A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Loki]

Ian,

Your point? Your analogy (coin tosses) is using objectively verifyable results. The Conceivability argument is attempting to demonstrate a point regarding metaphysics.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,

Your point? Your analogy (coin tosses) is using objectively verifyable results. The Conceivability argument is attempting to demonstrate a point regarding metaphysics.

My point is that your argument is one of stunning breathtaking illogic! LOL Come on Loki, I have a lot of respect for your arguments and intellect but please admit when you make a silly mistake. People will admire you more for it.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Stimpson said:

The fact that you [Ian] so profoundly lack any understanding of even your own argument, makes it not at all surprising that you never understand mine. The assumption that p-zombies are logically possible is exactly the assumption that consciousness is something non-physical. Combine that with the other premise of your argument, which is that consciousness must affect the physical world since you know you have it, and you have assumed that real people are causally affected by something non-physical.

But Ian has said:

... nor does it and could it play any fruitful role in any of theories in our scientific descriptions of reality, ...

to which I responded:

I thought we had agreed this was incorrect.

and he responded:

You really got to be kidding!

So I don't think he's using the premise that consciousness must affect the physical world.

Oh wait! Perhaps I'm wrong. Perhaps he thinks that it does affect the physical world, but doesn't play any role in scientific theories. It's like a sooper sekret cause or something. Is that it?

I'm so konfoozed.

~~ Paul

 

[Loki]

Ian,

My point is that your argument is one of stunning breathtaking illogic!

Rather than just exchange witty comments back and forwards (well, witty may be stretching it) how about you explain the "breathtaking illogic"?

What I'm trying to say :

(A) "Concievability" is in the eye of the beholder. What a Muslim finds conceivable, a Mormom will not.
(B) "Conceivability" is *at best* a rule of thumb, not a rule of logic. The link between "is conceivable" and "is logically possible" is shakey, as demonstrated by the fact that we can produce two examples of "conceivable" concepts that are, in fact, logically incompatible. At least one of these concepts (and probably both!) are in fact not logically possible, even though they are both conceivable (and not not logically self-contradictory).

Do you disagree with any of the above? Or do you agree but feel I explained it poorly in my earlier post?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,


Rather than just exchange witty comments back and forwards (well, witty may be stretching it) how about you explain the "breathtaking illogic"?

What I'm trying to say :

(A) "Concievability" is in the eye of the beholder. What a Muslim finds conceivable, a Mormom will not.
(B) "Conceivability" is *at best* a rule of thumb, not a rule of logic. The link between "is conceivable" and "is logically possible" is shakey, as demonstrated by the fact that we can produce two examples of "conceivable" concepts that are, in fact, logically incompatible. At least one of these concepts (and probably both!) are in fact not logically possible, even though they are both conceivable (and not not logically self-contradictory).

Do you disagree with any of the above? Or do you agree but feel I explained it poorly in my earlier post?

Why wouldn't a mormon find it conceivable? By conceivable I simply mean conceptually imagining a possible state of affairs in some logically possible Universe. Conversely, if it is not conceivable then we cannot conceptually imagine it. You're simply employing the Stimpy tactic of redefining words to suit your own agenda!

Obviously if we can imagine a possible state of affairs in some logically possible Universe then this would tend to be suggestive that it is logically possible!

Why do people wish to argue with me about the most trivial things? I've had a brilliant insight today about the mind/body problem which will affect and shape my thinking on the subject forevermore. And people keep pestering me about irrelevant trivialities!

 

[csense]

Ian,


Mormonism is conceivable (especially for Mormons) which tends to suggest it is logically possible.
Islam is conceivable (especially for Muslims) which tends to suggest it is logically possible.
Islam and Mormonism are logically incompatible - at least one is false. So much for conceivability.

Are you saying that competing theories can only exist in science, and if so, why

 

[Loki]

csense,

Are you saying that competing theories can only exist in science, and if so, why

No, not at all. Just that "conceivability" is more an output (result) of metaphysical discussions, rather than an input.

 

[csense]

csense,


No, not at all. Just that "conceivability" is more an output (result) of metaphysical discussions, rather than an input.

I think you're a little vague but, this is different from scientific discussions how?

 

[Loki]

csense,

think you're a little vague ...

Quite possible - I'm having trouble understanding where you are coming from.

... but, this is different from scientific discussions how?

Well, in scientific discussions the "conceivability" can be put to the test through experiment and result, and only survives if the data backs it up.

 

[csense]

csense,

Well, in scientific discussions the "conceivability" can be put to the test through experiment and result, and only survives if the data backs it up.

You're weaving in and out of concepts. Discussions and experiments are two different things.

If you have two competing theories in philosophy, or theology, how are these any less acceptable to reason as two competing theories in physics or psychology

 

[Titus Rivas]

Victory

Ian has said a lot I wanted to say, so that I won't repeat his arguments now.

Just a last attempt to clarify why some of us don't buy the materialist mythology.

Several members seem to think that it is rational to hold that a brain can be conscious. I've already said more than once, that the current definitions of the physical world make that view irrational.
You don't seem to realize how important such definitions are. For example, Dr. Stupid repeats his claim that his reductionism is epistemological, rather than ontological. However, if that really were so, why should he say anything about the REAL experient, namely that it would be the brain? Since when isn't the statement that the experient equals the brain an ontological statement, i.e. a statement about reality as it is, rather than an epistemological statement, i.e. a statement about our knowledge of reality?
On the other hand, some of you seriously believe that the definition of physical reality by dualists is tautological. I'm really baffled by this. Maybe you haven't read enough about the origins of materialism?
Finally, some of you claim that the brain as a physical system is conscious, conveniently leaving out the main characteristics of what being conscious means. Don't you see what you're doing?

This may be a skeptical forum, but don't you think you're being just a bit too easy on yourself? If "winning" a debate implies misrepresenting the opponent's position, what could be the intellectual satisfaction? If skepticism were intrinsically linked to rationalism (in the original, neutral sense) our ontological (I know, it's an epistemological one in Stimpy's view ) discussion would doubtlessly have taken another course.

Titus

 

[Loki]

csense,

You're weaving in and out of concepts. Discussions and experiments are two different things.

Sorry - I was (perhaps still am?) having trouble trying to determine what your point is. My references to "experiments" was in reply to your references to "science". I think it's a red herring.

If you have two competing theories in philosophy, or theology, how are these any less acceptable to reason as two competing theories in physics or psychology

They're not, and I didn't (intentionally) say that. I'm referring to the issue of "conceivability entailing logical possibility". Ian is claiming that the "concievabilty" of P-Zombies counts against materialism. I'm trying to say that under a materialist view, the "conceivability" is questionable at best.

As best I can tell, you've read my remarks as meaning something completely different - I don't think we're discussing the same issue here.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

Victory

Ian has said a lot I wanted to say, so that I won't repeat his arguments now.

Just a last attempt to clarify why some of us don't buy the materialist mythology.

Several members seem to think that it is rational to hold that a brain can be conscious. I've already said more than once, that the current definitions of the physical world make that view irrational.

Yes, you have asserted this several times. You have still yet to provide any justification for this assertion.

You don't seem to realize how important such definitions are. For example, Dr. Stupid repeats his claim that his reductionism is epistemological, rather than ontological. However, if that really were so, why should he say anything about the REAL experient, namely that it would be the brain? Since when isn't the statement that the experient equals the brain an ontological statement, i.e. a statement about reality as it is, rather than an epistemological statement, i.e. a statement about our knowledge of reality?

It is a statement about our knowledge of reality. The scientific evidence clearly indicates that human consciousness is a physical process of the brain. The fact that you can imagine metaphysical situations in which that is not the case, but the evidence just seems to indicate that it is, is irrelevant.

Like you said, an epistemological statement is a statement about our knowledge of reality. One thing we know about reality is that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain. This says nothing about the "true metaphysical nature" of either the brain, or consciousness, or of anything else. You can daydream about various metaphysical explanations for this all day. It doesn't matter. What matters is that we can, in principle, provide a scientific description of consciousness in terms of physical brain processes.

On the other hand, some of you seriously believe that the definition of physical reality by dualists is tautological. I'm really baffled by this. Maybe you haven't read enough about the origins of materialism?

I have no idea what you are talking about here. What does it mean to say that a definition is tautological? A logical statement can be tautological. A definition is simply an expression of the meaning of a word. If you have a definition which includes logical statements, then it is not just a definition. It is a definition plus a logical statement.

Finally, some of you claim that the brain as a physical system is conscious, conveniently leaving out the main characteristics of what being conscious means. Don't you see what you're doing?

Obviously not. This may have something to do with the fact that none of the people who believe we are leaving something out are capable of even coherently saying what we are leaving out, much less demonstrating that something is being left out.

This may be a skeptical forum, but don't you think you're being just a bit too easy on yourself? If "winning" a debate implies misrepresenting the opponent's position, what could be the intellectual satisfaction?

You tell me. I am not the one who has declared victory here.

If skepticism were intrinsically linked to rationalism (in the original, neutral sense) our ontological (I know, it's an epistemological one in Stimpy's view ) discussion would doubtlessly have taken another course.

You are forgetting that many of the people involved in this discussion are not skeptics.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

Humbly addressing the ruthless conqueror

Well, very funny indeed, Dr. Stupid.

I won't repeat my own "justifications", as I have done enough by now.

I do want to repeat though that there is NO evidence whatsoever that the brain would be a conscious experient.

Just this clarification:

have no idea what you are talking about here. What does it mean to say that a definition is tautological? A logical statement can be tautological. A definition is simply an expression of the meaning of a word. If you have a definition which includes logical statements, then it is not just a definition. It is a definition plus a logical statement.

I was referring to a comment and obviously meant that some have claimed (here and elsewhere) that the conclusions drawn about the nature of consciousness are conclusions which were artificially produced by including them as it were in the definition. You're right that my own wording wasn't precise enough. I meant that the definition of consciousness would (according to my opponents, not according to myself) lead to a conclusion based on nothing more than petitio principii. I just pointed out that consciousness was not defined to be able to draw dualistic conclusions, but that the dualistic conclusions are a consequence of the definition of consciousness (shared by dualists and most non-dualists alike) and the definition of the physical world.

But enough about myself:
What (if anything) could convince you that you're wrong, Dr. Stupid?

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

Well, very funny indeed, Dr. Stupid.

I won't repeat my own "justifications", as I have done enough by now.

Apparently in your world "enough" means "none at all".

I do want to repeat though that there is NO evidence whatsoever that the brain would be a conscious experient.

Repeat it all you like. That isn't going to make any of the scientific evidence go away.

But enough about myself:
What (if anything) could convince you that you're wrong, Dr. Stupid?

Simple. We know that if consciousness is not a brain process, then at the very least consciousness affects our brain processes, by virtue of the fact that our brains know that we are conscious. Produce evidence of effects on the brain which cannot be explained in terms of our current physical laws, and show that these effects are directly responsible for the behavioral effects of consciousness, and you will have falsified the mind-brain theory.

The entire idea that consciousness is not a brain process depends on the assumption that somehow consciousness is controlling our brains. Show that there is some external "thing" controlling our brains, and then I will take your claim seriously. until then, it is just another unjustified claim which contradicts the laws of nature as we currently understand them, without providing any alternative laws to replace them.

Until such time as somebody can demonstrate that such effects are present, there is no reason to think that there is anything other than brain processes involved. You might as well tell me that charged particles don't influence each other through the electromagnetic force, but instead that some sort of supernatural being causes them to move by an act of will. In fact, it would appear that this is exactly what Idealism claims!


Dr. Stupid

 

[Mercutio]

A ray of hope!

....Finally, some of you claim that the brain as a physical system is conscious, conveniently leaving out the main characteristics of what being conscious means....

Please, please, please, please please explain to me the main characteristics of what being conscious means...or what the main characteristics of being conscious are...This thread has left me adrift at sea, unable to prove I am not a p-zombie! I need to know what the main characteristics of consciousness are!!! So far, everything I think, feel, remember and do I can quite adequately explain without invoking a "consciousness"--what am I missing?!?!

 

[Titus Rivas]

Subjectivity encompassing all subjective experiences

Let it shine!

So far, everything I think, feel, remember and do I can quite adequately explain without invoking a "consciousness"--what am I missing?!?!

Mercutio, assuming you're sincere, the answer isn't half as mysterious as you seem to think.

First of all, as I have said before on this thread, the term consciousness has several quite different meanings, but in the context of qualia, we're obviously talking about subjective awareness.

Now, consciousness in this sense, of subjective awareness, is an abstract concept which encompasses all types of subjective experiences, and every concrete subjective experience. For example, consciousness encompasses your conscious thinking, feeling, remembering and doing.

All of these conscious mental processes first of all share the property that they are undergone by a subject and that they are qualitative. Neither of these characteristics can be left out as we are talking about conscious processes, not about unconscious ones. It is these characteristics which make it meaningful to conceptualize this abstract concept of consciousness (in the sense of subjective awareness). Without these characteristics there would be no relevant difference between subjective experiences and unconscious psychological processes.


Titus

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Subjectivity encompassing all subjective experiences

Without these characteristics there would be no relevant difference between subjective experiences and unconscious psychological experiences.

Titus

...unconscious psychological experiences.

huh?

Who experiences these? I think you mean unconscious psychological processes.

But maybe I'm missing something *shrug*

Adam

 

[Dancing David]

By logically impossible I mean that there is an inherent incoherency in the notion of a p-zombie, for eg like an object which at the same time is simultaneously both a cube and a sphere. That is to say that it must be shown that p-zombies could not obtain in any logically possible Universe.

A p-zombie is logicaly inconsistent in that you give it all the properties of consiousness but then state that it has all the properties but is not consious. So that is a contradiction right there , in the definition.

I can concieve that monkeys will fly out of my rectum with hundred dollars bills in thier hands, it does not make them logical.

 

[Dancing David]

I experience the phenomenological redness of red by definition. I know that I experience redness because of the very fact that I do so. It is nonsensical for myself to claim that I don't really see redness.

Ian you did not see redness the first time you were exposed to it, as a child you developed the neural netweook, and then learned to percieve the redness. You only know that it is red through referent action with other humans.