A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

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Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Ian said:
and after I responded he said:
I guess I don't understand your argument. I know I don't understand what "uninterpreted directy reality" is. Could you restate the argument?

~~ Paul

I experience the phenomenological redness of red by definition. I know that I experience redness because of the very fact that I do so. It is nonsensical for myself to claim that I don't really see redness.
 
Originally posted by Interesting Ian

That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible.
This statement carries its own refutation in a delightfully self-referential way.
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
quote:
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If you reject the existence of consciousness sure!
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I can neither reject nor accept its existence until you define what you mean by the term.

I can't. We only! :eek: know of it as a directly experienced reality.


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But I would suggest that only a p-zombie could claim that consciousness is meaningless.
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If you cannot define what the word means, then it is meaningless. That is what the word "meaningless" means.

Please do not continually redefine words. Even if I agree to your definition then this would simply necessitate that there is no inconsistancy in the meaningless existing. But then I'll get some dickhead who says you've obviously winning the argument because I am making ludicrous assertions eg that which is meaningless exists. It's happened before, and I'm sure that lot of people think it.

I'm a tad pissed off with your cheating in this way. I refuse to any loger accept your definition of words.

So f*ck off you stupid cheating b*stard.
 
Dymanic said:

That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible.
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This statement carries its own refutation in a delightfully self-referential way.

Talking through your f*cking ass again I see. Oh well what's new? If you disagree then explain why you disagree instead of spewing forth meaningless facile drive-by assertions.
 
Ian said:
I experience the phenomenological redness of red by definition. I know that I experience redness because of the very fact that I do so. It is nonsensical for myself to claim that I don't really see redness.
Of course there is redness.

~~ Paul
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
We cannot define it, but each one of us (ie the non p-zombies) is immediately acquainted with it. It is for this reason that we know consciousness better than we know anything.
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There is certainly something which I call consciousness, which I am immediately acquainted with. I am quite capable of defining what I mean by the word, though. And I certainly see no reason to think that this thing which I am immediately acquainted with is not definable, or that it cannot be investigated scientifically.

I know, that's because you're stupid. Or should that be Dr Stupid?

Of course, a p-zombie would be "immediately acquainted" with those brain processes which I am claiming are consciousness. But they are definable, and can be studied scientifically.

Since, by definition, there is no way for you to know whether you are p-zombie or not,

Huh? What an utterly astonishing thing to say! :eek: Of course I know that I experience (real) consciousness!


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But the inability to provide a definition doesn't alter the fact that we know it better than we know anything physical since we are immediately acquainted with it.
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Your inability to provide a definition just indicates your own conceptual confusion. You see, you may not realize it, but when you say that consciousness is "that which you are immediately acquainted with", you have just provided a definition for consciousness.

Fine, I hope you like my "definition" of consciousness. Just bear in mind that I do not have the same definition of "definition" that you have.
 
II
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So following on from this, if the world is physically closed, and all possible knowledge about all things are derived through the 5 senses, then there cannot be any distinction between real people and p-zombies. But I know I'm not a p-zombie by definition. As there cannot be a distinction between real people and p-zombies (given the world is physically closed) it therefore follows that no-one can be a p-zombie.

But materialism can only ever imply the existence of p-zombies and not real people! So therefore given that I know I am not a p-zombie, it necessarily means that the world is not physically closed.

Therefore libertarian free will necessarily exists!
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Actually, even if the above premises were true, it would only imply that the supernatural exists.

It destroys determinism thereby implying libertarian free will.


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Hey! I've just thought all this out now! Is there anything wrong with my reasoning??
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Yes, your claim that materialism can only ever imply the existence of p-zombies, and not real people, is based on the assumption that real people are causally affected by something non-physical. You have no evidence for this, only your intuitive preconceptions.

No, it is based on the assumption that p-zombies are not logically impossible. That is all. What you said is not my assumption, but rather my conclusion! :rolleyes:

This means that you are concluding that the physical world is not causally closed from the assumption that something non-physical (your free-will) is causally affecting something physical (your brain).

No, you entirely misunderstand my argument. That would simply beg the question! :eek:

Unless you can demonstrate that something non-physical is having an effect on your brain, that is begging the question.

With your intepretation of my argument that would indeed be begging the question. Since that wasn't by argument it isn't.
 
Ian said:
Huh? What an utterly astonishing thing to say! Of course I know that I experience (real) consciousness!
Really? How? How do you know it's not your brain playing a trick on you to convince you you're conscious? After all, that's what a p-zombie's brain does. Otherwise a p-zombie would look confused and incredulous when people were discussing consciousness around him, and give himself away.

If you want to be a magically-conscious person, just say so. Trying to argue for it is a futile project.

~~ Paul
 
Originally posted by Interesting Ian

That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible.
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This statement carries its own refutation in a delightfully self-referential way.
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Talking through your f*cking ass again I see. Oh well what's new? If you disagree then explain why you disagree instead of spewing forth meaningless facile drive-by assertions.
If you can't grasp that, you need a break. Go for a walk, get some fresh air. I know you are capable of working that out for yourself; if you just aren't in the mood to make the effort, that's cool too; let's move on.

As for the reference to Gödel in my response to this:
we know consciousness better than we know anything.
I'm not going to attempt to present the Gödelian argument in its entirety here; you are either familiar with it or you aren't. I will say only that saying that we know we are conscious because we are conscious is like letting a kid grade his own homework.
But materialism can only ever imply the existence of p-zombies and not real people! So therefore given that I know I am not a p-zombie, it necessarily means that the world is not physically closed.
You have hit on something quite interesting here.

I also would say that I 'know' that I am not a p-zombie, and agree that this assertion cannot be proven logically. This whole thing is currently driving me a little crazy, and reading Penrose isn't helping (Shadows of the Mind isn't a book one reads for enjoyment, it is a book one uses as a club to beat his own brain to a bloody pulp).

It seems to have to do with the low-level details of the mechanics of common sense; the degree to which these are logical and algorithmic; the mysterious way 'common sense' seems to be able to become more powerful than formal logic by jumping the bounds of formal logic.
 
Ian said: quote:

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Me
Just because we can observe physical processes does not in any way entail that we will also be able to "experience" them ourselves. We have completely unique brain structures and chemistries, and the only hypothetical way in which we could experience such physical experiences were if we could "create" an exact replica of the subjects brain and replace ours with the "created" brain. Yet, we would still be entirely different "subjects" due to spacetime subtexts.


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I don't think this would be so under materialism. Under materialism a subject is entirely defined by their brain pattern. It doesn't matter where they are.


Well, isn't the brain pattern defined by the environment which we are experiencing? Which is unique for us via "subjective, first-person perspective." How does it being able to be studied refute this?

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Another added complication may be that quantum events have a large role to play in the physical events of a brain state. Consequently, any observation or measurement by us would ultimately interfere with the "experience" of said brain state.


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Yes, so what? How on earth any of this remotely addresses my original point is quite beyond me.

I was attempting to illustrate that an experience, such as "the feeling of sadness" is able to be "subjective" and from the "first person experience" in addition to it being brain processes occurring in a location. You seem to be excluding this middle ground. Why, I do not know.


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As I just posted to Titus, I just do not see why such "subjectivity"


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Huh?? Subjectivity?? You clearly don't understand what the word subjectivity means! That is not subjectivity. It has already been explained what subjectivity means. What is wrong with you??

For my benefit, please define "subjectivity" for me, without using other terms that are undefinable. (If you want to know my definition, subjectivity is having a completely unique conscious experience. This is not at odds with consciousness being able to be studied through understanding of brain processes.)


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is not the unique differences that every individual has in their body. Our unique bodies provide the special "first-person perspective,"


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The fact that your brain is not exactly the same as anyone elses can scarcely be said to provide any justification for the first person perspective! I mean how on earth could it. I just think you don't have a clue what you're talking about.

Well, I used the word "body," to be fair. Also, my eyes are attached to my brain, and so are all my nerves. Moreover, my brain is (explicately) separate from yours and everyone else's. Hence, it is unique. How does all this not provide for a first-person perspective? Do your "p-zombies" view themselves from the second and third persons?

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so I do not see why this is a problem for you Ian. Why does "subjectivity" hold such a reified status with you?
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Because the subjective is all that truly exists. It is reality. There is nothing more to the "physical" world than our perceptual experiences of it.

Why?
 
Dymanic said:
That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible.
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This statement carries its own refutation in a delightfully self-referential way.
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Talking through your f*cking ass again I see. Oh well what's new? If you disagree then explain why you disagree instead of spewing forth meaningless facile drive-by assertions.
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If you can't grasp that, you need a break. Go for a walk, get some fresh air. I know you are capable of working that out for yourself; if you just aren't in the mood to make the effort, that's cool too; let's move on.

Does your stupidity know of no limit?? Let's let at the sentence you are suggesting is incoherent.

That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible.

Now please tell me how that sentence is self refuting or cut the cr*p.
 
Dymanic said:
we know consciousness better than we know anything.

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I'm not going to attempt to present the Gödelian argument in its entirety here; you are either familiar with it or you aren't. I will say only that saying that we know we are conscious because we are conscious is like letting a kid grade his own homework.

Doesn't look like you're doing very well in justifying your assertions does it. Needless to say this is a false analogy. Given what consciousness means it is not possible to conclude you're not conscious when you in fact are. It simply a question of recognising it for what it is.

Please tell me where Gödel argued that we may not know we're conscious even if we are.
 
Dymanic said:
That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible.
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This statement carries its own refutation in a delightfully self-referential way.
------------------------------------------------------------------

Talking through your f*cking ass again I see. Oh well what's new? If you disagree then explain why you disagree instead of spewing forth meaningless facile drive-by assertions.
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If you can't grasp that, you need a break. Go for a walk, get some fresh air. I know you are capable of working that out for yourself; if you just aren't in the mood to make the effort, that's cool too; let's move on.

After due consideration I think you must be making the mistake of supposing something is necessarily logically possible if it is conceivable. I have a good deal of sympathy with that. However the materialist must deny this, otherwise materialism fails.
 
Ian, just an aside -

Someone here once asked if you'd considered writing a book.

Well that would be a huge undertaking but how about a website setting out your philosophy? No doubt your ISP gives you enough free space already.

I'm sure I'm not the only naturalist/materialist who would be interested in examining what you have to say - with the heat turned down. :)
 
Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Let's [look] at the sentence you are suggesting is incoherent.

That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible.
I didn't say it was incoherent, did I? I said it was self-refuting. Your sentence (quite coherently) claims that nothing is logically impossible if it is possible to concieve of it. To extract the refutation then, it is necessary only to concieve that your sentence is false. Not everyone enjoys this type of puzzle, but I do. If every concievable idea were logically possible, we would have no basis for preferring one over another, and all of us here would be forced to find something else to do. The more interesting issue this relates to is the existence in 'idea space' of locations which cannot be reached by a series of logical steps, but which are nonetheless valid (this is the sort of thing Gödel talked about and...
...and I just snipped a large chunk of stuff about that, because it got so big no one would want to read it, which is exactly what I was trying to avoid by simply saying "I hereby invoke Gödel." If that isn't good enough for you, consider it retracted).

Given what consciousness means it is not possible to conclude you're not conscious when you in fact are.
Especially if you use as your definition of consciousness: "the state of being unable to to conclude you're not conscious when you in fact are". There is a certain elegance to this; an internal consistency. I think you may have found one of the unreachable yet valid locations I just mentioned.
 
Dymanic said:
I didn't say it was incoherent, did I? I said it was self-refuting. Your sentence (quite coherently) claims that nothing is logically impossible if it is possible to concieve of it.

I said no such thing! I said "that which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible". I certainly gave no definitive statement that that which is conceivable must necessarily be logically possible. But we might suppose it is logically possible unless one is supplied with reasons to suppose otherwise.

To extract the refutation then, it is necessary only to concieve that your sentence is false.

Conceivably my sentence might be false, but it is extremely implausible to suppose so.

Not everyone enjoys this type of puzzle, but I do. If every concievable idea were logically possible, we would have no basis for preferring one over another,

Don't be absurd! Simply because something is possible doesn't mean to say it's as likely as any other thing which is possible!



SNIP!!


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Given what consciousness means it is not possible to conclude you're not conscious when you in fact are.
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Especially if you use as your definition of consciousness:

I don't have a definition of consciousness.
 
Ian,

Yes, the only escape for the materialist is to logically demonstrate that p-zombies are logically impossible!

By logically impossible I mean that there is an inherent incoherency in the notion of a p-zombie, for eg like an object which at the same time is simultaneously both a cube and a sphere. That is to say that it must be shown that p-zombies could not obtain in any logically possible Universe.

But it is difficult to see how the materialist could do this. After all, unlike an object which is simultaneously both a cube and a sphere, I can certainly conceive of p-zombies. That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible. Certainly the onus is on the materialist to logically demonstrate that they are not.

Well, if the mind-brain hypothesis is true, then p-zombies are logically impossible. This is because if the mind-brain hypothesis is true, then consciousness can (at least in principle) be logically derived from the physical facts. The existence of a p-zombie would therefore be a logical contradiction.

Of course, the only way I could formally prove that, would be to actually derive consciousness from the physical facts. Unfortunately, we do not yet know all of the physical facts, and even if we did, the complexity is such that a derivation of that type is probably not tractable.

I don't see why this should be seen as a problem, though. After all, we cannot logically derive the chemical properties of complex molecules from Quantum Mechanics either. We just assume that chemistry is reducible to QM because that is the most parsimonious explanation we have for our observations. The fact that I cannot derive it certainly does not justify the claim that chemistry involves more than QM, and likewise the fact that we cannot yet formally derive consciousness from brain activity, does not justify the claim that there is more to consciousness than just brain activity.

If you want to prove that materialism implies that people are p-zombies, then you need to demonstrate that p-zombies are logically possible. You cannot just assume that they are, on the basis that I cannot prove they are not, and then from that conclude that materialism is false. After all, the assumption that p-zombies are logically possible involves the assumption that the physical world is not causally closed, which is an assumption that materialism is false. Your reasoning is circular.

I can neither reject nor accept its existence until you define what you mean by the term.
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I can't. We only! :eek: know of it as a directly experienced reality.

Perhaps you just don't understand what a definition is? I am not asking for a complete explanation for it, or any kind of explanation. I am asking for you to tell me what mean by the word. It appears as though you mean "that which we directly experience". That is a definition. I certainly agree that I have experiences, but I do not see why you insist that they cannot possibly be brain processes, or for that matter, any kind of physical process.

But I would suggest that only a p-zombie could claim that consciousness is meaningless.
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If you cannot define what the word means, then it is meaningless. That is what the word "meaningless" means.
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Please do not continually redefine words. Even if I agree to your definition then this would simply necessitate that there is no inconsistancy in the meaningless existing. But then I'll get some dickhead who says you've obviously winning the argument because I am making ludicrous assertions eg that which is meaningless exists. It's happened before, and I'm sure that lot of people think it.

I have no idea what you just said here. Are you going to try to claim that a word that has not been defined still means something? :confused:

Note that I am not saying that consciousness is meaningless. I am saying that as long as you refuse to define what you mean by the word "consciousness", any statement you make which refers to that word doesn't mean anything.

I'm a tad pissed off with your cheating in this way. I refuse to any loger accept your definition of words.

So f*ck off you stupid cheating b*stard.

You're pissed off? I'm the one cheating? You are the one who starts entire threads about consciousness, and insults materialists because of their views of it, even though you cannot even explain what you mean by the term. :rolleyes:

There is certainly something which I call consciousness, which I am immediately acquainted with. I am quite capable of defining what I mean by the word, though. And I certainly see no reason to think that this thing which I am immediately acquainted with is not definable, or that it cannot be investigated scientifically.
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I know, that's because you're stupid. Or should that be Dr Stupid?

Another dazzling argument from the brilliant philosopher. :rolleyes:

Of course, a p-zombie would be "immediately acquainted" with those brain processes which I am claiming are consciousness. But they are definable, and can be studied scientifically.

Since, by definition, there is no way for you to know whether you are p-zombie or not,
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Huh? What an utterly astonishing thing to say! Of course I know that I experience (real) consciousness!

Do you? Your brain is what knows things, yet if you accept the epiphenomenalism argument upon which p-zombies are dependant, your brain cannot possibly know anything about consciousness. Your brain believes it possesses consciousness, but for completely physical and misguided reasons. Your consciousness experiences your brain's thoughts, but has no cognitive capabilities of its own. It doesn't "know" anything.

Frankly, I don't understand why you are persisting with this p-zombie nonsense anyway. P-zombies are not consistent with either of our worldviews. If they are truly logically possible, then we are both wrong about the nature of consciousness.

If Libertarian free-will exists, as you believe, then p-zombies are impossible, because consciousness affects the physical world. Therefore a p-zombie would not be physically identical to a normal human being, just as a TV which cannot pick up any television signals is not physically identical to one which can.

If the physical world is causally closed, then p-zombies are impossible because consciousness is a purely physical phenomenon. Therefore a p-zombie would not be physically identical to a normal human being, because his brain processes would have to be different.

It really boggles my mind that even though you are an idealist, all of the arguments you use against materialism are dualistic ones, which are equally incompatible with idealism.

Your inability to provide a definition just indicates your own conceptual confusion. You see, you may not realize it, but when you say that consciousness is "that which you are immediately acquainted with", you have just provided a definition for consciousness.
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Fine, I hope you like my "definition" of consciousness. Just bear in mind that I do not have the same definition of "definition" that you have.

Talking to you is like clapping with one hand.

Actually, even if the above premises were true, it would only imply that the supernatural exists.
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It destroys determinism thereby implying libertarian free will.

This is pathetic even for you. Are you seriously saying that the only alternative to determinism is Libertarian free-will? :confused:

Here's a counter example for you. We are all just puppets being controlled by God and Satan. The entire universe is a huge puppet show that they are putting on for their local community. Our belief in free will is an illusion that they gave us in order to make the show more amusing.

Yes, your claim that materialism can only ever imply the existence of p-zombies, and not real people, is based on the assumption that real people are causally affected by something non-physical. You have no evidence for this, only your intuitive preconceptions.
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No, it is based on the assumption that p-zombies are not logically impossible. That is all. What you said is not my assumption, but rather my conclusion! :rolleyes:

The fact that you so profoundly lack any understanding of even your own argument, makes it not at all surprising that you never understand mine. The assumption that p-zombies are logically possible is exactly the assumption that consciousness is something non-physical. Combine that with the other premise of your argument, which is that consciousness must affect the physical world since you know you have it, and you have assumed that real people are causally affected by something non-physical.

Let me put it this way. If materialism is true, then p-zombies are not logically possible. You have assumed that p-zombies are logically possible. That means that you have assumed that materialism is not true. To conclude from this that materialism is not true, is both trivial and completely irrelevant. Unless you can demonstrate that p-zombies are logically possible, you have proven nothing about the real world.

This means that you are concluding that the physical world is not causally closed from the assumption that something non-physical (your free-will) is causally affecting something physical (your brain).
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No, you entirely misunderstand my argument. That would simply beg the question! :eek:

Then perhaps you should clarify your argument. You can start by presenting your evidence that there are supernatural influences on the brain.


Dr. Stupid
 
Ian,

That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible.
Mormonism is conceivable (especially for Mormons) which tends to suggest it is logically possible.
Islam is conceivable (especially for Muslims) which tends to suggest it is logically possible.
Islam and Mormonism are logically incompatible - at least one is false. So much for conceivability.
 
I think this bears repeating...

(Rayn wrote) : Also, my eyes are attached to my brain, and so are all my nerves. Moreover, my brain is (explicately) separate from yours and everyone else's. Hence, it is unique. How does all this not provide for a first-person perspective? Do your "p-zombies" view themselves from the second and third persons?
 
Loki said:
Ian,


Mormonism is conceivable (especially for Mormons) which tends to suggest it is logically possible.
Islam is conceivable (especially for Muslims) which tends to suggest it is logically possible.
Islam and Mormonism are logically incompatible - at least one is false. So much for conceivability.

A tossed coin landing heads is conceivable which tends to suggest it is logically possible.
A tossed coins landing tails is conceivable which tends to suggest it is logically possible.
Landing both heads and tails are logically incompatible - at least one is false. So much for conceivability.
 

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