A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

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Titus said:
know, but I see epiphenomenalism as a burning refuge for physicalists, to use the somewhat agressive military analogy (of a battle between positions rather than a damaging personal conflict).
Are you saying that there are rational people who think epiphenomenalism makes sense? How do they explain how we're managing to discuss consciousness?

Let me know when the funeral is.

~~ Paul
 
RIP

Are you saying that there are rational people who think epiphenomenalism makes sense? How do they explain how we're managing to discuss consciousness?

That's a tough one. They aren't rational in this conviction, but more generally, yes they are quite rational I suppose.

Let me know when the funeral is.
I suppose it won't be missed by intellectually active people such as yourself, Paul.

Titus
 
69dodge said:
That's what people mean by "consciousness," no?

You continually say that consciousness is a set of brain processes (or might be, at least). At the risk of exposing myself to all sorts of ridicule, I have to ask, what is your definition of "is"?

I wonder if this argument is less about the nature of consciousness and more about the nature of scientific explanation. Perhaps you don't expect as much as Ian does from a scientific explanation of consciousness.

No no, I do not expect a scientific explanation of consciousness at all! Here is what I have said before on my definition of science:


It is not the task of science to explain the experiencer (the self or consciousness) which experiences, nor the ontological character of the experiences themselves, but rather the patterns exhibited by the sub-branch of experiences represented by our sensory experiences. This is acheived by building mental representational models patterning and ordering these experiences (or qualia).



It might also be helpful to quote what I said yesterday in another thread where I was trying to explain Idealism and pointing out that simply because it is foggy, that doesn't mean to say I won't bump into objects! But I also explain what science deals with and what metaphysics deals with.


II
. . . or in virtual reality or in computer games even. In a computer game your avatar can get killed by a train in the computer game environment.
Ed
I agree.
II
How can this be if it is not material?

Ed
It is material. Electrons and such. You make one statement that is unknowable, though interesting to discuss. As such it is a waste of time. This is why philosophy is irrelevant and pointless.

II
The point I'm getting at is that a computer game character like Lara Croft dies in the computer game because of rules. It is not the computer game train per se which kills her, but rather the game is programmed in such a way that when the train hits her she dies. Likewise if I'm playing a flying game and I happen to be flying in fog, this doesn't mean that the rules have changed so that I am unable to crash into the ocean.

The real world is like this in that it is described by, and follows rules. More precisely these rules govern what we can expect the course of our sensory experiences to consist of. These rules are referred to as the physical laws of nature and it is the task of science to discern them.

So we have our sensory experiences which change according to rules or physical laws. But how come when 2 or more people look at an object their visual sensory experiences are more or less the same? Well we might appeal to the notion of an external object existing independently of the perceivers which gives rise to their similar sensory experiences. Or we can hypothesize it is the result of an omnipotent consciousness which directly conveys to us all of our sensory experiences, and organizes them in such a manner that our experiences follow rules (physical laws of nature). And there are many other possible hypotheses.

Note though that such speculation is not science, because all science does is attempt to discern what those rules are. Science cannot address the question of why reality follows rules in the first place, or why those rules don't suddenly change etc. All science can do is assume these rules are consistent, that they will not suddenly change etc, and take it from there.

Questions pertaining to why there are rules or physical laws in the first place are not scientific questions, but rather metaphysical questions. It is no more scientific to hypothesize an external mind independent world, then it is to hypothesize an Omnipotent consciousness to explain the course of our sensory experiences.
 
I found this interesting paper titled "Toward a Proper Monism":

http://www.phil.gu.se/posters/prop.html#3. False

If I understand him correctly, he proposes that materialism is a misguided form of monism that implicitly assumes Cartesian dualism; phenomenalism is the flip side of the coin. He contrasts dualism with proper monism, which eliminates the Cartesian baggage. He has some things to say about the subjective character of mind and about qualia.

I should add that he doesn't seem to make an ontological commitment to what the monistic "stuff" actually is, thank you very much.

Another interesting paper by the same fellow:

http://www.phil.gu.se/Cong/publications/assc3_filip.html

~~ Paul
 
Originally posted by Titus

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Private behavior doesapply to both conscious and non-conscious processes that are not (even in theory) observable by another--your use of "subjective" does not add to this, so why is it needed?
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Because otherwise we can't make any other distinction between conscious and non-conscious processes.
Well, you said a mouthful there.
. If you're not satisfied by dualism, you'd better come up with another theory but please without leaving anything out.
So what you're saying here is: come up with an alternative to dualism that doesn't refute dualism?
As you will know, there even is quite some evidence for Extra-Sensory Perception.
Yes, mountains of it. It is the quality of that evidence, rather than the quantity, that is subject to question.
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
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The difference between me and an epiphenomenalist is that the epiphenomenalist makes the additional assertion that consciousness has absolutely no effect on our behavior, which is clearly false.
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You've just contradicted yourself. If physical processes wholly explain our behavior then physical processes wholly explain our behavior. Logically this means that consciousness plays no part in explaining our behavior.
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Only if consciousness is not a physical process. You know damn well that this is not what I think.

You declare conscious experiences are literally the very same thing as physical processes in the brain. Why should anyone choose this option since conscious experiences and brain processes are utterly different from each other, and the proposition is immune from any refutation, even in principle? If you cannot give any justification for this wild and implausible, and questionably intelligible assertion, why on earth should any person who has any passing acquaintance with reasoning choose to believe it?? I know why, it's because people are bewitched by the materialist metaphysic. And saying that conscious experiences are literally the very same thing as neurons firing is a wild metaphysical assertion (to put it politely!)


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Of course, since consciousness is a set of physical brain processes, there is no conflict between the claim that consciousness influences our behavior, because consciousness is a physical process.
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I explained this in the post you are responding to! I'll copy and paste.

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To say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behavior, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behavior that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superfluous.
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Once again, this is not the case if your position is that consciousness is a subset of those physical processes which determine your behavior.

Is it even possible for you to present an argument that doesn't implicitly assume that consciousness is not a set of physical processes?

You've completely ignored my point so shall paste it in yet again.

To say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behavior, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behavior that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superfluous.


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And BTW, to say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behavior, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness.
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Not true. If consciousness is a set of physical process, then we most definitely need consciousness to describe all physical change in the world in terms of physical laws.
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No this is not true. We simply need all physical facts obtained from the 3rd person perspective in order to explain our behavior.
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Why are you assuming that there is anything more to consciousness than these "3rd person perspective facts"?

Well if you are denying the existence of consciousness then there is nothing more I can say. Third person facts just give third person facts.

Let me try an analogy. A pencil can be viewed from its side, or it can be viewed straight on. Even though on both occasions we are viewing one and the same object, nevertheless our visual experiences will be quite different. The same goes for consciousness. Even though consciousness and the firing of neurons are one and the same thing, they are not synonymous. You can either view consciousness from the outside (neural processes), or the inside (conscious experience).

Now in order to understand a pencil's behaviour if we choose to throw it accross a room, clearly we shall need to know how the pencil looks from every perspective, including how it looks from its side and how it looks end on (so we know its 3D shape). In contrast, to understand our behaviour, we need only refer to what we know about consciousness from the outside. Consciousness viewed from the inside is superflous to explaining our behaviour.


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The only way you can get round this is to show that these neural correlates logically necessitate consciousness.
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They don't "logically necessitate" it, they are it! Stop trying to cast me as some sort of epiphenomenalist.

No, epiphenomenism only naturally necessitates consciousness. To say that consciousness is one and the very same thing as physical processes is to say it is logically necessitated.


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So show it. I'd also be interested to understand why a boulder rolling down a hill doesn't logically necessitate consciousness, but our behavior does.
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Go ask somebody who actually believes in epiphenomenalism. I don't.

Hmmmm, interesting that you're unable to answer this question.
 
Ian said:
No, epiphenomenism only naturally necessitates consciousness. To say that consciousness is one and the very same thing as physical processes is to say it is logically necessitated.
Stimpy will correct me if I'm wrong, but when he says "consciousness is a brain process" I don't think he means they are the same thing. I think he means that consciousness is a type of brain process. If they were one and the same thing, we wouldn't need both words.

Do you really think that "logically necessitates" means the same thing as "is the same as"?

~~ Paul
 
The Emperor's New Clothes

So what you're saying here is: come up with an alternative to dualism that doesn't refute dualism?
No, I'm rather saying that despite all the centuries of attacks at dualism, the (materialist) opponents haven't solved even a tiny bit of the mind-body problem. The new strategy seems to boil down to bluntly denying that there is a real problem. It might work for the faithful Emperor's court, but outside that small circle we just see a ridiculously naked tyrant with no clothes on.

Titus
 
Titus, I'm not sure you've been paying attention to physiology and neuropsychology, but anyway. Also, I'm not really sure what the problem is. I don't deny there is one, but what is it, exactly? And if dualism is it, how do the two "substances" interact?

~~ Paul
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Ian said:
Stimpy will correct me if I'm wrong, but when he says "consciousness is a brain process" I don't think he means they are the same thing.

I think he means that consciousness is a type of brain process. If they were one and the same thing, we wouldn't need both words.



I'm sure he would say there are brain processes which are not conscious processes, sure. But nevertheless all conscious processes are one and the very same thing as brain processes.

Do you really think that "logically necessitates" means the same thing as "is the same as"?

No it doesn't. And I never claimed it did.
 
69dodge,

Why are you assuming that there is anything more to consciousness than these "3rd person perspective facts"?
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That's what people mean by "consciousness," no?

Not that I know of. It certainly isn't what I mean by consciousness. I think that the whole "first person facts vs third person facts" idea is just a rephrasing of the "primary vs secondary qualities" nonsense. There are no first-person facts about the world. There are facts about the world, which are all objective. There are our first-person experiences, which are physical processes taking place in the world, and about which there are objective facts, but which are not "facts about the world" themselves. And finally, there are the facts which we either intuitively or logically infer from those experiences.

You continually say that consciousness is a set of brain processes (or might be, at least). At the risk of exposing myself to all sorts of ridicule, I have to ask, what is your definition of "is"?

In this context, equivalence. I am saying that the word "consciousness" is a label which refers to a set of brain processes.

I wonder if this argument is less about the nature of consciousness and more about the nature of scientific explanation. Perhaps you don't expect as much as Ian does from a scientific explanation of consciousness.

I expect nothing more than what it is possible for a scientific explanation to provide, namely an accurate and comprehensive description, in terms of verifiable physical facts.

Suppose that whenever a certain process occurs in my brain (and only then), I feel hungry. You might discover this correspondence by looking at my brain at various times and asking me whether I feel hungry then. Do you think you could, in principle, discover this in any other way, say by doing some horrendously complicated quantum mechanical calculation, without ever looking at anyone's brain and asking them how they felt at the time?

No. In principle I think that should be possible, but I very much doubt that such a computation could ever be accomplished.

If not, would you still say that you had a complete explanation of hunger "because after all, I understand brain processes, and that brain process is hunger"?

I don't claim to have a complete explanation for anything. We are a very long way from having a complete scientific explanation of consciousness. We may never have one. But that is a far cry from arbitrarily declaring that no explanation is even possible.

Ian might ask, "Well, perhaps it is, using your funny definition of 'is', but why is it? Why should anyone feel hungry, simply because that particular brain process occurs?"

Because your feelings are brain processes, that's why. If you want to know why things are the way they are, just make up an answer, because science is not going to give you one. If you want to know how things are, science can tell you that. Right now, science very strongly indicates that consciousness is a set of brain processes.

I'm not sure this type of question is answerable. Science tries to discover how the world is, not why it is that way, because it's not clear that "why it is that way" really means anything to begin with. But saying the question is unanswerable isn't the same as answering it.

I agree. But keep in mind that Ian is not asking us to explain why consciousness is a brain process. He is simply declaring that it absolutely cannot possibly be one.


Ian,

Only if consciousness is not a physical process. You know damn well that this is not what I think.
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You declare conscious experiences are literally the very same thing as physical processes in the brain. Why should anyone choose this option since conscious experiences and brain processes are utterly different from each other, and the proposition is immune from any refutation, even in principle?

1) I do not require anybody to choose that option. That is my position. If you think my position is wrong, whoopie for you. Nobody ever said you have to agree with me. If you think there is a flaw in my position, you will need more than circular arguments to convince me.

2) Brain processes and conscious experiences are not utterly different from each other. In fact, I can find no differences at all. What is different is your intuitive interpretation of conscious experiences, and brain processes. Your intuition is wrong. Get over it.

If you cannot give any justification for this wild and implausible, and questionably intelligible assertion, why on earth should any person who has any passing acquaintance with reasoning choose to believe it??

Then don't. You have refused to give any consideration to the scientific evidence supporting my position. Given your profound ignorance of said evidence, it is only natural that you should reject such a counter-intuitive hypothesis. But the fact remains that your ignorance of the evidence does not make the evidence not exist. You are wrong, whether you choose to learn enough about the subject to be convinced of the fact or not.

I know why, it's because people are bewitched by the materialist metaphysic. And saying that conscious experiences are literally the very same thing as neurons firing is a wild metaphysical assertion (to put it politely!)

Of course. It could not possibly be that the people who disagree with you know something that you do not. In fact, this possibility is so implausible that there is no reason for you to ever look at any of the evidence that they present to justify their claims. After all, that evidence violates your intuitive beliefs, so it must be wrong too. And of course, the people who think it is valid evidence are just either too stupid to realize how obviously wrong it is, or are brainwashed.

To say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behavior, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behavior that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superfluous.
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Once again, this is not the case if your position is that consciousness is a subset of those physical processes which determine your behavior.

Is it even possible for you to present an argument that doesn't implicitly assume that consciousness is not a set of physical processes?
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You've completely ignored my point so shall paste it in yet again.

To say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behavior, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behavior that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superfluous.

I did not ignore your point at all. I directly addressed it. The fact that you cannot see why my response soundly refutes your argument, just illustrates your own inability to even contemplate the possibility that consciousness might just be brain processes.

Consider the following argument, which could easily have been presented 100 years ago:

We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for nuclear fusion. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of the sun, that nuclear fusion is required at all. We must judge it to be superfluous.

Doesn't hold any water, does it? Consciousness is a specific set of physical processes. The fact that we can describe some parts of the world completely in terms of physical laws, without making any reference to those processes, does not in any way imply that those processes are superfluous to a description of human behavior. Your argument is completely nonsensical, because it assumes that consciousness is not a set of physical processes.

Why are you assuming that there is anything more to consciousness than these "3rd person perspective facts"?
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Well if you are denying the existence of consciousness then there is nothing more I can say. Third person facts just give third person facts.

Where did I deny the existence of consciousness?

Let me try an analogy. A pencil can be viewed from its side, or it can be viewed straight on. Even though on both occasions we are viewing one and the same object, nevertheless our visual experiences will be quite different. The same goes for consciousness. Even though consciousness and the firing of neurons are one and the same thing, they are not synonymous. You can either view consciousness from the outside (neural processes), or the inside (conscious experience).

Nonsense. The conscious experience is not a view of consciousness, it is the process of being conscious. There is no first-person perspective of consciousness. The so-called "first-person" facts about consciousness that you claim we all have, are nothing more than our intuitive interpretations of the process of being conscious. That process is a physical process. All facts about consciousness are objective, third-person facts. Your own intuitive interpretation of consciousness is just that, an interpretation.

The above is nothing more than a flawed semantic justification for inserting dualism into a system where none is required.

Now in order to understand a pencil's behaviour if we choose to throw it accross a room, clearly we shall need to know how the pencil looks from every perspective, including how it looks from its side and how it looks end on (so we know its 3D shape). In contrast, to understand our behaviour, we need only refer to what we know about consciousness from the outside. Consciousness viewed from the inside is superflous to explaining our behaviour.

I agree. But that is completely different from saying that consciousness is superfluous to explaining our behavior. Your subjective interpretation of your experiences, and the experiences themselves, are two different things.

They don't "logically necessitate" it, they are it! Stop trying to cast me as some sort of epiphenomenalist.
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No, epiphenomenism only naturally necessitates consciousness. To say that consciousness is one and the very same thing as physical processes is to say it is logically necessitated.

Logically necessitated by what? Does it make any sense to say that something is logically necessitated by itself? Because that is exactly what you are saying when you claim that consciousness is logically necessitated by brain processes.

So show it. I'd also be interested to understand why a boulder rolling down a hill doesn't logically necessitate consciousness, but our behavior does.
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Go ask somebody who actually believes in epiphenomenalism. I don't.
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Hmmmm, interesting that you're unable to answer this question.

I'll answer your question, right after you tell me why elephants have wings. :rolleyes:


Dr. Stupid
 
Why should anyone be in favour of materialism?

Paul said:

Titus, I'm not sure you've been paying attention to physiology and neuropsychology, but anyway.
I have, and more than once. But the point is that qualia can't be found there.

Also, I'm not really sure what the problem is. I don't deny there is one, but what is it, exactly?
The problem is that if we define the brain as physical and anything physical as non-qualitative, i.e. completely quantifiable and non-subjective, conscious experiences can't be regarded as part of the brain. So either the definition of the physical world is wrong, or conscious experiences aren't physical. The problem cannot be 'conjured away' by claiming that there are no conscious experiences or that the definition of the physical world does in fact accord well with the characteristics of consciousness. I've seen the papers linked by you, but I can't say I'm impressed.

And if dualism is it, how do the two "substances" interact?
By interactionist laws of nature, which should be considered fundamental. That's the only way, as anything else would boil down to a non-dualistic reduction (of mind to matter, or of matter to mind, or of both to a neutral substance) rather than to dualism.

What I fail to understand is what could be so attractive about materialism that anyone should prefer this theory which cannot account for the existence of the conscious mind over a dualistic theory which even existentially seems a lot more appealing.

Titus
 
Ian said:
I'm sure he would say there are brain processes which are not conscious processes, sure. But nevertheless all conscious processes are one and the very same thing as brain processes.
I can only assume here that "one and the very same thing as" does not mean the same thing as "same." :confused:

To say that consciousness is one and the very same thing as physical processes is to say it is logically necessitated.
Can you explain this, since I obviously don't understand it?

~~ Paul
 
Titus said:
The problem is that if we define the brain as physical and anything physical as non-qualitative, i.e. completely quantifiable and non-subjective, conscious experiences can't be regarded as part of the brain. So either the definition of the physical world is wrong, or conscious experiences aren't physical. The problem cannot be 'conjured away' by claiming that there are no conscious experiences or that the definition of the physical world does in fact accord well with the characteristics of consciousness. I've seen the papers linked by you, but I can't say I'm impressed.
I guess I'd have to differ with the official definition of the physical world, then. I don't see why it excludes subjective experiences.

By interactionist laws of nature, which should be considered fundamental. That's the only way, as anything else would boil down to a non-dualistic reduction (of mind to matter, or of matter to mind, or of both to a neutral substance) rather than to dualism.
Ouch. These metaphysics that require miracles always bother me.

What I fail to understand is what could be so attractive about materialism that anyone should prefer this theory which cannot account for the existence of the conscious mind over a dualistic theory which even existentially seems a lot more appealing.
Well, this question might be more important to someone who does not think that ontology is meaningless. However, I find two things unappetizing: the appeal to miracle to connect the two substances, and the premature insistence that we just can't grok consciousness without resorting to making it something special. Perhaps I'm more patient than some.

~~ Paul
 
Originally posted by Titus

No, I'm rather saying that despite all the centuries of attacks at dualism, the (materialist) opponents haven't solved even a tiny bit of the mind-body problem.
I think most of the substantive progress has been made during the last few decades. So to be fair, you would need to rephrase:
Despite several decades of effort, the (materialist) opponents haven't solved even a tiny bit of the mind-body problem. Which hardly seems fair, and isn't accurate anyway. We know more about how the brain works than you seem to realize, certainly 'a tiny bit' at least. Appeals to ignorance are premature.

The emperor's new clothes metaphor works so well when pointed in the other direction that I can't help wondering if you invoked it as a pre-emptive strategy. It is, after all, the dualist stance that makes the claim that something extra exists.

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And if dualism is it, how do the two "substances" interact?
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By interactionist laws of nature, which should be considered fundamental.
If any such laws could be described, they would certainly be fundamental. Can you be more specific?
 
Titus,

Also, I'm not really sure what the problem is. I don't deny there is one, but what is it, exactly?
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The problem is that if we define the brain as physical and anything physical as non-qualitative, i.e. completely quantifiable and non-subjective, conscious experiences can't be regarded as part of the brain.

Well, that's the problem right there. Why o Earth would we define physical to mean "non-qualitative", or "non-subjective"? Doing so would be to presuppose that subjective experiences, and our qualitative interpretations of them, are not physical processes.

I think you'll find that materialists don't define physical that way at all. Why do you?

So either the definition of the physical world is wrong, or conscious experiences aren't physical.

Definitions cannot be said to be right or wrong. The point is that the definition you gave is not the one materialists use.

The problem cannot be 'conjured away' by claiming that there are no conscious experiences or that the definition of the physical world does in fact accord well with the characteristics of consciousness.

The problem only exists if you define "physical" in a way that arbitrarily omits consciousness. Materialists do not. We are not "conjuring away" the problem. Dualists "conjured it up" in the first place, by applying definitions which are inherently dualistic to the claims of materialists.

And if dualism is it, how do the two "substances" interact?
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By interactions laws of nature, which should be considered fundamental. That's the only way, as anything else would boil down to a non-dualistic reduction (of mind to matter, or of matter to mind, or of both to a neutral substance) rather than to dualism.

In what way can you claim that the two substances are distinct then? Indeed, in what sense can they meaningfully be said to be distinct at all? After all, all we know about them are what we can infer from our observations via the scientific method. We could arbitrarily divide up the set of all that exists into any number of "substances". What makes you think such a distinction is in any way representive of reality?

If the brain and the mind interact with each other, according to some natural laws, and those laws can be determined by applying the scientific method to our observations, then why should we declare that the mind is composed of some sort of different substance than the brain? What does such a distinction add to our understanding? How is speculation about metaphysical substances even meaningful at all?

What I fail to understand is what could be so attractive about materialism that anyone should prefer this theory which cannot account for the existence of the conscious mind over a dualistic theory which even existentially seems a lot more appealing.

Two things.

1) Materialism can account for the conscious mind.

2) Dualism adds nothing to materialism but meaningless metaphysical baggage.

Of course, if you are referring to classical metaphysical materialism, which holds that everything is composed of one type of metaphysical substance, then it brings equally meaningless metapysical baggage, as does idealism. But that isn't what anybody here is advocating. Modern materialism rejects the notion of metaphysical substances as being devoid of any real meaning. We define physical to refer to that which can be scientifically observed and understood. If consciousness fits that description, then it is physical, regardless of whether on some unverifiable metaphysical level, it happens to be composed of some distinct substance (whatever that means).

If it doesn't fit that description, then modern materialism is false. Of course, changing that description to include arbitrary qualifiers like "non-subjective" has absolutely no relevance to the validity of modern materialism.


Dr. Stupid
 
Questions for Dr. Stupid

Stimpy said:

We define physical to refer to that which can be scientifically observed and understood.
Would you define subjective experiences which can only be observed as such by the experient himself as physical? If not, you're implicitly using the same age-old materialistic definition of the physical world. It doesn't matter whether you deny the existence of such intrinsically subjective experiences or not.

Another, related question: if there would be strong naturalistic evidence of a surviving experient after his body died, would you regard this surviving experient as physical?

Would you agree that the brain cannot be subjective in any quantitative, chemical or biological sense? And that there is a huge gap between biology and consciousness? If not, even if you continue to deny it, you're a materialist in the "old-fashioned"', "metaphysical" sense of the word.

Titus
 
Laws of nature

Dymanic,

It is, after all, the dualist stance that makes the claim that something extra exists.
I was talking about the claim of materialists that they would understand that the mind-body problem is supposedly not a problem at all.

If any such laws could be described, they would certainly be fundamental. Can you be more specific?
Well, we would have to postulate laws of the kind: if a certain physical process takes place this evokes a certain non-physical mental process, and vice versa. Wiesner and Thouless (or Thouless and Wiesner :wink:) have written about this topic, linking it to psychokinesis (the influence of mind upon matter) and ESP. A third kind of law would have to explain somatogenic influences of the brain on non-perceptual mental processes such as are seen in sleep, many Altered States of Consciousness, brain disease or the effects of neurobiological maturation on psychological development.

Titus
 
Titus,

We define physical to refer to that which can be scientifically observed and understood.
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Would you define subjective experiences which can only be observed as such by the experient himself as physical? If not, you're implicitly using the same age-old materialistic definition of the physical world. It doesn't matter whether you deny the existence of such intrinsically subjective experiences or not.

They are not observed by the experient, they are experienced by him. That person can observe that he is experiencing something, but so can other people. So yes, I would say that subjective experiences are physical processes occurring in the person's brain.

Another, related question: if there would be strong naturalistic evidence of a surviving experient after his body died, would you regard this surviving experient as physical?

Of course.

Would you agree that the brain cannot be subjective in any quantitative, chemical or biological sense?

I don't know what that means. The word subjective refers to experiences, and intuitive interpretations of those experiences. Experiences are physical processes. Your brain is not a physical process. Your brain is not subjective. Those brain processes which constitute your experiences are subjective. They also objectively exist.

And that there is a huge gap between biology and consciousness? If not, even if you continue to deny it, you're a materialist in the "old-fashioned"', "metaphysical" sense of the word.

I don't know what you mean by a gap between biology and consciousness. Consciousness is a biological process. Unless you make the a-priori assumption that consciousness is non-physical, there is absolutely nothing metaphysical about that claim.


Dr. Stupid
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
quote:
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Only if consciousness is not a physical process. You know damn well that this is not what I think.
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You declare conscious experiences are literally the very same thing as physical processes in the brain. Why should anyone choose this option since conscious experiences and brain processes are utterly different from each other, and the proposition is immune from any refutation, even in principle?
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1) I do not require anybody to choose that option. That is my position. If you think my position is wrong, whoopie for you. Nobody ever said you have to agree with me. If you think there is a flaw in my position, you will need more than circular arguments to convince me.

I have given many many arguments demonstrating the complete stupidity of your position. You refuse to listen and take note of my arguments.

2) Brain processes and conscious experiences are not utterly different from each other.

Of course they are! It is not possible to deny this.

In fact, I can find no differences at all. What is different is your intuitive interpretation of conscious experiences, and brain processes. Your intuition is wrong. Get over it.

One does not interpret our immediate conscious awareness, we only interpret the contents of consciousness.


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If you cannot give any justification for this wild and implausible, and questionably intelligible assertion, why on earth should any person who has any passing acquaintance with reasoning choose to believe it??
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Then don't. You have refused to give any consideration to the scientific evidence supporting my position.

There is no scientific evidence retard. You misunderstand the nature of science. Your stupidity really does know of no limits does it? You truly chose an appropriate name for yourself.

Given your profound ignorance of said evidence, it is only natural that you should reject such a counter-intuitive hypothesis.

Evidence for metaphysical positions is extremely obscure.

But the fact remains that your ignorance of the evidence does not make the evidence not exist. You are wrong, whether you choose to learn enough about the subject to be convinced of the fact or not.

They cannot be any evidence. I repeat, you misunderstand the nature of science.


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I know why, it's because people are bewitched by the materialist metaphysic. And saying that conscious experiences are literally the very same thing as neurons firing is a wild metaphysical assertion (to put it politely!)
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Of course. It could not possibly be that the people who disagree with you know something that you do not.

It's not so much a question of evidence, it's a question of logic.

In fact, this possibility is so implausible that there is no reason for you to ever look at any of the evidence that they present to justify their claims. After all, that evidence violates your intuitive beliefs, so it must be wrong too.

All so called "evidence" is accommodated equally well by the transmission hypothesis.

And of course, the people who think it is valid evidence are just either too stupid to realize how obviously wrong it is, or are brainwashed.

Yes that's right.


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To say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behavior, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behavior that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superfluous.
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Once again, this is not the case if your position is that consciousness is a subset of those physical processes which determine your behavior.

Is it even possible for you to present an argument that doesn't implicitly assume that consciousness is not a set of physical processes?
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You've completely ignored my point so shall paste it in yet again.

To say that the physical laws are just descriptions of conscious decisions leading to behavior, misses the point. We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for consciousness. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of our own behavior that consciousness is required at all. We must judge it to be superfluous.
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I did not ignore your point at all. I directly addressed it.

No you didn't. You completely ignored it and continue to do so.

The fact that you cannot see why my response soundly refutes your argument, just illustrates your own inability to even contemplate the possibility that consciousness might just be brain processes.

You just haven't got a clue what you're talking about. You truly are stupefyingly thick.

Consider the following argument, which could easily have been presented 100 years ago:

We describe all other physical change in the world completely in terms of physical laws playing out, without any need for nuclear fusion. Therefore we cannot say that in the case of the sun, that nuclear fusion is required at all. We must judge it to be superfluous.

Incorrect analogy. You cannot appeal to a similar causal role for consciousness as you claim it is one and the same thing as physical processes. It is the physical processes (consciousness viewed from without) which completely explains our behaviour.

BTW, my argument does not assume that consciousness is not a physical process. I'm saying that if it is, then it is superflous. Brain processes as viewed from within (conscious experience) is not need to explain behaviour within the context of your metaphysic.

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Why are you assuming that there is anything more to consciousness than these "3rd person perspective facts"?
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Well if you are denying the existence of consciousness then there is nothing more I can say. Third person facts just give third person facts.
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Where did I deny the existence of consciousness?

Third person facts are not synonymous with consciousness even if identical. So acquaintance with third person facts would not in itself have the meaning that that person is conscious. Like when we view a pencil side on, the viewing of the pencil from that particular perspective could not in and of itself lead to the understanding that the appearance of a pencil would look like a very small circle when viewed end on.


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Let me try an analogy. A pencil can be viewed from its side, or it can be viewed straight on. Even though on both occasions we are viewing one and the same object, nevertheless our visual experiences will be quite different. The same goes for consciousness. Even though consciousness and the firing of neurons are one and the same thing, they are not synonymous. You can either view consciousness from the outside (neural processes), or the inside (conscious experience).
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Nonsense.

What?? :eek:

The conscious experience is not a view of consciousness, it is the process of being conscious.

The word "view" wasn't meant literally. I simply mean that there is consciousness as in phenomenologically experienced, and as third person physical facts (firing of neurons). Clearly they are not synonymous.

There is no first-person perspective of consciousness.

Huh??? So now you're advocating eliminitavist materialism!! :eek:

You're a hopeless case. As soon as I demonstrate that a particular position of yours is unintelligible, you shift to another!

There's nothing I can say to someone who doesn't believe that they themselves are conscious.

Sorry but there's no point in further discussing this.

You're just incorrigibly hopelessly stupid.
 

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