A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[csense]

I have been presupposing that materialism is correct throughout. Just because I presupoose a certain position to be correct does not mean I subscribe to that position!

[sigh]
Yes, yes...I know all that, but my comments weren't directed at thought experiment Ian, they were directed at Interesting Ian.

I realize that it can be tiresome and tedious when shifting in and out of perspectives in such a long philosophical thread as this, but to be perfectly frank with you, if you didn't understand my post, then I also think that it generates a level of confusion as to which frame of reference one might be in at any given time.
Be that as it may, I won't offer you further confusion

 

[ceptimus]

As I say there is no paradox from the third person perspective, by which I mean anyone who isn't either of the Ian's. Each Ian is absolutely identical.

It's profoundly different from the perspective of each of the Ians though. The difference between £10,000,000 and death.

Yes, but Ian knows all this before he accepts the test. He knows that 'one of him' will get the £10,000,000 and the other 'one of him' will get killed. He knows that each of the Ians will have the same uninterrupted seamless experience of being Ian. He knows that one of them is going to be grateful that he got the money, and the other one will be upset that he is to be executed.

You explained all this in your post. We understood it. You know that we understood it. We know that you know... and so on.

Where's the paradox?

By the way, did you ever get a reply from Birds Eye?

 

[Loki]

Danish,

Loki, my philosophical guitarist ...

Working on some new material as we speak - my new album will lead off with "Stairway to Epiphenomenalism", and finish with "Who Let the P-Zombies Out". The rest is still under development.

... with the gorgeous wife, ...

She just turned 40, and is getting better with age! (and no, she doesn't read the JREF so I'm not "sucking up").

... if you have managed to find the paradox, kindly explain it to this bewildered materialist.

At the moment my 'best guess' at what this paradox is goes like this. Ian is claiming that under materialism :

1. It is true that the duplicator creates two identical "streams of consciousness". It is an objective fact that these two consciousnesses are absolutely identical in every way (except location) - in other words, their "contents" are identical.

2. From the point of view of each consciousness there is *one fact* that is known to both of them - who they are. From Ian1's perspective, Ian1 *knows* that he is "myself" and that Ian2 is "not-myself". THis is also true for Ian2 - that he knows he is "myself" and that Ian1 is "Not-myself".

(Edited to add)
Perhaps this clarifies what I have written : The two consciousnesses are identical, but the "fact" that they know (their own identity) is different for each.

I think Ian is saying it is as if they each have an identical age, each knows their own age, but their ages are different.

They each have a self.
The selves are identical.
THe selves can differentiate themselves.
(End of additons)

I think Ian sees this as a logical contradiction - the two streams are identical, yet each can (correctly) *know* a fact that appears to be different for each - they can identify "themselves" correctly, even when identifying different selves.

I don't think this is a paradox - but it's the best idea I've come up with for what Ian's on about.

 

[Win]

Paul:

He doesn't? Did we kill him? Perhaps you're talking about alternate scenario 23C, while I am talking about original scenario 1. Sorry, I can't keep them straight.

Him being pre-dup Ian. No, we didn't kill him. The passage of time did, as it were.

The key question is: What is the relationship between Ian at time x (Ian x) and Ian after any arbitrary time interval n (Ian x+n).

If we're using the same definition of epiphenomenalism, it says that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain, but has absolutely no affect on the brain. That would mean that whatever the attributes of this epiphenomenon are, over and above the attributes of the brain, would be inaccessible to the brain. So the only thing we could talk about were attributes of the brain and the concept of this "additional epiphenomenal consciousness" would never arise.

Not really. Circles, for example, don't cause my brain to do anything. I can still talk about them.

Imagine p-zombie world. There is no phenomenal consciousness there. Our p-zombie conterparts are having this discussion, and the discussion originated there because high-level self referential systems in the p-zombies' brains were mistaken for being phenomenal consciousness. P-zombie Dan Dennett says: Look these systems are all there is to phenomenal consciousness; end of story; consciousness explained. P-zombie Win (among others) says: Nope. The raw feels still have to be explained, and they surely exist.

Same as here, only here I'm right and Dan Dennett is wrong.

I agree. So why did you start with "It can be, but most often isn't" in response to my question about whether epiphenomenalism is a brand of materialism?

Because most "epiphenomenalists" are dualists these days.

Ian:

I'm not confused at all. It's everyone else who is confused in that they don't understand the paradox.

Of course. But perhaps you'll indulge me a little bit more.

Not assuming as such. Rather it's a consequence of saying that I am one of the 2 Ians in a way that I'm not the other one. So of course then the obvious observation to make is that I therefore can't say I am one of the Ian's and not the other. And of course saying I am one of the Ian's contradicts materialism and your own epiphenomenalism. And seeing as we're presupposing the correctness of materialism I therefore definitely shouldn't say I am one Ian and not the other. I recognise that. But nevertheless I can say I am one Ian and not the other, which means that both materialism and epiphenomenalism are false (if we disregard the possibility of me experiencing out of both Ians simultaneously).

You, qua you pre-duplication Ian, don't exist any more. The passage of time has rubbed that Ian out of existence.

Again, you're assuming that your stream of consciousness flows "naturally" into one of the Ians. It doesn't. It is only because there is, at present, only one way to get from time x to time x+n that we priviledge the individual at the end of that chain with the title "I."

So, all we're left with are two people who each have first-person perspectives. Not so special.

I can still hear Billy Joe's country boy voice: But, if we didn't do the duplication, I'd still be sitting at my computer. Surely, that one is me.

Nope.

You only ever experience one stream of consciousness. In order for your original stream of consciousness to get to be split up so as for you to then both wholly experience out of copy1 and to wholly experience out of copy2 (not out of both simultaneously) the Universe literally has to split into 2. So we then have 2 Universes after copying rather than the original one.

You only ever experience each given moment at a time. Your "stream of consiousness" is a fiction of your memory.

Yep, if materialism or ephiphenomenalism is true. But nevertheless there is a special relationship. Therefore materialism and epiphenomenalism are false.

Naughty. After all this time where we've been saying that materialists assume their conclusion, you've started doing it.

For there to be a "special relationship," there would have to be a substantial consciousness that adheres to the body. There isn't. And anyway, you can't just assert there is.

Danish:

As epiphenomenalism is incoherent, I fear the dualist position is hopeless. Move away from the Dark Side, Win.

Like I said, if, after much thought, I were to conclude that dualism is fatally flawed, I'd fall back to hard mysterianism.

It is you who must abandon the tired cant of that bankrupt ideology of last century, materialism.

 

[Loki]

Win,

...must abandon the tired cant of that bankrupt ideology of last century, materialism.

In favour of the 19th ideology of dualism? Or the 18th century ideology of idelaism? Or the 4th century ideology of mysterianism?

 

[Interesting Ian]

[sigh]
Yes, yes...I know all that, but my comments weren't directed at thought experiment Ian, they were directed at Interesting Ian.

You said:

You should be arguing against duplication, not for it. Once you agree, as you have above, that a functioning duplicate is not only possible, but actual, then you have agreed in principle that life, and therefore consciousness, can be created from that which is non life, and in principle, this is the materialists argument.

From here, you could never demonstrate or even argue that the I is not contingent upon the physical, or physical processes. Certainty would only be subjective and never objective, which is what you are trying to argue in attempting to show materialism wrong.

You may know materialism is wrong, but you can not show it this way, especially when you make no arguments against a mechanism for creation.

I don't know why you have this habit of refusing to speak in a strightforward manner. In a sense I am arguing against duplication because it leads to absurd consequences. So what is wrong with that? And I don't know what you mean by certainty being objective. Do you mean that everyone is certain? Everyone should be certain that it leads to absurd consequences. It's not my fault people don't understand my argument.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Yes, but Ian knows all this before he accepts the test. He knows that 'one of him' will get the £10,000,000 and the other 'one of him' will get killed. He knows that each of the Ians will have the same uninterrupted seamless experience of being Ian. He knows that one of them is going to be grateful that he got the money, and the other one will be upset that he is to be executed.

You explained all this in your post. We understood it. You know that we understood it. We know that you know... and so on.

Where's the paradox?

If you're asking wherre the paradox is then you clearly haven't understood it! There shouldn't be a 50/50 chance of me being executed! I just can't believe how stupid everybody is!

By the way, did you ever get a reply from Birds Eye?

They sent me £5 in vouchers and said they might look into it. I was going to reply to them again but haven't got round to it.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

Not really. Circles, for example, don't cause my brain to do anything. I can still talk about them.

Of course they do! You can see them. You can learn about pi. You can picture one in your head. You can point to circular objects.

Imagine p-zombie world. There is no phenomenal consciousness there. Our p-zombie conterparts are having this discussion, and the discussion originated there because high-level self referential systems in the p-zombies' brains were mistaken for being phenomenal consciousness. P-zombie Dan Dennett says: Look these systems are all there is to phenomenal consciousness; end of story; consciousness explained. P-zombie Win (among others) says: Nope. The raw feels still have to be explained, and they surely exist.

There would be no knowledge of the "raw feel of phenomenal consciousness" to be explained. The concept of the feeling of consciousness would never enter their brains, because that feeling has no effect on the brain.

Because most "epiphenomenalists" are dualists these days.

So they claim that an emergent property of the brain, which we cannot possibly know anything about because it has no effect on the brain, is a separate ontological existent from the brain? That's absurd.

It is you who must abandon the tired cant of that bankrupt ideology of last century, materialism.

We have all abandoned last century materialism, Win. No one is making any claims about what stuff really is.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Epiphenomenalism

Hi Win.

And "epiphenomenalism" is the best dualist bet, IMHO.

Please give me your views on this paper of mine , which claims to show that epiphenomenalism or non-efficacy, even in Chalmer's version is fatally flawed. It would be nice to welcome a new-comer to radical dualism

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

If you're asking wherre the paradox is then you clearly haven't understood it! There shouldn't be a 50/50 chance of me being executed! I just can't believe how stupid everybody is!

Me, too! I haven't understood it either. Can you explain it?

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Persons are complex objects for reductive materialism

Hi Ian,

Again I'd like to emphasize that reductive materialism views persons as nothing more than complex pbjects. My point is pretty much the same as Win's.
Against our rational acceptance of the obvious, namely that we are irreducibly conscious subjects with irreducible subjective, qualitative experiences, materialists hold that both subjects and subjectivity are abstract terms for nothing more than purely physical processes. So asking who would experience anything, in the normal sense, simply is a naive, "folk psychological" question which doesn't apply to the framework of materialism. The only way a materialist can understand the question is whether the processes in one organic brain (or android artificial brain) are identical to processes in another brain. Formally, the processes can be the same, i.e. they can have all the same quantitative properties. But they aren't just processes in one brain, but in two different brains. So in that sense, processes in one brain can't be the same as processes in another brain.
Asking who experiences the processes in both brains doesn't make sense in a reductive materialist context, as the answer would have to be: nobody, since consciousness in the normal sense simply wouldn't exist.

Titus

 

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

I think I also finally understand what you have been trying to say.
Consider this version....

Original Ian is duplicated twice as Duplicate Ian 1 and Duplicate Ian 2 (or simply Ian 1 and Ian 2) and original Ian is vapourized in the process.
Now let's consider Ian 1 and Ian 2.....

From the objective POV:
"They are physically absolutely indistinguishable."

From the subjective POV:
The (objectively identified) Ian 1 knows he is this Ian here and not that Ian over there because, well, he is this Ian here looking at that Ian over there and not that Ian over there looking at this Ian right here.
And ditto for the (objectively identified) Ian 2

This alone, from your POV (I'm talking about poster Ian now), must be sufficient to refute materialism. Materialism does not distinguishing Ian 1 from Ian 2 ("They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.") but they ARE distinguishable subjectively, therefore materialsim must be false (because it fails to account for the subjective POV).


BillyJoe

 

[Titus Rivas]

Billy Joe,

Materialism does not distinguishing Ian 1 from Ian 2 ("They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.") but they ARE distinguishable subjectively, therefore materialsim must be false (because it fails to account for the subjective POV).

There are two problems with this position:

- There is absolutely no subjectivity according to reductive materialism. So this point would only make sense if you accepted subjective experiences all along, i.e. if you weren't a materialist from the start. That would amount to begging the question.

- Being identical means two very different things. I'm sure scholastic philosophy developed special terms for this, but I'm not aware of them (not in this incarnation anyway )

(a) possessing the same properties.

(b) being one and the same thing.

For example two freshly piinted identical editions of Darwin's The Origen of Species would be identical in the first sense, they posses the same properties. However, they wouldn't be identical in the second sense, of being one and the same thing.

Titus

 

[BillyJoe]

I can still hear Billy Joe's country boy voice: But, if we didn't do the duplication, I'd still be sitting at my computer. Surely, that one is me.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Billy said:

This alone, from your POV (I'm talking about poster Ian now), must be sufficient to refute materialism. Materialism does not distinguishing Ian 1 from Ian 2 ("They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.") but they ARE distinguishable subjectively, therefore materialsim must be false (because it fails to account for the subjective POV).

No, they are objectively distinguishable. There are two of them standing there!

We have to understand the difference between equal and same. The two Ians are equal but not the same.

Titus said:

- There is absolutely no subjectivity according to reductive materialism. So this point would only make sense if you accepted subjective experiences all along, i.e. if you weren't a materialist from the start. That would amount to begging the question.

Aw, come on! Of course there is subjectivity, it just isn't this ephemeral irreducible thing you keep talking about. If you dismiss subjectivity because it is "only an emergent property of the brain," then you have to dismiss wind because it is only an emergent property of air molecules.

~~ Paul

 

[BillyJoe]

- There is absolutely no subjectivity according to reductive materialism. So this point would only make sense if you accepted subjective experiences all along, i.e. if you weren't a materialist from the start. That would amount to begging the question. Titus

Surely this is not correct. How can subjective experiences be denied. After all we are all here having them. I don't think materialism has a problem with subjectivity. It's really no different from my morning newspaper being identical but not the same as your morning newspaper (provided you get "The Melbourne Age" of course)

-- Being identical means two very different things. I'm sure scholastic philosophy developed special terms for this, but I'm not aware of them (not in this incarnation anyway )

(a) possessing the same properties.

(b) being one and the same thing.

For example two freshly piinted identical editions of Darwin's The Origen of Species would be identical in the first sense, they posses the same properties. However, they wouldn't be identical in the second sense, of being one and the same thing.

Well, I've generally been saying that Ian 1 and Ian 2 are IDENTICAL but not the SAME.
(so my "identical " is your definition (a))

 

[BillyJoe]

No, they are objectively distinguishable. There are two of them standing there!

Sorry, yes "They are physically absolutely indistinguishable (except for position)"

BillyJoe.

 

[BillyJoe]

DanishDynamite,

BillyJoe, remember the "Staying Alive" thread? Can you remember what the exact example was which changed your stance? I believe it had something to do with "suspended animation" which showed how the Original's only claim to distinction (the fact he had the original elementary particles) was irrelevant.

Actually I don't think it was one particular thing. I think it just suddenly came to me - in the way that you think about a puzzle intensely for days and weeks on end and then sit back almost resigned to never understanding it when suddenly...the light switches on.

BillyJoe.

BTW, didn't you start that thread?

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
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Not assuming as such. Rather it's a consequence of saying that I am one of the 2 Ians in a way that I'm not the other one. So of course then the obvious observation to make is that I therefore can't say I am one of the Ian's and not the other. And of course saying I am one of the Ian's contradicts materialism and your own epiphenomenalism. And seeing as we're presupposing the correctness of materialism I therefore definitely shouldn't say I am one Ian and not the other. I recognise that. But nevertheless I can say I am one Ian and not the other, which means that both materialism and epiphenomenalism are false (if we disregard the possibility of me experiencing out of both Ians simultaneously).
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You, qua you pre-duplication Ian, don't exist any more. The passage of time has rubbed that Ian out of existence.

I don't know where you get this bizarre idea from. Clearly duplication doesn't wipe out my existence anymore than a second later will wipe out my present existence. Would you assert that I am literally dying every infinitesimal fraction of a second only to be replaced by an almost exact duplicate? In that case why should I care and plan about "my" future at all since in the next quadrillionth of a second I'm going to cease to exist just as much as if I actually die?

Again, you're assuming that your stream of consciousness flows "naturally" into one of the Ians.

No I'm not assuming it. Rather from the experiential perspective I can only possible experience continuing in one unique body, or in both bodies. By both bodies I mean simultaneously experiencing out of both of them. We just have to try and imagine it from our ongoing experiences at the precise moment of duplication. If the duplicate appears at some differing location one of three things could happen. At the precise moment of duplication either

a) nothing untoward will happen at all. (ie I remain the original)

b) I will suddenly experience a shift in perspective (ie I become the duplicate).

c) I will suddenly start to experience out of 2 bodies simultaneously.

Now that exhausts all the possibilities. The scenario you're envisaging is conceptually impossible from my first person perspective i.e my ongoing experiences. It only makes sense to someone who is not either of the 2 Ians.

It doesn't. It is only because there is, at present, only one way to get from time x to time x+n that we priviledge the individual at the end of that chain with the title "I."

So, all we're left with are two people who each have first-person perspectives. Not so special.

You're just viewing it from an objective viewpoint. You're ignoring my arguments demonstrating the incoherency of your position.

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You only ever experience one stream of consciousness. In order for your original stream of consciousness to get to be split up so as for you to then both wholly experience out of copy1 and to wholly experience out of copy2 (not out of both simultaneously) the Universe literally has to split into 2. So we then have 2 Universes after copying rather than the original one.
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You only ever experience each given moment at a time. Your "stream of consiousness" is a fiction of your memory.

I would say that under materialism or epiphenomenalism my stream of consciousness is constituted by my memory. I don't know what you mean by describing it as a "fiction". How would my stream of consciousness differ if it were "real"?

So there are only memories which makes a person a person. How does this impact on my argument? If you like then second by second there is a self, then another self, then another self {duplication} then another 2 selves, then another 2 selves etc. Great, what does this prove? There at least appear to be ongoing experiences which is the crucial point. Pre-dup self there will appear to be either one of 2 futures which will happen to me. In a very real sense I could end up as the duplicate and hence getting executed.

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Yep, if materialism or ephiphenomenalism is true. But nevertheless there is a special relationship. Therefore materialism and epiphenomenalism are false.
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Naughty. After all this time where we've been saying that materialists assume their conclusion, you've started doing it.

Absolutely not at all. I have been explaining my position over the last few pages. In my thought experiment that you ignored the action of duplicating pre-dup me, makes pre-dup me less confident of my future than I otherwise would be. Necessarily you would need to maintain that my non-confidence is misplaced.

In addition you have ignored the fact that an infinite number of selves can in principle be created by a unique physical configuration of the brain. This directly contradicts materialism and epiphenomenalism.

For there to be a "special relationship," there would have to be a substantial consciousness that adheres to the body. There isn't.

Oh yes? I wonder how you could possibly know that? A special relationship is clear from our ongoing experiences. I cannot possibly be mistaken in my own experiences.

And anyway, you can't just assert there is.

I have simply demonstrated that your position is incoherent. If that necessitates that there is a "substantial consciousness" then so be it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Persons are complex objects for reductive materialism

Hi Ian,

Again I'd like to emphasize that reductive materialism views persons as nothing more than complex pbjects. My point is pretty much the same as Win's.
Against our rational acceptance of the obvious, namely that we are irreducibly conscious subjects with irreducible subjective, qualitative experiences, materialists hold that both subjects and subjectivity are abstract terms for nothing more than purely physical processes. So asking who would experience anything, in the normal sense, simply is a naive, "folk psychological" question which doesn't apply to the framework of materialism.

Well I've addressed this point to you before. At the risk of boring you and others I might as well repeat it since I have nothing further to add:


one might argue there isn't an experiencer or self which has these experiences. Maybe there are only "free floating" experiences. But nevertheless these experiences do appear to come in distinct groups. That is to say there seems to be a distinction between my body kissing a gorgeous young lady and someone else doing so, because in the former "I" shall receive pleasurable experience. Well, at least "I" will if she can kiss, and she hasn't got bad breath. Anyway . . er . . where was I? Yes so there seems to be a self in the sense that of the totality of distinct experiences, there is only a tiny subset that "I" am acquainted with in a way that "I" am not acquainted with all other experiences. This stream of experiences can constitute the self for the materialist; or at least this stream of seeming experiences, if the past doesn't exist and their reality is constituted by "ones" memory. So it would seem that a materialist should admit a "self" appropriately defined so long as he doesn't hold the position that everyone is a p-zombie.

The only way a materialist can understand the question is whether the processes in one organic brain (or android artificial brain) are identical to processes in another brain. Formally, the processes can be the same, i.e. they can have all the same quantitative properties. But they aren't just processes in one brain, but in two different brains. So in that sense, processes in one brain can't be the same as processes in another brain.

In what sense can't they be?? All they have is a different location which cannot conceivably be relevant.