A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

I spent some time and quite some considerable effort to explain myself. Now perhaps people can understand why I get rather brusque.

Yes, but then when we get right to the heart of the matter, you stop answering questions.

What do you think is the ontological status of the "external world"? Apparently you don't think it exists independent of you, yet it is separate from you. Did your mind create this external world and then lose control of it?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Interesting Ian,

Now obviously the external world effects me in all sorts of ways. Why shouldn't it? The "physical" world is external to me meaning that it is not produced by my own thoughts, even if its existence is constituted by my experiences and other sentient beings (if you still don't understand this imagine for the sake of argument that telepathy exists. Now someone could project some image into my mind. Now I am therefore not the origin of that image, although clearly that image in my mind couldn't exist if my mind didn't exist. You see?)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No, not really. The image in your mind couldn't exist without your mind, but the person who projected it could.

My analogy was meant to facillitate the understanding. Do I take it I have failed in this endeavor? Besides which I believe the external world is a projection by the infinite mind. Our sense experiences are directly conveyed to us by this metamind.

You still are assuming that something exists independently of your perceptions of it;

Not anything apart from other consciousnesses (including God's).

If the physical world can affect you like the telepathic person can, don't you have to assume that it too has an independent existence?

Even if there were no God I don't think there is any problem here. As long as there is intersubjective agreement in the course of our sensory experiences, this is all that is required. There need be no reality independent of any of our perceptions. This is obviously correct anyway when you consider an apparition which a group of people simultaneously experience ( I presume you think apparitions are hallucinations and not therefore of a mind-independent reality?)

Otherwise, you could only ever describe your experiences; you could never explain them in terms of effects of the physical world upon you.

Remember all that science does is describe the course of our sensory experiences. No putative mind-independent physical world need be invoked.

And a mostly unrelated question: If brain processes are so different from conscious experiences that you are sure conscious experiences cannot be explained in terms of them, are they not also so different that brain processes could not conceivably affect conscious experiences? If brains can't cause us to remember, how can they cause us to remember incorrectly?

Well they can cause us to remember and forget. I don't understand why brain processes couldn't conceivably affect mental processes. I see this as being no more mysterious than parts of the physical world being able to affect other parts of the physical world, or consciousness being able to affect the physical world.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

As long as there is intersubjective agreement in the course of our sensory experiences, this is all that is required. There need be no reality independent of any of our perceptions.

and then:

No putative mind-independent physical world need be invoked.

You many not need a mind-independent physical world, but you do need a mind-independent intersubjective agreement mechanism. I'll call mine external reality and you can call yours snorkulon. but we end up with the same thing. And we don't even have to worry about its ontological status!

~~ Paul

 

[Dymanic]

Sorry about the bad link above. I usually test first, but I forgot (probably due to an abnormally low caffeine level).Genesis by observership

 

[Rayn]

Hmm... you have some interesting views on reality Ian, I'll give you that.

You seem to be advocating a philosophy very similar to that of William James, that of a "Radical Empiricism" where "the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as any thing else in the system" (A World of Pure Experience).

Personally, I enjoy and agree with much of James' philosophy. However, I also believe that modern science has made many leaps that reconcile itself with his thoughts on consciousness, namely through attempts at further understanding of quantum mechanics. One particularly interesting concept is that of Bohm's Implicate Order Theory that I mentioned earlier in this thread. Essentially, one could use the term "consciousness" as opposed to "implicate order," and such a theory would still be cogent, though others would object to the usage of "consciousness" in this way.

I am of the former mind set, as I do believe that consciousness can be regarded as an "undifferentiated plenum," and all of our separate consciousnesses are merely explicate manifestations of this wholly interconnected reality. Basically, the concept that there are consciousnesses separate from yours is also an illusion, as we are all interconnected and from the same "source," but I'm not sure how you would take that concept.

William James has a particularly relevant quote, one I believe he appropriates from Percy Shelley, but I don't have it in front of me so I'll mangle it horribly in paraphrased form. Consciousness is a white radiance, and we are unique prisms through which it shines. Ugh, James is obviously more eloquent than I am, but I hope you get the idea.

Basically, I think that an issue here is that you seem to be relegating science to only being able to understand the explicate order of the universe, as opposed to the implicate as well, and I believe that is false. Of course we need to refine our concepts and move on past such useless distinctions as primary and secondary qualities, but I also believe that insofar as our brain serves as a prism for consciousness, understanding how it functions in this matter is of supreme importance. In many ways, I agree that consciousness, in the implicate order sense, is irreducible, but I cannot agree that my subjective experience is as well. Moreover, through attempting to understand such phenomena as superluminal information transfer and other "violations" of TLOP that occur at the quantum level, I believe we are getting closer to understanding the true nature of the universe and of an Implicate Order.

Bah, I've rambled on too much. A book you may enjoy is by Roger Penrose's Shadows of the Mind where he argues that there is an essential non-computability to individual consciousness. Also, Michael Talbot's Holographic Universe is an interesting read, although he does provide some shallowly cited examples of "mysitical phenomena" that I believe are not necessary to accept as far as the Implicate Order Theory goes. However, I won't discount the possibility that such phenomena can occur, but they are not scientific data by any means.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

(Glad to be moving on from elephants and biscuits...)

They hold that our sensory perceptions are "caused" or are due to a world which exists entirely independently of our perceptions of it. In other words they believe that the world exists unexperienced. But if the material world exists unexperienced then we cannot know of this world through experience. I mean we cannot experience that which is unexperienced.

True enough - we can't experience the unexperienced!! But many of the experiences we currently can gather from this external world *strongly* suggest it has had (in the past) an existence independant of human consciousness. Why is that? Either the external world is telling the truth, and has been without human consciousness for 99.999% of it's own existence, or it's lying to us about that. Either way, the question (for me) is "why?".

Alternatively, perhaps this unexperienced realm is like how the physicists envisage it? No colorsE, but simply certain particular wavelegths of electromagnetic radiation.
...
In an approriate sense, everything we ever experience is a lie.

Trying not to be use language with such an obvious agenda attached, I'd say "everything we ever experience is an approximation".

Again this is not a plausible position to hold.

Why not? Can you expand on why this is implausible? Do you mean to say that you find it lessplausible than your alternative?

Now obviously the external world effects me in all sorts of ways.
...
So do you see why there is no problem in the external world (in the context of idealism) effecting me, anymore than if the world exists in abstraction from any perceptions of it effecting me?

Well, the core issue (for me) remains unaddressed. You've (after a fashion) explained the "how" of your worldview - how it is that the "physical/external" is affecting you. But what's the "why", Ian? Why are some of your memories filtered from you? Why does this external world report *some* information to you (via your experiences) that strongly imply an "unexperienced by humans" existence? Why has this metamind hidden itself behind a layer that seems to indicate it's non-existence? Is the metamind shy?

In the absence of a "why", your worldview make little sense to me. You are espousing a philosophy that demands an "why", but then you can't supply it (without simply inventing it - and that's why every "idealist" is an individual philosophy - you can't agree on a "why"!)

In the absence if a "why", materialism makes perfect sense, since it implicitly allows the external world to reply "don't care", or "just is", or "why not".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hey Loki, great sig!

Rayn said:

I am of the former mind set, as I do believe that consciousness can be regarded as an "undifferentiated plenum," and all of our separate consciousnesses are merely explicate manifestations of this wholly interconnected reality. Basically, the concept that there are consciousnesses separate from yours is also an illusion, as we are all interconnected and from the same "source," but I'm not sure how you would take that concept.

If you replace "consciousness" with "physical reality," you end up with the same thing. The only reason to favor consciousness is if you assume it cannot be a product of a physical brain.

~~ Paul

 

[Rayn]

If you replace "consciousness" with "physical reality," you end up with the same thing. The only reason to favor consciousness is if you assume it cannot be a product of a physical brain.

Which, I believe, is exactly what Ian assumes.

My statements were in regards to where "consciousness" = "implicate order." I suppose using the word "consciousness" in this confusing way is probably more of an obstacle then any bridge in discussion. In the sense that I was using it, however, your statement is true, I do not believe "consciousness" is a "product of a physical brain" but instead that the brain itself results from "consciousness," the "implicate order."

 

[hammegk]

If you replace "consciousness" with "physical reality," you end up with the same thing. The only reason to favor consciousness is if you assume it cannot be a product of a physical brain.

~~ Paul

You will also favor "consciousness" over "physical reality" unless you assume several things including that HPC is not a "hard problem" and in fact does not occur.

 

[Mercutio]

Well I'm willing to consider the existence of "free floating" experiences without a self experiencing them. This is the only other alternative is there not? I mean if one rejects the existence of a unified self where everything comes together so to speak and which has experiences. Presumably you would say the "self" is nothing over and above the simple summation of particular experiences? But does it make sense to talk about experiences without an experiencer?

Or is your point something entirely else which I'm failing to understand?

Ian--I have mentioned this to you before, but it was quite a while ago. Would your library have access to this?

Calkins, Mary Whiton. 1930. "The Philosophical Credo of an Absolutistic Personalist." in Contemporary American Philosophy. George P. Adams and William Pepperell Montague, eds. Vol. 1. New York: Russell & Russell:197-218.

It is incredibly well written, absolutely beautiful prose (reminiscent of you at your best...ok, better than that ), and it is right up your alley. Her philosophical proof (I'm working from memory here, so allow for some settling) works from "mental entities exist" up through a universal self, in absolute airtight logic (in my humble opinion, if you accept her first premise, you are pretty much on for the ride until the end--she leaves no loose ends). I would be very much interested in seeing your reaction to this work. In fact, if your library cannot get this, let me know and I'll scan it and (somehow, with luck) link it here.

Actually, anyone who has been following this thread would benefit from reading that piece (and if you are still reading this thread by now, you fit my operational definition of "interested in the topic"). If you can find it before I post it (again, I have to figure out how first), do so.

I just realized I did not address your actual question, Ian--sorry, I got too excited about this recommendation. I'll have to go back now and look...

 

[Mercutio]

Mercutio said:
I'm not at all sure what you're saying here, but if it clarifies things, I said that I don't feel as if there is an infinite stack of experiences. That makes me think that there is no need for an infinite stack of viewers in my brain.

The mind's optic nerve is connected back to the mind. That is why I cannot experience exactly what it is like to experience the highest level of my mind. That is why I cannot get a tight grip on what qualia really are: Nothing is viewing the qualia viewers.

~~ Paul

I'm sorry to confuse. My point was, in the classical view of the mind (as somebody here posted back a ways) the brain processes stuff and presents it to the mind, which does the actual "seeing". Of course, if we can't explain how we "see" something without invoking the presence of a mind, how is it we have explained it by saying the mind does it? Surely we have to explain that--if we can simply say "that's what it does", then why couldn't we say that about the brain? If we must invoke a mind to explain our seeing, it makes sense to invoke another mind to explain that mind's seeing, and so ad infinitum (or ad nauseum, take your pick). My point was that, as you see the infinite layer of minds as unnecessary, I see the very first mind as equally unnecessary. Neither an infinite number nor even one mind actually explains perception.

I'm sure you've heard all this before; I'm not trying to teach. Just trying to explain my confusing prior post.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

You will also favor "consciousness" over "physical reality" unless you assume several things including that HPC is not a "hard problem" and in fact does not occur.

It may be a hard problem, but I doubt it's an impossible problem.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Mercutio said:

Neither an infinite number nor even one mind actually explains perception.

Are you distinguishing mind from brain in some way, or rejecting the distinction?

~~ Paul

 

[Suggestologist]

Re: Suggestologist,

I'm not exactly sure what you're getting at here, could you please clarify for me? It seems that you are saying that people "re-present" experience to both themselves and the outside world, but I'm not sure exactly where the eidetic/echoic and constructions come into play. I'm aware of eidetic (photographic)memories, but I suppose I'm not familiar with the term outside of that context. Anyways, sorry for my inability to grasp what you're saying, hope you can help me out.

Forget the outside world. And try not to think of a pink elephant with green polka dots right now. Did you succeed in not thinking of the pink elephant with green polka dots? Or did you hallucinate the thing in your mind, involuntarily, hopelessly unable to prevent yourself, simply because you read about the pink elephant with green polka dots?

Eidetic means photographic, or highly accurate "re-presentations" of external (usually in reference to visual) stimuli. Newly constructed re-presentations, work like the pink elephant with green polka dots which you have never seen, but must imagine -- simply because you heard/read the description and automatically decoded it with reference to acutal but separate experiences of elephants and polka dots and the color green. You simply could now understand what I wrote without decoding the linguistic description. You could only resist if you had no intent to understand my message, in which case you probably would not have read it.

Words work like keys on a keyboard into someone else's mind. People often assume that we can play another person's mind the way we play our own. The failure of that particular assumption often leads to bitter disagreements where each party comes to believe that the other has approached the discussion in bad faith; or as I prefer -- with "negative intent".

In a sense, we always communicate what we internally represent, but we would have to get into a discussion of minimal cues and such to fully address this. And I don't care about external re-presentation at this point.

Words do not function as re-presentation; but as cues for others to "re-present" to themselves what they "re-present" to themselves when they use that word/concept talking to themselves in their own hallucinated voice or voices. Since this involves their own experiences, they simply can never FULLY communicate what it means for them to "re-present" some word or concept to themselves. Thus, communication never attains perfect presentation of the experience the speaker wants to communicate to the sender; which the speaker originally experienced by external stimuli.

The difference between the conventional view of involuntary pathological hallucination, and normal everyday hallucination (like the voice in your head, you probably use to talk to yourself); rests in context cues of the "re-presentation".

I see. So you have issues with the "anthropology" of science, as opposed to the methodology. Of course, I can agree with this point to the extent that there are always factors that come into play with the scientific community, not the least of which are the monetary awards and competitions necessary to get funding for your laboratory. I am very much against the "cult of scientism" as you have formulated and as Huston Smith has also expounded upon, but I would not take this so far as to discount verifiable experiments and analyses based upon them. Perhaps this is a "faith" in the people who are carrying out these experiments to a degree, but I believe it is as informed as I personally can make it, and I always attempt to be skeptical in the conclusions I take as "true."

Well, it made little sense to me that people who call themselves skeptics embrace things they have no direct experience of, just because the reporter of experience calls themselves a scientist. While, in general, I have more confidence in what people who call themselves "scientists" have discovered, than people who don't, I keep my options open -- more than persons on this forum who consider themselves skeptical have indicated that they themselves keep open. I would say that the moon landing has a confidence level of 95% in my mind, but many on this forum seem to consider that so low as to put me in the moon-landing denier camp. Their certainty of this event which they cannot verify by personal experience seems to come in at 99.9999999% and up.

I believe they are making the effort to do so. However, language is a necessary tool in order to communicate the complex ideas involved, and as General Semantics makes evident, it is imperfect and of course problems can arise out of such categorizations. Staying vigilant in using specifically defined terminology is necessary, and hopefully you will help us in this discussion. As far as the wave/particle duality and such paradoxes as Schrodinger's Cat, this is obviously evidence of the linguistic frailty that exists in science, but it does not discredit the work, instead forces it to re-evaluate itself (as well as provide some nice materials for good novels, Robert Anton Wilson anyone?). Anyways, this is all just a long way of saying I agree, but I don't plan on performing every experiment ever thought up in order to verify my beliefs in science.

I don't plan to perform every experiment either, but as I have said, you can't know everything that people can know, so why should you care whether you can personally find verification of every scientific experiement; we should just doubt those more than the ones we can verify -- but not with an infinitesimal difference in confidence from the ones which we can.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Homunculus as a major (though little) straw man

The homunculus problem attributed to dualists is part of a real charicature of this philosophical position.

If the self or experient were really represented as a little man with the same (though miniature) functions and even organs as a whole person, then you would indeed get an infinite regression. Every man would contain a homunculus, including the homunculus itself, as he's nothing less than a little man. No experience would ever be possible because the regress would never stop.

However, there is no real question of a homunculus within dualism. The concept of a self or experient is that of an irreducible entity which undergoes all conscious experiences directly without any regression. Experiencing something does not equal physical registration of that event. Whereas this equation would be essential for a homunculus problem to arise. So we don't need to postulate any duplication of man's physical senses or brain in the self.

Homunculus is nothing but a (little) straw man created by anti-dualists. It is a misrepresentation or reinterpretation of dualism in pseudo-dualist, materialist terms. In fact, only if we understand the homunculus problem as a problem within materialism itself does it make any sense. Meaning that there is no place for any experient within materialism.

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus, Rivas,

Homunculus is nothing but a (little) straw man created by anti-dualists. It is a misrepresentation or reinterpretation of dualism in pseudo-dualist, materialist terms.

It is not a strawman, although the infinite regression idea is only one side of the argument against the dualistic notion of a non-physical "experiencer". The other side of the argument is that if you reject the infinite regression, as you said, and instead assert that the "experiencer" is an irreducible entity which experiences directly, then why bother with it at all? Why not just cut out the middle mad, and accept that your brain is the experiencer?

Which brings us to your next point...

In fact, only if we understand the homunculus problem as a problem within materialism itself does it make any sense. Meaning that there is no place for any experient within materialism.

Wrong. In materialism the experiencer is your brain. See? Simply and to the point. No mucking about with speculative entities whose existence can be neither confirmed nor explained. No need to deal with the incoherencies of epiphenomenalism, or the supernaturalism inherent in interactive dualism.

All you have to do is get over your naive intuitive belief that there is something magical about your mind. You are what you brain is doing. You don't have to like it. Apparently reality doesn't care whether you like it or not.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

The brain can never experience anything, just physiologically represent

Wrong. In materialism the experiencer is your brain. See? Simply and to the point. No mucking about with speculative entities whose existence can be neither confirmed nor explained. No need to deal with the incoherencies of epiphenomenalism, or the supernaturalism inherent in interactive dualism.

Stimpy, it's not a matter of speculation, but of a clear description of experience. We know that experience possesses qualities which cannot be described in physical terms. Whether you like it or not.
The brain defined as a purely physical system cannot be the experient as a physical system cannot experience anything. It can just register physically or contain completely quantifiable representations of physical registration. Only if you leave out the very essence of what we know not speculate is the essence of subjectivity is it possible to claim that a purely physical brain could be an experient. Or as Dennett puts it, within reductive materialism, the self is nothing but a narrative fiction (the centre of narration), not a real experient. This fact won't go away just by calling it names like "magical".

Anyway it's time you move on from your outdated reductionism. Science should progress

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

The brain can never experience anything, just physiologically represent

The brain can do all sorts of things. What evidence do you have that "experiencing things" is not one of them? I am not sure what you mean by "physiologically represent". Is information processing a form of physiological representation? How about pattern recognition? If so, could point out your evidence that there is anything more to "experiencing things" than a combination of pattern recognition and information processing?

Wrong. In materialism the experiencer is your brain. See? Simply and to the point. No mucking about with speculative entities whose existence can be neither confirmed nor explained. No need to deal with the incoherencies of epiphenomenalism, or the supernaturalism inherent in interactive dualism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Stimpy, it's not a matter of speculation, but of a clear description of experience. We know that experience possesses qualities which cannot be described in physical terms. Whether you like it or not.

Name one.

The brain defined as a purely physical system cannot be the experient as a physical system cannot experience anything.

This is the third time you have asserted this in just this single post. Do you have anything more than assertion to offer?

It can just register physically or contain completely quantifiable representations of physical registration.

And process information. And recognize patterns. Don't forget that. Your brain doesn't just store information, it processes it too. Your brain is what does your thinking and remembering. Your brain is what processes your sensory input and draws conclusions about the world from them. Your brain is what, right now, is totally convinced that there must be some "experiencer" experiencing what it is doing. Think about what that implies.

Only if you leave out the very essence of what we know not speculate is the essence of subjectivity is it possible to claim that a purely physical brain could be an experient.

And what would that be?

Or as Dennett puts it, within reductive materialism, the self is nothing but a narrative fiction (the centre of narration), not a real experient. This fact won't go away just by calling it names like "magical".

You are misinterpreting Dennett. He is saying that your intuitive feeling of being some "self", distinct from your brain processes, is an illusion created by your brain. He is not saying that consciousness does not exist, or that there is no "experient". Just that our intuitive preconceptions about these things are, as is all too often the case, wrong.

Anyway it's time you move on from your outdated reductionism. Science should progress

Science is progressing just fine as it is, thank you very much. I fail to see how it could progress at all if we took your advice. The hypothesis you have put forward is unfalsifiable, and violates Occam's razor. It is decidedly unscientific, and no scientific progress could possibly be made towards understanding consciousness until such a hypothesis is rejected, and replaced with a scientific one.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus, Rivas,



It is not a strawman, although the infinite regression idea is only one side of the argument against the dualistic notion of a non-physical "experiencer". The other side of the argument is that if you reject the infinite regression, as you said, and instead assert that the "experiencer" is an irreducible entity which experiences directly, then why bother with it at all? Why not just cut out the middle mad, and accept that your brain is the experiencer?

So as well as experiences there is an experiencer?? I thought you agreed with Dennet??

All you have to do is get over your naive intuitive belief that there is something magical about your mind.

Since when has magical meant a denial of materialism?

You are what you brain is doing. You don't have to like it. Apparently reality doesn't care whether you like it or not.

Well I would say that reality doesn't care about your hopelessly deluded and thoroughly confused unintelligible ideas on reality.

 

[BillyJoe]

re: CARTESIAN THEATRE

It's probably too late (time zones and all that) but so you don't think I haven't read your replies.....

Paul

I think you have misunderstood the Cartesian Theatre but I guess you know that now from replies to your posts from both Mercutio and SJC so I won't go over it again.

Ian

I wasn't trying to say anything against your view with that post but merely trying to explain the idea behind the Cartesian Theatre. Basically the Cartesian Theatre is the mind-as-separate-from-brain idea sneaking into materialism as a centre-of-consciousness within the brain. Both concepts lead to an infinite regress from the materialists point of view. From the materialists point of view, there is no mind separate from the brain and no centre of consciousness. The brain does it all - no infinite regress.

Titus

Off topic.....
My parents used to own and run a coffee shop on a street corner in Niemegen. My sister went back there a couple of years ago but, alas, it had just been pulled down to make way for....hmmm, can't remember what. I lived there for the first two years of my life before migrating to Australia.

regards,
BillyJoe.
(Sorry for the personal history)