A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[ceptimus]

Well let's suppose a boulder is conscious. After all, it rolls down a hill so why shouldn't it be conscious? So how exactly is duplicating a boulder different from duplicating human beings?

The materialist view is that consiousness isn't a yes-it's-there/no-it's-not thing (like for example pregnancy is). To a materialist, like me, consciousness is a measure of the complexity of the thought processes going on inside a brain or computer or whatever.

So say that when I'm awake and not drunk, I could assign a measure to how conscious I am. Let's say, as I type this, my brain is working at the 1 ceptimus unit-of-consciousness level.

Now I would say a rock has no consciousness at all, but that a chimpanzee is quite conscious, maybe just as much as I am. When it comes to things like slugs and snails, I think they're pretty unconscious. I think things like fish and sharks have a very dim level of consciousness. So I could assign measures of consciousness to things on a scale like this.

Item     Consciousness Level

rock         0
ant          0.000001
goldfish     0.05
dog          0.8
chimpanzee   1.0
ceptimus     1.0

I suppose that seems weird, nonsensical even, to you. But that is the materialist view I think. I'm sure Mercutio and the other materialists here will point out how their world views may differ. The numbers aren't important by the way - you could easily convince me that a goldfish ought to have a higher or lower rating - it's just the concept that there is a scale of consciousness that matters.

 

[LuxFerum]

What if that cryogenic crap works, and you get frozen.


At what level of consiousness you will be?

 

[Mercutio]

my beliefs about consciousness--

I may be alone in this, but I am perfectly happy dismissing the term "consciousness" altogether. The term is merely a byproduct of our language, which assigns "noun" status to such varied things as rocks, concepts, dogs, categories, whelks, and Ians. We may therefore speak of "having a consciousness" in the same phrase as the whelk's "having a shell" when in fact the two "having"s are completely different. "Consciousness", we learn (when as children we start learning the more difficult vocabulary), refers to a particular fuzzy category of behaviors. Not recognizing this leads to questions such as "do x's have a consciousness?" which imply that consciousness is a thing that is possessed. So for me, the question of a boulder's consciousness--which Ian claims I must assume as a materialist--is a nonsensical question. The boulder has not exhibited any of the behaviors encompassed by the category "consciousness". Might it just sit there and think? Don't know, don't care.

I am willing to talk of 2 transported Mercs or Ians with identical thinking, remembering, feeling, etc.. This is usually enough to say they have the same "consciousness." If we then make a claim that "consciousness" is some thing over and above thinking and remembering, etc., that has to inhabit one of the Mercs or Ians, then I'll have none of it.

I would think that my view is compatible with materialism. It is my view whether it is compatible or not. I don't know whether my view is the materialist view. But then, I think we may have differences of opinion amongst our idealists here, too.

 

[ceptimus]

Well said Mercutio. I agree with all that. I don't think it would be fair to Ian to ask him to do without the c-word though, so I tried to explain what the everyday use of the word means to me.

 

[Dancing David]

To the answer of the multiple duplicates , yes they are all the same in one sense but in another they are not.

From my materialist POV, the continuity of self is an illusion, the body and all the parts of the self are always changing. The continuity of the body is illusory, just like a river is a body of water flowing through the lowest terrain, but it's constituent parts always changing.

So self is somewhat like the integer , at any moment the self is what it is but the next moment it is another self(n+1). So if we call particular self the (N) than the next momentary self is (N+1) and so on.

So lets us state that there is a copy made of Ian(N) at moment n and refer to him as Ian(N*), at the moment of duplication the two Ian's will have identical consiousness. But from my POV as time passes there will be a large number of changes between Ian(N) and Ian(N*) until they will be seperate streams of consious ness with Ian(N) as the root. Ian(N) will get up from the chair, say "That is a great movie, and thanks for the money". Ian(N*) will get up from the chair and scream "But I am the real Ian, I have been tricked!" And then go on to meet death in whatever fashion.


So for a brief while they will be the same but as i increases with the momentary passing of time Ian(N+i) will enjoy the movie and get the money, but Ian(N*+i) will be shocked upset and soon have an end to that stream of consiousness.

Then what about the android, for the experimenter made a disc of what the duplicated Ian was like and stores it. His great grandchildren then recreate Ian in the distant future. He starts as Ian(N**)but is the same as Ian(N), except for the fact that he is sitting in the chair watching the movie when suddenly he is in the distant future.

Ian(N+0)=Ian(N*+0) because they are in duplicate rooms but soon diverge.
Ian(N**+0) does not equal Ian(N+0) because from the start he is in the distant future, not in a duplicate room.

So there are three seperate streams pf consiousness, they all are Ian, but they are all unique.

 

[hammegk]

So lets us state that there is a copy made of Ian(N) at moment n and refer to him as Ian(N*), at the moment of duplication the two Ian's will have identical consiousness.

And I suspect that is "Ian's Paradox". One chair, odds 100% Ian lives & gets paid. Two chairs, odds 50% (for each Ian) that "he" lives & gets paid.

Which is Ian? 'Both' you must say as a materialist. Huh?


BTW, assuming both Ians are living, as an Idealist I have the same problem so far as I can see, but must be (morally) unwilling to kill either one.

I would say Idealism suffers a fatal blow IFF we can determine that Ian Android is also "Ian". Unfortunately, we will have to take the Android's word for it. But is it a p-zombie? Conversely, proof that the Android is *not* "Ian" would provide the fatal blow for materialism, imo.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I pretty much at a loss to understand what anyone is saying in this thread anymore.

Ian said:

The paradox would kick in when consciousness kicks in.

Why, if from the materialist perspective, consciousness is nothing special?

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

BTW, assuming both Ians are living, as an Idealist I have the same problem so far as I can see, but must be (morally) unwilling to kill either one.

I would say Idealism suffers a fatal blow IFF we can determine that Ian Android is also "Ian". Unfortunately, we will have to take the Android's word for it. But is it a p-zombie? Conversely, proof that the Android is *not* "Ian" would provide the fatal blow for materialism, imo.

I think you are right. BTW, I also said earlier that killing either Ian would be murder--I don't know if I also explicitly stated that I would be unwilling to do so. I would, in fact, be unwilling to kill any Interesting Ian I ran across in this or any parallel universe, so he need not fear me...or any materialist who thinks like I do.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Yet again, I can see what your thinking, but don't seem to be able to clarify the issue for you...

As I recall it's basically that people are looking at this from the third person perspective. In talking about streams of consciousnesses this is obviously the wrong approach.

This is clear - you are thinking about this from the first person perspective, and don't see how the 3rd person is relevant. Okay.

I mean if you insist that there are 2 streams of consciousnesses then necessarily one of them is me, and the other isn't.

This is "necessarily" so depending upon what you mean by "me". I think you mean "my first person perspective".

From the first person perspective I will either experience 1 or 2.

Again, the emphasis on "first person perspective". What you need to grasp (I think) is that the duplicator scenario creates an entirely new "first person perspective" that happens to be identical.

At the moment you are approached regarding the offer of 10 million pounds to watch Andi McDowell act badly, the universe contains only *one* "first person perspective that calls itself 'Ian'". The moment after duplication, there are two. Asking questions like "which body is *me*" or "*my* consciousness is attached to whihc brain?" is failing to understand that there are now two *me/my* first person perspectives where the previously was only one.

 

[Loki]

Win,

Good to see you, stay awhile.

Materialism's still false though.

But epiphenomenalism is true? And Titus thinks materialism is a 'hard sell'...

(Ian wrote) : Loki will be delighted you're arguing against me (he once complained about us ganging up against the materialists since we disagreed with each other as much as with the materialists)

I'm delighted mostly to find that you (Win), Hammegk and Titus seem to agree with my opinion of Ian's "paradox". If there was some strong support being offered for Ian's interpretation I'd be forced to review my own thinking. In Ian's terms, I guess you and Titus are as stupid as I am ... I take comfort from that! Somehow, I wish it was true that you and I had the same degree of knowledge regarding philosophy!

 

[Win]

Ian:

Yes that's right. They can't be the same because my stream of consciousness experiences out of one Ian and not the other. The other Ian is not my stream of consciousness, but merely someone who thinks and acts identically to me. That's why if materialism is correct it can only be saved by supposing that the person who is duplicated experiences out of both his bodies simultaneously.

OK. Let's think about what you mean by "your" stream of consciousness.

What makes the phenomenal experiences you're having right now part of the same "stream of consciousness" as those you remember having yesterday?

You feel there must be a paradox because there seems to be a self-evident connection between "your" phenomenal experiences of today and those of yesterday; they are both within the same "stream of consciousness."

Yet, this is a false intuition. I would argue that there is no more connection between your phenomenal experiences of yesterday and those of today than there is between the phenomenal experiences of Ian1 and Ian2.

So, once you let go of the false intuition that "you" have some continuity across time, the paradox vanishes.

Anyway, this is the nub of the confusion. Maybe we should focus on what kind of relation you think exists between you, right now, and you, ten minutes ago, and what you think the basis of that relation is. Clearing this up will, I think, resolve all the other issues.

Loki:

But epiphenomenalism is true? And Titus thinks materialism is a 'hard sell'...

Like SH says, once you have eliminated the impossible, what remains, however improbable, is the truth.

Less glibly, I think the choice is between a naturalistic dualism and mysterianism. And "epiphenomenalism" is the best dualist bet, IMHO.

Still, if I were to come to the conclusion that epiphenomenalism were fatally flawed, my position would shift only so far as another dualistic position or, ultimately, hard mysterianism.

Because materialism is demonstrably false.

Thanks for the welcome back.

 

[Loki]

Win,

...my position would shift only so far as another dualistic position or, ultimately, hard mysterianism.

Perhaps a little to glib, but the *practical* difference between most forms of Idealism and "mysterianism" is spelling?

Because materialism is demonstrably false.

Well, see, there's this P-Zombie that can't see red, and another who was duplicated into a red room. The duplicate has conceived Mary, who is immaculate - except for being color blind. They can all think about consciousness, and directly access red, but have no effect on Ian's paradox. Ian, who is apparently a 1000 year old android, isn't in the matrix. But Neo is the One and Titus was a T-Rex in a previous life.

And materialism? Well, it's still taking out the trash and getting on with the business of making the universe arrive at next Tuesday in one piece - so that a few collections of H2O moelcules can debate why.

Again, welcome back Win!

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well, see, there's this P-Zombie that can't see red, and another who was duplicated into a red room. The duplicate has conceived Mary, who is immaculate - except for being color blind. They can all think about consciousness, and directly access red, but have no effect on Ian's paradox. Ian, who is apparently a 1000 year old android, isn't in the matrix. But Neo is the One and Titus was a T-Rex in a previous life.

LMAO! Loki you have a brilliant sense of humor!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hey Win!

Still, if I were to come to the conclusion that epiphenomenalism were fatally flawed, my position would shift only so far as another dualistic position or, ultimately, hard mysterianism.

Are you assuming the same definition of epiphenomenalism that I am? You know, the one that is patently absurd and would disallow us from having this conversation?

Because materialism is demonstrably false.

Isn't epiphenomenalism a brand of materialism?

It's amazing how duplicating a hunk of meat can result in so much conversation.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
Yes, so what?
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It just reminded me a bit of your own earlier complaint. You quite correctly chided some folk for making a distinction between the original and the copy of the body, since if they were identical there should really be no distinction. After all, the particular molecules involved are not special in any way. The same argument can be made here. You are calling one of the "consciousnesses" my consciousness, when in fact they both lay equal claim to being yours.

Yes I have no problems with this. Has no relevance to what I originally said though.

I just saw the prior post...
quote:
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It hasn't? So does this mean my stream of consciousness, prior to duplication, will literally be in the original Ian's body post duplication, and not at all in my duplicate body? What implications does this have for using the teletransporter?
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It will literally be in both, after duplication, in the same sense that both new bodies are originals.

Yes, but in that case I don't really think the word "forked" is all that inappropriate. I was simply emphasizing that my original has no more claim to be the continuation of my stream of consciousness than the duplicate.

Again, you do not carry your past with you, you carry your memory of your past.

As long as you're maintaining it's exactly the same for both the original and duplicate, then I am quite happy

Both new Ians have this identical memory, and if the duplicator does its job (and we are not allowed to use the third person perspective of the experimenter), both are you, in the full sense of the word.

Yes I absolutely agree

If the idea of spontaneously creating a conscious, thinking, remembering, feeling self is incredible, it is only because the thought problem itself is incredible.

Remember I'm not saying how incredible in the sense as the very thought of another me is astonishing. I assert it leads to a logical paradox. I still think that no-one has really comes to grips with this paradox. Indeed I feel that no-one even understands it!

The perfect replication of a body is no less remarkable than the thought that this perfectly replicated body should think, feel, and remember just like the original.

Well, if you were me would you undergo that thought experiment I outlined, and have absolute confidence that the experimenter wouldn't open the door at the end to say you're about to be executed?

 

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

That is my POV from the materialist perspective. I mean if you insist that there are 2 streams of consciousnesses then necessarily one of them is me, and the other isn't.

Suppose Original Ian is anaesthetized and then duplicated. Then both Original Ian and Duplicate Ian are transferred to a room into adjoining beds. When they wake up, both can reason that one of them is Original Ian and the other is Duplicate Ian but they can't tell who is who. Suppose also that this was set up in such a way that even the scientists don't know who is who. We must therefore call them Ian 1 and Ian 2.

Which Ian are you?

If you say something like "I don't know which one I will be but I will be either one or the other", then on what basis do you say this? I mean Ian 1 and Ian 2 are identical, therefore Ian 1's brain and Ian 2's brain are identical, therefore the processes inside Ian 1's brain and the processes inside Ian 2's brain are identical, therefore the processes inside Ian 1's brain that define the self and the processes inside Ian 1's brain that define the self are identical.

What on Earth, from a materialist's POV, could determine that, for example, Ian 2 is you?

BillyJoe.

 

[Mercutio]

Well, if you were me would you undergo that thought experiment I outlined, and have absolute confidence that the experimenter wouldn't open the door at the end to say you're about to be executed?

Wow...two smiley faces from you in one post...and basic agreement on everything but the existence of a paradox. Too bad that's the crux of the matter...

Would I undergo the experiment? No. First, I don't believe I could be absolutely confident, if the experiment was done properly, and second, whether it is me getting killed or me getting killed (not a me2, as both have equal claim), I'll have no part in this murder.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

BillyJoe said:

Suppose Original Ian is anaesthetized and then duplicated. Then both Original Ian and Duplicate Ian are transferred to a room into adjoining beds. When they wake up, both can reason that one of them is Original Ian and the other is Duplicate Ian but they can't tell who is who. Suppose also that this was set up in such a way that even the scientists don't know who is who. We must therefore call them Ian 1 and Ian 2.

Ooh, this is deliciously creepy. The identity of the original Ian is lost forever.

No reason to anaesthetize them, really. Just duplicate Ian and throw both copies into a complex maze with disconnects. Let them wander around, without watching them, until they both emerge. No one would ever know who was the original.

Can anyone state succinctly what Ian thinks is the paradox here? I really can't get a handle on it.

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

I think that the maze points it out, that from the subjective there is no difference between the two, but from the 'substantial' POV, there is something more to the original Ian and the duplicate would lack that 'substantial' something.

If i read Titus's posts correctly.

 

[slimshady2357]

If a stream of consciousness is terminated when one uses a teletransporter, then since you are that stream of consciousness, then you will cease to exist and you shouldn't use the transporter. It's also a denial of materialism.

It's an affirmation of materialism!

And I would totally use the transporter still. Even though the stram of consciousness attached to my meat brain would cease to exist. That's because an identical one, attached to a new meat brain, would exist. Which is A-Ok with me

Why can't the original stream end up in another brain?

Uh, because materialism states that brains cause consciousness You're really trying to take on board the materialist idea of consciousness aren't you?

If you have absolutely identical physical processes then you must get one and the very same stream of consciousness.

Well I don't expect you to listen to this, since you have ignored it from the start, but here goes.

If you have identical physical processes in two brains, you will get identical consciouseness', but TWO of them. Not the very same one.... two of them that are the very same. You will have the very same ones, so to speak. Just like the second brain which is identical is not the 'very same one' as the original brain.

Otherwise there is something more than the totality of physical facts which determines you i.e you are denying materialism.

Nope, it' you that is denying materialism, when you think that consciousness is not attached to a single brain. Your problem is that you're still using Ideaist ideas about the self to disprove materialism. The fact that you think a consciousness created by Brain A can somehow 'move' to Brain B, is clear evidnce of this, since this is absurd under materialism.

I have absolutely no interest how many people who disagree with me, whether they are materialists or not, how intelligent they are.

It certainly doesn't mean you're wrong prima facie, but it points to it.

If you accept that offer that my thought experiment outlined you cannot be 100% certain that you will get the money rather than dying. Indeed you only have 50/50 of a chance.

But ok, tell me, would you take that offer up? Would you have absolute certainty that you, your stream of consciousness won't end up dying? If you have this confidence then you'll accept the offer, right?

Other than the ethical problems of killing one of me once there are two (hey, I don't want any me's to die! ), I would certainly take the 10,000,000 pounds!

One of me will survive and I'm not particularily sentimental about this meat brain, so I say show me the money

Adam