A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Loki]

Ian,

But equally obviously it is incumbent upon those who suppose certain physical event logically entail consciousness, but other physical events don't, to explain why this is so. Do you agree?

This has been explained before, but you seem to still get it backwards - "consciousness" is the name given to a particular set of physical processes. If you have a different set of physical processes, you don't have "consciousness". The question you ask ( "certain physical event logically entail consciousness, but other physical events don't" ) is only meaningful if you assume that "consciousness" is *not* the same as "a set of physical processes". Since materialism doesn't assume this, the question has no meaning.

How about you, Ian? Under your worldview, why does consciousness attached itself mostly to a certain set of physical processes (the brain), and not others? You firmly believe that consciousness is not always associated with these brain processes - the Pam Reynolds case is clearly one where you believe the consciousness was still "active" and receiving information from the physical world, yet the (normally) related physical brain processes were missing. Why doesn't your consciousness occasionally detach from your physical brain processes and attach itself to a rock?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,


This has been explained before, but you seem to still get it backwards - "consciousness" is the name given to a particular set of physical processes.

Ummmm . . .no I'n afraid it isn't. Looks like you don't understand what the word consciousness means.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

What leads you to the conclusion that consciousness effects physical things?

How many times are we going to go round the wheel of reincarnation on this one?

If it didn't, then we wouldn't be talking about it.

Of course, perhaps you're asking this question rhetorically, under the assumption that there are no physical things.

~~ Paul

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Ummmm . . .no I'n afraid it isn't. Looks like you don't understand what the word consciousness means

Well, since you seemed to be asking materialists to explain *why*, I assumed you were using a materialist definition of consciousness.

If you're asking me the explain why *your* conception of consciousness *must* be logically attached to a given set of physical processes then I can't. Sorry, but I have no idea what your "undefineable consciousness" is, so I'm not able to discuss what it can or can't relate to. Again, do *you* have any reason to explain why your semi-detached consciousness seems to have a preference for attaching to your body, rather than to a nearby pint of lager (except during NDEs of course, when it decides to float off to the ceiling for a while and watch) ?

Why does a certain set of physcial process (the brain) generate "consciousness"? For the same reason that a certain set of physical processes (rock/hill/gravity) generates "momentum", and another set of physical processes (stomach/food/acid) generates "digestion". They're just labels describing the processes.

No need to tell me you disagree Ian - I already know that. Just pointing out why your initial question is irrelevant under materialism.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

No materialist would say that.
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Then it seems that you have to deny the publically observable has primary being. Therefore there is no such thing as a materialist.

Well, you are right about one thing. There is no such thing as what you call a materialist. That naive position was discredited long before you came along. I fail to see what any of that has to do with the position being held by modern scientific naturalists, like myself, though.

I don't make any claims about "primary being", because the metaphysical notion of "beingness" does not make any sense to me. I claim only that human consciousness can in principle, be completely described in terms of physical processes in the brain. If you want to speculate that consciousness has "primary beingness", and that it can exist without those brain processes in some sort of metaphysical way, go right ahead. I have no use for such unverifiable speculation.

That is what an epiphenomenalist would say, not a materialist.
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I have explained why both have to say this.

Your "explanation" uses the premise that phenomenal consciousness is not simply a set of physical processes. Your premise directly contradicts materialism, and therefore no claims about materialism can be derived from it.

A materialist would say that consciousness can, and does, determine our outward behavior, and that this is not a problem because consciousness is just a set of physical processes in the brain.
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I have acknowledged this. You need to address my argument concerning this.

What argument are you claiming I have not addressed?

But this means that p-zombies would indeed behave in all ways identical to real people including arguing about real people and p-zombies and having this idea[z] of real consciousness.

So this seems clearly absurd. And yet if everything we as real people do is the result of physical processes then obviously there doesn't seem to be anything contradictory in a world of p-zombies acting in the same way.
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The point is moot, because under materialism p-zombies are a contradiction in terms.
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True enough but irrelevant as you have yet to defend yourself against my arguments.

If you acknowledge that under materialism, p-zombies are self-contradictory, then clearly any argument which takes as a premise the logical possibility of p-zombies, cannot be used to refute materialism. That would be begging the question.

Prove that p-zombies are logically possible, and you will have refuted materialism (and libertarian free-will as well). Simply asserting that they are will not accomplish anything.

A p-zombie cannot simultaneously be physically identical to a normal human, and lack consciousness, because consciousness is a set of physical processes happening in that person's brain. Under materialism, a p-zombie is as impossible as a an r-zombie (an r-zombie is physically identical to a normal living human, but lacks resperation.)
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Yes I know. But as I say this is wholly irrelevant and does not address my arguments.

Are you daft? If you agree that a p-zombie cannot simultaneously be physically identical to a normal human, and lack consciousness, then you are agreeing that p-zombies are not logically possible, because their very definition is self-contradictory!

No, a ridiculous consequence that obtains when you suppose that the world is physically closed, but that consciousness is non-physical.
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Nope, my argument is for any scenario which supposes the world is physically closed.

No it doesn't. It clearly does not apply to a scenario which supposes that the world is physically closed, and that consciousness is a set of physical processes.

The bottom line is that this combination simply isn't consistent with the world we see around us. Either consciousness is physical, or the physical world is not causally closed.
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You're confusing naturalism with materialism.

No, you are confusing me with what you call a materialist. Try arguing against my position, not your strawman of it.

Either way consciousness effects physical things, so p-zombies are impossible.
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What leads you to the conclusion that consciousness effects physical things?

The fact that my physical brain knows I have consciousness. The fact that my conscious states affect my physical behavior. The fact that if consciousness did not affect physical things, then we would not be capable of discussing it at all!

Not quite. I don't need to hypothesize that consciousness is a brain process in order to establish that consciousness has an effect on the world. All I have to do is take note of the fact that we are physically discussing consciousness right now.
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Yes? Which poses difficulty for supposing the world is physically closed. You do not escape this difficulty by asserting "X" is one and the same thing as "Y".

It only poses difficulty if I assume that consciousness is not physical. I cannot see any logical reason to make this assumption.

BZZZT. That is where you are wrong. I am claiming that the "consciousness" explanation you gave (fancying a glass of orange juice), is logically reducible to the scientific explanation in terms of brain processes.
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Irrelevant. I repeat that these explanations are not synonymous even if "identical".

Who cares? If one explanation is reducible to the other, then that is sufficient. What makes you think that I am claiming anything more than this? Why should anything more than this be required to satisfy physical closure? Why should anything more than this be required for consciousness to be scientifically explainable?

why isn't the boulder rolling down a hill equate to conscious experiences?
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Why doesn't it equate to computation? Or digestion? Or any other physical process that it isn't? Because it is not the same physical process as a conscious experience. Duh.
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I'm sorry but I don't understand. What has a boulder rolling down a hill got to do with digestion? If you repeat "what has a boulder rolling down a hill got to do with consciousness", then I need to know why this physical process does not involve consciousness, but other physical processes do?

Why does this physical process not involve digestion, but other physical processes do? It is because a rock rolling down a hill is one type of physical process, and the brain functions which we call consciousness are completely different types of brain processes.

What is it about physical processes in the brain which logically necessitate consciousness, but which no other physical processes do?? Do you understand my question?

You seem to think that I am some sort of dualist, who believes that consciousness is non-physical, but logically necessitated by physical processes. This is not my position. I am saying that consciousness is a specific set of physical processes. It is not logically necessitated by them, it is them.

No I don't. Dead bodies don't have conscious experiences.
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I'm talking about people, not a corpse which is not a person

What about my other examples? Is a person with extensive brain damage not a person? The point is that it is not the fact that you are a person that somehow "logically necessitates" that some mysterious non-physical consciousness will be attached to you. If your brain is performing those physical processes which we call consciousness, then you have consciousness. If it is not, then you do not.

Of course not. Consciousness is a set of physical processes.
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So why do some physical processes lack consciousness?

They do not "lack" consciousness, nor do any physical processes "have" consciousness. Consciousness is a specific set of physical processes. Not all physical processes belong to that set.

If those processes are not present, then the thing is not conscious. What is so surprising about that?
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So certain processes are special in some way. In what way are they special?

They are not special, any more than those processes which happen to be computation are special, or those processes which happen to be digestion are special.

How do they logically entail conscious experience??

They don't. They are conscious experience.

Look, if consciousness is logically entailed, then surely you can give me the logical proof??

It is not logically entailed. Consciousness is a specific set of physical processes.

So why are you not able to do this?? Indeed why are you not able to give any reason whatsoever that this physical "stuff" somehow leads to consciousness???

Because that is not what I am claiming. Consciousness is not "logically entailed" by your brain activity. Consciousness is something which your brain is doing. The brain does not "lead" to consciousness, consciousness is something that the brain does.

No, I am not completely unable to do this. I am just no able to give a complete explanation for it, because I do not yet have all of the necessary facts to do so.
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So you can give a partial explanation then?? GIMME GIMME GIMME!! LMFAO!!!

I, and many others here, have tried. We have given you many references to the work that has been done in neuroscience and psychology in this regard. You simply reject this work, without making any attempt to understand it, by claiming that it must be irrelevant because of your a-priori assumption that there cannot possibly be a scientific explanation for consciousness.

A human being absent consciousness is not impossible. What is impossible is having two human beings who are physically identical, where one of them has consciousness, and the other does not.
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Logically impossible rather than merely naturally impossible? How so??

I already explained how. It is logically impossible in this world, because in this world consciousness has physical effects. Remove consciousness and you remove those physical effects.

If you want to argue that there could be some other world where consciousness does not have physical effects, fine. But that world would clearly be physically different than this world. And since the definition of p-zombies requires that such a world be physically identical, p-zombies are not logically possible.

You can imagine an alternative universe in which consciousness does not exist, but people behave the same as they do in this world, but the people in that world would have to be structurally different than the people in this one. Their physical brains could not possibly work the same way ours do. This is true regardless of whether you claim consciousness is a set of brain processes, or that consciousness is something non-physical which effects the brain.

I disagree with your completely unjustified assertion that consciousness is "clearly different" from a set of physical processes in the brain.
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{shrugs} There is phenomenal experience, and there is physical processes in the brain. They at least appear to be completely different.

Your appeal to intuition does not impress me. Magnetic fields "seem" to be completely different from electric fields, but they are not.

So what exactly is being asserted by saying they are in fact the same?

That the phenomenal experience can, in principle, be completely described in terms of physical processes in the brain.

You cannot logically deduce one from the other, or at least you cannot deduce the mental from the physical.

How do you know? I am asserting that, at least in principle, the mental can be deduced from the physical.

So what reasons do you have for supposing they are one and the very same thing?

I have already told you, several times. You have rejected my reasons as being irrelevant, based on your a-priori assumption that consciousness cannot possibly be physical.

Let's agree with your premises that mind is effected by brain and the mind has its source in the brain. How do you go from that to declaring they are literally one and the very same thing??

Scientific investigation. Right now, that is the most parsimonious theory which is consistent with the facts we have. There is no need to posit the existence of some external influence on the brain, when there is no evidence that such an influence is present.

Like I said before, your position is that consciousness, physical or otherwise, is not a set of brain processes, but instead something external to the brain, which has some sort of effect on the brain, thereby influencing, or even causing, our behavior. If this is true then there should be some detectable effects on brain activity that could be measured, but which cannot be attributed to sensory input or the brain's own dynamics. Demonstrate that such effects actually exist, and then I will entertain the hypothesis that consciousness, or at least some aspects of it, may be something external to the brain.

Until such time as such effects are demonstrated, the simplest explanation for consciousness is that it is something our brains do.


Dr. Stupid

 

[BillyJoe]

THE CIRCLE GAME

and the season's they go round and round
and the painted ponies go up and down
we're captive on the carousel of time
we can't return, we can only look
behind from where we came
and go round and round and round in the circle game

- Joni Mitchell

 

[Interesting Ian]

If you acknowledge that under materialism, p-zombies are self-contradictory, then clearly any argument which takes as a premise the logical possibility of p-zombies, cannot be used to refute materialism. That would be begging the question.

Huh?? You are joking right? Are you suggesting that we cannot even countenance the logical possibility of p-zombies because that would be incompatible with materialism?? Hell, if people were to adopt your approach in defending their beliefs, no-one would ever be able to refute anything!

Prove that p-zombies are logically possible, and you will have refuted materialism (and libertarian free-will as well). Simply asserting that they are will not accomplish anything.

I don't care about libertarian free will. Clearly the materialist denies libertarian free will. In thinking about p-zombies we must assume the world is physically closed.

Are you daft? If you agree that a p-zombie cannot simultaneously be physically identical to a normal human, and lack consciousness, then you are agreeing that p-zombies are not logically possible, because their very definition is self-contradictory!

It really doesn't matter whether I think p-zombies are logically possible or not! What is important are the reasons you can advance to suppose they are logically impossible. You cannot appeal to the possibility that the world is physically open because this contradicts one of the basic premises of materialism!

 

[Dancing David]

Spit in the ocean,
I am a materialist and I do not deny libertarian free will, with in the LOP, only stupid philosphers who can't believe they are resposnsible for thier actions do that.

Silly rabbit, kicks are for trids.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

If you acknowledge that under materialism, p-zombies are self-contradictory, then clearly any argument which takes as a premise the logical possibility of p-zombies, cannot be used to refute materialism. That would be begging the question.
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Huh?? You are joking right? Are you suggesting that we cannot even countenance the logical possibility of p-zombies because that would be incompatible with materialism??

You can "countenance the logical possibility" all you want, so long as you recognize that when you do so, you are imagining something which contradicts materialism. Like I said, if you can prove that p-zombies are logically possible, then you will have refuted materialism. Simply asserting that they might be logically possible accomplishes nothing.

Hell, if people were to adopt your approach in defending their beliefs, no-one would ever be able to refute anything!

What are you talking about? I am not saying that materialism cannot possibly be wrong. I am just saying that you cannot prove that materialism is wrong by assuming something which materialism claims is false, and then deducing from it that materialism is wrong. That is circular reasoning.

Prove that p-zombies are logically possible, and you will have refuted materialism (and libertarian free-will as well). Simply asserting that they are will not accomplish anything.
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I don't care about libertarian free will. Clearly the materialist denies libertarian free will. In thinking about p-zombies we must assume the world is physically closed.

In thinking about p-zombies we must assume that materialism is false. Like I said, prove that p-zombies are logically possible, and you will have refuted materialism. Until then, all you have shown is that materialism, and the logical possibility of p-zombies, cannot both be true. Congratulations Captain Obvious. We already knew that!

Are you daft? If you agree that a p-zombie cannot simultaneously be physically identical to a normal human, and lack consciousness, then you are agreeing that p-zombies are not logically possible, because their very definition is self-contradictory!
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It really doesn't matter whether I think p-zombies are logically possible or not! What is important are the reasons you can advance to suppose they are logically impossible. You cannot appeal to the possibility that the world is physically open because this contradicts one of the basic premises of materialism!

I have explained to you exactly why I think they are not logically possible. I think that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain. If this is true, then p-zombies are logically impossible. End of story.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Loki]

Ian : "If a 'round square' is conceivable, then Geometry is false".

Stimpy : "Everything I know about Geometry tells me that a 'round square' is inconceivable"

Ian : "But I can concieve of a 'round square', so Geometry must be false. Can you explain why a 'round square' is not conceivable?"

Stimpy : "Because every fact about Geometry currently known to us says it isn't so."

Ian : "But I can think of a worldview called Idealist-Geometry in which 'round squares' are conceivable."

Stimpy : "But using a concept that is valid under Idealist-Geometry to try and disprove Geometry is an invalid logical argument."

Ian : "...."

 

[Suggestologist]

Ian : "If a 'round square' is conceivable, then Geometry is false".

Stimpy : "Everything I know about Geometry tells me that a 'round square' is inconceivable"

Ian : "But I can concieve of a 'round square', so Geometry must be false. Can you explain why a 'round square' is not conceivable?"

Stimpy : "Because every fact about Geometry currently known to us says it isn't so."

Ian : "But I can think of a worldview called Idealist-Geometry in which 'round squares' are conceivable."

Stimpy : "But using a concept that is valid under Idealist-Geometry to try and disprove Geometry is an invalid logical argument."

Ian : "...."

Well, were this discussion to have happened; I would think that Stimpy is unaware of the arbitrariness of Euclidean Geometry, and would recommend a reading of Tarski. In fact, Stimpy would be engaging in a circular argument without realizing it. This metaphorically describes my opinion of the current state of the debate.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I agree that this argument is a complete and total waste of time. To save any newcomers to this thread of having to read the last 10 pages or so, an excellent summary which completely covers all pertinent points is as adumbrated below. It has gone something like this:

II
If p-zombies are conceivable this would tend to suggest, in the absence of any counter reasons, that they are logically possible ie they exist in some logically possible world. But the logical possibility of p-zombies is incompatible with materialism. Therefore this leads to the conclusion that materialism is false in the absence of any such counter reasons.

Stimpy
Materialism entails the logical impossibility of p-zombies. Therefore you are committing a logical fallacy in that you are begging the question in raising the logical possibility of their existence. In order to show materialism is false you must clearly demonstrate that they are logically possible.

II
But . .but. . . one cannot argue against a position by assuming its premises! You are begging the question. Look . . .

And round and round and round it goes.

I just give up . . . .

THis is the last post in this thread.

And please Stimpy, stop following me around all the place! Hell, you even threatened to put me on ignore a few months ago unless I was more polite to you. I wish! Talk about empty threats! LOL

 

[Interesting Ian]

I agree that this argument is a complete and total waste of time. To save any newcomers to this thread of having to read the last 10 pages or so, an excellent summary which completely covers all pertinent points is as adumbrated below. It has gone something like this:



quote:
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II
If p-zombies are conceivable this would tend to suggest, in the absence of any counter reasons, that they are logically possible ie they exist in some logically possible world. But the logical possibility of p-zombies is incompatible with materialism. Therefore this leads to the conclusion that materialism is false in the absence of any such counter reasons.

Stimpy
Materialism entails the logical impossibility of p-zombies. Therefore you are committing a logical fallacy in that you are begging the question in raising the logical possibility of their existence. In order to show materialism is false you must clearly demonstrate that they are logically possible.

II
But . .but. . . one cannot argue against a position by assuming its premises! You are begging the question. Look . . .


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And round and round and round it goes.

I just give up . . . .

THis is the last post in this thread.

Well just this one more post.

Just to sum up my insight of a few pages ago. It is stipulated that P-zombies are behaviourally indistinguishable from real people. Initially one might think "well obviously I am not a p-zombie because I know I am (phenomenally) conscious". Now if and only if the world is physically closed, this thought will also necessitate certain correlated physical processes in the brain. Physical processes which would also occur in a p-zombie. The point is that if my thought processes just "follow on" from such brain processes, then it doesn't seem that my thought "that I am conscious" can independently establish that I am in fact conscious.

But then we have a paradox. Because on the one hand it seems we cannot establish our own consciousness by thinking it, and yet on the other hand it is utterly preposterous and self-contradictory to supposre we are not immediately acquainted with our own consciousnesses. The conclusion would seem to be that there can be no meaningful distinction between real people and p-zombies. But since I know I am not a p-zombie, it seems to follow that other people are therefore not p-zombies.

Therefore we must conclude that either p-zombies are logically impossible, or that the world is not physically closed. Since it is the case that p-zombies are clearly conceivable, then this highly suggests their logical possibility. Therefore we must abandon the idea that the world is physically closed. If the world is not physically closed this suggests the existence of libertarian free will.

So unlike Chalmers, I do not merely believe that the logical possibility of p-zombies refutes materialism, but it alse creates extreme difficultes for epiphenomenalism. We are therefore compelled to look at some non-materialist based metaphysic.

Hope this summary makes everything clear.

 

[Dancing David]

Ian,

That last post has reached sillyness, this is the science forum, just because something is logicaly possible does not make it scientific! What eveidence do you have that there are p-zombies, c'mon cough it out.
What you can't ?

No wonder you huff off.

The square root of negative one may have meaning in math but it is very hard to find a physical correlary.

Suggestologist:

For your refutation of Loki's post to make sense , are you really saying that non Euclidian geometry allows you to define a circle to be square.

What kind of wierdness is that?

 

[BillHoyt]

Well, were this discussion to have happened; I would think that Stimpy is unaware of the arbitrariness of Euclidean Geometry, and would recommend a reading of Tarski. In fact, Stimpy would be engaging in a circular argument without realizing it. This metaphorically describes my opinion of the current state of the debate.

What's this claim about Tarski and Euclidean Geometry?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian summarized Stimpy:

Stimpy
Materialism entails the logical impossibility of p-zombies. Therefore you are committing a logical fallacy in that you are begging the question in raising the logical possibility of their existence. In order to show materialism is false you must clearly demonstrate that they are logically possible.

And then summarized himself:

II
But . .but. . . one cannot argue against a position by assuming its premises! You are begging the question.

You can't argue against it by changing its premises, either. You must convince us that the assumed premises are faulty. In other words, as Stimpy said:

You can "countenance the logical possibility" all you want, so long as you recognize that when you do so, you are imagining something which contradicts materialism. Like I said, if you can prove that p-zombies are logically possible, then you will have refuted materialism. Simply asserting that they might be logically possible accomplishes nothing.

Convince us that materialism does not include the logical impossibility of p-zombies. Or, better yet, convince us that its more fundamental premises are faulty.

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Therefore we must conclude that either p-zombies are logically impossible, or that the world is not physically closed. Since it is the case that p-zombies are clearly conceivable, then this highly suggests their logical possibility. Therefore we must abandon the idea that the world is physically closed.

Pure nonsense. P-zombies are not logically possible because, regardless of whether the world is physically closed or not, consciousness does affect the physical world, and this flatly contradicts the definition of a p-zombie. End of story.

Arguing that the world is not physically closed doesn't make p-zombies any less impossible. In your scenario consciousness is some non-physical thing which has effects on our physical brains. This is every bit as incompatible with the logical possibility of p-zombies as materialism is. The only way p-zombies can be logically possible is to assert that consciousness is something which we do not, and could not possibly ever know about.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,



Pure nonsense. P-zombies are not logically possible because, regardless of whether the world is physically closed or not, consciousness does affect the physical world,

Hold it right there.

There seem to be 3 scenarios floating about here. Either:

a) Our behaviour can be partially explained by consciousness affecting the world.

b) Our behaviour can be wholly explained by physical processes playing out.

c) And this is the obscure one. Both consciousness and physical processes, each and of their own right, explain some of our very same behaviour.

Now "a" is my position. "b" is the p-zombie or epiphenomenalist position. And "c" is your position.

But I submit "c" simply doesn't make any sense. Either my behaviour in going to get a glass of water to drink can be explained in terms of:

(i) Intent, with that intent maybe being influenced through the fact I'm thirsty. (or at least paritially explained by intent)

(ii) Purely physical processes occurring in my brain and my local environment.

Now I submit that if the world is physically closed a complete explanation can be provided in terms of physical processes. If a complete physical explanation can be provided, then this entails the explanation in terms of intent is superflous! It is in fact not an explanation at all!

And BTW, to say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behaviour, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behaviour that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superflous.

So if a complete physical explanation can be given for me drinking a glass of water this entails either I am a p-zombie, or I am a epiphenomenalist "person".

Agreed?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian, I tried hard to read your posts and address certain points without too much resort to moaning and sighing. However, this has become so befuddled that it's ridiculous.

c) And this is the obscure one. Both consciousness and physical processes, each and of their own right, explain some of our very same behaviour.

. . . And "c" is your position.

No, it's not. Consciousness is a brain process. It is not something other than a brain process. It makes no sense to say "both consciousness and physical processes."

b) Our behaviour can be wholly explained by physical processes playing out. ...

"b" is the p-zombie or epiphenomenalist position.

Say huh?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian, I tried hard to read your posts and address certain points without too much resort to moaning and sighing. However, this has become so befuddled that it's ridiculous.



quote:
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c) And this is the obscure one. Both consciousness and physical processes, each and of their own right, explain some of our very same behaviour.

. . . And "c" is your position.
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No, it's not. Consciousness is a brain process. It is not something other than a brain process. It makes no sense to say "both consciousness and physical processes."

Even if we were to say the intent and a brain process are one and the very same thing, they are clearly not synonymous. This can clearly be seen when we reflect that when I intend to get a drink I am not implicitly aware of what physical processes are occurring in my brain, where as I would be if they were synonymous. Conversely if you were to examine my brain when I have the intent to have a drink, it wouldn't be immediately evident to you that I was thirsty simply from studying the physical processes in my brain. Therefore they are not synonymous.

So therefore my argument is sound.