A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[hammegk]

What's to not see?

c) is some form of dualism

a) is non-materialism ("mind" is all there is)

b) is the opposite of a) ("matter" is all there is)

II approaches the problem from the human consciousness end of the spectrum; I prefer starting at the subatomic end of the spectrum.

Both of us conclude a) most closely fits the facts as we see them.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Even if we were to say the intent and a brain process are one and the very same thing, they are clearly not synonymous. This can clearly be seen when we reflect that when I intend to get a drink I am not implicitly aware of what physical processes are occurring in my brain, where as I would be if they were synonymous.

I will stipulate that no two words are synonymous, unless they are synonyms.

Conversely if you were to examine my brain when I have the intent to have a drink, it wouldn't be immediately evident to you that I was thirsty simply from studying the physical processes in my brain. Therefore they are not synonymous.

How can you possibly make this claim? By the way, how did I know you intended to have a drink in the first place?

Let's use temperature control rather than consciousness. Clearly temperature control is not synonymous with physical process. So you would also suggest this scenario:

c') And this is the obscure one. Both temperature control and physical processes, each and of their own right, explain some of our very same perspiration.

You do not seem to grok the concept that consciousness could be a physical process.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammgk said:

c) is some form of dualism

a) is non-materialism ("mind" is all there is)

b) is the opposite of a) ("matter" is all there is)

Hmm. If (c) is some form of dualism, then it is not my position. I don't understand why Ian mentioned (a), since he does not think that consciousness affects the world. Why is (b) a p-zombie or epiphenomenalist position?

What's not to see? Ha!

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

There seem to be 3 scenarios floating about here. Either:

a) Our behaviour can be partially explained by consciousness affecting the world.

b) Our behaviour can be wholly explained by physical processes playing out.

c) And this is the obscure one. Both consciousness and physical processes, each and of their own right, explain some of our very same behaviour.

Now "a" is my position. "b" is the p-zombie or epiphenomenalist position. And "c" is your position.

No. As Paul pointed out, my position is "b". The difference between me and an epiphenomenalist is that the epiphenomenalist makes the additional assertion that consciousness has absolutely no effect on our behavior, which is clearly false.

Of course, since consciousness is a set of physical brain processes, there is no conflict between the claim that consciousness influences our behavior, because consciousness is a physical process.

Your position "c" implicitly assumes that consciousness is not a physical process. It is the position of an integrationist dualist.

And BTW, to say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behaviour, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness.

Not true. If consciousness is a set of physical process, then we most definitely need consciousness to describe all physical change in the world in terms of physical laws.

Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behaviour that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superflous.

Nonsense. If consciousness is a set of physical processes, then it is clearly not superfluous. This is silly. You are just assigning the epiphenomenalist position to me, and then attacking it. I am not an epiphenomenalist. I do not believe that consciousness is something non-physical which has no effect on the physical world. I believe that consciousness is a physical process.

So if a complete physical explanation can be given for me drinking a glass of water this entails either I am a p-zombie, or I am a epiphenomenalist "person".

Agreed?

No. It could also mean that consciousness is a set of physical processes in your brain. In that case you are not a p-zombie, epiphenomenalism is false, and a complete physical explanation can be given.

Even if we were to say the intent and a brain process are one and the very same thing, they are clearly not synonymous. This can clearly be seen when we reflect that when I intend to get a drink I am not implicitly aware of what physical processes are occurring in my brain, where as I would be if they were synonymous. Conversely if you were to examine my brain when I have the intent to have a drink, it wouldn't be immediately evident to you that I was thirsty simply from studying the physical processes in my brain. Therefore they are not synonymous.

What is that supposed to mean? Could you please explain what you mean by them being "synonymous", and why that has any relevance at all to what we are discussing? If the intent is a brain process, then what does it mean to say that they are not synonymous? What difference does it make whether they are or not?


Dr. Stupid

 

[Suggestologist]

Suggestologist:

For your refutation of Loki's post to make sense , are you really saying that non Euclidian geometry allows you to define a circle to be square.

What kind of wierdness is that?

Stimpy's position is like Kant's: Kant took Euclidean geometry as a priori.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conversely if you were to examine my brain when I have the intent to have a drink, it wouldn't be immediately evident to you that I was thirsty simply from studying the physical processes in my brain. Therefore they are not synonymous.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


How can you possibly make this claim? By the way, how did I know you intended to have a drink in the first place?

Let's use temperature control rather than consciousness. Clearly temperature control is not synonymous with physical process. So you would also suggest this scenario:

c') And this is the obscure one. Both temperature control and physical processes, each and of their own right, explain some of our very same perspiration.

You do not seem to grok the concept that consciousness could be a physical process.

{Sighs heavily}


If you mean by "temperature control" simply temperature, then we have 2 interpretations of what is meant by temperature. We have first of all the physical process of what is meant by temperature, and we also have temperature as in phenomenologically experienced. Now it is very clear that from the materialist stance that it is the physical process of what is meant by temperature which completely explains the various physical effects upon the body. It does not matter one wit how warm or cold I feel, the only important thing is the physiological effect upon my body.

Now does this answer your concern??

 

[BillHoyt]

Stimpy's position is like Kant's: Kant took Euclidean geometry as a priori.

How about we focus on one claim at a time, here, suggestologist. I repeat:
"What's this claim about Tarski and Euclidean Geometry?"

 

[hammegk]

How about we focus on one claim at a time...

Does this mean you don't intend to answer the statistics questions?

Oh, and before I forget .... **** * *** ****.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

If you mean by "temperature control" simply temperature, then we have 2 interpretations of what is meant by temperature. We have first of all the physical process of what is meant by temperature, and we also have temperature as in phenomenologically experienced. Now it is very clear that from the materialist stance that it is the physical process of what is meant by temperature which completely explains the various physical effects upon the body. It does not matter one wit how warm or cold I feel, the only important thing is the physiological effect upon my body.

Now does this answer your concern??

No, but it does prompt me to take a dive off this merry-go-round. Perhaps a debate with some Creationists would hit the spot . . .

~~ Paul

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
What is that supposed to mean? Could you please explain what you mean by them being "synonymous", and why that has any relevance at all to what we are discussing? If the intent is a brain process, then what does it mean to say that they are not synonymous? What difference does it make whether they are or not?

Are "the year of the first moon landing" and "1969" synonymous?

Certainly, the year of the first moon landing is 1969. Yet, the only reason that statement is more meaningful than the entirely trivial statement "1969 is 1969," is that the two phrases are not synonymous. Asking why we first landed on the moon in 1969 is reasonable. Asking why 1969 is 1969 is just silly.

Your assertion that consciousness is a brain process might be true, but it isn't the case that it's true by definition. Consciousness might be a brain process, but "consciousness" doesn't have the same meaning as "a brain process."

Ian, I gather, is asking why consciousness is a brain process. I don't think science is in the business of answering this type of "why" question. But it's not a silly question. You act as if he asked why a brain process is a brain process, which would indeed be silly.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

69dodge,

What is that supposed to mean? Could you please explain what you mean by them being "synonymous", and why that has any relevance at all to what we are discussing? If the intent is a brain process, then what does it mean to say that they are not synonymous? What difference does it make whether they are or not?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Are "the year of the first moon landing" and "1969" synonymous?

Certainly, the year of the first moon landing is 1969. Yet, the only reason that statement is more meaningful than the entirely trivial statement "1969 is 1969," is that the two phrases are not synonymous. Asking why we first landed on the moon in 1969 is reasonable. Asking why 1969 is 1969 is just silly.

Actually, what I was looking for was for Ian to post some sort of explanation for is "synonymous" argument, as you just did. I never said that the phrase "brain processes" was synonymous with the word "consciousness". I asked Ian to explain what he meant by synonymous in this context, and why he thinks it is relevant to my argument.

Your assertion that consciousness is a brain process might be true, but it isn't the case that it's true by definition. Consciousness might be a brain process, but "consciousness" doesn't have the same meaning as "a brain process."

They don't have the same meaning. But of course, this has no relevance to the validity of my position.

Ian, I gather, is asking why consciousness is a brain process. I don't think science is in the business of answering this type of "why" question. But it's not a silly question. You act as if he asked why a brain process is a brain process, which would indeed be silly.

That may be. I don't know what Ian meant, because he won't tell me. If he did mean what you just said, then my response is simple.

I have not, anywhere in this thread, claimed that I could prove that consciousness is a set of brain process. Ian has claimed that consciousness cannot possibly be brain processes. If Ian wants to simply claim that I have not formally proven my position to be true, then I will happily agree with him. If he wants to claim that my position cannot possibly be true, as he has done, then he needs to explain why. Simply demanding that I prove it true, and insisting that since I have not, it can't be, is fallacious.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

69dodge,



Actually, what I was looking for was for Ian to post some sort of explanation for is "synonymous" argument, as you just did. I never said that the phrase "brain processes" was synonymous with the word "consciousness".

You seemed to imply it in the "Final proof that Stimpson J Cat is wrong" thread.

I have not, anywhere in this thread, claimed that I could prove that consciousness is a set of brain process. Ian has claimed that consciousness cannot possibly be brain processes.

I have not claimed this. This would only follow if p-zombies were indisputably logically possible. I have only ever claimed that the fact they are conceivable suggests that they are logically possible. Therefore the onus is upon those who claim that conscious processes and physical processes are one and the very same thing to show this. Otherwise our default presumption should be that materialism is false.

If Ian wants to simply claim that I have not formally proven my position to be true, then I will happily agree with him. If he wants to claim that my position cannot possibly be true, as he has done,

You're a liar.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

You're a liar.

Whatever. I am not going to go searching through these threads to find all of the times you have declared that saying that consciousness is a brain process is meaningless, or unintelligible, or the many times you have declared that it is impossible because consciousness is "irreducibly subjective", or the many times you have commented on how anybody would have to be completely clueless and stupid to not realize that consciousness is obviously not a brain process, and so on.

Your entire argument amounts to nothing more than saying that we should assume that whatever seems most intuitively reasonable to you, should be accepted as the "default position" by everybody, until such time is it is absolutely proven that it cannot be true.

The fact that you find p-zombies to be "conceivable" does not mean anything at all, other than that you clearly haven't thought through the implications of them. I have already explained that there are other "conceivable" options which would imply that p-zombies are not logically possible. If those options are logically possible, then p-zombies are not logically possible. Which is it? Which default position should we take?

Your entire line of reasoning is flawed. Our decision on which, if any, option to choose, should be based on available evidence, not on intuition or conceivability. There is not, and never could be, evidence that p-zombies are logically possible. There is therefore no good reason to assume as our default position that they are.

Furthermore, your entire line of argumentation is fallacious, because while you insist to me that I should reject materialism because p-zombies "might be" logically possible, you do not reject Libertarian free-will, even though the logical possibility of p-zombies would render that impossible as well. you are either a hypocrite, or you simply don't understand what the actual implications of the logical possibility of p-zombies are.

You have repeatedly accused me of being completely clueless, but at least I am not the one trying to refute somebody else's position, by presenting arguments which, if they were valid, would also refute mine. You are an Idealist. Dualism is no more compatible with Idealism than it is with my position. When you attack materialism with arguments that assume that dualism is true, you are not only begging the question, you are also assuming that your own position is false!

Get back to me when you can actually formulate a coherent argument.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

There seem to be 3 scenarios floating about here. Either:

a) Our behaviour can be partially explained by consciousness affecting the world.

b) Our behaviour can be wholly explained by physical processes playing out.

c) And this is the obscure one. Both consciousness and physical processes, each and of their own right, explain some of our very same behaviour.

Now "a" is my position. "b" is the p-zombie or epiphenomenalist position. And "c" is your position.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



No. As Paul pointed out, my position is "b".

In that case you holding the position that consciousness is not causally efficaceous.

The difference between me and an epiphenomenalist is that the epiphenomenalist makes the additional assertion that consciousness has absolutely no effect on our behavior, which is clearly false.

You've just contradicted yourself. If physical processes wholly explain our behaviour then physical processes wholly explain our behaviour. Logically this means that consciousness plays no part in explaining our behaviour.

Of course, since consciousness is a set of physical brain processes, there is no conflict between the claim that consciousness influences our behavior, because consciousness is a physical process.

I explained this in the post you are responding to! I'll copy and paste.

To say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behaviour, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behaviour that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superflous.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
And BTW, to say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behaviour, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Not true. If consciousness is a set of physical process, then we most definitely need consciousness to describe all physical change in the world in terms of physical laws.

No this is not true. We simply need all physical facts obtained from the 3rd person perspective in order to explain our behaviour. In other words we simply need the neural correlates of of consciousness rather than consciousness itself to explain our behaviour. The only way you can get round this is to show that these neural correlates logically necessitate consciousness. So show it. I'd also be interested to understand why a boulder rolling down a hill doesn't logically necessitate consciousness, but our behaviour does.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

There seem to be 3 scenarios floating about here. Either:

a) Our behavior can be partially explained by consciousness affecting the world.

b) Our behavior can be wholly explained by physical processes playing out.

c) And this is the obscure one. Both consciousness and physical processes, each and of their own right, explain some of our very same behavior.

Now "a" is my position. "b" is the p-zombie or epiphenomenalist position. And "c" is your position.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No. As Paul pointed out, my position is "b".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In that case you holding the position that consciousness is not causally efficacious.

Or that I think that consciousness is a subset of those physical processes which determine our behavior. Come on Ian, I know you aren't this dense.

The difference between me and an epiphenomenalist is that the epiphenomenalist makes the additional assertion that consciousness has absolutely no effect on our behavior, which is clearly false.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You've just contradicted yourself. If physical processes wholly explain our behavior then physical processes wholly explain our behavior. Logically this means that consciousness plays no part in explaining our behavior.

Only if consciousness is not a physical process. You know damn well that this is not what I think.

Of course, since consciousness is a set of physical brain processes, there is no conflict between the claim that consciousness influences our behavior, because consciousness is a physical process.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I explained this in the post you are responding to! I'll copy and paste.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behavior, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behavior that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superfluous.

Once again, this is not the case if your position is that consciousness is a subset of those physical processes which determine your behavior.

Is it even possible for you to present an argument that doesn't implicitly assume that consciousness is not a set of physical processes?

And BTW, to say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behavior, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Not true. If consciousness is a set of physical process, then we most definitely need consciousness to describe all physical change in the world in terms of physical laws.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No this is not true. We simply need all physical facts obtained from the 3rd person perspective in order to explain our behavior.

Why are you assuming that there is anything more to consciousness than these "3rd person perspective facts"?

In other words we simply need the neural correlates of of consciousness rather than consciousness itself to explain our behavior.

Begging the question. You are assuming that what you are calling the "neural correlates" of consciousness, is not all there is to consciousness. Otherwise the above makes absolutely no sense!

The only way you can get round this is to show that these neural correlates logically necessitate consciousness.

They don't "logically necessitate" it, they are it! Stop trying to cast me as some sort of epiphenomenalist.

So show it. I'd also be interested to understand why a boulder rolling down a hill doesn't logically necessitate consciousness, but our behavior does.

Go ask somebody who actually believes in epiphenomenalism. I don't.


Dr. Stupid

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Why are you assuming that there is anything more to consciousness than these "3rd person perspective facts"?

That's what people mean by "consciousness," no?

You continually say that consciousness is a set of brain processes (or might be, at least). At the risk of exposing myself to all sorts of ridicule, I have to ask, what is your definition of "is"?

I wonder if this argument is less about the nature of consciousness and more about the nature of scientific explanation. Perhaps you don't expect as much as Ian does from a scientific explanation of consciousness.

Suppose that whenever a certain process occurs in my brain (and only then), I feel hungry. You might discover this correspondence by looking at my brain at various times and asking me whether I feel hungry then. Do you think you could, in principle, discover this in any other way, say by doing some horrendously complicated quantum mechanical calculation, without ever looking at anyone's brain and asking them how they felt at the time? If not, would you still say that you had a complete explanation of hunger "because after all, I understand brain processes, and that brain process is hunger"? Ian might ask, "Well, perhaps it is, using your funny definition of 'is', but why is it? Why should anyone feel hungry, simply because that particular brain process occurs?"

I'm not sure this type of question is answerable. Science tries to discover how the world is, not why it is that way, because it's not clear that "why it is that way" really means anything to begin with. But saying the question is unanswerable isn't the same as answering it.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

69dodge said:

Suppose that whenever a certain process occurs in my brain (and only then), I feel hungry. You might discover this correspondence by looking at my brain at various times and asking me whether I feel hungry then. Do you think you could, in principle, discover this in any other way, say by doing some horrendously complicated quantum mechanical calculation, without ever looking at anyone's brain and asking them how they felt at the time? If not, would you still say that you had a complete explanation of hunger "because after all, I understand brain processes, and that brain process is hunger"?

I'm not sure why asking someone a question isn't a good way to obtain the facts of the matter. Is there something about the scientific investigation of consciousness that rules out asking questions of the person having the conscious experience? Asking such questions and recording the results is perfectly objective. Eventually, we might very well be able to look at someone's brain without asking questions and detect when they are hungry.

Of course, all of this doesn't necessarily tell us "what that person feels like when he is hungry," because we aren't that person. I think, in the long run, we'll understand enough about the brain to understand how "what it feels like" arises. Then we will understand consciousness and qualia, even though we still won't be able to experience another person's conscious experiences.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Answer to Mercutio

How now, Mercutio,

I find it interesting that to write this, you chose the noun "experiences"--which, of course, comes from the verb "to experience." "An experience" is a noun, certainly, but its existence is metaphorical. You say experiences are more than behavior, but thus far everything you add to it is more behavior! "Subjectively undergoing", to the extent that I understand the phrase, simply means "feeling" or "seeing" or "thinking", as far as I can tell. ***

You're right that undergoing an experience can in a sense be seen as a private activity, however you miss out on what distinguishes an experience from other types of "private behaviors" if you don't acknowledge the subjective character of this activity, i.e. the fact that the activity consists of subjectively experiencing something. Leave out the subjective character and there is no difference between a non-conscious brain process and a subjective experience anymore. Doesn't that strike you as absurd?

Private behavior doesapply to both conscious and non-conscious processes that are not (even in theory) observable by another--your use of "subjective" does not add to this, so why is it needed?

Because otherwise we can't make any other distinction between conscious and non-conscious processes.

What "subjective" processes are not included in "private" behavior? (more on this just below, I see) In sum, you say it is a category of experiences. I'd tweak that to a category of experiencing...a category of behaving. (or behaviors, if you prefer nouns.)

The fact that you can include something in a broader category doesn't mean that you can't distinguish it from other processes in that same category!

Um...what's the difference between an experient and just the organism that is experiencing?

The point here is not who or what is experiencing but that there is this type of activity which is irreducibly subjective.

Anyway, this is what I meant by baggage.

Again, even without such baggage you're still confronted by the same question. It won't go away just by saying that the question was supposedly answered wrongly by other thinkers. If you're not satisfied by dualism, you'd better come up with another theory but please without leaving anything out.

Doncha hate it when perfectly good words go bad?

Yes, though you may also see it as a sign that there's at least been some theoretical activity in a particular field of thought.

The category itsef has no causal impact. Certainly the behaviors within the category have an impact. This may well be the crux of the issue. You are treating a category label as if it is a causal entity, rather than just a word that corrals a bunch of behaviors which themselves may certainly have effects.

No, I'm not. I was implicitly talking of the individual behaviors as you would call them, i.e. the individual conscious experiences which together can be abstractly referred to as consciousness or subjective awareness.

Ok, then, please tell me what this "more" is! I'm getting a little scared here--maybe I'm somebody's p-zombie experiment and I just don't know it!

Well, I've once carried through a thought experiment in which some of the reductionists really didn't have any consciousness. They didn't understand the non-reductionists, because they literally had no idea what the latter were talking about. Such reductionists could serve as a satisfying alternative for all the defenceless sentient laboratory animals (I'm not implying these should be used without such an alternative BTW), or even as a source of protein. Just kidding of course.
More seriously: would you agree that there is something irreducibly subjective about pain? If so, that's the kind of phenomenon the anti-reductionists like myself are talking about. If not, well, sorry, but I'm afraid I can't help you out.
Perhaps you should read Romeo and Juliet once more and ask yourself if there might be anything irreducibly subjective (such as feelings of love and affection) Shakespeare made them die for.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Remaining civilized

Hi David,

You had responded to my words Again, that’s not an assertion about the reality of qualia but just about its possible source(s).:

I think I understand this but this just seems to be neoplatonism, just because I can look at a picture and see red, it doesn't mean that 'red' exists putside the perception or the memory of it. It can be called an abstraction, but that doesn't give it a seperate existance, from my concrete viewpoint

No, it's nothing to do with neoplatonism or platonism in the sense of forms or ideas in a transcendent world. I also believe that 'red' exists within the context of perception and memory (and on that basis, of dreams, imagination and visualization as well). The question remains however if all perception and memory in the qualitative sense are by definition dependent on the brain. It is obvious that the physical processes involved in normal sensory perception depend on processes in our bodies, but it is not at all obvious that that is all there is or can be to perception in the qualitative sense. As you will know, there even is quite some evidence for Extra-Sensory Perception.

I haven't read the articles, but I doubt that these children have information which I would find to be demonstrable proof of reincarnation. Very simple test however, if the child can be demostrated to posses knowledge of events that it can't have possible gotten from other sources then, I would accept. Like if they knew the location of lost objects.

A high bar would do, I think. But I suggest you read more about the subject. You might be quite surprised by the kind of evidence we're talking about.

And the famous NDE, have you studied the phenomena of 'confabulation'?

Of course I know of that possibility. But I was referring to cases in which this possibility was at least very implausible.

Well I am not sure what that means, there is a lot of literature on how neural processing occues, and it is more fuzzy reverberation than it is , digital bits

Okay, but it remains an entirely quantitative process, whether you digitally count to two (or one rather) or analogously to infinity. It's still just a question of numbers, with nothing irreducibly qualitative in it.

The brain learns to percieve qualia as it grows, which makes it even harder to say 'quantification' because there is a large amount of stuff our brains just make up out of refernecing.

That is doubtlessly true, i.e. we do make up a lot. But the question is here if we make up ALL of our consciousness, and that's simply seems too far-fetched to take seriously rationally. By the way, the brain or in my view rather the mind or self learns to perceive qualia as it develops, but mainly in the cognitive perceptual sense of learning to categorize experiences. Not in the sense that we only experience what we've learnt to label. Otherwise you should believe that infants or animals don't experience any pain unless they've learnt to label it. I for one don't.

Thank You Titus, I want to say that I enjoy discussing things absent the name calling and abuse that this topic generaly generates, thanks for trying to ex-plain this to me!

You're welcome and thank you for remaining quite civilized yourself.

PS: I did read the article about the reincarnation, but so far I don't think that they would meet my standard for, non contamination. Sorry, I am a sceptic

Perhaps you should at least try Ian Stevenson's basic treatise Twenty Cases and some articles in the
Journal of Scientific Exploration.

Again, I would accept any story that could be verified and controled for contamination. Just like Anastasia, I believ that she was the German maid of the tzarina, not the tzarina

Though it partially depends on one's standards (which in turn relate to one's broader world view), there are quite a lot of cases in which it certainly seems very plausible that they can't be explained away by any such contamination (or other normal processes).

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

The downfall of physicalism

Hi Ian,

I read your article (and others) about 3 months ago before I ever communicated with you. It was good. Actually I at first thought you were arguing against epiphenomenalism and espousing some form of materialism until about half way through when I read your footnotes

I see, thanks by the way.

I agree with what you said about epiphenomenalism, but I think that materialism is even more ludicrous. I mean at least epiphenomenalism acknowledges the existence of consciousness ie it is not identical or a function of some physical thing.

I know, but I see epiphenomenalism as a burning refuge for physicalists, to use the somewhat agressive military analogy (of a battle between positions rather than a damaging personal conflict). It's part of my strategy to demolish this refuge. Not in order to kill off all the bewildered physicalists when they leave the lost citadel, but to welcome them in the camp of anti-physicalism. Physicalists will one day realize that the only type of physicalist theory they might coherently defend is a reductionist one. That's shattering enough, for intelligent people anyway. Physicalism and thereby materialism as well, are lost causes. Some of the scattered troops simply haven't realized that the war is really over. And we even see some tough-minded, rather eloquent and inspiring generals like Dennett or at this forum Dr. Stupid who actually believe they are gaining more terrain. I sometimes pity such characters as they obviously are serious about their theories, though maybe they're useful after all in that attacking their sophisticated formulations of physicalism may be even more effective than addressing the less sophisticated types. I'm convinced that in the long run, physicalism will be little more than a curiosity in the history of the philosophy of science. We're witnessing its inevitable, irreversible decline.

Introspective 'acquaintance'?? But this introspective 'acquaintance' can't have any neural correlates can it? So . . er . .yeah it wouldn't be epiphenomenalism would it?

It would, but sometimes people prefer using a disguise.

Titus