A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Physical structures and processes can always, by definition (even if only in principle) be described exhaustively in mathematical, quantitative terms. There are no physical structures or processes, either in the brain defined as a physical system or anywhere else in the physical world, which can possess any non-quantitative properties. Non-quantitative properties are properties which don't belong to physical systems. Now, if we acknowledge that subjective experiences aren't completely quantifiable (not even in principle), we must automatically acknowledge that there can't be a completely quantifiable system (the brain, a computer, or whatever) with subjective experiences.
It's as simple as that.

and Ian said:

I don't understand how it can be. How can sadness have a location? I mean it can't have unless you beg the question and say sadness is just certain physical processes in the brain. But that is absurd because sadness is a certain feeling accessible only to the person experiencing it ie it is only known from the first person perspective. That is to say it is subjective. Physical processes however are objective and can potentially be seen and measured by anyone.

You both continue to give a special place to consciousness just because it happens to be going on in our heads. It is entirely possible that consciousness is a result of the physical structure of my brain, can be completely quanitified, and yet "feel subjective" to exactly one person: me. So someone else can describe my consciousness mathematically, yet still not know what I feel like.

If you insist on giving this special place to consciousness, I think you should explain why you don't give the same special place to what it feels like to be a tree or a rock. What assumptions are you making that lead you to ignore this issue?

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

There is an excellent example of how this can help a schizophrenic. It is documented that a certain therapist told ("convinced" may be a better word) a schizophrenic who visually hallucinated fairies flying around her head to instead: put them in an envelope which the therapist would then keep for safe-keeping. The patient could come back to the therapist's office and visit the fairies, anytime she wanted to. This worked: she stopped hallucinating the fairies, believing them to now occupy the therapist's envelope. Initially she visited them weekly, but eventually reduced the visits to monthly, then less and less to once every 2 years, and then she apparently forgot about them or died of natural causes. So, relocating hallucinations has practical applications even for some schizophrenics.

This allowed her to be a full functioning member of society -- the fairies now didn't interfere with her daily life. And this method has infinately more efficacy than electro-shock or brain surgery, or years of being locked up in an institution.

Ah, the anecdotal treatment of a misdiagnosed mental illness through the theraputic process.(This is very similar to the lining of the hat with tin foil)

From the scientific viewpoint there are a number of reasons this could happen.
Nomenclature issues: some doctors make general diagnosis of schizophrenia where it would not be warranted under the system delineated in the DSM-IV, generaly because the 'prodromal' period of decline has not been met. Or they misdiagnose based on a lack of understanding the treatment of the illness, both depression and bipolar disorder can cause the appearance of hallucinations. Then there is also the schizophreniform which is a hort term period of psychosis that may or may not repeat itself.
Seizure disorders: despite what most conventiona wisdom will tell you, visual hallucinations are very rare in scizophrenia, theyt are generaly a response to oraganic brain syndromes or damagae.

So while this might hve benifited this one individual, I have worked with hundreds of people living with schizophrenia, and telling them to put thier voices in a box will not make the voices go away.

Now that side, that is very useful technique for the treatsment of many cognitive disorders, especialy anxiety and other stress related conditions. The 'god box' is a common tool used by people going through recovery, as a way of comaptementalizinf thier anxiety.

So at this point Suggestologist: I do understand your point about hallucination, but I just find that the use of language does not add to the clarity of the discussion. I respect your POV but do not share it.

Personaly I find there is a welth of clarify-ing language that can allow for direct communication.

And in answer to the cat with the ball of yarn, no they do not see the same cat, they may share similar cognitive maps which allow them to discuss the cat and the yarn, but they may only share the maps. This does not however support ian's contention that the material world does not exist.

In general(to all and sundry): there is no thinker behind the thought, there is no feeler behind the emotions, there is no seer behind the eye. That is an illsiory trap of misperception. The mind and the self are pictures we place in reality, just like constelations in the sky, they don't exist.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

How much of a quale is intellectual?

Imagine someone grew up without ever learning anything about fear: never reading about it, talking about it, having someone point out that he was afraid. What would fear feel like to this person?

He would still have all the physical correlates of fear when presented with a fearful stimulus. Well, some of the correlates anyway. But he would have no intellectual understanding of fear, no notions about how he should feel or what he should do or why he was afraid, no association with other fear events in history.

For him, would there be something it was like to be afraid, or would it be a completely mechanical reaction?

~~ Paul

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

How can sadness have a location? I mean it can't have unless you beg the question and say sadness is just certain physical processes in the brain.

Is there a difference between begging a question and testing a hypothesis?

Neurobiology is an embryonic science; new theory inspires new technology, and the new technology inspires new theory; the fat lady has yet to sing.

For instance, PET scans of depressed patients show increases in blood flow in the frontal cortex and the amygdala; but to say: "sadness is just certain physical processes in the brain" would of course be an oversimplification.

Fear triggers an array of autonomic and endocrine responses such as changes in levels of testosterone, cortisol, etc. The adrenal glands for example (nowhere near the brain) release epinephrine, which increases pulse rate, and acts as a bronchodilator, etc. The feeling of fear then, is a composite of incoming signals from throughout the body.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Some replies to Paul again

Paul said:

And how do these nonphysical things interact with my brain? In particular, could you draw the line between the types of memories stored in my brain and the types stored in my consciousness?

Well, that's the old question of interaction. Here it is enough to state that they do interact with the brain. The memories which cannot be stored in the brain are memories which contain information about the conscious experiences themselves rather than just about their possible neural correlates. Elsewhere I've termed these memories "metasubjective" or 'metaphenomenal" memories which refer to conscious experiences.

You both continue to give a special place to consciousness just because it happens to be going on in our heads.

Not at all, neurological processes happen to be going in our heads and I don't give a special place to them. So that can't be the criterion.

It is entirely possible that consciousness is a result of the physical structure of my brain,

It sometimes is partially caused by physical processes (rather than structures as such) but that doesn't make them even a bit physical themselves.

can be completely quanitified

Please give me just one convincing example! It is a priori impossible.

and yet "feel subjective" to exactly one person: me. So someone else can describe my consciousness mathematically, yet still not know what I feel like.

The other person wouldn't be describing your consciousness at all, but at best the possible physical correlates of it.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Two forms of idealism at this forum?

Hi Ian and Hammegk,

Have I understood you correctly?

You're both idealists but you don't agree on the existence of telepathy?

Hammegk, wouldn't you agree that within an idealist ontology you need to explain the correspondence in our (apparent) individual perceptions of an illusory external physical world? And what would be your alternative if you don't postulate a process related to telepathy? Some kind of divine "(pre)stabilization" a la Leibniz? Please clarify!


Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

How can sadness have a location? I mean it can't have unless you beg the question and say sadness is just certain physical processes in the brain.
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Is there a difference between begging a question and testing a hypothesis?

So we have a "hypothesis" that says that "A" and "B" are the very same thing even though they are utterly characteristicly unlike each other. It's like saying a biscuit is the very same thing as an elephant is a hypothesis, and after enumerating all the differences between a biscuit and an elephant, and pointing out there are no similarities whatsoever, you still insisting it is an hypothesis! So we have a hypothesis which is inconsistent with all facts and which could never be shown to be false. Hmmmmm

Neurobiology is an embryonic science; new theory inspires new technology, and the new technology inspires new theory; the fat lady has yet to sing.

Doesn't matter. Consciousness can never be explained by science in principle. Within the materialist metaphysic consciousness must always remain something which is simply tacked onto the world.

For instance, PET scans of depressed patients show increases in blood flow in the frontal cortex and the amygdala; but to say: "sadness is just certain physical processes in the brain" would of course be an oversimplification.

Oversimplification! It's just flat out false.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Two forms of idealism at this forum?

Hi Ian and Hammegk,

Have I understood you correctly?

You're both idealists but you don't agree on the existence of telepathy?

Hammegk, wouldn't you agree that within an idealist ontology you need to explain the correspondence in our (apparent) individual perceptions of an illusory external physical world? And what would be your alternative if you don't postulate a process related to telepathy? Some kind of divine "stabilization" a la Leibniz? Please clarify!


Titus

I don't think the external world is illusionary at all. In fact I don't know what is meant by describing it as illusionary.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Illusory

Ian said:

I don't think the external world is illusionary at all. In fact I don't know what is meant by describing it as illusionary.

I mean by illusory (here) that you have the impression or 'idea' (in the idealist sense) of an external, physical world out there. But that this impression is based on a misinterpretation of subjective experience. The physical world would be part of mental reality and it would have no substantial existence of its own, outside our minds. I have always understood this as the main idealist tenet.

The other type of idealism, sometimes called emanationism (emergent idealism), holds that matter does exist semi-independently but only as an emanation of mind. In a way, it's a type of dualism (or more generally pluralism). From what I gathered on this forum I thought you both held a non-emergent position. Tell me where I went wrong in your case, Ian!

Titus

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Some replies to Paul again

Well, that's the old question of interaction. Here it is enough to state that they do interact with the brain. The memories which cannot be stored in the brain are memories which contain information about the conscious experiences themselves rather than just about their possible neural correlates. Elsewhere I've termed these memories "metasubjective" or 'metaphenomenal" memories which refer to conscious experiences.

"It is enough to state that they do interact with the brain"? What "they" interacts with the brain? "It is enough to state that my assumptions are true" does not address the truth of your assumptions.

"The memories which cannot be stored in the brain" are exactly what memories? Is this a reference to the imperfect and reconstructive nature of memory? If so, we have no need to "store" those memories anywhere! Like Randi's tests, don't go explaining the mechanism of an ability before you demonstrate that the ability exists! Like DD has said here, advances in our understanding of memory (we follow the actual evidence, rather than trying to introspectively study some hypothetical ideal notion of memory) are demonstrating that some of our old questions about memory "storage" are quite simply nonsensical. Encoding, storage and retrieval are useful metaphors when studying remembering, but they are only metaphors. If you can demonstrate some "memories which cannot be stored in the brain", I have some cognitive psychologist researcher friends who would be glad to make a career out of this groundbreaking area.

 

[Rayn]

Titus Rivas said: Rayn said:


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the first (bold) statement, I don't see why subjective information "cannot" be found in the brain. Subjective information is encoded in every brain, but it is unique to every brain. No brains are exactly alike, hence subjectivity.
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That's another meaning of the term subjectivity. Again, what I'm referring to here, is subjectivity in the sense of "undergoing subjective experiences", not in the sense of 'non-objectivity'.

I don't see how this doesn't fit my description. The brain does "undergo subjective experiences," it is subjective and has a "first-person perspective" due to its uniqueness in spacetime subtext and physiological configuration/composition. What exactly is your definition of "subjective experience" then if it is not "non-objective experience"?

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Moreover, on a "physical" level, no brains could ever be "exactly" alike due to spacetime subtexts. Is there an argument as to why this unique subjectivity is not your "quality," but is merely "quantity"?
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Yes, and a very simple one too. The subjectivity we're discussing here is not the subjectivity of "relativity of one's specific perspective". If that were the issue, you'd be right. Then the issue would be "How is it possible that everybody has his own perspective" and then the differences between brains would be similar to the differences between perspectives.

Again, what is the subjectivity that we are discussing then?

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Which brings me to the second (bold) statement. It seems a tautology based on your definitions and word usage.
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It's a logical deduction and therefore it really is based on the definitions and concepts used. However, there is no question of arbitrary definitions. The definitions certainly weren't formulated in order to draw the desired conclusions!


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Of course a brain state that is "non-qualitative" would not have information about "qualitative experiences," but how does this rule out "qualitative brain states"? What exactly is a "non-quantitative quality"?
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By a non-quantitative quality I understand a quality that cannot (not even in principle) be exhaustively described in quantitative terms.

Then, by definition quality cannot arise out of quantity? So, if I accept your definitions, then I must also accept a dualistic conception of consciousness, that there is the brain, which can be described only quantitatively, and "something else," which holds all quality. Is this the case Titus? Because I don't see how you can be arguing for some dualism when your definitions implicitly assume this dualism to exist, that is begging the question.

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Why is the brain "non-subjective"? Isn't it a subject in-and-of-itself?
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The brain is a entirely physical system, at least as it is defined within neurology or biology. The brain does not possess any properties which cannot be described in terms of physical structures and processes. Physical structures and processes can always, by definition (even if only in principle) be described exhaustively in mathematical, quantitative terms. There are no physical structures or processes, either in the brain defined as a physical system or anywhere else in the physical world, which can possess any non-quantitative properties. Non-quantitative properties are properties which don't belong to physical systems. Now, if we acknowledge that subjective experiences aren't completely quantifiable (not even in principle), we must automatically acknowledge that there can't be a completely quantifiable system (the brain, a computer, or whatever) with subjective experiences.
It's as simple as that.

Again you argue from definition. What if I reject your terminology and the implicit dualism? As it is difficult to carry on a discussion without agreed upon terminology, any follow up on this will be difficult. I will say, however, that although our "first-person experience" is filled with things which you define as "non-quantifiable" (which is the only real definition of "quality" you provide), i.e., hopes, desires, pains, joys, etc., nowhere have you shown that such "non-quantifiability" is necessary. Why can't "quality" arise from the specific "quantity" that is my body? Does this diminish anything at all? Is the sunset any less beautiful, Coltrane's sax any less vibrant, T.S. Eliot's words any less poignant because it is "only" my body that is undergoing these "subjective experiences"? I believe they are only if you believe they are, that there must be something more. Provide me some evidence for such a necessity, please, and do it without your terminology, which I cannot agree to use for reasons stated.

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What is "the feeling of sadness" without a brain state?
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It's exactly that: the feeling of sadness. There is no logical relation between a brain state and a feeling of sadness. There just may be a relation in terms of laws of psychophysical interaction. It is logically conceivable that certain subjects have feelings of sadness without a neural correlate, especially during a possible existence outside this physical world.

Titus

I think there is a clear logical relation between brain state and a feeling of sadness. That there is a certain sub-set of brain states that arise into an emotion we label as "sadness." You obviously would disagree due to your implicit dualism, which I do not believe you have justified. Also, although it may be "logically conceivable" I am not sure that it is in any way "probable," and I won't touch your statement of there being something "outside this physical world." It is also "logically conceivable" that I will be able to pass through a wall, that every one of my molecules will be able to find a space to pass through every one of the walls molecules. This is mathematically possible. But, according to the math, I won't be able to do so until our sun decides to nova, and believe me I won't be running into a wall waiting for that moment.

Anyways, my point is that I don't see any conceivable reason why there should be this dichotomy between "quality" and "quantity" that you assert. I do not see how "quality" being an emergent property of my body is in any way detrimental, unless I am hoping for some persistence of personality after death. Moreover, I think that even if there were a persistence of personality after death that it could be explained through science. As I have stated earlier in this thread, I think the Implicate Order Theory is an outstanding interpretation of quantum mechanics, and that such a theory can reconcile your "quality" and "quantity." Your insistence that such a division be acknowledged has no real justification to back it up, outside of definitions. Check out IO Theory, maybe you'll agree that such a reconciliation is possible under science, who knows.

 

[Rayn]

Ian said:
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Originally posted by Rayn




In the first (bold) statement, I don't see why subjective information "cannot" be found in the brain.


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I don't understand how it can be. How can sadness have a location? I mean it can't have unless you beg the question and say sadness is just certain physical processes in the brain. But that is absurd because sadness is a certain feeling accessible only to the person experiencing it ie it is only known from the first person perspective. That is to say it is subjective. Physical processes however are objective and can potentially be seen and measured by anyone.

Well, suppose that we were able to "stop time" during a particular moment of sadness. I believe that there will be characteristic neurophysical events that will be unfolding during this moment, or in other words, there will be a brain state that has similar characteristics to the brain states of other people during such a moment (and I believe that you agree that brain states can influence "feelings" and "emotions"). However, the exact brain state for a particular individual will be unique, based upon the chaotic algorithm that has been shaped through their life experiences.

Just because we can observe physical processes does not in any way entail that we will also be able to "experience" them ourselves. We have completely unique brain structures and chemistries, and the only hypothetical way in which we could experience such physical experiences were if we could "create" an exact replica of the subjects brain and replace ours with the "created" brain. Yet, we would still be entirely different "subjects" due to spacetime subtexts. Another added complication may be that quantum events have a large role to play in the physical events of a brain state. Consequently, any observation or measurement by us would ultimately interfere with the "experience" of said brain state.

As I just posted to Titus, I just do not see why such "subjectivity" is not the unique differences that every individual has in their body. Our unique bodies provide the special "first-person perspective," so I do not see why this is a problem for you Ian. Why does "subjectivity" hold such a reified status with you?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Consciousness can never be explained by science in principle.

Consciousness as you seem to define it neither needs nor deserves explaining anyway.

Within the materialist metaphysic consciousness must always remain something which is simply tacked onto the world.

I agree, but would rephrase slightly: Within the materialist metaphysic certain definitions for consciousness must always refer to something which is simply tacked onto the world by Idealists.

 

[Suggestologist]

I think I understand what you are saying by the word "hallucination," Suggestologist, but from what DD has posted, I don't believe he wishes to (nor does Mercutio and I would steer away from such use as well) agree to such a definition. Personally, although you seem to be trying to make the point that "everyone hallucinates," such a point is not going to be readily conceded here. I would prefer to say that "everyone thinks" or "everyone has a subjective experience" before I would say "everyone hallucinates," merely due to the fact that you insist on using a word outside of its normal denotation. Anyways, I was just wondering as what argument this furthers for you, or in other words, if we concede to your definition of hallucination, and your subsequent conclusion that "everyone hallucinates," where does that take us?

I have argued at a meta-level from the particular argument between the materialists and the um... nonmaterialists or whatever they call themselves.

Hallucination in the way I have used it, denotes the same thing as the dictionary definition, it just ignores the default connotation. By apposing the pathological with the normal, I exoticize the familiar and/or normalize the exotic. Thus hopelessly confusing everyone who can't deal with it, and proving my point.

I show that the way we build stories in our minds around the language someone uses; varies from person to person; and people should keep that in mind when they think they disagree with someone about something. The temptation to attribute negative intent to someone who you think sees the same picture as you do, but keeps contradicting it, is understandable. But when you understand that you don't know what their picture is, that attribution should pass away; and you should seek to aquire more information about their picture.

Further, I show the mutability of hallucinations; as I have defined them; through purely psychological interference. Though I don't claim that is always possible.

 

[Mercutio]

Hallucination in the way I have used it, denotes the same thing as the dictionary definition, it just ignores the default connotation. By apposing the pathological with the normal, I exoticize the familiar and/or normalize the exotic. Thus hopelessly confusing everyone who can't deal with it, and proving my point.

I show that the way we build stories in our minds around the language someone uses; varies from person to person; and people should keep that in mind when they think they disagree with someone about something. The temptation to attribute negative intent to someone who you think sees the same picture as you do, but keeps contradicting it, is understandable. But when you understand that you don't know what their picture is, that attribution should pass away; and you should seek to aquire more information about their picture. [/B]

So basically you say nothing more than what any student of cognition, memory and language already knows, but you say it in language that pisses everybody off.


Thanks for playing...

 

[csense]

Hallucination in the way I have used it, denotes the same thing as the dictionary definition, it just ignores the default connotation. By apposing the pathological with the normal, I exoticize the familiar and/or normalize the exotic. Thus hopelessly confusing everyone who can't deal with it, and proving my point.

Well, for what it's worth, I think you're doing a good job of confusing things.
If you ignore the "default connotation," then you'll likely encounter problems correlating "pathological" to any given concept...that is, if you stay true to your principles, which many people don't, either willfuly, or through ignorance.

Of course, with the use of the term ignorance, feel free to ignore similar default connotations.

 

[Rayn]

Suggestologist said: I have argued at a meta-level from the particular argument between the materialists and the um... nonmaterialists or whatever they call themselves.

Hallucination in the way I have used it, denotes the same thing as the dictionary definition, it just ignores the default connotation. By apposing the pathological with the normal, I exoticize the familiar and/or normalize the exotic. Thus hopelessly confusing everyone who can't deal with it, and proving my point.

I show that the way we build stories in our minds around the language someone uses; varies from person to person; and people should keep that in mind when they think they disagree with someone about something. The temptation to attribute negative intent to someone who you think sees the same picture as you do, but keeps contradicting it, is understandable. But when you understand that you don't know what their picture is, that attribution should pass away; and you should seek to aquire more information about their picture.

Further, I show the mutability of hallucinations; as I have defined them; through purely psychological interference. Though I don't claim that is always possible.

Hmm ... well I believe that we would all concede those points, but would insist that using the word "hallucination" in order to "exoticize" our normal subjective experience seems un-profitable. I of course grant that language is an imperfect medium for communication, but (at least at the moment) it is our most efficient one. Moreover, I think by your usage of "hallucination" you clearly illustrated the point that in order to reach a conclusion we must be careful of what words we use, and strive to reach more understanding when we feel that misunderstanding is occuring. Had you posted this from the start, I believe we would have all conceded and moved on, but still insisted that there is no real advantage that the term "hallucination" grants us in this discussion. I agree with your points, and appreciate your contribution, but it did not necessarily serve clarity.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Consciousness can never be explained by science in principle.
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Consciousness as you seem to define it

Consciousness cannot be defined, nor does it need to be.

neither needs nor deserves explaining anyway.

Yes.

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Within the materialist metaphysic consciousness must always remain something which is simply tacked onto the world.
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I agree, but would rephrase slightly: Within the materialist metaphysic certain definitions for consciousness must always refer to something which is simply tacked onto the world by Idealists.

No, it is irrelevant from which metaphysic you approach this issue. Materialism could only ever accommodate p-zombie consciousness.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Consciousness cannot be defined, nor does it need to be.

[snip]

No, it is irrelevant from which metaphysic you approach this issue. Materialism could only ever accommodate p-zombie consciousness.

This pretty much says it all. A p-zombie is defined to be exactly like a normal person, only without "consciousness". You can't define what the term "consciousness" means, so any distinction between a normal person and a p-zombie is meaningless.

You say that materialism claims we are all p-zombies? That's like me saying that idealism claims we are all nurlfes. A nurfle is just like a normal human, except that he doesn't have gorfness. By the way, I can't define what "gorfness" means, nor should I have to. But we should all point and laugh at idealists, because they reject the existence of gorfness, which we all know we possess, even though I can't define what it means.

Tell me what the difference between a human being and a p-zombie is, without making reference to terms you cannot define, and then I'll worry about whether that is a problem or not.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

I don't understand how it can be. How can sadness have a location? I mean it can't have unless you beg the question and say sadness is just certain physical processes in the brain. But that is absurd because sadness is a certain feeling accessible only to the person experiencing it ie it is only known from the first person perspective. That is to say it is subjective. Physical processes however are objective and can potentially be seen and measured by anyone.
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Well, suppose that we were able to "stop time" during a particular moment of sadness. I believe that there will be characteristic neurophysical events that will be unfolding during this moment, or in other words, there will be a brain state that has similar characteristics to the brain states of other people during such a moment (and I believe that you agree that brain states can influence "feelings" and "emotions"). However, the exact brain state for a particular individual will be unique, based upon the chaotic algorithm that has been shaped through their life experiences.

Yes, so what?

Just because we can observe physical processes does not in any way entail that we will also be able to "experience" them ourselves. We have completely unique brain structures and chemistries, and the only hypothetical way in which we could experience such physical experiences were if we could "create" an exact replica of the subjects brain and replace ours with the "created" brain. Yet, we would still be entirely different "subjects" due to spacetime subtexts.

I don't think this would be so under materialism. Under materialism a subject is entirely defined by their brain pattern. It doesn't matter where they are.

Another added complication may be that quantum events have a large role to play in the physical events of a brain state. Consequently, any observation or measurement by us would ultimately interfere with the "experience" of said brain state.

Yes, so what? How on earth any of this remotely addresses my original point is quite beyond me.

As I just posted to Titus, I just do not see why such "subjectivity"

Huh?? Subjectivity?? You clearly don't understand what the word subjectivity means! That is not subjectivity. It has already been explained what subjectivity means. What is wrong with you??

is not the unique differences that every individual has in their body. Our unique bodies provide the special "first-person perspective,"

The fact that your brain is not exactly the same as anyone elses can scarcely be said to provide any justification for the first person perspective! I mean how on earth could it. I just think you don't have a clue what you're talking about.

so I do not see why this is a problem for you Ian. Why does "subjectivity" hold such a reified status with you?

Because the subjective is all that truly exists. It is reality. There is nothing more to the "physical" world than our perceptual experiences of it.