A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Mercutio]

Yes, so why haven't you answered my question?? I repeat:

"What is the distinction between feeling, and "feeling the feeling"??

Ok, this is a little scary, Ian...I would have asked the exact same question. What is the difference?

(for me, there is no difference except in our language. The former, "feeling" is what happens. "Feeling the feeling" is what we say happens.

What is your answer? Anybody, not just Ian)

 

[Suggestologist]

So you persist in the use of the term "hallucination" despite DD's reasonable plea for a more precise term.

It seems reasonable to you because you see the discussion the way you "see" it. In making my point, I attempt to show something different from what you already see.

If you are wishing to use a more general and inclusive term, we have them, and a history of their use in this sort of debate. The more general terms are "seeing" or "hearing" (or whatever sense you wish to exploit). A visual hallucination, as per your usage, is much less contraversially termed "seeing." The voice you claim to hallucinate is "heard." It is trivially obvious (not that that carries any weight around here) that our vision sometimes tricks us, even with our eyes wide open. So accuracy is not a necessary part of seeing, and so your "hallucinations" (I must agree with DD, the word is an emotionally-loaded one--which I doubt very much is coincidental to its use in your posts) are merely one category of "seeing" (perhaps a major category, perhaps a sliver, but hallucinating is seeing--or hearing or feeling, if you wish to try to take a sentence out of context). The logical positivist philosophical literature has many examples of discussions of seeing that do not require an immediately present stimulus; they still call it "seeing."

Although I'm perfectly content with "seeing", I think DD is right, that being more rather than less specific would probably be best for this debate. You want to use "hallucinate"? Please justify why either more or less specific words are less appropriate.

Because it categorizes the particular phenomenae I want to discuss. "Seeing" can categorize parts of what I want to discuss, as can "thinking" and other words, but they don't entirely describe the particular category that I have in mind.

"Hallucinate" does not carry the negative connotation for me, that it apparently does for you and DD (because I routinely use it the way I've used it in this discussion). In assuming that I use it for affective purposes, you illustrate the point I have made all along. You hallucinate my intent based on your own experiences, instead of realizing that you don't have access to my experiences and what I really mean, or what I really intend.

Metaphorizing with "the cat played with a ball of yarn": You hallucinate the cat chasing the ball around in the backyard, while I hallucinate the cat knocking around a ball attached to a pole, indoors. Yet, you continue to think that I have the same hallucination in mind as yourself.

And that constitutes a second-order hallucination -- just kidding -- or am I?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Yes, so why haven't you answered my question?? I repeat:

"What is the distinction between feeling, and "feeling the feeling"??

Since I propose that any such distinction is illusory, I wouldn't be the one to badger for an answer. I was asking Titus for clarification on whether this fairly characterizes his position. You might ask him.

So it is a fundamental principle of physics that not only the physical world is describable by physical laws, but the self and its actions are also.

If, by 'the self', you mean something capable of taking action in the physical world, I would say that physics would seek explanations consistent with certain laws. If, by 'self', you mean something that does not exist in the physical world, I would say that physics does not address that question, rendering meaningless any claim such as: "physical laws apply to not only the perceptually experienced, but experiencers (selfs) also".

I'm sorry but I don't understand. How does what I have said imply that the self originates elsewhere??

I'll tell you what, why don't we end the guessing game?
Pick one:
1)The self originates from brain states.
2)The self originates from something other than brain states.
3)No such thing as a self exists.
4)Other.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk, you didn't go back far enough. Ian said:

Speaking for myself I do not necessarily agree that p-zombies are possible, and even if there were we could distinguish them from normal human beings by anomalous cognition.

Then I said:

Hold on just a durn minute! Are you saying after all these months of discussing consciousness, that the only way to detect your brand of it is through telepathy?

Then you said:

Is this the first moment you've faced this problem? Two choices: solipsism, or "gentlemens' agreement" (*you* are not a p-zombie, or Turing Machine, either, as *I* am not).

What the heck is telepathy?

You see, I use the word telepathy to refer to Ian's anomalous cognition. Then we went into a tailspin from there.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Since I propose that any such distinction is illusory, I wouldn't be the one to badger for an answer. I was asking Titus for clarification on whether this fairly characterizes his position. You might ask him.

I do not disagree with anything he has said. Moreover I feel I understand him perfectly. Therefore I have no need to ask him anything.

If, by 'the self', you mean something capable of taking action in the physical world, I would say that physics would seek explanations consistent with certain laws.

Not if you suppose physics deals only with the perceptually perceived. What evidence or reason do you have to suppose it deals with more than that?

If, by 'self', you mean something that does not exist in the physical world, I would say that physics does not address that question, rendering meaningless any claim such as: "physical laws apply to not only the perceptually experienced, but experiencers (selfs) also".

Good. You're beginning to see sense

I'll tell you what, why don't we end the guessing game?
Pick one:
1)The self originates from brain states.
2)The self originates from something other than brain states.
3)No such thing as a self exists.
4)Other. [/B]

My answer is "other".

 

[Interesting Ian]

Hammegk, you didn't go back far enough. Ian said:
Then I said:
Then you said:
You see, I use the word telepathy to refer to Ian's anomalous cognition. Then we went into a tailspin from there.

~~ Paul

Paul,

I subscribe to the existence of anomalous cognition. Hammegk probably doesn't. Why are we required to agree about everything simply because we both espouse idealism? Do you and Stimpy agree about everything??

 

[Mercutio]

Because it categorizes the particular phenomenae I want to discuss. "Seeing" can categorize parts of what I want to discuss, as can "thinking" and other words, but they don't entirely describe the particular category that I have in mind.

Are you saying that "hallucinating" is a broader category than "seeing"? "Seeing" only covers part of what you mean, but "hallucinating" covers all? I would disagree.

Metaphorizing with "the cat played with a ball of yarn": You hallucinate the cat chasing the ball around in the backyard, while I hallucinate the cat knocking around a ball attached to a pole, indoors. Yet, you continue to think that I have the same hallucination in mind as yourself. [/B]

But would I be correct in saying that I see a different "cat playing with a ball of yarn" than you do? To me, this is more inclusive than "hallucinate" while still allowing you to mean whatever portion of "see" you mean as "hallucinate".

Do we simply have a different hierarchy of verbs? For me, hallucinating is a portion of seeing. Is seeing a portion of hallucinating for you?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Not if you suppose physics deals only with the perceptually perceived. What evidence or reason do you have to suppose it deals with more than that?

Physics deals with more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

My answer is "other".

Knew it. I should've made it:
4)Other. (explain).

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

subscribe to the existence of anomalous cognition. Hammegk probably doesn't. Why are we required to agree about everything simply because we both espouse idealism? Do you and Stimpy agree about everything??

Wow, this is the most convoluted subplot! Who said anything about you two agreeing? All I did was explain the source of my use of the word telepathy by going further back in the thread. I guess when I said "anomalmouse cognition," he didn't catch the reference to your earlier post. Anyway, by all means, disagree.

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

Without cheating, what color are your mother's eyes?
Cheating? That is stored in number of memory locxations. Since my mother is two thousand miles away a direct referent would be difficult. I can verbally recall the information and then I also have some visual memories for that.



When people offer the objection you have; they normally get told to "pretend" they hear the voice from that position. Pretending within this context, quickly comes to mean actually doing what one "merely" pretended to do. Everyone can do it; it does not take 20 years. It takes a few minutes (at most 20 or 30 with the proper assistance).

Perhaps you don't know me very well, I forget where I first encountered the idea that we can translocate the interior voice to other parts of our bodies. I have practised it many times and for some reason my thought voice does not translocate, I can translocate color thought to other parts of my body and have learned to do that through practice. When I try the translocated thought process, I don't have much sucsess with voice/thought. My physical body seems to prefer other means of translocated thought.


Another way to put this: do you ever have two voices that argue between eachother, like two points of view that you argue to yourself? Do you sense that they come from slightly different positions inside your head? Or: Have you ever heard your parents' voice(s) within your head? Etc.


I have had multiple intrusive thoughts when experiencing obsession but they have the same character voice as my 'sole' voice. I have experienced memory voices of other. And when I still used marijuana , I had a stronger abilty to recall voices of others.


The point: People can move voices around. You can move it down to your stomach, over your head, a mile away -- whatever. Changing the position changes the impact of the voices -- I leave the particular impact of particular positionings for you to discover for yourself.

Perhaps you can, glad to know that you speak for all humanity, that must be very useful


People can control hearing where their voices come from. When people don't realize this, they sometimes convince themselves that they have mental pathology of some sort -- when they don't. Of course, pathology can cause the same types of things.


Excuse me, but I hope you are not claiming that the voices heard by people living with schizophrenia are misattributed thoughts, perhaps you are. Do you know any one living with severe schizophrenia?

But yes, I can understand that some people may have the ability to translocate there thoughts and percieve them as occuring at a point outside thier body.


So, hallucination does not require pathology. Hallucination happens all the time; when you hear a voice within your head; or imagine the events that someone describes to you. Confusing these things with reality, can happen for a variety of reasons -- not necessarily pathology.

I understand the point that there are misattributions of reality. In fact a great deal of the 'qualia' we experience are manufactured wholesale by our brains. This why we can percieve objects in the visual field where our blind spot is.

But I don't find it useful to call my thoughts hallucinations.

 

[Suggestologist]

Are you saying that "hallucinating" is a broader category than "seeing"? "Seeing" only covers part of what you mean, but "hallucinating" covers all? I would disagree.
But would I be correct in saying that I see a different "cat playing with a ball of yarn" than you do? To me, this is more inclusive than "hallucinate" while still allowing you to mean whatever portion of "see" you mean as "hallucinate".

You see (within the hallucination) a different cat, yes. You also have different affective (emotional) response to your cat, than I do to mine. You may also "hear" the cat (within the hallucination) differently, if your hallucination includes audio, like mind does. And so on.

Do we simply have a different hierarchy of verbs? For me, hallucinating is a portion of seeing. Is seeing a portion of hallucinating for you?

You're saying something that sounds to me like: "Is west a portion of south?" Well, not really.

"Seeing" means both more and less than does hallucinating. You can see "within" a hallucination, and you can see the physical world "pseudo-directly".

And of course, all words mean both more and less than what we mean them to mean; but in the particular relation of "seeing" to "hallucinating" -- the word produces Much more and Much less than the intended meaning.

Hallucinating for me, means visualizing -- but with hearing, feeling, proprioceptive sense, etc. -- all the senses we have -- in "re-presented" form. As opposed to "presented"-by-the-physical-environment form. So you could call it; full-sensory visualization or something; but that would miss what we already know about what people think of when they say "hallucination" -- and I want to preserve that aspect of the meaning in the term I use for this.

Now, we can get bogged down and say that all sensory information, in-fact gets "re-presented" before it ever gets understood by the brain -- but that discussion is peripheral to what I'm talking about. For example: We might argue the question: "When does seeing occur?" Well, pick a step: 1) Electromagnetic radiation hits "physical" object. 2) Electromagnetic radiation emits from "physical" object. 3) Side Note: Electromagnetic radiation may emit from one object, then hit another object, which results in an emission from the second object. 4) Electromagnetic radiation hits the lens of your eye. 5) Electromagnetic radiation hits the rods and cones in your er.. retina. 6) Rods and cones encode the signal, (time-sensitive effects included). 7) Signal is sent through the optic nerve. 8) Optic nerve, as part of the body, transmits information through the body, thus introducing noise into the signal -- such as may be caused by fatigue, caffeine, drugs, nutrition, stages of ultradian cycles, etc. 9) Signal gets decoded by the brain. 10) Brain identifies objects and distances. 11) Meaning of the particular object arrangement is made by referencing memories. 12) Brain may now identify more objects based on remembered information. 13) Meaning/perceiving loop continues between steps 10 and 12, which also influences step 9, and less obviously, influences all of the steps all the way back to 1. And I've probably left out some steps, and oversimplified others.

But I don't care to consider this particular problem of "when does seeing occur" in the seeing process -- at this time. That has a peripheral role to the type of "re-presentation" that I mean by "hallucination".

 

[Suggestologist]

I understand the point that there are misattributions of reality. In fact a great deal of the 'qualia' we experience are manufactured wholesale by our brains. This why we can percieve objects in the visual field where our blind spot is.

But I don't find it useful to call my thoughts hallucinations.

There is an excellent example of how this can help a schizophrenic. It is documented that a certain therapist told ("convinced" may be a better word) a schizophrenic who visually hallucinated fairies flying around her head to instead: put them in an envelope which the therapist would then keep for safe-keeping. The patient could come back to the therapist's office and visit the fairies, anytime she wanted to. This worked: she stopped hallucinating the fairies, believing them to now occupy the therapist's envelope. Initially she visited them weekly, but eventually reduced the visits to monthly, then less and less to once every 2 years, and then she apparently forgot about them or died of natural causes. So, relocating hallucinations has practical applications even for some schizophrenics.

This allowed her to be a full functioning member of society -- the fairies now didn't interfere with her daily life. And this method has infinately more efficacy than electro-shock or brain surgery, or years of being locked up in an institution.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

This allowed her to be a full functioning member of society -- the fairies now didn't interfere with her daily life. And this method has infinately more efficacy than electro-shock or brain surgery, or years of being locked up in an institution.

Actually, none of the treatments you mentioned are part of the normal course of treatment for schizophrenics anyway (that includes institutionalization for the most part, at least in the U.S. -- get 'em back on their meds, get 'em back on the street -- that's usually pretty much it). I've had some personal experience dealing with schizophrenics (I know how much emphasis you place on this). Based on this post and one you made earlier in the thread, I'd venture to guess that you haven't, so if you're going to sling stuff like this around, I'd suggest you cite.

 

[Suggestologist]

Actually, none of the treatments you mentioned are part of the normal course of treatment for schizophrenics anyway (that includes institutionalization for the most part, at least in the U.S. -- get 'em back on their meds, get 'em back on the street -- that's usually pretty much it). I've had some personal experience dealing with schizophrenics (I know how much emphasis you place on this). Based on this post and one you made earlier in the thread, I'd venture to guess that you haven't, so if you're going to sling stuff like this around, I'd suggest you cite.

This occurred at a time when the course of treatment could include what I've suggested.

 

[Titus Rivas]

What is Paul missing?

Paul said:

If I have never experienced sadness, but know everything there is to learn about it from books, then I still don't have all the information about sadness. But what am I missing? I am missing the neural connections that are formed or modified or activated by actually being sad. So I walk outside my room and get sad. Bam! Now I have all the information in my brain.

You seem to be saying that "what it is like to have" is more than just acquiring these neural connections. What more is it?

How about "how it feels", "what it is like to undergo it", etc. For example, you may know exactly what parts of the brain are activated when a woman suffers the pain of labour, but unless you've experienced at least similar pains yourself, you can't really know what it is like to have such a tormenting pain. In understanding subjective experiences we always need some subjective, first-person knowledge which cannot be found in neurophysiological knowledge. Formin neural connections does not equal undergoing a sensation or emotion. It may be related to subjective experiences (though it probably is not most of the time) but it does not equal the subjective experience itself.

The point is that the information about purely non-qualitative brain states simply lacks the information about qualititative experiences. There is absolutely no qualitative information in the brain, just quantitative information.

Which is by the way an argument for a non-physical consciousness but also for a non-physical memory with qualitative information about consciousness.

Titus

 

[Rayn]

Mercutio said: (for me, there is no difference except in our language. The former, "feeling" is what happens. "Feeling the feeling" is what we say happens.

What is your answer? Anybody, not just Ian)

I agree Mercutio, the concept of "feeling the feeling" is just a semantic distinction, a phrase that has sense but no reference. Basically, meta-statements like this are able to infinitely regress if we wanted them to. What is "feeling the 'feeling the feeling'?" Rudolf Carnap wrote several linguistic papers on meta-languages, and the necessity to speak under an agreed upon language to communicate.

Suggestologist said: Hallucinating for me, means visualizing -- but with hearing, feeling, proprioceptive sense, etc. -- all the senses we have -- in "re-presented" form. As opposed to "presented"-by-the-physical-environment form. So you could call it; full-sensory visualization or something; but that would miss what we already know about what people think of when they say "hallucination" -- and I want to preserve that aspect of the meaning in the term I use for this.

I think I understand what you are saying by the word "hallucination," Suggestologist, but from what DD has posted, I don't believe he wishes to (nor does Mercutio and I would steer away from such use as well) agree to such a definition. Personally, although you seem to be trying to make the point that "everyone hallucinates," such a point is not going to be readily conceded here. I would prefer to say that "everyone thinks" or "everyone has a subjective experience" before I would say "everyone hallucinates," merely due to the fact that you insist on using a word outside of its normal denotation. Anyways, I was just wondering as what argument this furthers for you, or in other words, if we concede to your definition of hallucination, and your subsequent conclusion that "everyone hallucinates," where does that take us?

Titus Rivas said: How about "how it feels", "what it is like to undergo it", etc. For example, you may know exactly what parts of the brain are activated when a woman suffers the pain of labour, but unless you've experienced at least similar pains yourself, you can't really know what it is like to have such a tormenting pain. In understanding subjective experiences we always need some subjective, first-person knowledge which cannot be found in neurophysiological knowledge. Formin neural connections does not equal undergoing a sensation or emotion. It may be related to subjective experiences (though it probably is not most of the time) but it does not equal the subjective experience itself.

The point is that the information about purely non-qualitative brain states simply lacks the information about qualititative experiences. There is absolutely no qualitative information in the brain, just quantitative information.

Which is by the way an argument for a non-physical consciousness but also for a non-physical memory with qualitative information about consciousness.

In the first (bold) statement, I don't see why subjective information "cannot" be found in the brain. Subjective information is encoded in every brain, but it is unique to every brain. No brains are exactly alike, hence subjectivity. Moreover, on a "physical" level, no brains could ever be "exactly" alike due to spacetime subtexts. Is there an argument as to why this unique subjectivity is not your "quality," but is merely "quantity"?

Which brings me to the second (bold) statement. It seems a tautology based on your definitions and word usage. Of course a brain state that is "non-qualitative" would not have information about "qualitative experiences," but how does this rule out "qualitative brain states"? What exactly is a "non-quantitative quality"? Why is the brain "non-subjective"? Isn't it a subject in-and-of-itself? What is "the feeling of sadness" without a brain state? Hoping you'll define some of these concepts for me Titus, thanks.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Definitions

Rayn said:

the first (bold) statement, I don't see why subjective information "cannot" be found in the brain. Subjective information is encoded in every brain, but it is unique to every brain. No brains are exactly alike, hence subjectivity.

That's another meaning of the term subjectivity. Again, what I'm referring to here, is subjectivity in the sense of "undergoing subjective experiences", not in the sense of 'non-objectivity'.

Moreover, on a "physical" level, no brains could ever be "exactly" alike due to spacetime subtexts. Is there an argument as to why this unique subjectivity is not your "quality," but is merely "quantity"?

Yes, and a very simple one too. The subjectivity we're discussing here is not the subjectivity of "relativity of one's specific perspective". If that were the issue, you'd be right. Then the issue would be "How is it possible that everybody has his own perspective" and then the differences between brains would be similar to the differences between perspectives.

Which brings me to the second (bold) statement. It seems a tautology based on your definitions and word usage.

It's a logical deduction and therefore it really is based on the definitions and concepts used. However, there is no question of arbitrary definitions. The definitions certainly weren't formulated in order to draw the desired conclusions!

Of course a brain state that is "non-qualitative" would not have information about "qualitative experiences," but how does this rule out "qualitative brain states"? What exactly is a "non-quantitative quality"?

By a non-quantitative quality I understand a quality that cannot (not even in principle) be exhaustively described in quantitative terms.

Why is the brain "non-subjective"? Isn't it a subject in-and-of-itself?

The brain is a entirely physical system, at least as it is defined within neurology or biology. The brain does not possess any properties which cannot be described in terms of physical structures and processes. Physical structures and processes can always, by definition (even if only in principle) be described exhaustively in mathematical, quantitative terms. There are no physical structures or processes, either in the brain defined as a physical system or anywhere else in the physical world, which can possess any non-quantitative properties. Non-quantitative properties are properties which don't belong to physical systems. Now, if we acknowledge that subjective experiences aren't completely quantifiable (not even in principle), we must automatically acknowledge that there can't be a completely quantifiable system (the brain, a computer, or whatever) with subjective experiences.
It's as simple as that.

What is "the feeling of sadness" without a brain state?

It's exactly that: the feeling of sadness. There is no logical relation between a brain state and a feeling of sadness. There just may be a relation in terms of laws of psychophysical interaction. It is logically conceivable that certain subjects have feelings of sadness without a neural correlate, especially during a possible existence outside this physical world.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

In the first (bold) statement, I don't see why subjective information "cannot" be found in the brain.

I don't understand how it can be. How can sadness have a location? I mean it can't have unless you beg the question and say sadness is just certain physical processes in the brain. But that is absurd because sadness is a certain feeling accessible only to the person experiencing it ie it is only known from the first person perspective. That is to say it is subjective. Physical processes however are objective and can potentially be seen and measured by anyone.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Only 2 stars!

Hmmmm . .just noticed this thread has only got 2 stars. Soon fix that. Amazing that people just automatically give any thread I start 1 star.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I said:

You seem to be saying that "what it is like to have" is more than just acquiring these neural connections. What more is it?

and then Titus said:

The point is that the information about purely non-qualitative brain states simply lacks the information about qualititative experiences. There is absolutely no qualitative information in the brain, just quantitative information.

You're saying this without justification, using terms like "simply lacks." The process of acquiring the brain state for sadness, and then possibly reliving that state in the future, is the qualitative experience of sadness. It "feels sad" while we acquire or exercise the brain state for sadness. It "feels red" while we look at or imagine red things.

I admit that I'm making assumptions, too. In order to reach a conclusion, we need to do more neurophysiology.

Which is by the way an argument for a non-physical consciousness but also for a non-physical memory with qualitative information about consciousness.

And how do these nonphysical things interact with my brain? In particular, could you draw the line between the types of memories stored in my brain and the types stored in my consciousness?

~~ Paul