) : Yes that's right. You've got it

Well, BillyJoe may have said it better (I *was* going to use the "vapourising duplicator" example also, but was waiting for you to confirm I was on the right path), but it's what I was trying to say also.

In short, your paradox is :

1. Materialism does not distinguishing Ian 1 from Ian 2 ("They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.")
2. They distinguishable subjectively.
3. Therefore materialsim must be false.

You'd agree with this?

Well, I'll assume this is accurate enough, since you seemed to agree with BillyJoe. As I said yesterday, I don't think this is a paradox at all - there are two points you are failing to consider (from a materialist point of view).

First, location. I don't think you'll like this argument, since you've been declaring "location" irrelevant. Still, I feel it's a point you are wrong on. "Location" is vital in understanding "why" the subjective difference exists. The reason that Ian1 can say "I'm me" and that Ian2 is "not-me" is because he understands "location". If you can imagine (somehow) a world in which your "self" had no sense of "location in the physical world", or was not "attached to this body" then I think you'd have no reason to say "Ian2 is not-me". In seems to me that the ability to distinguish between *your* location, and *everything else* is an essential part of the self. So a sense of location is integral in the self. Since Ian1 can see that Ian2 is at a different location, it is this difference alone that establishes the "me/not-me" differentiation. Objectively they differ in location. Subjectively they differ in location. No paradox.

Second, identical contents. You might (how knows!) find this more acceptable. Under materialism, two identical brains produce two identical streams of consciousness - the contents are the same. If the contents of Ian1's stream includes "this is *me*, that's *not-me*", then we would expect that Ian2's brain would also contain the same contents. Objectively, the two streams are the same. Subjectively, the two streams are the same. No paradox.

Imagine the two identical Ians in two identical rooms. They both look at a TV set and see a favourite movie. Both streams of consciousness will contain the the thought "gee, that's a nice TV set". The "thought" in each stream is the same, but the TV set it refers to is not - Ian1's thought refers to the set in room1, Ian2's thought (which is identical to Ian1's) refers to the set in room2. Same thing with the "me/not-me" though. Ian1's "that's not me" thought refers to Ian2. Ian2 has the identical thought, but it refers to Ian1. Identical thoughts, different refernants. No paradox.

 

[Dancing David]

The paradoc resides in the fact that subjectively there is no difference between the two Ian's except for location and the latter divergent awareness.

This is what creates the paradox, they are both the same Ian but they do not show any metaphysical identity to tell them apart.

There is no difference between the wto , except for thier location. Which I an says is irrelevant, because of Berkley.

If you believe that subjective experience is all there is to the world this presents the problem of:

They are the same but they are not sharing thier consiousness.

The paradox is that subjectively they are the same.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Proof?

II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
They surely don't deny that. It makes no sense to deny that we have experiences since we appear to have them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well, I remember having read somewhere that Stimpson said we seem to have them but we don't really have them. They would be no more than illusions, i.e. not real at all.

Did he indeed. Perhaps you would be good enough to explain the difference between seeming to have an experience and really having an experience?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like when one mathematically proves something, someone else saying your proof begs the question because you are implicitly presupposing 1+1 = 2.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No, like when one is trying to prove the existence of God, by an argumentation which presupposes the existence of God. For example like a Bible Belt preacher who claims we have to accept that (his) God exists, because "He said so himself in his Holy Bible".

False analogy.

1+1= 2 is an analytical truth which does not rest on any empirical assumptions.

I would be interested in hearing your argument that the notion we have experiences relies upon certain assumptions

Though I do agree, as you know already, that the irreducible existence of consciousness itself disproves materialism. The trouble is that eliminative materialists such as Stimp don't acknowledge the "un-eliminable" existence of consciousness. So you can't prove they're self-defeating by introducing into the argument the very thing they want to deny. What I'm trying to say is: they're quite obviously wrong, but not for this particular reason.

My argument was never intended to refute the type of materialism that completely denises the existence of conscious experiences. As I said pages ago, my argument takes for granted that we are not all p-zombies and we do have conscious experiences.

There is nothing I can say to a person who denies this.