A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Mercutio]

At the risk of pissing you off, Mercutio, I don't understand what you just said.

I don't really think it is possible to piss Mercutio off...That particular comment was on the circularity of defining a separate "I". I think Ian was actually agreeing that none of them held any special title to being "his" consciousness--that he did not choose one because it was "him", but rather it was "him" because he chose it. (probably didn't help much...)

I didn't say I had great affection for one over the other, but one is the original, after all. Apparently, though, Ian is talking about the scenario where the original is killed. Then, indeed, neither copy is special.

Even in the original scenario, the "original" Ian can only be determined via the forbidden third person perspective. (spooky...)

Can you summarize it, then? I can't even tell which feature of the scenario is the one that is supposed to be paradoxical.
~~ Paul

I was afraid somebody would ask that...can I just answer "no"?

Perhaps it is merely that these are supposed to be identical selves, and yet the simple choosing of an "I" among them (any one of them, actually) immediately renders them non-identical--they are now (from each I's perspective) either "me" (for just the one) or "not-me" (for any additional copies). Therefore, we have identical bodies, but non-identical minds, thus the contradiction that disproves materialism.

(this ignores the symmetry of the exact same process going on in each "I", which is perhaps only verifiable through the dreaded third-person perspective...)

So, Ian, is that it?

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
Yes DD, I understand and agree with all this.
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DD
But do you, really? If you do, I don't understand why you have the objections you do.

Well I think I best express myself in my reply to Win in the green text. In that thought experiment I actually find out that I am the duplicate. But I could have found out I was the original.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Well I think I best express myself in my reply to Win in the green text. In that thought experiment I actually find out that I am the duplicate. But I could have found out I was the original.

I've read you thought experiment. I think this is the relevant part:

So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd! After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place? Then, since no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.

Where is the paradox? Either you have agreed to the experiment or you haven't. If you haven't, then no one will come and execute you. If you have, then what's the problem?

Ian, let me reiterate: You only exist as a by-product of an Ian brain. No Ian brain, no you. 10 Ian brains (and 10 identical environments), 10 you. Switch off (instant suspended animation) the currently sole ian brain, and there will no longer be an Ian. Switch it on again 10 years later (after having exchanged every atom in the Ian body with new ones) and there you are.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
At the risk of pissing you off, Mercutio, I don't understand what you just said.
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I don't really think it is possible to piss Mercutio off...That particular comment was on the circularity of defining a separate "I". I think Ian was actually agreeing that none of them held any special title to being "his" consciousness--that he did not choose one because it was "him", but rather it was "him" because he chose it. (probably didn't help much...)

quote:
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I didn't say I had great affection for one over the other, but one is the original, after all. Apparently, though, Ian is talking about the scenario where the original is killed. Then, indeed, neither copy is special.
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Even in the original scenario, the "original" Ian can only be determined via the forbidden third person perspective. (spooky...)

quote:
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Can you summarize it, then? I can't even tell which feature of the scenario is the one that is supposed to be paradoxical.
~~ Paul
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I was afraid somebody would ask that...can I just answer "no"?

Perhaps it is merely that these are supposed to be identical selves, and yet the simple choosing of an "I" among them (any one of them, actually) immediately renders them non-identical--they are now (from each I's perspective) either "me" (for just the one) or "not-me" (for any additional copies). Therefore, we have identical bodies, but non-identical minds, thus the contradiction that disproves materialism.

(this ignores the symmetry of the exact same process going on in each "I", which is perhaps only verifiable through the dreaded third-person perspective...)

So, Ian, is that it?

Yes I think you got it basically spot on. Need to read through it again to check.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Yes I think you got it basically spot on. Need to read through it again to check.

Yeah your understanding seems fine although I don't blame Paul for maybe getting confused! So you understand but don't agree. Realistically I couldn't ask for more!

 

[Mercutio]

Yeah your understanding seems fine although I don't blame Paul for maybe getting confused! So you understand but don't agree. Realistically I couldn't ask for more!

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Win's right you know - your confusion stems from your inability to grasp the nature of the relationships between Pre-Dup Ian and the Post-Dup Ians.

(Mercutio wrote) : Perhaps it is merely that these are supposed to be identical selves, and yet the simple choosing of an "I" among them (any one of them, actually) immediately renders them non-identical--they are now (from each I's perspective) either "me" (for just the one) or "not-me" (for any additional copies). Therefore, we have identical bodies, but non-identical minds, thus the contradiction that disproves materialism.

Finally, I think I see your point Ian (thanks Mercutio!) That's the good news for you Ian. The bad news is I think it's not a paradox. But leave it with me, and I'll digest it a little more before replying in detail...

 

[csense]

if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer!

So ok, I agree to it. Now let's suppose that the copying will take place in a room with a TV set. The copying will take place sometime whilst I am watching my favorite film of all time Groundhog Day, although precisely when duplication will take place is not specified. It could take place anytime during the duration of the film. Imagine also that the duplicate will suddenly appear in an absolute identical room with the same film playing which is also precisely synchronized to the other film.

It should be obvious that nothing untoward will happen at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the original obviously nothing will happen. I will be watching the film and will notice absolutely nothing at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the duplicate, again I will note nothing untoward. At the precise moment of duplication I will suddenly appear in the duplicate room, sitting exactly in the same relative position and posture, the film will be continuous with the film being shown in the other room, and my memories will be continuous with the original Ian just prior to duplication.

So ok, I'm sitting there watching the film, and I most probably will be thinking to myself "hmmmm, I wonder if I have been duplicated yet or not?". Because I have no way of knowing. Moreover, even if I have been duplicated, I have absolutely no way of telling whether I am the original or the duplicate. But now the end of the film arrives. I know that duplication must have taken place, but there is absolutely nothing about the character of my experiences which could enable me to determine whether I am the original or the duplicate. My consciousness has been continous. I might feel therefore that I must be the original Ian. But of course the duplicate will be thinking exactly the same thoughts. Bearing this in mind I cannot ascribe anymore probability than I am the original than the duplicate, and the same reasoning will be gone through by the other Ian. So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.

Then the door to the room opens, and the person standing there says "I regret to inform you that you are the duplicate Ian, and therefore must be immediately executed".

So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd! After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place? Then, since no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.

It might be popinted out that at least the other Ian gets the £10,000,000. But this doesn't interest me anymore than anyone else I like who receives £10,000,000.

I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency.

You should be arguing against duplication, not for it. Once you agree, as you have above, that a functioning duplicate is not only possible, but actual, then you have agreed in principle that life, and therefore consciousness, can be created from that which is non life, and in principle, this is the materialists argument.

From here, you could never demonstrate or even argue that the I is not contingent upon the physical, or physical processes. Certainty would only be subjective and never objective, which is what you are trying to argue in attempting to show materialism wrong.

You may know materialism is wrong, but you can not show it this way, especially when you make no arguments against a mechanism for creation.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You should be arguing against duplication, not for it. Once you agree, as you have above, that a funtioning duplicate is not only possible, but actual, then you have agreed in principle that life, and therefore consciousness, can be created from that which is non life, and in principle, this is the materialists argument.

I have been presupposing that materialism is correct throughout. Just because I presupoose a certain position to be correct does not mean I subscribe to that position!

 

[DanishDynamite]

Loki:

Finally, I think I see your point Ian (thanks Mercutio!) That's the good news for you Ian. The bad news is I think it's not a paradox. But leave it with me, and I'll digest it a little more before replying in detail...

Loki, my philosophical guitarist with the gorgeous wife, if you have managed to find the paradox, kindly explain it to this bewildered materialist.

csense:

You should be arguing against duplication, not for it. Once you agree, as you have above, that a funtioning duplicate is not only possible, but actual, then you have agreed in principle that life, and therefore consciousness, can be created from that which is non life, and in principle, this is the materialists argument.

From here, you could never demonstrate or even argue that the I is not contingent upon the physical, or physical processes. Certainty would only be subjective and never objective, which is what you are trying to argue in attempting to show materialism wrong.

You may know materialism is wrong, but you can not show it this way, especially when you make no arguments against a mechanism for creation.

Ian doesn't hold with materialism. He is just taking what he understands the materialist postion to be, in order to try and show it is incoherent.

So far, no luck.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

I think that would be true. Neural processes eventually cause the raw exerience of seeing say redness. But that raw experience itself is clearly not physical. I mean what would it mean to declare it were?

But if that has a different ontological status, then so do the concepts represented by every single nonphysical noun in the language. And there would be no reason to think that all those concepts taken together were just one extra ontological existent. Every one of them represents a different one. So we don't have dualism, we have n-ism, where n is a very large number.

Isn't it more reasonable to say that nonconcrete things and emergent properties have no ontological status, but are just concepts? (And people wonder why I think ontology is incoherent.)

Mercutio said:

Even in the original scenario, the "original" Ian can only be determined via the forbidden third person perspective. (spooky...)

Yes, but spooky isn't the same as paradoxical.

Perhaps it is merely that these are supposed to be identical selves, and yet the simple choosing of an "I" among them (any one of them, actually) immediately renders them non-identical--they are now (from each I's perspective) either "me" (for just the one) or "not-me" (for any additional copies). Therefore, we have identical bodies, but non-identical minds, thus the contradiction that disproves materialism.

After a nanosecond you don't have identical bodies, either. My kingdom for the paradox!

If I make a perfect photocopy of a piece of paper, remember which one is the original, and then show them both to someone else, do I have the same paradox? One of us knows which is which and the other does not.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,

Win's right you know -

No I didn't know that.


And I still don't.

your confusion stems from your inability to grasp the nature of the relationships between Pre-Dup Ian and the Post-Dup Ians.

It's the same as the relationship between myself from one second to the next.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Mercutio said, while explaining the paradox:

(this ignores the symmetry of the exact same process going on in each "I", which is perhaps only verifiable through the dreaded third-person perspective...)

Ian, you ought to address this.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

csense:Ian doesn't hold with materialism. He is just taking what he understands the materialist postion to be, in order to try and show it is incoherent.

Yea, assume something to be true and show that it leads to absurd consequences.

So far, no luck.

You have your opinion And even if one supposes I am wrong (which I'm not), there are quite a few other arguments demonstrating its incoherency.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Finally, I think I see your point Ian (thanks Mercutio!) That's the good news for you Ian. The bad news is I think it's not a paradox. But leave it with me, and I'll digest it a little more before replying in detail...

goody

 

[Interesting Ian]

(this ignores the symmetry of the exact same process going on in each "I", which is perhaps only verifiable through the dreaded third-person perspective...)
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Ian, you ought to address this.
[/B]

What is there to address? From the third person perspective both Ian's are absolutely identical, yes? From the first person perspective (either Ian) they're not.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Just had a look back in the thread to see what exactly Mercutio said. Apparently it was this bit:

Perhaps it is merely that these are supposed to be identical selves, and yet the simple choosing of an "I" among them (any one of them, actually) immediately renders them non-identical--they are now (from each I's perspective) either "me" (for just the one) or "not-me" (for any additional copies). Therefore, we have identical bodies, but non-identical minds, thus the contradiction that disproves materialism.

Since every single one of the Ians will simultanously have the feeling of a "me", I don't see the paradox. In fact, even if this feeling of "me" arrived at different times, I still don't see the paradox.

I guess the reason is that there is no paradox.

 

[ceptimus]

I still don't think any paradox has been demonstrated. Has Mercutio said that he now finds the situation paradoxical? I don't think he has.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Just had a look back in the thread to see what exactly Mercutio said. Apparently it was this bit:

quote:
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Perhaps it is merely that these are supposed to be identical selves, and yet the simple choosing of an "I" among them (any one of them, actually) immediately renders them non-identical--they are now (from each I's perspective) either "me" (for just the one) or "not-me" (for any additional copies). Therefore, we have identical bodies, but non-identical minds, thus the contradiction that disproves materialism.
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Since every single one of the Ians will simultanously have the feeling of a "me", I don't see the paradox. In fact, even if this feeling of "me" arrived at different times, I still don't see the paradox.

I guess the reason is that there is no paradox.

As I say there is no paradox from the third person perspective, by which I mean anyone who isn't either of the Ian's. Each Ian is absolutely identical.

It's profoundly different from the perspective of each of the Ians though. The difference between £10,000,000 and death.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Interesting Ian:

As I say there is no paradox from the third person perspective, by which I mean anyone who isn't either of the Ian's. Each Ian is absolutely identical.

It's profoundly different from the perspective of each of the Ians though. The difference between £10,000,000 and death.

Sorry, but nothing is different. Every single Ian feels exactly the same way.