A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

Another point Stimpy

Why when a boulder rolls down a hill is it not logically necessitated that it is accompanied by conscious experiences? Indeed if brain processes simply are conscious experiences, why isn't the boulder rolling down a hill equate to conscious experiences? You claim that some physical things ie human beings logically necessarily have conscious experiences associated with them, yet any non-sentient thing doesn't! Moreover you are wholly unable to explain why the particular physical processes which constitute a human being should equate to consciousness. How can it be that a boulder absent any consciousness is logically possible, but a "human being" absent any consciousness (ie a p-zombie) is logical impossible? I mean the only option it seems to me is to state that there is something magical about the physical processes occurring in a human being. A hypothesis the materialist must reject.

I think that your only answer is to state that this just is, for some reason, how the world is. We cannot, in other words, a priori show that the physical processes making up human beings constitute consciousness, we need instead to say that physical processes leading to consciousness is something we discover from the world. But if this is so, and if you embrace naturalism, then we cannot say that consciousness is identical to physical processes anymore than we can for any other 2 objects in the world which are clearly different, even if causally connected. It seems then you are forced into espousing epiphenomenalism!

Am I misunderstanding something?

 

[Skeptical Greg]

Yes.

 

[Quasi]

Hi Ian,

I think what you are talking about is the problem of induction. We can only learn by experiencing things, and since we all experience things differently, it leads to a very high polydispersity of beliefs and personalities. This problem, however was solved by Karl Popper who stated that we can test belifs (if they are testable) by setting them up in conditions that are optimal for failure within the theoretical framework. So is conciousness inherent to people, and is channeled from another dimension? Based on our knowledge of neurobiology this is extremely unlikely. But if there is a claim regarding conciousness, which someone actually states something is ocurring in reality which can be measured, this idea should be tested under the most stringent, failure prone way. So if it stands up to scrutiny, it will be far more validated than by any other means. Does this make sense to you?

PS: I have been trying to get homeopaths who claim homeopathic medicine is a complete medical system, far superior to current science based medicine to cure terminally ill cancer and AIDS victims. Ahh, the chirp of crickets. Makes me wonder why they fear that which they are so convinced of? Because this simple test for failure would completely blow homeopathy away- they would have to admit they were wrong- big time. This is the power of science.

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Reply to Mercutio

Mercutio said:
quote: I am, of course

I just meant that some questions can be the fruit of a debating technique, don't take it personally

no prob!

quote:So "consciousness" is a category of behaviors.

Not at all. It's a category of experiences. Experiences are more than just behavior of the body or functional processes in the brain. The word behavior in either of these contexts does not capture the experiential nature of consciousness. Which is also a matter of subjectively undergoing, not just of doing. "Private behavior" would apply both to non-conscious and subjective inner processes. So just saying that consciousness is private behavior is simply insufficient.

I find it interesting that to write this, you chose the noun "experiences"--which, of course, comes from the verb "to experience." "An experience" is a noun, certainly, but its existence is metaphorical. You say experiences are more than behavior, but thus far everything you add to it is more behavior! "Subjectively undergoing", to the extent that I understand the phrase, simply means "feeling" or "seeing" or "thinking", as far as I can tell. *** Private behavior doesapply to both conscious and non-conscious processes that are not (even in theory) observable by another--your use of "subjective" does not add to this, so why is it needed? What "subjective" processes are not included in "private" behavior? (more on this just below, I see) In sum, you say it is a category of experiences. I'd tweak that to a category of experiencing...a category of behaving. (or behaviors, if you prefer nouns.)

quote: I don't think we can use the term "subjective" here yet, as it has baggage (as seen in this thread).

Well, I precisely think we can’t do without it in one particular sense, as I’ve said before, namely that of "being experienced by an experient".

Um...what's the difference between an experient and just the organism that is experiencing? Is the experient some subjective entity within the organism (say, a self or consciousness) that is somehow qualitatively separate (less than, more than, different from) the organism? (person, usually, but why discriminate?) "subjective" as I used it in the previous sentence (its classic usage, as somehow qualitatively different from "objective", rather than differing merely by perspective) implies, though I suppose it does not require, some "mental" reality that is different from a physical reality. Anyway, this is what I meant by baggage.

quote: You give these behaviors as examples, too--are there any members of this category which you consider qualitatively different from these?

Actually, they are all qualitatively different, even every single experience is qualitatively different from any other single experience.

Which is why I used the word "category". There are certainly similarities enough to clump them together. And they are all (which is why the question arose) private behaviors of the organism.

quote: oh, could we use "non-conscious" instead of "unconscious"? The latter has a lot of psychodynamic baggage that is not worth sorting through

You’re right, the term unconscious isn’t neutral anymore. No objection.

Doncha hate it when perfectly good words go bad?

quote: It is not a causal entity, and adds nothing but a layer of nomenclature to the discussion

Even in your conception, it should have some causal impact, as ‘behavior’. So you've lost me here.

The category itsef has no causal impact. Certainly the behaviors within the category have an impact. This may well be the crux of the issue. You are treating a category label as if it is a causal entity, rather than just a word that corrals a bunch of behaviors which themselves may certainly have effects.

quote: If I engage in these behaviors (and I assure you sincerely that I do) as a M-zombie (or a p-zombie, for that matter), there is nothing more to consciousness than that. (?)

Of course I don’t agree with this.

Ok, then, please tell me what this "more" is! I'm getting a little scared here--maybe I'm somebody's p-zombie experiment and I just don't know it!

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Another point Stimpy

Why when a boulder rolls down a hill is it not logically necessitated that it is accompanied by conscious experiences? Indeed if brain processes simply are conscious experiences, why isn't the boulder rolling down a hill equate to conscious experiences?
I am sure that there is some fancy name for this kind of argument, I would assume that it is argument by generalization. To say that a certain set of physical events is associated with consiousness is not the same as saying all physical events are associated with cosnsiousness.

This is rather typical of you Ian, you make an assertion that is not held by the other side in the debate and then use it to refute them.

You claim that some physical things ie human beings logically necessarily have conscious experiences associated with them, yet any non-sentient thing doesn't!

This is just more of your questionable rhetoric, you are the only one making the logicaly neccesitaed argument . A materialist says that , at this point the only consiousness we are aware of is associated with organic brains. There is no proof as yet that there is consiousness outside organic brains, while such is possible. More argument by generalization.
Moreover you are wholly unable to explain why the particular physical processes which constitute a human being should equate to consciousness.
Again Ian, science shows an approxiamation that predicts future behavior of the system, philosphers make the outrageous claims of causality, science does not have to show why, it just makes predictions and tests the theries.
Can you demonstrate any theory which would prove that consiousness is not associated with an organic brain?
How can it be that a boulder absent any consciousness is logically possible, but a "human being" absent any consciousness (ie a p-zombie) is logical impossible? I mean the only option it seems to me is to state that there is something magical about the physical processes occurring in a human being. A hypothesis the materialist must reject.
This is argument by assertion, you are stating what a materialist should believe and then refuting it. In a materialist viewpoint, a p-zombie , is consious because it exhibits all the signs of consiousness, therefore in the scientific sense it is consious! No matter what! A p-zombie is consious in the scientfic sense.

-snip-
But if this is so, and if you embrace naturalism, then we cannot say that consciousness is identical to physical processes anymore than we can for any other 2 objects in the world which are clearly different, even if causally connected. It seems then you are forced into espousing epiphenomenalism!

Sorry Ian but you lost me there, why should a materialist hold that beleif at all, in the scientific materialist viewpoint, you don't have to prove causality, it is a theory that consiousness is asssociated wonly with oraganic brains, until someone demostrates a consious event outside an organic brain , it will be assumed to be the most correct theory.


Am I misunderstanding something?

there is a particuler series of physical events associated with consiousness a particular set of physical events is associated with consiousness

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Aother reply to Dancing David

David asked:


What about an irreducible mind which contains both consciousness and a non-physical memory?

While I am willing to believe that they might exist, I have yet to see any demostration that they exist. They would be real cool, but I haven't seen the evidence to say that they do exist. Mere argumentation is not enough for me. I am concrete in my thinking.



Again, that’s not an assertion about the reality of qualia but just about its possible source(s).

I think I understand this but this just seems to be neoplatonism, just because I can look at a picture and see red, it doesn't mean that 'red' exists putside the perception or the memory of it. It can be called an abstraction, but that doesn't give it a seperate existance, from my concrete viewpoint.


About experiments I’m not so sure, but there is quite some naturalistic evidence in parapsychology or psychical research which strongly suggests that the mind can indeed function extra-cerebrally. Also, there is serious evidence for memories of previous lives in young children and for memories of experiences during a stage very close to flat EEG .

I haven't read the articles, but I doubt that these children have information which I would find to be demonstrable proof of reincarnation. Very simple test however, if the child can be demostrated to posses knowledge of events that it can't have possible gotten from other sources then, I would accept. Like if they knew the location of lost objects.
Sorry as a psychology major, I set a very high bar for verification.

And the famous NDE, have you studied the phenomena of 'confabulation'?


In my view it could only be meaningful if qualia could after all be represented quantitatively (or ‘formally’) in neural patterns. Otherwise, it doesn’t make any sense.

Well I am not sure what that means, there is a lot of literature on how neural processing occues, and it is more fuzzy reverberation than it is , digital bits.
The brain learns to percieve qualia as it grows, which makes it even harder to say 'quantification' because there is a large amount of stuff our brains just make up out of refernecing.



Titus

Thank You Titus, I want to say that I enjoy discussing things absent the name calling and abuse that this topic generaly generates, thanks for trying to ex-plain this to me!



PS: I did read the article about the reincarnation, but so far I don't think that they would meet my standard for, non contamination. Sorry, I am a sceptic. Again, I would accept any story that could be verified and controled for contamination. Just like Anastasia, I believ that she was the German maid of the tzarina, not the tzarina.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Hi Ian,

I think what you are talking about is the problem of induction. We can only learn by experiencing things, and since we all experience things differently, it leads to a very high polydispersity of beliefs and personalities. This problem, however was solved by Karl Popper

Solved??? Well that will be news to philosophers of science! Scientists might think that Poppers falsifiability best characterises scientific progress, but then they're thick.

who stated that we can test belifs (if they are testable) by setting them up in conditions that are optimal for failure within the theoretical framework.

Yes I know what Popper stated. Could you please state where precisely he mentions that the falsifiability criteria applies to metaphysical theories as well as scientific ones?

So is conciousness inherent to people,

I assume you mean inherent to matter?

and is channeled from another dimension? Based on our knowledge of neurobiology this is extremely unlikely.

Complete nonsense. If it's unlikely then demonstrate this. Otherwise it's merely bald assertion.

And since when does impossibility trump unlikelihood?

But if there is a claim regarding conciousness, which someone actually states something is ocurring in reality which can be measured, this idea should be tested under the most stringent, failure prone way. So if it stands up to scrutiny, it will be far more validated than by any other means. Does this make sense to you?

No

PS: I have been trying to get homeopaths who claim homeopathic medicine is a complete medical system, far superior to current science based medicine to cure terminally ill cancer and AIDS victims. Ahh, the chirp of crickets. Makes me wonder why they fear that which they are so convinced of? Because this simple test for failure would completely blow homeopathy away- they would have to admit they were wrong- big time. This is the power of science.

God knows what all this has got to do with my previous post.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Another point Stimpy

there is a particuler series of physical events associated with consiousness a particular set of physical events is associated with consiousness

I'm impressed with your apparent inability to understand anything. And your spelling is attrocious!

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Reply to Mercutio

Ok, then, please tell me what this "more" is! I'm getting a little scared here--maybe I'm somebody's p-zombie experiment and I just don't know it! [/B]

Well at least you're only scared[z].

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Re: Re: Another point Stimpy

I'm impressed with your apparent inability to understand anything. And your spelling is attrocious!

I stated , and you left out that
to equate a ceratin set of physical events in the brain to awareness is not the same as equating all physical events to awareness. (I substitued awareness for the word I have trouble spellin)

SO , IAN MAYBE THE PROBLEM IS THAT YOU DON'T EXPLAIN ANYTHING!

If you really understand the stuff that you sling then I am really suprised because you lack the ability to explain it. Which means that you really don't understand it in the first place. If you can't write it clearly then you can't think.

So Idiotic Ian, is your brain as good as your flame, I hope so because your flame is pathetic.

So explain why my stament that

a subset of events leading to awareness in the physical realm does not equate to all events in the physical realm.

I dare you to explain otherwise to me, which we shall see if you can.

Otherwise I will call you out for being the muddle headed crack pot that you are.

But this is rather typical of your atacks by bafoonism, you put words in other people mouths, you define thier position for them then when your pathetic lack of brains showss through you resort to insults and inuenndo.

I would look forward to rational response from you Ian, but you are incapable of discussing my point, so I guess you will just ignore it.

Beacuse: You don't know what you think, you can't explain what you don't know and you are a moral weakling who doesn't even know the meaning of the word: integrity.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Chalmers and epiphenomenalism

Ian said:


He's got a very curious position very much like epiphenomenalism, though he might deny that himself. He acknowledges the argument formulated by Dennett and others (including myself) that in order to justify our claim that we know of the existence of an irreducible consciousness, we must admit that there is a way to know our own subjective experiences. However, he thinks this does not equal a causal impact, but is based on introspective 'acquaintance' . Together with my friend Hein van Dongen I've published an article against epiphenomenalism, which includes some criticism of Chalmers' position. Our well-founded case is that qualia are causally efficacious. If anyone wants to know why, please read the article first.

Best wishes,

Titus

Titus,

I read your article (and others) about 3 months ago before I ever communicated with you. It was good. Actually I at first thought you were arguing against epiphenomenalism and espousing some form of materialism until about half way through when I read your footnotes.

I agree with what you said about epiphenomenalism, but I think that materialism is even more ludicrous. I mean at least epiphenomenalism acknowledges the existence of consciousness ie it is not identical or a function of some physical thing.

Introspective 'acquaintance'?? But this introspective 'acquaintance' can't have any neural correlates can it? So . . er . .yeah it wouldn't be epiphenomenalism would it?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Another point Stimpy

Beacuse: You don't know what you think, you can't explain what you don't know and you are a moral weakling who doesn't even know the meaning of the word: integrity. [/B]

I think that anyone who knows me would agree that if there's one thing I can't be accused of, it is having a lack of integrity

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Another point Stimpy

I think that anyone who knows me would agree that if there's one thing I can't be accused of, it is having a lack of integrity

EEEK all you want, stand by your words if you do have integrity!

Why is it that if someone states that brain events are associated with awareness, you go and say that this means all physical events should be associated with awareness?

For a materialist to state that brain events are associated with the c-word is one statement.

But then you go and make the argument that a boulder rolling down a hill is a physical event and therefore it ought to be associated with the c-word.

Or if not why would the c-word be associated with brain events.

So explain yourself Ian, you are the one who made the generalization. Why would it make sense at all. how do you go from a subset of physical events to all physical events.

Do you have the integrity to explain yourself? Or will you just balther about my speeling, when you could answer the question?

Do you have real integrity or are you the king of attack and run?

I stand by my words, I can explain them because I understand what I think, I know the concepts well enough to explain them, I don't have to restort to jargon that I can't explain.

So are you smart enough to explain your statements? Do you really understand the concepts you sling around?

Why should the c-word occuring with a subset of physical events mean that it should occur with any physical event? Can you explain it.

Unlike you I do try to understand other, and I await your explanation.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Well it would seem so to me. But the materialist holds that all behaviour is a result of physical processes. It is never phenomenal consciousness per se which determines our behaviour, but rather the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness.

No materialist would say that. That is what an epiphenomenalist would say, not a materialist. A materialist would say that consciousness can, and does, determine our outward behavior, and that this is not a problem because consciousness is just a set of physical processes in the brain.

But this means that p-zombies would indeed behave in all ways identical to real people including arguing about real people and p-zombies and having this idea[z] of real consciousness.

So this seems clearly absurd. And yet if everything we as real people do is the result of physical processes then obviously there doesn't seem to be anything contradictory in a world of p-zombies acting in the same way.

The point is moot, because under materialism p-zombies are a contradiction in terms. A p-zombie cannot simultaneously be physically identical to a normal human, and lack consciousness, because consciousness is a set of physical processes happening in that person's brain. Under materialism, a p-zombie is as impossible as a an r-zombie (an r-zombie is physically identical to a normal living human, but lacks resperation.)

Just one of the ridiculous consequences that obtain in supposing the world is physically closed.

No, a ridiculous consequence that obtains when you suppose that the world is physically closed, but that consciousness is non-physical. The bottom line is that this combination simply isn't consistent with the world we see around us. Either consciousness is physical, or the physical world is not causally closed. Either way consciousness effects physical things, so p-zombies are impossible.

I have already explained why I think they are impossible. If consciousness has any effect on the physical world at all, then they are logically impossible.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I just want to address this one point for now and hopefully get round to addressing some more of your colossal output later on or tomorrow.

Your position is that consciousness is identical to certain physical processes in the brain. Therefore when we totally explain behaviour by reference to these physical processes, you can say that since consciousness is one and the same as these physical processes, that consciousness has an effect upon the world.

Not quite. I don't need to hypothesize that consciousness is a brain process in order to establish that consciousness has an effect on the world. All I have to do is take note of the fact that we are physically discussing consciousness right now.

But the more pressing difficulty for you is that you seem to have 2 explanations for our behaviour. The one is consciousness, often in the form of intent (eg I really fancy having a glass of orange juice), the other in the physical processes in the brain which can be encompassed by a scientific theory just like any other physical facts. Now these explanations are clearly not synonymous.

BZZZT. That is where you are wrong. I am claiming that the "consciousness" explanation you gave (fancying a glass of orange juice), is logically reducible to the scientific explanation in terms of brain processes. I cannot answer your question, because it simply is not a question about the position I actually hold.

Why when a boulder rolls down a hill is it not logically necessitated that it is accompanied by conscious experiences? Indeed if brain processes simply are conscious experiences,

Hold it right there. Brain processes are not consciousness experiences. Conscious experiences are certain types of brain processes. There is an important difference. A square is a rectangle, but not all rectangles are squares.

why isn't the boulder rolling down a hill equate to conscious experiences?

Why doesn't it equate to computation? Or digestion? Or any other physical process that it isn't? Because it is not the same physical process as a conscious experience. Duh.

You claim that some physical things ie human beings logically necessarily have conscious experiences associated with them,

No I don't. Dead bodies don't have conscious experiences. People who are brain dead don't have conscious experiences. People in certain types of comas don't have conscious experiences.

yet any non-sentient thing doesn't!

Of course not. Consciousness is a set of physical processes. If those processes are not present, then the thing is not conscious. What is so surprising about that?

Moreover you are wholly unable to explain why the particular physical processes which constitute a human being should equate to consciousness.

No, I am not completely unable to do this. I am just no able to give a complete explanation for it, because I do not yet have all of the necessary facts to do so.

How can it be that a boulder absent any consciousness is logically possible, but a "human being" absent any consciousness (ie a p-zombie) is logical impossible?

A human being absent consciousness is not impossible. What is impossible is having two human beings who are physically identical, where one of them has consciousness, and the other does not.

I mean the only option it seems to me is to state that there is something magical about the physical processes occurring in a human being. A hypothesis the materialist must reject.

I have no idea why you would think this is the case.

I think that your only answer is to state that this just is, for some reason, how the world is. We cannot, in other words, a priori show that the physical processes making up human beings constitute consciousness, we need instead to say that physical processes leading to consciousness is something we discover from the world. But if this is so, and if you embrace naturalism, then we cannot say that consciousness is identical to physical processes anymore than we can for any other 2 objects in the world which are clearly different, even if causally connected. It seems then you are forced into espousing epiphenomenalism!

I disagree with your completely unjustified assertion that consciousness is "clearly different" from a set of physical processes in the brain. You have no evidence to back up this assertion, only your own unreliable intuition.

Am I misunderstanding something?

Apparently. I can't understand how, though, given the number of times that I have explained that your above representation of my position is not my actual position.


Dr. Stupid

 

[hammegk]

Either consciousness is physical, or the physical world is not causally closed.

Or, the perceived "physical world" is a chimera.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

Or, the perceived "physical world" is a chimera.

That explains why Ian's metaphysic sounds like the head of a lizard stuck on the body of a pig!

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Or, the perceived "physical world" is a chimera.

The physical world is a freakish mythological creature?

What are you smoking?

Can I have some?


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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Well it would seem so to me. But the materialist holds that all behaviour is a result of physical processes. It is never phenomenal consciousness per se which determines our behaviour, but rather the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness.
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No materialist would say that.

Then it seems that you have to deny the publically observable has primary being. Therefore there is no such thing as a materialist.

That is what an epiphenomenalist would say, not a materialist.

I have explained why both have to say this.

A materialist would say that consciousness can, and does, determine our outward behavior, and that this is not a problem because consciousness is just a set of physical processes in the brain.

I have acknowledged this. You need to address my argument concerning this.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But this means that p-zombies would indeed behave in all ways identical to real people including arguing about real people and p-zombies and having this idea[z] of real consciousness.

So this seems clearly absurd. And yet if everything we as real people do is the result of physical processes then obviously there doesn't seem to be anything contradictory in a world of p-zombies acting in the same way.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The point is moot, because under materialism p-zombies are a contradiction in terms.

True enough but irrelevant as you have yet to defend yourself against my arguments.

A p-zombie cannot simultaneously be physically identical to a normal human, and lack consciousness, because consciousness is a set of physical processes happening in that person's brain. Under materialism, a p-zombie is as impossible as a an r-zombie (an r-zombie is physically identical to a normal living human, but lacks resperation.)

Yes I know. But as I say this is wholly irrelevant and does not address my arguments.

{Sighs heavily}

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just one of the ridiculous consequences that obtain in supposing the world is physically closed.
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No, a ridiculous consequence that obtains when you suppose that the world is physically closed, but that consciousness is non-physical.

Nope, my argument is for any scenario which supposes the world is physically closed.

The bottom line is that this combination simply isn't consistent with the world we see around us. Either consciousness is physical, or the physical world is not causally closed.

You're confusing naturalism with materialism.

Either way consciousness effects physical things, so p-zombies are impossible.

What leads you to the conclusion that consciousness effects physical things?

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
Your position is that consciousness is identical to certain physical processes in the brain. Therefore when we totally explain behaviour by reference to these physical processes, you can say that since consciousness is one and the same as these physical processes, that consciousness has an effect upon the world.
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Not quite. I don't need to hypothesize that consciousness is a brain process in order to establish that consciousness has an effect on the world. All I have to do is take note of the fact that we are physically discussing consciousness right now.

Yes? Which poses difficulty for supposing the world is physically closed. You do not escape this difficulty by asserting "X" is one and the same thing as "Y".

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
But the more pressing difficulty for you is that you seem to have 2 explanations for our behaviour. The one is consciousness, often in the form of intent (eg I really fancy having a glass of orange juice), the other in the physical processes in the brain which can be encompassed by a scientific theory just like any other physical facts. Now these explanations are clearly not synonymous.
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BZZZT. That is where you are wrong. I am claiming that the "consciousness" explanation you gave (fancying a glass of orange juice), is logically reducible to the scientific explanation in terms of brain processes.

Irrelevant. I repeat that these explanations are not synonymous even if "identical".

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Why when a boulder rolls down a hill is it not logically necessitated that it is accompanied by conscious experiences? Indeed if brain processes simply are conscious experiences,
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Hold it right there. Brain processes are not consciousness experiences. Conscious experiences are certain types of brain processes. There is an important difference. A square is a rectangle, but not all rectangles are squares.

Could you please address the substance of my point??

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why isn't the boulder rolling down a hill equate to conscious experiences?
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Why doesn't it equate to computation? Or digestion? Or any other physical process that it isn't? Because it is not the same physical process as a conscious experience. Duh.

I'm sorry but I don't understand. What has a boulder rolling down a hill got to do with digestion? If you repeat "what has a boulder rolling down a hill got to do with consciousness", then I need to know why this physical process does not involve consciousness, but other physical processes do? What is it about physical processes in the brain which logically necessitate consciousness, but which no other physical processes do?? Do you understand my question?

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You claim that some physical things ie human beings logically necessarily have conscious experiences associated with them,
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No I don't. Dead bodies don't have conscious experiences.

I'm talking about people, not a corpse which is not a person

{sighs heavily}

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yet any non-sentient thing doesn't!
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Of course not. Consciousness is a set of physical processes.

So why do some physical processes lack consciousness?

If those processes are not present, then the thing is not conscious. What is so surprising about that?

So certain processes are special in some way. In what way are they special? How do they logically entail conscious experience??

PLEASE PLEASE PLEASE answer this question!!! I really do truly want to understand! But I can't!

Look, if consciousness is logically entailed, then surely you can give me the logical proof?? So why are you not able to do this?? Indeed why are you not able to give any reason whatsoever that this physical "stuff" somehow leads to consciousness???

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Moreover you are wholly unable to explain why the particular physical processes which constitute a human being should equate to consciousness.
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No, I am not completely unable to do this. I am just no able to give a complete explanation for it, because I do not yet have all of the necessary facts to do so.

So you can give a partial explanation then?? GIMME GIMME GIMME!! LMFAO!!!

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How can it be that a boulder absent any consciousness is logically possible, but a "human being" absent any consciousness (ie a p-zombie) is logical impossible?
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A human being absent consciousness is not impossible. What is impossible is having two human beings who are physically identical, where one of them has consciousness, and the other does not.

Logically impossible rather than merely naturally impossible? How so??

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I mean the only option it seems to me is to state that there is something magical about the physical processes occurring in a human being. A hypothesis the materialist must reject.
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I have no idea why you would think this is the case.

Then it seems we're not communicating very effectively.

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I think that your only answer is to state that this just is, for some reason, how the world is. We cannot, in other words, a priori show that the physical processes making up human beings constitute consciousness, we need instead to say that physical processes leading to consciousness is something we discover from the world. But if this is so, and if you embrace naturalism, then we cannot say that consciousness is identical to physical processes anymore than we can for any other 2 objects in the world which are clearly different, even if causally connected. It seems then you are forced into espousing epiphenomenalism!
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I disagree with your completely unjustified assertion that consciousness is "clearly different" from a set of physical processes in the brain.

{shrugs} There is phenomenal experience, and there is physical processes in the brain. They at least appear to be completely different. So what exactly is being asserted by saying they are in fact the same? You cannot logically deduce one from the other, or at least you cannot deduce the mental from the physical. So what reasons do you have for supposing they are one and the very same thing? Let's agree with your premises that mind is effected by brain and the mind has its source in the brain. How do you go from that to declaring they are literally one and the very same thing??

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Another point Stimpy

David,

Calm down. If I've hurt your feelings then I apologise.

DD

EEEK all you want, stand by your words if you do have integrity!

Why is it that if someone states that brain events are associated with awareness, you go and say that this means all physical events should be associated with awareness?

I of course did not state that. I refer the gentlemen to my post concerning this.

For a materialist to state that brain events are associated with the c-word is one statement.

But then you go and make the argument that a boulder rolling down a hill is a physical event and therefore it ought to be associated with the c-word.

No I didn't. I refer the gentlemen to the post he is addressing.

So explain yourself Ian, you are the one who made the generalization. Why would it make sense at all. how do you go from a subset of physical events to all physical events.

No, the onus is upon you to explain why some physical processes are associated with consciousness but other physical processes aren't.

Do you have the integrity to explain yourself? Or will you just balther about my speeling, when you could answer the question?

Do you have real integrity or are you the king of attack and run?

I stand by my words, I can explain them because I understand what I think, I know the concepts well enough to explain them, I don't have to restort to jargon that I can't explain.

Well, I'm afraid I'm still utterly clueless how materialism can be supposed to be coherent, nevermind correct. Emotional outbursts will not convince me that you are correct. Really, honestly

So are you smart enough to explain your statements? Do you really understand the concepts you sling around?

I've already explained my problems as much as I am able to do so. If you still can't understand where I am failing to understand, then that is unfortunate. But I guess there is nothing that can be done about that.

Why should the c-word occuring with a subset of physical events mean that it should occur with any physical event? Can you explain it.

Obviously it needn't do. But equally obviously it is incumbent upon those who suppose certain physical event logically entail consciousness, but other physical events don't, to explain why this is so. Do you agree?