A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[BillyJoe]

Tell me what the difference between a human being and a p-zombie is....

...um....a human being exists and a p-zombie doesn't?....

BillyJoe.
(Titus, I will see my sister on Wednesday)

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Consciousness cannot be defined, nor does it need to be.

[snip]

No, it is irrelevant from which metaphysic you approach this issue. Materialism could only ever accommodate p-zombie consciousness.
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This pretty much says it all. A p-zombie is defined to be exactly like a normal person, only without "consciousness". You can't define what the term "consciousness" means, so any distinction between a normal person and a p-zombie is meaningless.

If you reject the existence of consciousness sure! But I would suggest that only a p-zombie could claim that consciousness is meaningless. We cannot define it, but each one of us (ie the non p-zombies) is immediately acquainted with it. It is for this reason that we know consciousness better than we know anything. It cannot be defined because it is neither an object in the world which can be pointed at, nor does it and could it play any fruitful role in any of theories in our scientific descriptions of reality, nor is it logically implied by anything in the world. But the inability to provide a definition doesn't alter the fact that we know it better than we know anything physical since we are immediately acquainted with it.

You say that materialism claims we are all p-zombies?

No, I'm saying that materialism could in principle only ever explain p-zombies and not proper people.

Tell me what the difference between a human being and a p-zombie is, without making reference to terms you cannot define, and then I'll worry about whether that is a problem or not.

I can't, but as explained this is irrelevant to the existence of consciousness.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You both continue to give a special place to consciousness just because it happens to be going on in our heads.

I don't think it is going on inside our heads. Nor would I grant it a specail status if this were so.

It is entirely possible that consciousness is a result of the physical structure of my brain,

Epiphenomenalism is possible, not reductive materialism.

can be completely quanitified, and yet "feel subjective" to exactly one person: me. So someone else can describe my consciousness mathematically, yet still not know what I feel like.

How would saying something like 2 + 3 = 5 be describing something like a feeling of despair?

If you insist on giving this special place to consciousness, I think you should explain why you don't give the same special place to what it feels like to be a tree or a rock.

We normally suppose trees and rocks are not conscious. If we are right here (and I acknowledge we may well be wrong), then there cannot be anything to feeling like a rock or tree.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Not if you suppose physics deals only with the perceptually perceived. What evidence or reason do you have to suppose it deals with more than that?
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Physics deals with more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

I'm afraid you're mistaken.

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My answer is "other".
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Knew it. I should've made it:
4)Other. (explain).

The self doesn't originate at all. It has always existed, it always will exist although its eventual teleological destiny is to become one with all other selves.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,


Yet, despite not having them, the P-Zombie insists he does. "You don't experience red"says Ian. "Nonsense, I experience red just as you do" replies the P-Zombie. Brain wave analysis confirms that both Ian and the P-Zombie had exactly the same "measurable activity" when seeing red. Both Ian and Mr P-Zombie confirm they did in fact see red, and that they experienced seeing red. Ian says "but by definition, you didn't really experience red". Mr P-Zombie replies "stuff the definition, I'm telling you I *did* experience red". Why is Mr P-Zombie so sure, Ian? What happened in his head to convince him that he did indeed have this experience?

The p-zombie is only sure[z]. But he is not really sure since he is not conscious! His output (him saying sure) is simply the result an algorithm. My utterance is accompanied by the qualitative feel of seeing red.

More importantly, if his subjective view of his own behaviour is that he *did* experience red, and the objective brain measures confirm the usual "seeing red" pattern, then how do *you* know you're not a P-Zombie? Your subjective view? - but he has that also. Your objective measurements? - but he has those also.

How do you know you aren't a P-Zombie? Presumably, your answer is "because I *know* I have qualia".
If I asked a P-Zombie how they knew they *were not* a P-Zombie, they'd presumably answer "because *I know* I have qualia". They'd say that, even though they don't. So much for qualia having an "intuitive" existence.

This could only be a problem for epiphenomenalism ie if my reasoning and conclusion that I have qualia is itself an epiphenomenon.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,


Yet, despite not having them, the P-Zombie insists he does. "You don't experience red"says Ian. "Nonsense, I experience red just as you do" replies the P-Zombie. Brain wave analysis confirms that both Ian and the P-Zombie had exactly the same "measurable activity" when seeing red. Both Ian and Mr P-Zombie confirm they did in fact see red, and that they experienced seeing red. Ian says "but by definition, you didn't really experience red". Mr P-Zombie replies "stuff the definition, I'm telling you I *did* experience red". Why is Mr P-Zombie so sure, Ian? What happened in his head to convince him that he did indeed have this experience?

More importantly, if his subjective view of his own behaviour is that he *did* experience red, and the objective brain measures confirm the usual "seeing red" pattern, then how do *you* know you're not a P-Zombie? Your subjective view? - but he has that also. Your objective measurements? - but he has those also.

How do you know you aren't a P-Zombie? Presumably, your answer is "because I *know* I have qualia".
If I asked a P-Zombie how they knew they *were not* a P-Zombie, they'd presumably answer "because *I know* I have qualia". They'd say that, even though they don't. So much for qualia having an "intuitive" existence.

Loki,

Just been thinking about this for the past 20 mins. I think I've changed my mind from what I used to believe. I think I tentatively agree that if the world is physically closed, then no meaningful distinction can be drawn between p-zombies and real people. After all, my conviction that I am a real person, experience qualia etc would itself be simply a consequence of physical processes.

So I am now leaning towards the idea that we cannot draw any meaningful distinction between real people and p-zombies if the physical world is closed. This therefore has serious consequences for epiphenomenalism. It seems that epiphenomenalism is as equally unintelligible as materialism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Loki,

Just been thinking about this for the past 20 mins. I think I've changed my mind from what I used to believe. I think I tentatively agree that if the world is physically closed, then no meaningful distinction can be drawn between p-zombies and real people. After all, my conviction that I am a real person, experience qualia etc would itself be simply a consequence of physical processes.

So I am now leaning towards the idea that we cannot draw any meaningful distinction between real people and p-zombies if the physical world is closed. This therefore has serious consequences for epiphenomenalism. It seems that epiphenomenalism is as equally unintelligible as materialism.

So following on from this, if the world is physically closed, and all possible knowledge about all things are derived through the 5 senses, then there cannot be any distinction between real people and p-zombies. But I know I'm not a p-zombie by definition. As there cannot be a distinction between real people and p-zombies (given the world is physically closed) it therefore follows that no-one can be a p-zombie.

But materialism can only ever imply the existence of p-zombies and not real people! So therefore given that I know I am not a p-zombie, it necessarily means that the world is not physically closed.

Therefore libertarian free will necessarily exists!

Hey! I've just thought all this out now! Is there anything wrong with my reasoning??

 

[Mercutio]

From the last 10 or 20 posts or so, I have concluded that I am a p-zombie. (Technically, an M-zombie, if you read back that far...) The things that Ian knows as givens, I cannot claim to share. I do think, I do see red, I do feel, but I don't have any consciousness that I can independently detect. I am perfectly serious about this; from all definitions of m-zombie (which was just a very slight definition change from a p-zombie), I am one. I am not a human being, by Ian's definition, as far as I can tell.

Though it does not bother me to be an M-zombie, I am curious as to how many other posters are m-zombies and how many of you are human. A show of hands, please?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

... nor does it and could it play any fruitful role in any of theories in our scientific descriptions of reality, ...

I thought we had agreed this was incorrect. If it does not, then we can't be talking about it.

How would saying something like 2 + 3 = 5 be describing something like a feeling of despair?

You constantly repeat a trivial math formula and then ask how it could describe some complex emotion or thought. Is that the only math formula my brain can compute? I doubt it.

We normally suppose trees and rocks are not conscious. If we are right here (and I acknowledge we may well be wrong), then there cannot be anything to feeling like a rock or tree.

If everything is just consciousness, then everything is conscious. Seems wildly presumptuous to assume that these things are not conscious. If they are, there is no way you are going to know what it is like to be them.

So following on from this, if the world is physically closed, and all possible knowledge about all things are derived through the 5 senses, then there cannot be any distinction between real people and p-zombies. But I know I'm not a p-zombie by definition. As there cannot be a distinction between real people and p-zombies (given the world is physically closed) it therefore follows that no-one can be a p-zombie.

But materialism can only ever imply the existence of p-zombies and not real people! So therefore given that I know I am not a p-zombie, it necessarily means that the world is not physically closed.

Therefore libertarian free will necessarily exists!

Hey! I've just thought all this out now! Is there anything wrong with my reasoning??

Your entire argument is based on the assumption that there is a difference between real people and p-zombies. You then use the wild premise that you know you're not a p-zombie to try to convince us that a physical world won't allow a distinction between real people and p-zombies, so therefore the world is something other than physical.

Imagine there was no difference between real people and p-zombies to begin with.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

nor does it and could it play any fruitful role in any of theories in our scientific descriptions of reality, ...
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I thought we had agreed this was incorrect.

You really got to be kidding!

If it does not, then we can't be talking about it.

Why not?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Your entire argument is based on the assumption that there is a difference between real people and p-zombies.

Well this follows from how p-zombies are defined ie a behaviourally indiscernible but insentient simulacrum of a human
cognizer. We know that we as real people are not insentient because we have raw conscious experiences where as a p-zombie is defined as not having any raw conscious experiences.

Now if you were to claim that p-zombies are logically impossible then that is another matter. In which case I would simply say prove it.

You then use the wild premise that you know you're not a p-zombie to try to convince us that a physical world won't allow a distinction between real people and p-zombies, so therefore the world is something other than physical.

Er. . .no . .I didn't say that. If everything I think and feel follows on from physical processes, then so must the conclusion that I have qualia. So my conviction that I have qualia doesn't appear to provide evidence that I do experience qualia. But this is an obvious absurdity since we can be more sure than anything else we experience qualia. I mean qualia are an uninterpreted direct reality. Therefore there is something wrong with our original reasoning. The only one which appears to be uncertain is our initial stiplulation that the world is physically closed. We must reject this premise. Hence libertarian free will exists. YES THIS IS PROOF!! At least I think it is. Just worked it out today

Imagine there was no difference between real people and p-zombies to begin with.

~~ Paul [/B]

I can't by virtue of a definition of a real person and a p-zombie. A real person has consciousness. A p-zombie only has consciousness[z]

 

[Dancing David]

Suggestologist: I think that if you looked you would find that there is plenty of language being used to decribe the phenmoena that you discuss and that it is already very well studied and discussed on the board.
I would just say that I find it more usefule to refer to thoughts as thoughts and not label them as hallucinations. I don't see what point you have made, if you open your mind you will see and find that most of us are already in agreement with you, it is just difficult for us to discuss becuase of the language barrier. I agree that in coversation language hallucination is applied to many things. Not as useful in deliniating discuss.
Also you cliam to have mormalized and exoticed the human condition. I am sceptical, I don't see that you have, but I agree that we all partake of the different aspectso of human experience, but there are degrees to all experiences.

Titus and Ian:
You have both made the bold claim that consious processes occur somehere outside the brain. This is a sceptics board and as much as i respect your viewpoints, you both have to prove it. You made the claims, where its it?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian, if consciousness doesn't play any fruitful role in any of theories in our scientific descriptions of reality, then that includes causing our mouths to discuss consciousness.

Well this follows from how p-zombies are defined ie a behaviourally indiscernible but insentient simulacrum of a human
cognizer. We know that we as real people are not insentient because we have raw conscious experiences where as a p-zombie is defined as not having any raw conscious experiences.

Yes, that is the definition of a p-zombie, more or less. That does not mean that p-zombies actually exist.

I said:

You then use the wild premise that you know you're not a p-zombie to try to convince us that a physical world won't allow a distinction between real people and p-zombies, so therefore the world is something other than physical.

and Ian said:

Er. . .no . .I didn't say that.

I think you did:

But materialism can only ever imply the existence of p-zombies and not real people! So therefore given that I know I am not a p-zombie, it necessarily means that the world is not physically closed.

If everything I think and feel follows on from physical processes, then so must the conclusion that I have qualia. So my conviction that I have qualia doesn't appear to provide evidence that I do experience qualia. But this is an obvious absurdity since we can be more sure than anything else we experience qualia. I mean qualia are an uninterpreted direct reality.

This just goes round and round. Of course you experience qualia, but nothing forces them to be something other than brain function. I have no idea what "uninterpreted direct reality" is.

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

If you reject the existence of consciousness sure!

I can neither reject nor accept its existence until you define what you mean by the term.

But I would suggest that only a p-zombie could claim that consciousness is meaningless.

If you cannot define what the word means, then it is meaningless. That is what the word "meaningless" means.

We cannot define it, but each one of us (ie the non p-zombies) is immediately acquainted with it. It is for this reason that we know consciousness better than we know anything.

There is certainly something which I call consciousness, which I am immediately acquainted with. I am quite capable of defining what I mean by the word, though. And I certainly see no reason to think that this thing which I am immediately acquainted with is not definable, or that it cannot be investigated scientifically.

Of course, a p-zombie would be "immediately acquainted" with those brain processes which I am claiming are consciousness. But they are definable, and can be studied scientifically.

Since, by definition, there is no way for you to know whether you are p-zombie or not, why do you think it is not possible for that which you are "immediately acquainted with", to be certain brain processes?

It cannot be defined because it is neither an object in the world which can be pointed at, nor does it and could it play any fruitful role in any of theories in our scientific descriptions of reality, nor is it logically implied by anything in the world.

Well, perhaps whatever it is whose existence you are going on about cannot be, but I have no reason to think that what I am "immediately acquainted with" fits this description. It sounds to me like you are just making assertions with no supporting evidence.

But the inability to provide a definition doesn't alter the fact that we know it better than we know anything physical since we are immediately acquainted with it.

Your inability to provide a definition just indicates your own conceptual confusion. You see, you may not realize it, but when you say that consciousness is "that which you are immediately acquainted with", you have just provided a definition for consciousness.

You say that materialism claims we are all p-zombies?
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No, I'm saying that materialism could in principle only ever explain p-zombies and not proper people.

If I ever meet one I'll be sure to let you know. ::

Tell me what the difference between a human being and a p-zombie is, without making reference to terms you cannot define, and then I'll worry about whether that is a problem or not.
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I can't, but as explained this is irrelevant to the existence of consciousness.

It is relevant to whether or not it is meaningful to talk about it at all.

So following on from this, if the world is physically closed, and all possible knowledge about all things are derived through the 5 senses, then there cannot be any distinction between real people and p-zombies. But I know I'm not a p-zombie by definition. As there cannot be a distinction between real people and p-zombies (given the world is physically closed) it therefore follows that no-one can be a p-zombie.

But materialism can only ever imply the existence of p-zombies and not real people! So therefore given that I know I am not a p-zombie, it necessarily means that the world is not physically closed.

Therefore libertarian free will necessarily exists!

Actually, even if the above premises were true, it would only imply that the supernatural exists.

Hey! I've just thought all this out now! Is there anything wrong with my reasoning??

Yes, your claim that materialism can only ever imply the existence of p-zombies, and not real people, is based on the assumption that real people are causally affected by something non-physical. You have no evidence for this, only your intuitive preconceptions.

This means that you are concluding that the physical world is not causally closed from the assumption that something non-physical (your free-will) is causally affecting something physical (your brain).

Unless you can demonstrate that something non-physical is having an effect on your brain, that is begging the question.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well this follows from how p-zombies are defined ie a behaviourally indiscernible but insentient simulacrum of a human
cognizer. We know that we as real people are not insentient because we have raw conscious experiences where as a p-zombie is defined as not having any raw conscious experiences.

Now if you were to claim that p-zombies are logically impossible then that is another matter. In which case I would simply say prove it.



Er. . .no . .I didn't say that. If everything I think and feel follows on from physical processes, then so must the conclusion that I have qualia. So my conviction that I have qualia doesn't appear to provide evidence that I do experience qualia. But this is an obvious absurdity since we can be more sure than anything else we experience qualia. I mean qualia are an uninterpreted direct reality. Therefore there is something wrong with our original reasoning. The only one which appears to be uncertain is our initial stiplulation that the world is physically closed. We must reject this premise. Hence libertarian free will exists. YES THIS IS PROOF!! At least I think it is. Just worked it out today



I can't by virtue of a definition of a real person and a p-zombie. A real person has consciousness. A p-zombie only has consciousness[z]

Yes, the only escape for the materialist is to logically demonstrate that p-zombies are logically impossible!

By logically impossible I mean that there is an inherent incoherency in the notion of a p-zombie, for eg like an object which at the same time is simultaneously both a cube and a sphere. That is to say that it must be shown that p-zombies could not obtain in any logically possible Universe.

But it is difficult to see how the materialist could do this. After all, unlike an object which is simultaneously both a cube and a sphere, I can certainly conceive of p-zombies. That which is conceivable tends to suggest that it is logically possible. Certainly the onus is on the materialist to logically demonstrate that they are not.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus and Ian:
You have both made the bold claim that consious processes occur somehere outside the brain. This is a sceptics board and as much as i respect your viewpoints, you both have to prove it. You made the claims, where its it? [/B]

I haven't and I can't recall Titus claiming this either. Consciousness has no location because it is not physical.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

The self doesn't originate at all. It has always existed,

Where?

we know consciousness better than we know anything.

Because we're conscious? I hereby invoke Gödel.

It cannot be defined because it is neither an object in the world which can be pointed at,

Lots of things can be defined that do not easily fit in the category 'object'. Is 'resonance' an object that can be pointed at? How about 'recursion'?

nor does it and could it play any fruitful role in any of theories in our scientific descriptions of reality,

There's an airtight tautology.

nor is it logically implied by anything in the world.

It is strongly implied, however.

 

[Interesting Ian]

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If everything I think and feel follows on from physical processes, then so must the conclusion that I have qualia. So my conviction that I have qualia doesn't appear to provide evidence that I do experience qualia. But this is an obvious absurdity since we can be more sure than anything else we experience qualia. I mean qualia are an uninterpreted direct reality.
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This just goes round and round. Of course you experience qualia, but nothing forces them to be something other than brain function. I have no idea what "uninterpreted direct reality" is.

But this is the whole point! My whole argument was that the world can't be determined, therefore materialism as generally understood is false, therefore qualia are not a brain function!

You have completely ignored my argument and simply reasserted your premise at the end of my refutation of your premise!!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

If everything I think and feel follows on from physical processes, then so must the conclusion that I have qualia. So my conviction that I have qualia doesn't appear to provide evidence that I do experience qualia. But this is an obvious absurdity since we can be more sure than anything else we experience qualia. I mean qualia are an uninterpreted direct reality.

and after I responded he said:

You have completely ignored my argument and simply reasserted your premise at the end of my refutation of your premise!!

I guess I don't understand your argument. I know I don't understand what "uninterpreted directy reality" is. Could you restate the argument?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

The self doesn't originate at all. It has always existed,
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Where?

Nowhere. Not being physical it has no location.

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we know consciousness better than we know anything.
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Because we're conscious? I hereby invoke Gödel.

If you have an argument against that then supply it.

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It cannot be defined because it is neither an object in the world which can be pointed at,
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Lots of things can be defined that do not easily fit in the category 'object'.

I know. See my other options

Is 'resonance' an object that can be pointed at? How about 'recursion'?

I have no idea what recurssion mean. There are many existents which cannot be pointed at. But if they are physical they must fit into the 3 alternatives I have supplied.

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nor does it and could it play any fruitful role in any of theories in our scientific descriptions of reality,
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There's an airtight tautology.

No it isn't, and if you disagree then show how it can. Anbd show how it can by not begging the question ie don't presume at the outset that conscious experiences are one and the same thing as physical processes.

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nor is it logically implied by anything in the world.
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It is strongly implied, however. [/B]

No it isn't. Within any materialist based metaphysic consciousness is just tacked onto the world. It is superflous. It cannot do anything.