A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[LuxFerum]

And I would totally use the transporter still. Even though the stram of consciousness attached to my meat brain would cease to exist. That's because an identical one, attached to a new meat brain, would exist. Which is A-Ok with me

you will die for what you believe.
That is something that I won't do.

 

[slimshady2357]

you will die for what you believe.
That is something that I won't do.

Hey, I'm not taking that transporter until I know for sure it's worked many times (who is that brave soul that will test it first? ). And I'm not going through with Ian's duplication situation unless I know the people offering up the dough are going to come through for me!

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

Win
OK. Let's think about what you mean by "your" stream of consciousness.

What makes the phenomenal experiences you're having right now part of the same "stream of consciousness" as those you remember having yesterday?

You feel there must be a paradox because there seems to be a self-evident connection between "your" phenomenal experiences of today and those of yesterday; they are both within the same "stream of consciousness."

Em . .I don't believe the paradox resides there. Remember I am absolutely happy in supposing the duplicate is just as much me as the original. No distinction at all between the 2 Ians No distinction, yet clearly there is a distinction as I experience only out of one of the 2 Ian's. It could be either Ian, and it's absolutely irrelevant which one, but whichever Ian it is, the other Ian is effectively a different person in that, although he thinks exactly the same thoughts and behaves exactly the same way given the same environmental stimuli, I do not literally experience his thoughts and his environment the same way I experience mine. That's the paradox.

Yet, this is a false intuition. I would argue that there is no more connection between your phenomenal experiences of yesterday and those of today than there is between the phenomenal experiences of Ian1 and Ian2.

Yes absolutely

So, once you let go of the false intuition that "you" have some continuity across time, the paradox vanishes.

Er . . no.

Oh BTW, Sou told me this morning she thinks you're a genius! Why don't I get woman saying that about me? LOL

BillieJoe
Suppose Original Ian is anaesthetized and then duplicated. Then both Original Ian and Duplicate Ian are transferred to a room into adjoining beds. When they wake up, both can reason that one of them is Original Ian and the other is Duplicate Ian but they can't tell who is who. Suppose also that this was set up in such a way that even the scientists don't know who is who. We must therefore call them Ian 1 and Ian 2.

Yes! Brilliant thought experiment BillieJoe!

Which Ian are you?

The Ian which I am experiencing out of. Could be the original, could be the duplicate. I don't know, I don't care, and neither does anyone else care, nor could it make any conceivable physical difference to anything whatsoever .

If you say something like "I don't know which one I will be but I will be either one or the other", then on what basis do you say this?

Because I will only experience out of one Ian's body and not both simultaneously.

I mean Ian 1 and Ian 2 are identical, therefore Ian 1's brain and Ian 2's brain are identical, therefore the processes inside Ian 1's brain and the processes inside Ian 2's brain are identical, therefore the processes inside Ian 1's brain that define the self and the processes inside Ian 1's brain that define the self are identical.

Yes absolutely.

What on Earth, from a materialist's POV, could determine that, for example, Ian 2 is you?

Nothing whatsover, not my assurances or anything else. They are physically absolutely indistinguishable.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Em . .I don't believe the paradox resides there. Remember I am absolutely happy in supposing the duplicate is just as much me as the original. No distinction at all between the 2 Ians No distinction, yet clearly there is a distinction as I experience only out of one of the 2 Ian's. It could be either Ian, and it's absolutely irrelevant which one, but whichever Ian it is, the other Ian is effectively a different person in that, although he thinks exactly the same thoughts and behaves exactly the same way given the same environmental stimuli, I do not literally experience his thoughts and his environment the same way I experience mine. That's the paradox.

Okay, I've read this five times. I'm really trying here. It's not that you don't experience your duplicate's experiences the same way as yours: You don't experience them at all. Why is that paradoxical?

Win said:

So, once you let go of the false intuition that "you" have some continuity across time, the paradox vanishes.

and Ian replied:

Er . . no.

Dang! Lost again.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
If a stream of consciousness is terminated when one uses a teletransporter, then since you are that stream of consciousness, then you will cease to exist and you shouldn't use the transporter. It's also a denial of materialism.
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Adam
It's an affirmation of materialism!

And I would totally use the transporter still. Even though the stram of consciousness attached to my meat brain would cease to exist. That's because an identical one, attached to a new meat brain, would exist. Which is A-Ok with me

quote:

II
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Why can't the original stream end up in another brain?
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Adam
Uh, because materialism states that brains cause consciousness You're really trying to take on board the materialist idea of consciousness aren't you?

Adam
Nope, it' you that is denying materialism, when you think that consciousness is not attached to a single brain. Your problem is that you're still using Ideaist ideas about the self to disprove materialism. The fact that you think a consciousness created by Brain A can somehow 'move' to Brain B, is clear evidnce of this, since this is absurd under materialism.

I think you're making the mistake of supposing that within the context of materialism a particular stream of consciousness is determined or equivalent to physical stuff itself. It's not, rather it is equivalent to the physical processes, or more basically a stream of consciousness is just information. If one reproduces the same physical function of your brain now, and kills the present Adam, then your stream of consciousness will persist. You might find yourself in another Adams body trillions of light years away beyond the cosmic horizon. Or you might find yourself inhabiting an androids body 100,000 years in the future. But there will be no break in your stream of consciousness. You will instantaneously leap trillions of light years in no time at all, or instantaneously travel 100,000 years into the future

quote:
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If you accept that offer that my thought experiment outlined you cannot be 100% certain that you will get the money rather than dying. Indeed you only have 50/50 of a chance.

But ok, tell me, would you take that offer up? Would you have absolute certainty that you, your stream of consciousness won't end up dying? If you have this confidence then you'll accept the offer, right?
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Other than the ethical problems of killing one of me once there are two (hey, I don't want any me's to die! ), I would certainly take the 10,000,000 pounds!

One of me will survive and I'm not particularily sentimental about this meat brain, so I say show me the money

Right, thanks for answering I'm going to ask this question to everyone else soon and a related question as I don't really feel that a great deal is being acheived at the present time.

 

[Win]

Ian:

Em . .I don't believe the paradox resides there. Remember I am absolutely happy in supposing the duplicate is just as much me as the original. No distinction at all between the 2 Ians No distinction, yet clearly there is a distinction as I experience only out of one of the 2 Ian's. It could be either Ian, and it's absolutely irrelevant which one, but whichever Ian it is, the other Ian is effectively a different person in that, although he thinks exactly the same thoughts and behaves exactly the same way given the same environmental stimuli, I do not literally experience his thoughts and his environment the same way I experience mine. That's the paradox.

I know you don't think that's where the paradox resides. That's what's confusing you.

Let's parse some of your language in the above paragraph, particularly this: "No distinction, yet clearly there is a distinction as I experience only out of one of the 2 Ian's." Here, you're tacitly assuming that one of the Ians has a connection to pre-duplication Ian such that that Ian stands in a special relation to pre-duplication Ian. There is no such connection, no such special relation.

When you say that you experience out of only one of the two Ian's, that's a consequence of your giving one of the Ians a privledged position that has no basis. You, qua pre-dup Ian, doesn't "experience out of" anything but pre-dup Ian.

Again, understanding the temporal sequence of Ians is the key to understanding why there isn't a paradox.

Loki:

Perhaps a little to glib, but the *practical* difference between most forms of Idealism and "mysterianism" is spelling?

Not really. A mysterian believes that we don't have any answers to "the hard questions." A hard mysterian belives we never will, because of human cognitive limitations.

And materialism? Well, it's still taking out the trash and getting on with the business of making the universe arrive at next Tuesday in one piece - so that a few collections of H2O moelcules can debate why.

Well, materialism isn't. Ontological positions don't do a lot of water carrying when it comes to making toast or lancing boils.

Or "making" the universe do anything, for that matter.

Paul:

Are you assuming the same definition of epiphenomenalism that I am? You know, the one that is patently absurd and would disallow us from having this conversation?

Err ... no.

I am referring to the counter-intuitive notion that we'd be having this conversation even if we were p-zombies.

The only difference between our world and p-zombie world is the truth value of some of our statements.

Isn't epiphenomenalism a brand of materialism?

It can be, but most often isn't. For example, a physical mechanism could produce an effect that is the terminal point in a causal chain, with no feedback into the chain. That terminal point would be epiphenomenal, yet physical.

Most of the time, I'm talking about epiphenomenal dualism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

Let's parse some of your language in the above paragraph, particularly this: "No distinction, yet clearly there is a distinction as I experience only out of one of the 2 Ian's." Here, you're tacitly assuming that one of the Ians has a connection to pre-duplication Ian such that that Ian stands in a special relation to pre-duplication Ian. There is no such connection, no such special relation.

Of course there is! One of the two Ians is the pre-duplication Ian. I can't imagine a more special relation than that. Of course, neither Ian knows whether he is the pre-duplication Ian.

I am referring to the counter-intuitive notion that we'd be having this conversation even if we were p-zombies.

Can you explain how we'd be able to talk about the attributes of the epiphenomena?

It can be, but most often isn't. For example, a physical mechanism could produce an effect that is the terminal point in a causal chain, with no feedback into the chain. That terminal point would be epiphenomenal, yet physical.

Are you suggesting that the epiphenomena of something have a different ontological status than the something itself?

~~ Paul

 

[Win]

Paul:

Of course there is! One of the two Ians is the pre-duplication Ian. I can't imagine a more special relation than that. Of course, neither Ian knows whether he is the pre-duplication Ian.

I'm afraid you'll have to spell it out for me. Just exactly how is it that one of the two Ians is the pre-duplication Ian.

One of the defining qualities of pre-dup Ian, as his name suggests, is that he exists prior to the duplication. After duplication, he no longer exists.

Can you explain how we'd be able to talk about the attributes of the epiphenomena?

What epiphenomena? Who are "we?"

Taking a stab anyway, I think you're confusing being able to talk about something with something being the cause of what you're talking about.

Are you suggesting that the epiphenomena of something have a different ontological status than the something itself?

You've lost me.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

One of the defining qualities of pre-dup Ian, as his name suggests, is that he exists prior to the duplication. After duplication, he no longer exists.

He doesn't? Did we kill him? Perhaps you're talking about alternate scenario 23C, while I am talking about original scenario 1. Sorry, I can't keep them straight.

What epiphenomena? Who are "we?"

Taking a stab anyway, I think you're confusing being able to talk about something with something being the cause of what you're talking about.

If we're using the same definition of epiphenomenalism, it says that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain, but has absolutely no affect on the brain. That would mean that whatever the attributes of this epiphenomenon are, over and above the attributes of the brain, would be inaccessible to the brain. So the only thing we could talk about were attributes of the brain and the concept of this "additional epiphenomenal consciousness" would never arise.

You said:

It can be, but most often isn't. For example, a physical mechanism could produce an effect that is the terminal point in a causal chain, with no feedback into the chain. That terminal point would be epiphenomenal, yet physical.

I agree. So why did you start with "It can be, but most often isn't" in response to my question about whether epiphenomenalism is a brand of materialism?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

I know you don't think that's where the paradox resides. That's what's confusing you.

I'm not confused at all. It's everyone else who is confused in that they don't understand the paradox.

Let's parse some of your language in the above paragraph, particularly this: "No distinction, yet clearly there is a distinction as I experience only out of one of the 2 Ian's." Here, you're tacitly assuming that one of the Ians has a connection to pre-duplication Ian such that that Ian stands in a special relation to pre-duplication Ian.

Not assuming as such. Rather it's a consequence of saying that I am one of the 2 Ians in a way that I'm not the other one. So of course then the obvious observation to make is that I therefore can't say I am one of the Ian's and not the other. And of course saying I am one of the Ian's contradicts materialism and your own epiphenomenalism. And seeing as we're presupposing the correctness of materialism I therefore definitely shouldn't say I am one Ian and not the other. I recognise that. But nevertheless I can say I am one Ian and not the other, which means that both materialism and epiphenomenalism are false (if we disregard the possibility of me experiencing out of both Ians simultaneously).

Did you read my thought experiment? I think the paradox is best illustrated there so I'll reproduce it here (in green) for you and others who may not have read it.


if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer!

So ok, I agree to it. Now let's suppose that the copying will take place in a room with a TV set. The copying will take place sometime whilst I am watching my favorite film of all time Groundhog Day, although precisely when duplication will take place is not specified. It could take place anytime during the duration of the film. Imagine also that the duplicate will suddenly appear in an absolute identical room with the same film playing which is also precisely synchronized to the other film.

It should be obvious that nothing untoward will happen at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the original obviously nothing will happen. I will be watching the film and will notice absolutely nothing at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the duplicate, again I will note nothing untoward. At the precise moment of duplication I will suddenly appear in the duplicate room, sitting exactly in the same relative position and posture, the film will be continuous with the film being shown in the other room, and my memories will be continuous with the original Ian just prior to duplication.

So ok, I'm sitting there watching the film, and I most probably will be thinking to myself "hmmmm, I wonder if I have been duplicated yet or not?". Because I have no way of knowing. Moreover, even if I have been duplicated, I have absolutely no way of telling whether I am the original or the duplicate. But now the end of the film arrives. I know that duplication must have taken place, but there is absolutely nothing about the character of my experiences which could enable me to determine whether I am the original or the duplicate. My consciousness has been continous. I might feel therefore that I must be the original Ian. But of course the duplicate will be thinking exactly the same thoughts. Bearing this in mind I cannot ascribe anymore probability than I am the original than the duplicate, and the same reasoning will be gone through by the other Ian. So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.

Then the door to the room opens, and the person standing there says "I regret to inform you that you are the duplicate Ian, and therefore must be immediately executed".

So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd! After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place? Then, since no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.

It might be popinted out that at least the other Ian gets the £10,000,000. But this doesn't interest me anymore than anyone else I like who receives £10,000,000.

I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency.


Also to repeat what I said a couple or so pages ago:

First of all imagine that your original body gets completely destroyed and 2 copies of your body are made. So there now is no original. You either suddenly experience a sudden shift of perspective so you find yourself experiencing out of copy1 of Paul, or you suddenly experience a sudden shift of perspective so you find yourself experiencing out of copy2 of Paul. But whichever you experience will be a unique continuous stream of consciousness from experiencing out of the destroyed body to experiencing out of one of the two copies. Now note that you do not experience both. Your stream of consciousness is unique and ongoing and uninterrupted. Basically it's an experiential thing. You only ever experience one stream of consciousness. In order for your original stream of consciousness to get to be split up so as for you to then both wholly experience out of copy1 and to wholly experience out of copy2 (not out of both simultaneously) the Universe literally has to split into 2. So we then have 2 Universes after copying rather than the original one.

There is no such connection, no such special relation.

Yep, if materialism or ephiphenomenalism is true. But nevertheless there is a special relationship. Therefore materialism and epiphenomenalism are false.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I just sighed so loudly that my wife asked me if everything was okay.

But nevertheless I can say I am one Ian and not the other, ...

Why, why, oh why? Perhaps you need to define "I" for us.

I swear yesterday you said that neither Ian could tell whether he was the original. Was that a different scenario?

~~ Paul

 

[DanishDynamite]

Danish:



Maybe not, but not so obviously, but I still think so anyway.

But what would a Swede know.

More than a Mick at any rate.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Paul
I just sighed so loudly that my wife asked me if everything was okay.


quote:
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But nevertheless I can say I am one Ian and not the other, ...
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Why, why, oh why? Perhaps you need to define "I" for us.

Because I only experience out of one body and not both simultaneously.

I swear yesterday you said that neither Ian could tell whether he was the original. Was that a different scenario?

Yes I said that yesterday (or today or both), and I stand by it.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Win:

Less glibly, I think the choice is between a naturalistic dualism and mysterianism. And "epiphenomenalism" is the best dualist bet, IMHO.

As epiphenomenalism is incoherent, I fear the dualist position is hopeless. Move away from the Dark Side, Win.

 

[Mercutio]

I swear yesterday you said that neither Ian could tell whether he was the original. Was that a different scenario?

I believe this remains true--even Ian said it did not matter which one he was, so long as he in fact was himself and not the other. As he says, "it's a consequence of saying that I am one of the 2 Ians in a way that I'm not the other one." Therefore, we cannot say that he says he is himself because he's not the other one. That would be circular. Ian, again:"So of course then the obvious observation to make is that I therefore can't say I am one of the Ian's and not the other." Which is true: he is, in fact, one of the Ians and the other. Which really should not surprise the materialist at all, since that was what the thought-experiment should have produced.

When you, Paul, said

Of course there is! One of the two Ians is the pre-duplication Ian. I can't imagine a more special relation than that. Of course, neither Ian knows whether he is the pre-duplication Ian.

I would argue that you held as much un-needed attachment to the particular molecules as we have been accusing Ian of holding to a particular consciousness. From a third-person perspective you are, of course, absolutely correct, but those are apparantly not the rules of this game.

I see Ian's paradox (I think) most clearly in this most recent post, but I am still not convinced that there is any "there" there.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I said:

Why, why, oh why? Perhaps you need to define "I" for us.

And Ian replied:

Because I only experience out of one body and not both simultaneously.

Note the emphasis that I added.

Yes I said that yesterday (or today or both), and I stand by it.

But every scenario you've given supposedly has the paradox.

Help! Am I the only one who is utterly confused here?

I believe this remains true--even Ian said it did not matter which one he was, so long as he in fact was himself and not the other. As he says, "it's a consequence of saying that I am one of the 2 Ians in a way that I'm not the other one." Therefore, we cannot say that he says he is himself because he's not the other one. That would be circular. Ian, again:"So of course then the obvious observation to make is that I therefore can't say I am one of the Ian's and not the other." Which is true: he is, in fact, one of the Ians and the other. Which really should not surprise the materialist at all, since that was what the thought-experiment should have produced.

At the risk of pissing you off, Mercutio, I don't understand what you just said.

I would argue that you held as much un-needed attachment to the particular molecules as we have been accusing Ian of holding to a particular consciousness. From a third-person perspective you are, of course, absolutely correct, but those are apparantly not the rules of this game.

I didn't say I had great affection for one over the other, but one is the original, after all. Apparently, though, Ian is talking about the scenario where the original is killed. Then, indeed, neither copy is special.

I see Ian's paradox (I think) most clearly in this most recent post, but I am still not convinced that there is any "there" there.

Can you summarize it, then? I can't even tell which feature of the scenario is the one that is supposed to be paradoxical.

~~ Paul

 

[DanishDynamite]

Ian, remember that under materialism there is no "you" except when there is an Ian brain generating "you". You feel that the "you" generated by the Ian brain which you have is somehow the real Ian, which is understandable given the nature of the thought experiment. However, try to understand that you are just a by-product of a functioning Ian brain. If there are 10 such brains, each will be generating a "you". None of these generated "you"s is different from any other at the moment of creation.

BillyJoe, remember the "Staying Alive" thread? Can you remember what the exact example was which changed your stance? I believe it had something to do with "suspended animation" which showed how the Original's only claim to distinction (the fact he had the original elementary particles) was irrelevant.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Win
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Let's parse some of your language in the above paragraph, particularly this: "No distinction, yet clearly there is a distinction as I experience only out of one of the 2 Ian's." Here, you're tacitly assuming that one of the Ians has a connection to pre-duplication Ian such that that Ian stands in a special relation to pre-duplication Ian. There is no such connection, no such special relation.
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Paul
Of course there is! One of the two Ians is the pre-duplication Ian. I can't imagine a more special relation than that. Of course, neither Ian knows whether he is the pre-duplication Ian.

No, they are both the pre-duplicate Ian.

Win
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It can be, but most often isn't. For example, a physical mechanism could produce an effect that is the terminal point in a causal chain, with no feedback into the chain. That terminal point would be epiphenomenal, yet physical.
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Paul
Are you suggesting that the epiphenomena of something have a different ontological status than the something itself?

I think that would be true. Neural processes eventually cause the raw exerience of seeing say redness. But that raw experience itself is clearly not physical. I mean what would it mean to declare it were?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian, remember that under materialism there is no "you" except when there is an Ian brain generating "you". You feel that the "you" generated by the Ian brain which you have is somehow the real Ian, which is understandable given the nature of the thought experiment. However, try to understand that you are just a by-product of a functioning Ian brain. If there are 10 such brains, each will be generating a "you". None of these generated "you"s is different from any other at the moment of creation.

Yes DD, I understand and agree with all this.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Yes DD, I understand and agree with all this.

But do you, really? If you do, I don't understand why you have the objections you do.