A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Dancing David]

Re: Victory

Ian has said a lot I wanted to say, so that I won't repeat his arguments now.

Just a last attempt to clarify why some of us don't buy the materialist mythology.

Several members seem to think that it is rational to hold that a brain can be conscious. I've already said more than once, that the current definitions of the physical world make that view irrational.
You don't seem to realize how important such definitions are. For example, Dr. Stupid repeats his claim that his reductionism is epistemological, rather than ontological. However, if that really were so, why should he say anything about the REAL experient, namely that it would be the brain? Since when isn't the statement that the experient equals the brain an ontological statement, i.e. a statement about reality as it is, rather than an epistemological statement, i.e. a statement about our knowledge of reality?
On the other hand, some of you seriously believe that the definition of physical reality by dualists is tautological. I'm really baffled by this. Maybe you haven't read enough about the origins of materialism?
Finally, some of you claim that the brain as a physical system is conscious, conveniently leaving out the main characteristics of what being conscious means. Don't you see what you're doing?

This may be a skeptical forum, but don't you think you're being just a bit too easy on yourself? If "winning" a debate implies misrepresenting the opponent's position, what could be the intellectual satisfaction? If skepticism were intrinsically linked to rationalism (in the original, neutral sense) our ontological (I know, it's an epistemological one in Stimpy's view ) discussion would doubtlessly have taken another course.

Titus

Okay Titus I ask you again, show consiousness that is not linked to an organic brain, where are the memories outside the brain, where is your demosntrable proof?

You are arguing from the closed system of the philosopher , which is a closed self referencing system, please show where anything that is remotely consious exists outside of an organic brain.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Humbly addressing the ruthless conqueror

I do want to repeat though that there is NO evidence whatsoever that the brain would be a conscious experient.

Titus

So where is there any evidence of consiousness that is not related to an organic brain?

Still waiting.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Subjectivity encompassing all subjective experiences

Let it shine!



Mercutio, assuming you're sincere, the answer isn't half as mysterious as you seem to think.

First of all, as I have said before on this thread, the term consciousness has several quite different meanings, but in the context of qualia, we're obviously talking about subjective awareness.

Now, consciousness in this sense, of subjective awareness, is an abstract concept which encompasses all types of subjective experiences, and every concrete subjective experience. For example, consciousness encompasses your conscious thinking, feeling, remembering and doing.

All of these conscious mental processes first of all share the property that they are undergone by a subject and that they are qualitative. Neither of these characteristics can be left out as we are talking about conscious processes, not about unconscious ones. It is these characteristics which make it meaningful to conceptualize this abstract concept of consciousness (in the sense of subjective awareness). Without these characteristics there would be no relevant difference between subjective experiences and unconscious psychological experiences.


Titus

Duh, Titus, unconsious experience is part of consiousness, duh?

Uh, consious experience is not solelt a subjective experience, if I objectively severe you optical nerve, you will not percieve color though your eyes.

That is the objective world, we need the organic machine to percieve.

 

[Dancing David]

Titus, I am very disappointed, you have resorted to the same mental word play and avoided the issues presented. Mecrtio is always sincere are you?

There is no experience without the organic framework, there is no consiousness outside of the perceptual organic framework.

You have made the claim that memories are outside the brain and you have hinted that there is consiousness outside the brain, any proof? Or just speculation. i am reall trying to understand the train of thought but the philosophers don't know how to express it concretely enough.

Second point we have self defining systems all the time, mathematics and philosphy are very good exam-les of closed self referencing systems, you can't rule out materialism because you just don't like. The philosphical system is dependant even more than materialism on using words in definitions to define themselves.

If you don't think that you need a body to exist. I suggest that you talk to Yahzi.

 

[Titus Rivas]

error

Who experiences these? I think you mean unconscious psychological processes.

You're right, Slimshady. I'll fix it right now.

Thanks,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Analysis

Okay Titus I ask you again, show consiousness that is not linked to an organic brain, where are the memories outside the brain, where is your demosntrable proof?

The proof is foremost an analytical one. So if you don't agree with my analysis show me wrong there. If you can't, what's your point?

Uh, consious experience is not solelt a subjective experience, if I objectively severe you optical nerve, you will not percieve color though your eyes.

That's nothing to do with the nature of consciousness itself, and you seem to fail to see what this subject is about.

Titus

 

[Dancing David]

Titus,
Please present the analytical framework that shows there is memory or consiousness outside of the oraganic framework, speculation is fine! As are plausability discussion.
(I must have missed your analysis, I have no desire to prove you wrong, just to understand. I am not out to count trump here, just to promote discussion)

Sorry if you can't answer the objectivity dilema, 'qualia' have meaning in the context of the organic framework. To say that they are merely subjective, seem to me to be a false statement.

You have the perceptaul 'qualia' of red if you eye interacts with light from a 'red' object but if you sever the optic nerve then that qualia ceases.

Just so can anologies be drawn to consiousness, I used to work with people who would drink so much water they became water toxic. number one sign is that they are passing out, or 'experiencing low levels of consiousness'.

My point is that for every form of consiousness that you can name there is probably a brain disorder that messes with that form of being consious, or there is some poor trama patients who has had a brain injury that effect that form of consiousness. So while philospohicaly you can state that there is a 'totaly subjective experience', in paychological terms it can be reduced to an objective event in the brain.

I am very open to discussion, but I haven't seen any proof or conjectures yet. If it is a purely semantic argument that is find, jsut be reminded that this is the science forum.
My purpose is not to flame , but to undetsand and find common language.

respectfuly
David G.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Seriously answering Dancing David

Hi Dancing David,

So while philospohicaly you can state that there is a 'totaly subjective experience', in psychological terms it can be reduced to an objective event in the brain.

You're confusing possible external causes of specific forms of consciousness with the existence of those specific forms of consciousness. Even if you were able to reduce (part of) the causes of specific forms of consciousness to processes in the brain, you still would not have reduced consciousness itself to processes in the brain. Causal physical influences on consciousness are compatible with emergent dualism, epiphenomenalism and interactionist dualism. Whereas ontological reduction of consciousness is exclusively compatible with materialism. It is therefore clear that if you have established the reality of causal neural influences on consciousness, you haven't at all established the identity of consciousness with certain neurological processes.

Please present the analytical framework that shows there is memory or consiousness outside of the oraganic framework, speculation is fine!

Well, the argument depends on the acceptance of the facts that qualia and subjective can't by definition be reduced to quantitative patterns, and that the brain as a physical system can by definition only contain quantitative, non-subjective patterns. If we accept these facts as true, it becomes clear that the brain can't contain exhaustive conceptual representations of the qualia. Such conceptual representations should refer to the non-quantitative and subjective aspects of consciousness. In a purely quantitative representational system there is no way to exhaustively, adequately represent these non-quantitative aspects of consciousness. Thus, the conceptual representation of qualia cannot reside in the brain as a physical system, and must belong to the same realm as consciousness. In other words: if we accept my premisses stated above, we must conclude that there is a non-physical memory which contains representations of our subjective experiences.

Sorry if you can't answer the objectivity dilema, 'qualia' have meaning in the context of the organic framework. To say that they are merely subjective, seem to me to be a false statement.

Again, you're mixing up physiological factors with the qualia themselves, I'm afraid. In qualia as such there is no optic nerve or any other physiological factor. Please note that we are talking about qualia as such, not about factors that give rise to qualia, or at least not as one and the same issue.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Subjectivity encompassing all subjective experiences

Let it shine!



Mercutio, assuming you're sincere, the answer isn't half as mysterious as you seem to think.

I am, of course, sincere.

Now, consciousness in this sense, of subjective awareness, is an abstract concept which encompasses all types of subjective experiences, and every concrete subjective experience. For example, consciousness encompasses your conscious thinking, feeling, remembering and doing.

So "consciousness" is a category of behaviors. You have used the term "concrete subjective experience"--I have translated that to "private behavior" (like thinking, feeling, remembering). I don't think we can use the term "subjective" here yet, as it has baggage (as seen in this thread). You give these behaviors as examples, too--are there any members of this category which you consider qualitatively different from these?

All of these conscious mental processes first of all share the property that they are undergone by a subject and that they are qualitative. Neither of these characteristics can be left out as we are talking about conscious processes, not about unconscious ones. It is these characteristics which make it meaningful to conceptualize this abstract concept of consciousness (in the sense of subjective awareness). Without these characteristics there would be no relevant difference between subjective experiences and unconscious psychological processes.

They are undergone by a subject. No disagreement there, unless you think the subject is somehow independent of my body. They are qualitative. That is to say that they have qualities that can be described? Ok. (oh, could we use "non-conscious" instead of "unconscious"? The latter has a lot of psychodynamic baggage that is not worth sorting through.)

Thus far, everything you say is in complete agreement with my notion that "consciousness" is nothing more than a categorical label for a list of public and private behaviors. It is not a causal entity, and adds nothing but a layer of nomenclature to the discussion. If I engage in these behaviors (and I assure you sincerely that I do) as a M-zombie (or a p-zombie, for that matter), there is nothing more to consciousness than that. (?)

You were right, it is not mysterious at all. The same things I do, but don't need to label as "consciousness", you do, but label as consciousness. Unless I am still missing something.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Seriously answering Dancing David

Hi Dancing David,

You're confusing possible external causes of specific forms of consciousness with the existence of those specific forms of consciousness. Even if you were able to reduce (part of) the causes of specific forms of consciousness to processes in the brain, you still would not have reduced consciousness itself to processes in the brain. -snip-

that still does not demosrate that there are any influences outside of the brain that effect consious-ness. So I would say that this is a plausabilty claim.
It is plausable that there are consiuos events outside of the brain, none are demostrated so far.

Well, the argument depends on the acceptance of the facts that qualia and subjective cannot be reduced to quantitative patterns, and that the brain as a physical system can only contain quantitative, non-subjective patterns.

And I would say that these are assumptions that could be proved or taken as axiomatic. I would argue that these are just assertion without any form of substantiation. Philosophical points yes, scientific demostration no.

If we accept these facts as true, it becomes clear that the brain can't contain exhaustive conceptual representations of the qualia.

I would state that the brain has a set of learned conditions that equate to the concept of qualia. It does not need an exhaustive compendium, even if it did, the analog bit representation of the brain is large enough to contain reams of information.

Such conceptual representations should refer to the non-quantitative and subjective aspects of consciousness. In a purely quantitative representational system there is no way to exhaustively, adequately represent these non-quantitative aspects of consciousness. Thus, the conceptual representation of qualia cannot reside in the brain as a physical system, and must belong to the same realm as consciousness. In other words: if we accept my premisses stated above, we must conclude that there is a non-physical memory which contains representations of our subjective experiences.

thats a mighty big assertion that the brain can not contain qualia, where else do they come from?


Again, you're mixing up physiological factors with the qualia themselves, I'm afraid. In qualia as such there is no optic nerve or any other physiological factor. Please note that we are talking about qualia as such, not about factors that give rise to qualia, or at least not as one and the same issue.

But thats the whole point, there may be qualia as a free floating semantic concept, but actual qualia are depndant on the physiology of the brain.

Best wishes,

Titus

Thank You Titus, you are right that we won't agree. But I think that we can discuss things if not change POV.

My feeling then it that you are saying:
1. There might be consiousness outside the brain, because it is a possibilty.
2. The brain could not contain qualia and therefore they exist somewhere else.
3. The brain is associated with consiousness but that consiousness is not limited to the brain.

But this being the science forum, I would ask, how can any of these assertions be tested for? I am willing to believe that they may in fact be true. But what experiments could be done to demostrate.

On the qualia issue: that seems to be based on the definition, is there room for scientific exploration of the way that the brain does represent qualia, or is that meaningless. I respectfuly submit that the brain is a fuzzy logic, analog computer with reverberation mess.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
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Yes, the only escape for the materialist is to logically demonstrate that p-zombies are logically impossible!

By logically impossible I mean that there is an inherent incoherency in the notion of a p-zombie, for eg like an object which at the same time is simultaneously both a cube and a sphere. That is to say that it must be shown that p-zombies could not obtain in any logically possible Universe.

But it is difficult to see how the materialist could do this. After all, unlike an object which is simultaneously both a cube and a sphere, I can certainly conceive of p-zombies. That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible. Certainly the onus is on the materialist to logically demonstrate that they are not.
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Stimp
Well, if the mind-brain hypothesis is true, then p-zombies are logically impossible. This is because if the mind-brain hypothesis is true, then consciousness can (at least in principle) be logically derived from the physical facts. The existence of a p-zombie would therefore be a logical contradiction.

I have no idea what this "mind-brain" hypothesis is, but if it implies p-zombies are logically impossible, then clearly you need to give some reason to suppose why this ""mind-brain" hypothesis" should be supposed to be correct.

I repeat what I said before. You must demonstrate that p-zombies are logically impossible. Are you going to do this or not? If not then it simply is not rational to adhere to the materialist metaphysic.

Of course, the only way I could formally prove that, would be to actually derive consciousness from the physical facts. Unfortunately, we do not yet know all of the physical facts, and even if we did, the complexity is such that a derivation of that type is probably not tractable.

In that case I would ask you to hypothesise some physical facts. Imagine some hypothetical physical facts which would necessitate that p-zombies are logically impossible. If you cannot do this, then you cannot rationally subscribe to materialism.

I don't see why this should be seen as a problem, though. After all, we cannot logically derive the chemical properties of complex molecules from Quantum Mechanics either. We just assume that chemistry is reducible to QM because that is the most parsimonious explanation we have for our observations.

I think these properties would be naturally necessitated rather than logically necessitated.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Chalmers disproof of materialism

“… The failure of logical supervenience directly implies that materialism is false: there are features of the world over and above the physical features. The basic argument for this goes as follows:

1) In our world there are conscious experiences.
2) There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive facts about consciousness in our world do not hold.
3) Therefore, facts about consciousness are further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts.
4) So materialism is false.”

http://www.geocities.com/qualophile/Mistrabajos/filosofiamente/zombies.html

This argument at least appears to be sound on the surface. Could anyone suggest what could possibly be wrong with it?

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Chalmers disproof of materialism

This argument at least appears to be sound on the surface. Could anyone suggest what could possibly be wrong with it?

Well...I can't agree with #1, as I have tried to explore with Titus Rivas. I think you (or the author you quote) need to make the case for "conscious experiences" as more than just a category of private behaviors which are, individually, perfectly well accomplished without resorting to invoking "consciousness" as some causal entity. If we are to deduce consciousness from our behaviors, we cannot then attribute the same behaviors to the workings of consciousness without falling into circularity.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

This argument at least appears to be sound on the surface. Could anyone suggest what could possibly be wrong with it?

I realise you're a little late coming into the P-Zombie issue Ian, but "what could possibly be wrong with it" is that it all rides on "conceivability", which is far from the open and shut case you think it is.

You referenced the article by Moody the other day. Dennet offers a short reply which raises the issue of whether P-Zombies as expressed by Moody are actually conceivable :The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies

If, ex hypothesi, zombies are behaviorally indistinguishable from us normal folk, then they are really behaviorally indistinguishable! They say just what we say, they understand what they say (or, not to beg any questions, they understandz what they say), they believez what we believe, right down to having beliefsz that perfectly mirror all our beliefs about inverted spectra, "qualia," and every other possible topic of human reflection and conversation.

I find this a reasonable argument - if P-Zombie Me is "just like me behaviourally", then that means what it says! P-Zombie Me responds to InterestingIan's posts exactly as I would. If P-Zombie Me would stop and think "I have no idea what Ian is referring to here? What does he mean he "experiences" red?" then he's *not* behaviourally the same as me.

A similar point is being made here :
Sniffing the Camembert: on the conceivability of Zombies

Chalmers’ case for the ‘logical possibility’ (or conceivability) of zombies is intended to dramatize and reinforce the basic intuition that informs his whole argument, namely that conscious states, or qualia, are entirely resistant to any sort of physical or functional analysis. Zombies also provide a useful lever in the opposite direction: if one could make a persuasive case for the inconceivability of zombies, this would undercut the notion of an ‘explanatory gap’, leaving the way open for a functional analysis of consciousness of the sort offered by Dennett (1991).
...
Taking the PC, or the severely degraded registrations of actual blindsight victims, as the model, one may fool oneself into thinking one has imagined something when one has not really confronted its detailed implications.

Note the last bit there - if you are unaware of the details, you may be lead (mistakenly) to assume that something is conceivable.

Finally, the counter I like best :
From Zombies versus Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability

Laying out the "proof" you are referencing above :

(1a) The zombie hypothesis contains no explicit contradiction.

(presumption, burden of proof on the materialist).

(1b) Theories containing no explicit contradiction are conceivable. (PNC)

(1c) Conceivable theories are possible. (CT).

(1) Therefore, zombies are possible. (1a-1c)

Now let me recall our former second premise:

(2a) If zombies are possible then MT is false.

(C1) Therefore, MT is false

This is where you are at. But you've stopped too soon...

This is the point where the zombist stops. We should not, however. As we know, MT is a supervenience thesis, so if there is a counterexample against MT, then MT is not only false, it is necessarily false—at least in S5, on which the zombist relies (as was noted above). So we can add now:

(3) If MT is false then MT is necessarily false.5

(C2) Therefore, MT is necessarily false.

Now we can "recycle" the zombist’s principles. It’s tautological that

(4) If MT is necessarily false, then it is impossible.

Using (the contraposition of) the zombist's Conceivability principle we can establish that

(5) If MT is impossible then it is inconceivable.

Using his Principle of no explicit contradiction we can add that

(6) If MT is inconceivable, it contains explicit or explicable contradiction.

(C3) Therefore, MT is inconceivable and contains explicit contradiction.

(by C2-6)

This conclusion, however, does not seem appealing. Materialism, even if it would turn out to be false, seems to be (at least weakly) conceivable. But this is not the point. Rather, we might point out that for concluding (C3) the burden of proof is now on the zombist.

There you have it. Following P-Zombie conceivability through to it's conclusion (rather than just stopping at the point where you get the answer you want) you have to now show that materialism contains an explicit contradiction.

 

[csense]

...Interesting discussion



For what it's worth, here's the problem that I have with materialism, which is very simple.

Materialism claims, that which we know as objective reality, or physical reality, exists independent of the observer. If this is true, then it follows that it must also exist independent of the observer's understanding.
This is not to say that we can't understand physical reality, only that it doesn't necessitate understanding, and this, it seems to me, is in conflict with much of the claims of materialism.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Yes, the only escape for the materialist is to logically demonstrate that p-zombies are logically impossible!

By logically impossible I mean that there is an inherent incoherency in the notion of a p-zombie, for eg like an object which at the same time is simultaneously both a cube and a sphere. That is to say that it must be shown that p-zombies could not obtain in any logically possible Universe.

But it is difficult to see how the materialist could do this. After all, unlike an object which is simultaneously both a cube and a sphere, I can certainly conceive of p-zombies. That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible. Certainly the onus is on the materialist to logically demonstrate that they are not.
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Stimp
Well, if the mind-brain hypothesis is true, then p-zombies are logically impossible. This is because if the mind-brain hypothesis is true, then consciousness can (at least in principle) be logically derived from the physical facts. The existence of a p-zombie would therefore be a logical contradiction.
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I have no idea what this "mind-brain" hypothesis is,

Oh please! I am talking about the hypothesis that consciousness is a set of physical brain processes!

but if it implies p-zombies are logically impossible, then clearly you need to give some reason to suppose why this ""mind-brain" hypothesis" should be supposed to be correct.

A couple reasons:

1) It is the most parsimonious falsifiable hypothesis we have for consciousness.

2) Lots and lots of supporting scientific evidence.

I repeat what I said before. You must demonstrate that p-zombies are logically impossible.

Nonsense. You are claiming that materialism is impossible because p-zombies are logically possible. Just because you can conceive of a scenario under which materialism would be false, does not mean that I have to formally refute that scenario as being impossible. You could spend the rest of your life making up such scenarios. Do I have to refute every single scenario you can dream up that would make materialism false?

If you want to use the logical possibility of p-zombies to show that materialism is false, then you need to demonstrate that they are logically possible. After all, you are the one who has asserted he has a formal proof here, not me. I have never claimed to be able to prove that materialism is true.

Are you going to do this or not? If not then it simply is not rational to adhere to the materialist metaphysic.

I do not adhere to any metaphysic. As for me proving that p-zombies are logically impossible, no, I am not going to do that. Doing so would, by definition, require that I know every physical fact about the world. I don't. You are essentially claiming that if I cannot refute an unfalsifiable hypothesis which contradicts materialism, then I must assume that hypothesis is true. That is just plain stupid.

Of course, the only way I could formally prove that, would be to actually derive consciousness from the physical facts. Unfortunately, we do not yet know all of the physical facts, and even if we did, the complexity is such that a derivation of that type is probably not tractable.
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In that case I would ask you to hypothesise some physical facts. Imagine some hypothetical physical facts which would necessitate that p-zombies are logically impossible.

Once again, the unfalsifiability of the p-zombie conjecture makes this impossible.

If you cannot do this, then you cannot rationally subscribe to materialism.

Baloney. If this reasoning were valid, then nobody could ever rationally subscribe to any position. For any position you could possibly want to hold, anybody could come up with any number of unfalsifiable positions which contradict it. You cannot reasonably demand that they must be refuted in order for the original position to be a rational one.

Can you prove that you not a puppet being controlled by aliens, whose belief in free-will is an illusion deliberately provided by them? If not, does that automagically render your belief in Libertarian free-will irrational? After all, if I can conceive of it, then surely that means the burden is on you to prove it isn't true!

I don't see why this should be seen as a problem, though. After all, we cannot logically derive the chemical properties of complex molecules from Quantum Mechanics either. We just assume that chemistry is reducible to QM because that is the most parsimonious explanation we have for our observations.
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I think these properties would be naturally necessitated rather than logically necessitated.

You are wrong, as usual. Science holds that Chemistry and Biology are logically reducible to Quantum Mechanics. Every "rule" in chemistry and biology is assumed to be logically deducible from QM, even though we cannot analytically perform that deduction. This is simply the application of Occam's razor. As long as there is no evidence to falsify this hypothesis, it is the simples possible explanation.

There is no need to imagine that there is something other than QM that somehow naturally necessitates the laws of chemistry, nor is there any need to imagine that something other than QM somehow naturally (or supernaturally) necessitates consciousness.

1) In our world there are conscious experiences.
2) There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive facts about consciousness in our world do not hold.
3) Therefore, facts about consciousness are further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts.
4) So materialism is false.”

http://www.geocities.com/qualophile...te/zombies.html
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This argument at least appears to be sound on the surface. Could anyone suggest what could possibly be wrong with it?

How about the fact that premise two flat-out claims that consciousness has absolutely no effect, whatsoever, on anything physical? Depending on how you define consciousness, either premise 1 or premise 2 is false.

If "conscious experience" is defined to be something which has no effect on anything physical, then there is no way he can claim that conscious experiences exist. In any event, what he is calling "conscious experience" is clearly not what either you or I mean by that term, since one of the few things we do agree on is that consciousness has effects on the physical world.

If he defines "conscious experience" to be our actual mental experiences, then the fact that they do have an effect on the physical world implies that premise two must be false. No such alternative world is possible, because regardless of whether the physical world is closed or not, a world without consciousness would be physically different from ours.

This is silly Ian. You are not an epiphenomenalist, so how can you possibly expect to convince a materialist that materialism is false by trying to claim that epiphenomenalism is true?


csense,

For what it's worth, here's the problem that I have with materialism, which is very simple.

Materialism claims, that which we know as objective reality, or physical reality, exists independent of the observer. If this is true, then it follows that it must also exist independent of the observer's understanding.
This is not to say that we can't understand physical reality, only that it doesn't necessitate understanding, and this, it seems to me, is in conflict with much of the claims of materialism.

It is not a conflict at all. What this means is that the assumption of an objective reality is not the only axiom of modern materialism. It is one of several. The other axioms, stated informally, assume that this reality is logical, consistent, and that we can infer facts about it from our observations. In other words, the axioms of modern materialism are exactly the set of assumptions that must be made in order to apply the scientific method.

This is why modern materialism is often also referred to as scientific materialism, by the po-mo's as scientism.

By the way, in spite of the negative connotation of it, I rather like the term "scientism" myself. It is much more direct and unambiguous than "materialism" or "physicalism".


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Chalmers disproof of materialism

1) In our world there are conscious experiences.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well...I can't agree with #1, as I have tried to explore with Titus Rivas.

You are not conscious? You're just an unconscious robot?

{Shrugs}

Then we have nothing to discuss.

I think you (or the author you quote) need to make the case for "conscious experiences" as more than just a category of private behaviors which are, individually, perfectly well accomplished without resorting to invoking "consciousness" as some causal entity.

Chalmers doesn't claim that consciousness is causally efficaceous. I believe he is an epiphenomenalist.

If we are to deduce consciousness from our behaviors,

Just to be quite clear, we don't deduce our own consciousness from our own behaviour. Rather it is an immediately experienced reality. Given that we know that ourselves are conscious, it might arguably be reasonable to infer from their bodily behaviour that others are also conscious.

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Re: Re: Chalmers disproof of materialism

Just to be quite clear, we don't deduce our own consciousness from our own behaviour. Rather it is an immediately experienced reality. Given that we know that ourselves are conscious, it might arguably be reasonable to infer from their bodily behaviour that others are also conscious.

But we do deduce our own consciousness from our behavior! I have clearly stated in this thread that private behaviors such as thinking, feeling, seeing...as "things that we do" are clearly "behaviors". You say we know we are conscious because of our experience--if that is so, then we are infering (or deducing) consciousness from seeing, feeling, remembering, and a host of other behaviors which even you say a zombie can do.

"given that we know that ourselves are conscious" is simply "given that we label these behaviors as 'consciousness' in ourselves". Then your last sentence works for me too.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I realise you're a little late coming into the P-Zombie issue Ian, but "what could possibly be wrong with it" is that it all rides on "conceivability", which is far from the open and shut case you think it is.

As usual you are being unfair. I never have insinuated it is an open and shut case. I said conceivability is suggestful of logical possibility. Certainly if p-zombies are not logically possible, then the onus is upon those who maintain this.

You referenced the article by Moody the other day.

Yeah that article was absolutely brilliant wasn't it?

Dennet offers a short reply which raises the issue of whether P-Zombies as expressed by Moody are actually conceivable

They are certainly conceivable because I can conceive them.

:The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies

quote:
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If, ex hypothesi, zombies are behaviorally indistinguishable from us normal folk, then they are really behaviorally indistinguishable! They say just what we say, they understand what they say (or, not to beg any questions, they understandz what they say), they believez what we believe, right down to having beliefsz that perfectly mirror all our beliefs about inverted spectra, "qualia," and every other possible topic of human reflection and conversation.
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I find this a reasonable argument

Loki, that wasn't an argument. He is just stating what is the case. There isn't an actual argument against the logical possibility of p-zombies contained in there.

- if P-Zombie Me is "just like me behaviourally", then that means what it says! P-Zombie Me responds to InterestingIan's posts exactly as I would. If P-Zombie Me would stop and think "I have no idea what Ian is referring to here? What does he mean he "experiences" red?" then he's *not* behaviourally the same as me.

Yep, but irrelevant.

A similar point is being made here :
Sniffing the Camembert: on the conceivability of Zombies

quote:
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Chalmers’ case for the ‘logical possibility’ (or conceivability) of zombies is intended to dramatize and reinforce the basic intuition that informs his whole argument, namely that conscious states, or qualia, are entirely resistant to any sort of physical or functional analysis. Zombies also provide a useful lever in the opposite direction: if one could make a persuasive case for the inconceivability of zombies, this would undercut the notion of an ‘explanatory gap’, leaving the way open for a functional analysis of consciousness of the sort offered by Dennett (1991).

Yes.

...
Taking the PC, or the severely degraded registrations of actual blindsight victims, as the model, one may fool oneself into thinking one has imagined something when one has not really confronted its detailed implications.
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Ok then, go on.

Note the last bit there - if you are unaware of the details, you may be lead (mistakenly) to assume that something is conceivable.

So what details about p-zombies am I unaware of?

Finally, the counter I like best :

Er . . there hasn't even been an attempt at any counter yet!

From Zombies versus Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability

Laying out the "proof" you are referencing above :

quote:
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(1a) The zombie hypothesis contains no explicit contradiction.

(presumption, burden of proof on the materialist).

Yes, I agree the burden of proof should be on the materialist.

(1b) Theories containing no explicit contradiction are conceivable. (PNC)

Well, I don't know about that, but my possible disagreement is an irrelevancy.

(1c) Conceivable theories are possible. (CT).

I assume he means logically possible? If he means naturally possible, this is certainly not true. Nor would I necessarily subscribe to the notion that conceivability necessarily implies logical possibility. But of course one would tend to suppose that a particular case of conceivability implies logical possibility unless one could advance arguments to cast doubt on this eg the logical possibility of p-zombies.

(1) Therefore, zombies are possible. (1a-1c)

Hmmm . . .well I don't agree with his premises. For a kick off I'm not aware of anyone stating they are naturally possible.

Now let me recall our former second premise:

Er . . .our??? It's certainly wasn't my premise!

(2a) If zombies are possible then MT is false.

MT is materialism? If p-zombies are logically possible then materialism is false.

(C1) Therefore, MT is false
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I don't think that's been proved. We need to allow the materialists to argue that p-zombies are logically impossible. Our tentative conclusion should be that p-zombies are logically possible in the absence of any reason to suppose they aren't.

And so far Loki, there hasn't been any arguments to that effect in your post!

This is where you are at. But you've stopped too soon...

Go on.

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This is the point where the zombist stops. We should not, however. As we know, MT is a supervenience thesis,

Er . . .so MT is a type of materialism?

so if there is a counterexample against MT, then MT is not only false, it is necessarily false

Yeah, like saying if the assertion that I went to the pub last night is false, then it is necessarily false.

Which of course doesn't say a great deal!

—at least in S5, on which the zombist relies (as was noted above).

Sorry I have no idea what S5 is, and it sure as hell wasn't noted above!

Loki if you're going to quote people could you please read through what you're quoting so at least it makes sense! Christ's sake!

So we can add now:

(3) If MT is false then MT is necessarily false.5

If the statement "I am hungry" is false, then the statement "I am hungry" is necessarily false. Of course if he means if there is a logical inconsistancy in materialism, then it follows materialism is necessarily false (such as if p-zombies were logically possible).

(C2) Therefore, MT is necessarily false.

Materialism is necessarily false if p-zombies are logically possible, sure. What's your point?

Now we can "recycle" the zombist’s principles. It’s tautological that

(4) If MT is necessarily false, then it is impossible.


Using (the contraposition of) the zombist's Conceivability principle we can establish that

(5) If MT is impossible then it is inconceivable.

Even if we were to accept that that which is conceivable is necessarily logically possible (remember I only said suggestful), it is illogical to conclude that that which is inconceivable is logically impossible.

Who is this complete a*sehole you are quoting???


Sorry, everything he says is simply lacking in any logic.
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There you have it.

Well if that's the best you can do! LMAO!!

Following P-Zombie conceivability through to it's conclusion (rather than just stopping at the point where you get the answer you want) you have to now show that materialism contains an explicit contradiction

I think not. All his argument shows is that if the non-materialist were to state that it has logically been proven that materialism is inconsistent, then the burden of proof would be for the non-materialist to demonstrate this. But the non-materialist isn't stating that (at least I don't, and not Chalmers either from what I read of some of his statements last night). The non-materialist is stating that the onus is on the materialist to show that p-zombies are logically impossible. If the materialist is unable to do this, then we should provisionally accept that materialism is false.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Stimpy

the assumption of an objective reality is not the only axiom of modern materialism. It is one of several. The other axioms, stated informally, assume that this reality is logical, consistent, and that we can infer facts about it from our observations.

Where did you get this definition of materialism from?? I know of no definition of materialism that stipulates that reality is logical, consistent, and that we can infer facts about it from our observations. This is not implicit within materialism at all, anymore than it is implicit within idealism or dualism. You're talking about science here, not materialism.