A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

So as well as experiences there is an experiencer?? I thought you agreed with Dennet??

Yes, the brain is the experiencer, which is in agreement with Dennett's view.
No mind. No centre of consciousness. Just brain.

regards,
BillyJoe
(Oops, I've started the 7^th page)

 

[BillyJoe]

......and the time zone rears its ugly head again.....read you again tomorrow.

BJ

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The brain can never experience anything, just physiologically represent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The brain can do all sorts of things. What evidence do you have that "experiencing things" is not one of them?

Now I see this as being the magical claim! Now please be a little more specific. Are you claiming that the brain can actually do more than physiologically represent? Or are you saying the physiological representation itself is consciousness? I presume not the former? Or if it is the former what more does the brain do than physiologically represent?

I am not sure what you mean by "physiologically represent". Is information processing a form of physiological representation? How about pattern recognition? If so, could point out your evidence that there is anything more to "experiencing things" than a combination of pattern recognition and information processing?

Obviously the onus is upon you to show how conscious experience can magically arise out of pattern recognition and information processing. In other words what is it about pattern recognition and information processing which could conceivably give rise to consciousness?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wrong. In materialism the experiencer is your brain. See? Simply and to the point. No mucking about with speculative entities whose existence can be neither confirmed nor explained. No need to deal with the incoherencies of epiphenomenalism, or the supernaturalism inherent in interactive dualism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Stimpy, it's not a matter of speculation, but of a clear description of experience. We know that experience possesses qualities which cannot be described in physical terms. Whether you like it or not.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Name one.

Any experiences whatsoever.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It can just register physically or contain completely quantifiable representations of physical registration.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



And process information. And recognize patterns. Don't forget that. Your brain doesn't just store information, it processes it too.

As long as the word "recognise" does not connote conscious awareness

Your brain is what does your thinking and remembering.

Now it is you that is making the bare assertions. Er . . when did consciousness enter into the picture? You have yet to argue how a purely physiological representation can somehow magically lead to conscious awareness.

Your brain is what processes your sensory input and draws conclusions about the world from them. Your brain is what, right now, is totally convinced that there must be some "experiencer" experiencing what it is doing. Think about what that implies.

Presupposes the correctness of materialist metaphysic without any justification.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only if you leave out the very essence of what we know not speculate is the essence of subjectivity is it possible to claim that a purely physical brain could be an experient.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



And what would that be?

The actual raw feel of conscious awareness.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Or as Dennett puts it, within reductive materialism, the self is nothing but a narrative fiction (the centre of narration), not a real experient. This fact won't go away just by calling it names like "magical".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



You are misinterpreting Dennett. He is saying that your intuitive feeling of being some "self", distinct from your brain processes, is an illusion created by your brain. He is not saying that consciousness does not exist, or that there is no "experient".

First of all you are denyint there is a self, then you are asserting there is an experient. Please be explicit, are there only experiences, or is there in addition a self or experiencer (experient)? If the self is an illusion then it doesn't exist! In saying there is a self this means no more than we feel there is a self, but in reality there isn't a self. You can't have it both ways and claim there is a self and isn't a self!

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,

Yes, the brain is the experiencer, which is in agreement with Dennett's view.
No mind. No centre of consciousness. Just brain.

regards,
BillyJoe
(Oops, I've started the 7^th page)

I thought he asserted there are only experiences, that there is no experiencer.

 

[Mercutio]

Are you distinguishing mind from brain in some way, or rejecting the distinction?

The concept of "mind" can be a useful abstraction, but because of our language (nouns are just nouns, we don't separate the real from the metaphorical) it is easy to reify "mind" and treat it like it is in fact a real, existant entity. It is more accurate to see it as an emergent property of our behavior (both public and private).

[digression] You can point to buildings, students, faculty, spreadsheets, master plans, but you cannot point to one thing and say "this is the Univerity." Yet, of course, it makes sense to compare one university to another on any number of dimensions. The fact that a univeristy is an emergent property of all these different physically existant things does not make it any less useful. Now, the "mind" (and the "self" and "consciousness" too, for that matter). We see, we feel, we think, we act, we digest, we argue...these are all things that we do. We make a claim that seeing, feeling, thinking, etc. are things that our mind does, or properties of a conscious self. This leads to discussions (arguments) about *how* the mind and the brain interact--arguments about as fruitful as those regarding how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. The mind does not *do* all those things. It *is* all those things--it is the label for an emergent property arising from the things we *do*. Look at the language we use about the mind. We say the mind interprets, or sees, or decides. No--our interpreting, seeing, and deciding are simply things that we do--then we clump them together and call it "mind". [/digression]

So to answer your question, of course I am distinguishing mind from brain. Even the currently popular phrase "the mind is what the brain does" is inadequate (but better than the classic view of the incorporeal-but-existant "mind"). We are too quick to point to the brain alone as the source of our behavior (I don't say "consciousness" here--what is consciousness apart from seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking--again, all just things we do, so what does adding the label "consciousness" add?). Our brains are in constant contact with the rest of the body, through the nervous system & endocrine system for instance. The body is the source of any input into the brain, and the means by which any output is delivered. Why artificially just say it is the brain? It is the entire body (and no, I'm not dismissing the brain, and no, I'm not talking about any mystical chakras or some such, I'm just pointing out that there is a more logical cutoff--the whole person--than just the brain).

So, now, I expect a barrage of "what? you don't think the mind exists? What utter garbage!", and so on...I will happily change my views if someone can actually describe a mind for me, separate and distinct from actions our bodies (including our brains) perform physically.

Sorry, PCA, didn't mean to dump all this as a response to your question. I got a little carried away.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

If the self is an illusion then it doesn't exist

Dennett uses the metaphor, "Center of Narrative Gravity".

Is it accurate to speak in terms of physical objects as having centers of gravity? Is a center of gravity as real a property as, say, length?

 

[Dancing David]

Most people can hear a voice that other do not -- whenever they want to. It doesn't require brain chemistry malfunctioning.

You have an unstated presupposition that hallucinations must occur involuntarily -- without intent to produce the specific content of the hallucination. I hear that in your response above.

But hallucinations all have the basic property of altering perceptions of the "real" world. And I define the term that way. I could bring in jargon terminology, but that would only make the discussion opaque.



What sort? [/B]

The whole point is that you are using a word which is already very clearly defined, which is why I suggest you do some research. The word hallucinate has a very clear deifinition that referes to internal stimuli that have no external correlate.

So you are the one who is muddy-ing the water by using a word with a very clear definition in an unconventional way, which given your linguistic bent, I think you would understand.

If you would read a little about schizophrenia and organic brain syndromes , you will see that the term hallucination has a clear definition.

If you would read up on cognitive science and the theories of perception, you will find that there is a wealth of clear language that can be applied to the phenomena that you are discussing.

My point is solely that you are making the same mistake Ian makes, in that you have your convetional definition of words that applies to you. And that there is a plethora of words and ideaology that exist to allready clearlt discuss the phenomena you are discussing.

Hallucinations are perceptions not shared by others (Ie deduced to be solely internal), which are involuntary in nature and caused by chemical disorders. Illusions are what most people experience when they take hallucinogens. Then there is the whole behavioral and cognitive modeling for perceptual processes.

I feel that while jargon is often not useful, there are times where it can add clarity and reduce the opacity of discussions.

 

[Dancing David]

Now I see this as being the magical claim! Now please be a little more specific. Are you claiming that the brain can actually do more than physiologically represent? Or are you saying the physiological representation itself is consciousness? I presume not the former? Or if it is the former what more does the brain do than physiologically represent?
The experience of consiuos ness is related to the physiological representation in the chemical processes in the brian, yes!



Obviously the onus is upon you to show how conscious experience can magically arise out of pattern recognition and information processing. In other words what is it about pattern recognition and information processing which could conceivably give rise to consciousness?

Depend on which of the many form of consiousness you wish to discuss, take 'thought', it is a set of cognitive patterns related to the physiological representation of speech


-snip-
As long as the word "recognise" does not connote conscious awareness

Sorry but the term recognition is one of the cores of consiousness.



Now it is you that is making the bare assertions. Er . . when did consciousness enter into the picture? You have yet to argue how a purely physiological representation can somehow magically lead to conscious awareness.

This may make sense in the sense of mathematical proof but not in the sense of scientific proof, I suggest to you that all the variuos forms of brain damage and all the consequent forms of alteration of consiousness are scientific proof.




-snip-


The actual raw feel of conscious awareness.

There is no such thing, there is the interpretation made by the brain of receptor based interactions.



First of all you are denyint there is a self, then you are asserting there is an experient. Please be explicit, are there only experiences, or is there in addition a self or experiencer (experient)? If the self is an illusion then it doesn't exist! In saying there is a self this means no more than we feel there is a self, but in reality there isn't a self. You can't have it both ways and claim there is a self and isn't a self!

Ain't that just the coolest thing, the SELF is the illusion, just like the MIND, there are all these cool things that happen, thoughts, feelings, memories, sensations and repetitive patterns, but the
Is No Self

There doesn't have to be the see-er behind the eye. There just is what is , the rest is illusion.

Read the buddha, he was a very smart and wise man.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

It is not a strawman, although the infinite regression idea is only one side of the argument against the dualistic notion of a non-physical "experiencer". The other side of the argument is that if you reject the infinite regression, as you said, and instead assert that the "experiencer" is an irreducible entity which experiences directly, then why bother with it at all? Why not just cut out the middle mad, and accept that your brain is the experiencer?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

So as well as experiences there is an experiencer?? I thought you agreed with Dennet??

If you actually understood Dennett's position, rather than dismissing it based on your preconceptions about the little pieces you have heard, and the criticisms made by dualists, you would realize that Dennett does not deny the existence of either experiences, or experiencers, but instead asserts that our intuitive notions about the nature of experiences are severely flawed.

All you have to do is get over your naive intuitive belief that there is something magical about your mind.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Since when has magical meant a denial of materialism?

Well, I don't know about whatever it is you are calling materialism this week, but I know that magical means a denial of naturalism. And that is exactly what you guys are asserting when you claim that consciousness cannot be scientifically understood.

The brain can do all sorts of things. What evidence do you have that "experiencing things" is not one of them?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Now I see this as being the magical claim!

I know. That's the whole problem. You have a-priori assumed that experiences are magical, so you deny the possibility that something non-magical, like the brain, could be responsible for them.

Now please be a little more specific. Are you claiming that the brain can actually do more than physiologically represent? Or are you saying the physiological representation itself is consciousness? I presume not the former? Or if it is the former what more does the brain do than physiologically represent?

Like I said to Titus, I have no idea what is meant by "physiologically represent".

I am not sure what you mean by "physiologically represent". Is information processing a form of physiological representation? How about pattern recognition? If so, could point out your evidence that there is anything more to "experiencing things" than a combination of pattern recognition and information processing?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Obviously the onus is upon you to show how conscious experience can magically arise out of pattern recognition and information processing.

It doesn't magically arise out of it. That's the point. There is nothing magical about it. What we think of as conscious experience is just a specific example of a type of pattern recognition and information processing.

In other words what is it about pattern recognition and information processing which could conceivably give rise to consciousness?

It doesn't "give rise to consciousness". Consciousness is a type of pattern recognition and information processing.

That is a falsifiable theory. Demonstrate that any aspect of conscious experience cannot be a form of pattern recognition and information processing, and you will have falsified it.

You are the one claiming that you know for a fact that it is not. Where is your evidence? I am claiming no such absolute knowledge. I claim only that this is the best explanation I currently have, and that there is substantial supporting evidence for it.

Stimpy, it's not a matter of speculation, but of a clear description of experience. We know that experience possesses qualities which cannot be described in physical terms. Whether you like it or not.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Name one.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Any experiences whatsoever.

More proof by assertion? This is a complete waste of time.

And process information. And recognize patterns. Don't forget that. Your brain doesn't just store information, it processes it too.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

As long as the word "recognise" does not connote conscious awareness

The term "recognition" as I have used it does not have to imply conscious awareness. I know of no evidence to indicate that conscious awareness is not a combination of pattern recognition and information processing. Provide your evidence, or stop asserting that this is so.

Your brain is what does your thinking and remembering.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Now it is you that is making the bare assertions. Er . . when did consciousness enter into the picture? You have yet to argue how a purely physiological representation can somehow magically lead to conscious awareness.

Are you claiming that it is not your brain which performs the information processing you call "thought", and the information retrieval process you call "memory"? Remember that in this sentence, I was referring to those things, not necessarily the experience of them. The point being that even if you imagine a non-physical "experiencer", it is by all accounts a mindless one, incapable of cognition, memory, or even introspection. That is, unless you imagine that all of these things are, for some inexplicable reason, duplicated by the experiencer.

Your brain is what processes your sensory input and draws conclusions about the world from them. Your brain is what, right now, is totally convinced that there must be some "experiencer" experiencing what it is doing. Think about what that implies.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Presupposes the correctness of materialist metaphysic without any justification.

No, it presupposes no metaphysics whatsoever. It is a scientific fact. Your ignorance of basic cognitive neuroscience does not change that any. Nor does the fact that you reject any scientific evidence that contradicts your belief system.

Only if you leave out the very essence of what we know not speculate is the essence of subjectivity is it possible to claim that a purely physical brain could be an experient.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And what would that be?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The actual raw feel of conscious awareness.

Like I said, what would that be. To shamelessly steal your metaphor, the idea of having an experience without the brain process, is like having the grin without the cat.

You are misinterpreting Dennett. He is saying that your intuitive feeling of being some "self", distinct from your brain processes, is an illusion created by your brain. He is not saying that consciousness does not exist, or that there is no "experient".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

First of all you are denyint there is a self, then you are asserting there is an experient.

I denied that there is a self distinct from your brain processes. Your brain is doing the experiencing. Your intuitive notion that there is some self distinct from your brain, which is experiencing what your brain does, is an illusion.

In other words, the "self" does not exist. The "self" is not the experiencer. Your brain is the experiencer. The fact that your brain believes that it is actually some "self" distinct from the brain, is an intuitive misconception.

Please be explicit, are there only experiences, or is there in addition a self or experiencer (experient)? If the self is an illusion then it doesn't exist! In saying there is a self this means no more than we feel there is a self, but in reality there isn't a self. You can't have it both ways and claim there is a self and isn't a self!

Read what I said again. When you can demonstrate that you are at least attempting to understand what I am saying, get back to me.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

A few thoughts

I can add very little what hasn't already been said by Ian.

I do wish to point out however that Dancing David is generally right that we should define our terms before we use them. However, if we talk about illusions in philosophy the term obviously doesn't have a psychiatric meaning.

What do we mean by illusion if somebody claims that consciousness is an illusion?

I think there are two possible uses of this word:

- An experiental one, which would be analytically absurd as the claim would read:
"we only EXPERIENCE that we are experients, but we really aren't". We cannot experience anything if experience does not exist.

- A cognitive one, which would imply that the claim can be translated as:
"we only THINK that we are experients, but we really aren't". This claim could apriori be right as it doesn't contain an analytical inconsistency. However, it is in flagrant contradiction with all of our conscious experiences.

Either way, the claim that consciousness is an illusion does not lead to rational insights.

BillyJoe, what was the name of the coffyshop? I might have known it.

Titus

 

[Dancing David]

Pretty cool sig line Titus, but materialism is not falling apsrt, it is another tool in the chest. Immaterilism has a very long history, back into pre history, and it is another tool as well.

What matters from the scientific viewpoint is inot the ontology or the why of existance, what matters from the scientific viewpoint is, can it be replicated.

Unfortunately for this discussion the scientific method cuts through the 'why' and get to 'what' can be replicated.

While a philospher might care to debate
-is consiousness real
-is reality real
-is the material world real

a scientist says, we can talk about that while we are out camping meanwhile, here are some commonalities to the human experience, here are ways in whcih we can approximate the experience. It doesn't matter if the theories are truth or fiction, as long as they give reliable approximations to the experience.

So is it direct perception when I read the mark on a balance scale and conclude that a certain amount of material has vaporised?

NO.

Because there is no direct perception anywhere in the system, we have receptors that respond to photons, the rest is biological interpretation.

There is no direct perception ever.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

What do we mean by illusion if somebody claims that consciousness is an illusion?

I think there are two possible uses of this word:

- An experiental one, which would be analytically absurd as the claim would read:
"we only EXPERIENCE that we are experients, but we really aren't". We cannot experience anything if experience does not exist.

- A cognitive one, which would imply that the claim can be translated as:
"we only THINK that we are experients, but we really aren't". This claim could apriori be right as it doesn't contain an analytical inconsistency. However, it is in flagrant contradiction with all of our conscious experiences.

Either way, the claim that consciousness is an illusion does not lead to rational insights.

How about a third option:

- That our intuitive conceptions of what consciousness is, are horribly flawed. That the definitions that are commonly given for consciousness, which are loaded with dualistic baggage, do not represent what we really are.

Nobody is denying that we experience things. What is in question is the nature of experience. Nobody is claiming that things like thought, awareness, memory, emotion, sense of self, and perception, the very things which consciousness is supposed to refer to, do not exist. What is in question is the nature of these things.

This wouldn't be a problem if Idealists and Dualists did not always insist on using definitions which implicitly include Idealistic or Dualistic metaphysical assumption. When they do so, the materialist is left with no choice but to say "what you have just defined is not something that exists".


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus,



How about a third option:

- That our intuitive conceptions of what consciousness is, are horribly flawed.

This sounds at least slightly promising. Could you provide a list of these intuitive conceptions please?

Thanks.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

This sounds at least slightly promising. Could you provide a list of these intuitive conceptions please?

OK.

-The conception of there being some immutable "self" that stays the same, even as every aspect of our personality and thought processes changes.

-The conception that this self is capable of making choices, unconstrained by any algorithmic processes (Libertarian free-will).

-The conception that the self is some sort of being, separate from the physical body, that experiences what the body is doing, and controls it, but is not actually a part of it.

That should do for starters.


Dr. Stupid

 

[hammegk]

-The conception of there being some immutable "self" that stays the same, even as every aspect of our personality and thought processes changes.

-The conception that this self is capable of making choices, unconstrained by any algorithmic processes (Libertarian free-will).

-The conception that the self is some sort of being, separate from the physical body, that experiences what the body is doing, and controls it, but is not actually a part of it.

That should do for starters.


Dr. Stupid

I'd go for the second statement.

One & three don't make sense in my worldview. Nothing I know makes me consider my "self" immutable, and, "physical body" -- what *is* that?

 

[Suggestologist]

The whole point is that you are using a word which is already very clearly defined, which is why I suggest you do some research. The word hallucinate has a very clear deifinition that referes to internal stimuli that have no external correlate.

Well, can you hear a voice in your head that has no external correlate? I certainly can. Most people can. I don't need to alter my brain chemistry to do it.

So you are the one who is muddy-ing the water by using a word with a very clear definition in an unconventional way, which given your linguistic bent, I think you would understand.

If you would read a little about schizophrenia and organic brain syndromes , you will see that the term hallucination has a clear definition.

No, it has a definition in that context. But other contexts use the same term.

If you would read up on cognitive science and the theories of perception, you will find that there is a wealth of clear language that can be applied to the phenomena that you are discussing.

Using alternate language would not make the point I'm making: that hallucination happens all the time. The only difference comes from context cues. If you heard the same voice in your head that you usually do when you talk to yourself; but attributed that voice to someone other than yourself -- then you would call that a hallucination. But the essence of the hallucination has not changed at all between the two situations. You always hallucinated the voice, you merely changed that attribution to create what YOU would call a "hallucination".

My point is solely that you are making the same mistake Ian makes, in that you have your convetional definition of words that applies to you. And that there is a plethora of words and ideaology that exist to allready clearlt discuss the phenomena you are discussing.

Hallucinations are perceptions not shared by others (Ie deduced to be solely internal), which are involuntary in nature and caused by chemical disorders. Illusions are what most people experience when they take hallucinogens. Then there is the whole behavioral and cognitive modeling for perceptual processes.

I feel that while jargon is often not useful, there are times where it can add clarity and reduce the opacity of discussions.

Hallucinations need not occur involuntarily, that simply does not occur in the "conventional" definition of the term.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Not really a third option

Dr. Stupid,

- That our intuitive conceptions of what consciousness is, are horribly flawed. That the definitions that are commonly given for consciousness, which are loaded with dualistic baggage, do not represent what we really are.

Well, we're not talking about consciousness in any other sense than what we EXPERIENCE.
So this is not really a third option. It really is identical to my second option, namely that you claim that what all people understand by consciousness is flawed. It boils down to the position that consciousness would simply not exist in the qualitative or subjective sense.

By the way, the other conceptions mentioned by you (and in fact held by myself) are not conceptions of what consciousness as such involves, but of the nature of the self. Though the two questions are closely related, they can still be distinguished. Let's not complicate things here more than is necessary. The question remains wether you accept that consciousness is irreducibly qualitative and subjective. That's not a matter of dualist or idealist ideology but simply of recognition of basic dimensions of consciousness which can only be denied by highly intelligent and at the same time shockingly misled philosophers or scientists (and their disciples). A philosophy based on a denial of quality and subjectivity as basic, irreducible dimensions of consciousness cannot simultaneously hold that those dimensions would simply be dimensions of a 'conscious brain'. A matter of logic: a non-subjective brain as a ('objective') physical object cannot be irreducibly subjective and an entirely quantifiable brain as a physical system cannot be irreducibly qualitative. Please note that we're talking about ontological reduction here (one domain of reality, here we mean: consciousness, is simply a complex structure within a more basic domain, in this case physical reality) , not about nomothetical reduction (the laws by which consciousness operates can be reduced to more general laws of nature, without any inherent implication that consciousness can be ontologically reduced to the brain as a physical system).

Titus

P.S.:

Logically sound ontological positions are:

- Solipsism

- Reductionism (in the ontological sense, i.e. eliminative materialism) Any non-eliminative materialism which acknowledges the irreducible subjective and qualitative existence of consciousness is not really a form of materialism.
However, if you follow the implications of reductionism, you will notice that real knowledge which would include its subjective aspects becomes impossible. If a reductionist implicitly sticks to a definition of knowledge as at least partially subjective, he would contradict itself. Reductionism has to be rigorous to be coherent. In the traditional sense of knowledge as something which can involve consciousness, reductionists must claim we can know nothing and shouldn't therefore believe in the existence of anything (ontological nihilism). As ontological nihilism and reductionism are not one and the same thing, this version of reductionism with a traditional concept of knowledge is hereby shown to be incoherent.

- Dualistic Interactionism

- Idealism


Empirically sound ontological positions are:

- Solipsism (though only for the person him- or herself)

- Dualistic Interactionism

- Idealism


Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Direct subjective experience does not equal direct external perception

So is it direct perception when I read the mark on a balance scale and conclude that a certain amount of material has vaporised?

NO.

Because there is no direct perception anywhere in the system, we have receptors that respond to photons, the rest is biological interpretation.

There is no direct perception ever.

Well, Dancing David, the point is you have misunderstood my point. I was not talking about perception in the sense of physical sensory registration + computational (peripheral and central) processing + subjective perception. I was talking about undergoing experiences. Of course there is no direct perception of the outside world (not even leaving ESP aside, as this process always involves a selection of information as well). Perception is always mediated by psychological processes. We never perceive anything external directly, but we do directly undergo all our conscious experiences (including the perceptual ones) all the time.

My point was precisely that perception as a complex process which (mostly) involves neurological as well as subconscious psychological (cognitive, etc.) processing on the one hand and conscious experience on the other should be lucidly distinguished, as equating the two created the straw homunculus.

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus, what does this mean:

Well, we're not talking about consciousness in any other sense than what we EXPERIENCE.

and what does this mean:

The question remains wether you accept that consciousness is irreducibly qualitative and subjective.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

What is Mind? No Matter

Titus, what does this mean: Well, we're not talking about consciousness in any other sense than what we EXPERIENCE.

Well, Paul, it means the topic here is the experiences we consciously undergo, not the intuitions nor the preconceptions about what those experiences are, but simply what we really experience.

and what does this mean:

quote:The question remains wether you accept that consciousness is irreducibly qualitative and subjective.

As I have just said in another posting on this thread, I was aiming at ontological irreducibility, meaning that the questions remains whether you accept that consciousness cannot be conceived of as really nothing more than a (quantitative, non-subjective) structure within the (quantitative, non-subjective) physical world.

Titus