A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Suggestologist]

This is something I also agree with, though 'hallucinate' isn't the word I would have chosen. I like to think of our view of the world as a 'simulation'.

In order to envisage the "simulation", you see and hear and feel it -- a "hallucination". You do not logically go through a simulation; you do more than that, at least.

Science acknowledges this as well; it is in fact to counteract this effect that we restrict ourselves with scientific methodology.

Scientists believe that their restrictions have succeeded, too much.

After we all get done muddying up this subject, maybe we can go out and freeze some ice, maybe set some lava on fire.

Too boring.

 

[Mercutio]

No need to thank me.

Finally, something we can agree upon!

You acknowledge that my definition includes perceptual distortion of "reality", and you stated this as a definition earlier. Now you claim that I have misunderstood your meaning.

Again you quibble on meanings. Are your memories part of your reality? In one sense, absolutely (and so your statement is undeniably correct). In another, perhaps more common colloquial sense, no. Your memories are of your past, your reality is of your present. It is that sense which I meant at the time. I'm sorry I did not split every hair in the definition. I was too busy changing my kids' diapers--no, wait, that was 10 year ago. Sorry, I so often confuse the past and the present, since all reality is the same.

And as I have stated earlier, everyone (nearly) always hallucinates.

Memory does not have to enter into it. Precontextualization can have the same effect as postcontextualization (mental sets) on perception of events. (i.e. first impressions).

Also, consider my first point ("for one") more thouroughly.

Ah, yes, kitties playing with yarn. I hope Yahweh is reading this. The use of hallucination in this example makes perfect sense from an idealist's point of view--there is a platonic ideal kitty-playing-with-yarn, and any deviation from that is a hallucination (or an hallucination, for folks who prefer that). That may well be your world view, I have given up the attempt to guess. In my world view, there is a real world (or there isn't and my senses fool me into thinking there is, but with no practical difference between the two, it is as if there is a real world, so we act as if there is) which is sensed, imperfectly, by the creatures in it. It is also remembered imperfectly, and (for those creatures who happen to be verbal) talked about imperfectly. One person will talk about a kitty, and another will listen and get an imperfect notion of what the first person spoke about. To the extent that the imperfect notion is close enough for the first person to get what he or she wants from the second, language works. Language is a tool with a specific function (to get others to do what we want them to do--the rest is gravy), and it need not be perfect to accomplish that.

Now, the astute reader will note the word "imperfect" as having had quite a role to play in the previous sentence. Imperfection, variability, randomness...variety is the spice of life, no? Does this variability necessitate the use of the word "hallucination"? I would not have thought so, but I am learning that it depends on your world view.

Unfortunately, Stimpson seems to have a hard time coming to terms with the circularity in his world view.

His fundamental assumptions (which he has explicitly stated) are different from yours (which you have not, if memory serves. Of course, memory is imperfect, or a hallucination, take your pick.) Given his assumptions, his world view is not circular. Yours may be. Given your assumptions, perhaps his is and yours is not. Why not tell us yours, and we can figure this out?




Oh, and thank you for the kind words, Dancing David.

 

[Rayn]

Dennett: Am I an instrumentalist? I think I have shown why that is a poorly concieved question in Real Patterns (1991a). Are pains real? They are as real as haircuts

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Ian: A pain is an uninterpreted direct sensation. A haircut is those perceptual experiences equivalent to what we would label as a haircut. Nothing to do with each other and only a moron would suppose otherwise.

Ian, it seems to me that you are using words which have a specific definition to you and applying them to a small slice of an entire book in order to judge it - an act you repeatedly commit throughout this post. If you could, please define the word "sensation" and "perception" and "experience" in a manner where they denote unrelated ideas and/or objects.

Dennett ... and dollars and opportunities and persons and centers of gravity, but how real is that?

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Ian: None of them whatsoever have to do with the experience of pain. What is your point?

I thought your argument was based upon the supposition that everything that exists is based upon a subjective experience, or a shared consensus of subjective experiences, an intersubjective experience, if you will. If that is not the case, please remind me as to what your position is then.

Dennett: These dichotomizing questions all grow out of the demand to fill in the blank in the quantified formula above,

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Ian: What quantified formula above?

Dennett: Dennett

The quantified formula that Dennett is referring to is the question "Are pains real?" This questions whether the statement (S) "If x is a pain, then x is real" is true or false.

Dennett: and some philosophers think that one develops a theory of mind by concocting a bulletproof proposition of that sort

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Ian: What sort?

I admit, Dennett's writing here could be clarified. From what I gather it is a proposition along the lines of 'S is true' or 'S is false.'

Dennett ... and then defending it. A single proposition isn't a theory, it's a slogan; and what some philosophers do isn't theorizing, it's slogan-honing.

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Ian: So what? What has this to do with me?

It could quite possibly have nothing to do with you. However, if you're advocating the proposition "All that is real is human experience" or "Our perceptual experiences are the external world" without providing us with a coherent, logical argument that prove these statements, then all you have is a "slogan."

Dennett: What is this labor for? What confusion would be dissipated, what advances in outlook would be created, by success in this endeavor? Do you really need something to print on your T-shirt? Some slogan-honers are very, very good at it, but as the psychologist Donald Hebb once memorably said, "If it isn't worth doing, it isn't worth doing well."

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Ian: What is what labor for? I have no idea what you're talking about.

The labor in finding and advocating the best "slogan" possible, I assume. Again, this could possibly be left out, but I believe Dennett is basically advocating the usage of creating coherent scientific theories instead of a nice catchphrase.

Anyways, I wouldn't do anyone the injustice of making judgements upon a single paragraph from the appendix of their work without reading the rest of the piece. Taking anyone's words out of context and attacking them on these grounds is a disservice to them.

I can appreciate your views, and from what I can understand of them, this long thread has arisen out of what you yourself identify as "diametrically opposed views." I believe that you are are using as an axiom Descartes' "I think, I am," and using it to extrapolate upon the world. I'm not sure what you define as "real" outside of some statements to the effect that reality is somehow founded upon or defined by our subjective or intersubjective experiences.

I don't know which one you are choosing throughout this discussion. If it is the former, I would have to disagree, as I do not believe our experience is necessary for reality or an outside world to exist. If it is the latter, then I agree, and as Stimpy has stated it is an axiom of science that through inferences based on our experience we can get at objective reality. Personally, I agree with this axiom and choose to use it to understand the world. Whether or not you do as well is unclear to me.

Edit: For formatting, and I can't seem to get rid of the "Dennett: Dennett in italics at one spot in this post. I don't know what happened there, so ignore it please.

 

[Rayn]

Suggestologist,

I believe that "scientism" has been used by Huston Smith in books such as Forgotten Truth where he uses it to delineate between "scientists" and "technicians." The former (from what I can recall) were those who practiced the scientific method and applied it to all hypotheses, while the latter were those who looked at science as a source of "ultimate truth," a truth not to be questioned, and I suppose could be considered part of a "cult of scientism" (I'm not sure if he actually used this phrase, so I will attribute it to you )

In regards to your usage of the word "hallucination," I would prefer to use the words subjective experience (although, I'm sure, many would prefer me not to). This is, by definition, unique and "un-knowable" to another, which relativizes notions such as "normal" or "the man with the yellow umbrella." You seem to be supporting the notion that science is only able to explore, at best, an intersubjective experience, one that may or may not have anything to do with "true reality."

However, I am not sure if this is what you mean, and I do not want to put words in your mouth. Personally, I although I can agree with such distinctions on some level, I prefer to think of this in terms of a scientific theory. The concept of a holographic universe seems to provide a theory that encompasses your assertions, as I understand them to be. According to such a model (again, as I understand it), there are two "orders" to the universe, the "explicate" and the "implicate," which can be compared to the image of a hologram and the holographic film itself, respectively. The explicate order is the one where we experience different, categorized "things," i.e., oranges, cats, windows, the sun, black holes, Mars, space-time, and the man in with the yellow unbrella. The implicate order, on the other hand, is the whole of this, an "unbroken plenum" or the whole interconnected universe, that can be used to explain the EPR effect and other quantum phenomena.

Anyways, not to muddy the waters further (as it seems that any contribution to this thread seems to do in one manner or another ), but insofar as you are stating that science is imperfect in its explanation's of the explicate order, this may be due in part to this explicate order being an imperfect projection of the implicate order that everything is a part of and where everything is enfolded in each part. Ugh ... it seems I've made a worse mess of things than anything else. Basically, I suppose that I'm trying to state that the Measurement Problem and other quantum phenomena that are unable to be reconciled with Relativity Theory may be exhibiting the issues you bring up with your allusions to subjective experience and our inability to accurately describe "reality." However, perhaps there is a scientific way to understand this through concepts such as the Implicate Order Theory put forth by David Bohm and other physicists and philosophers like him.

Books by David Bohm: On Creativity (the one I've read) and Wholeness and the Implicate Order.

Links to Articles: Edit: Seems link wasn't working. Access this article "An ontological basis for the quantum theory" in Physics Reports, Volume 144, Issue 6, January 1987, Pages 321-375 by D. Bohm, B. J. Hiley and P. N. Kaloyerou at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journals
Ugh, seems you have to pay now for access to these articles, I wonder when that happened. Sorry all, it used to be that you could get knowledge for free, seems that's not the case anymore.

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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Dennett: Am I an instrumentalist? I think I have shown why that is a poorly concieved question in Real Patterns (1991a). Are pains real? They are as real as haircuts

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Ian: A pain is an uninterpreted direct sensation. A haircut is those perceptual experiences equivalent to what we would label as a haircut. Nothing to do with each other and only a moron would suppose otherwise.

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Ian, it seems to me that you are using words which have a specific definition to you and applying them to a small slice of an entire book in order to judge it - an act you repeatedly commit throughout this post. If you could, please define the word "sensation" and "perception" and "experience" in a manner where they denote unrelated ideas and/or objects.

A sensation meaning the collective term to refer to pains and the like. Obviously one cannot further define "pain". A perceptual experience refers to qualia.

quote:
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Dennett ... and dollars and opportunities and persons and centers of gravity, but how real is that?

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Ian: None of them whatsoever have to do with the experience of pain. What is your point?
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I thought your argument was based upon the supposition that everything that exists is based upon a subjective experience, or a shared consensus of subjective experiences, an intersubjective experience, if you will. If that is not the case, please remind me as to what your position is then.

Everything that "physically" exists yeah. What's the problem?

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Dennett: These dichotomizing questions all grow out of the demand to fill in the blank in the quantified formula above,

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Ian: What quantified formula above?
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Dennett: Dennett

The quantified formula that Dennett is referring to is the question "Are pains real?" This questions whether the statement (S) "If x is a pain, then x is real" is true or false.

I do not know what it could possibly mean to state that pains do not exist. People experience pains therefore they exist. Nice attempt to confuse the issue though by asking whether pains are real rather than do they exist.

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Dennett ... and then defending it. A single proposition isn't a theory, it's a slogan; and what some philosophers do isn't theorizing, it's slogan-honing.

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Ian: So what? What has this to do with me?
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It could quite possibly have nothing to do with you. However, if you're advocating the proposition "All that is real is human experience" or "Our perceptual experiences are the external world" without providing us with a coherent, logical argument that prove these statements, then all you have is a "slogan."

If you assert that there is more to the "physical" world then our perceptual experiences then clearly it is not upon the onus of me to show this is not so! How the hell could I since I don't know what this mysterious material world is that you believe in?? Provide some arguments to suppose my position is incorrect, and I shall address them. I fell disinclined to explain why a mysterious existent doesn't exist when you fail to specify the nature of this mysterious existent or any reasons or evidence to suppose it has actuality.

Anyways, I wouldn't do anyone the injustice of making judgements upon a single paragraph from the appendix of their work without reading the rest of the piece. Taking anyone's words out of context and attacking them on these grounds is a disservice to them.

{shrugs}

Not my fault. Somebody else quoted him. And I have no intention of reading his "consiousness explained". As I have explained many times on this board, it is not possible to explain consciousness. It is a basic ontological existent.

I can appreciate your views, and from what I can understand of them, this long thread has arisen out of what you yourself identify as "diametrically opposed views." I believe that you are are using as an axiom Descartes' "I think, I am,"

Not in this thread I'm not. I'm talking about primary and secondary qualities. This has nothing to do with the nature of the self.

and using it to extrapolate upon the world. I'm not sure what you define as "real" outside of some statements to the effect that reality is somehow founded upon or defined by our subjective or intersubjective experiences.

Well I would say consciousnesses are real as well, and yes even the self although this hasn't been addressed in this thread so far as I can recall.

I don't know which one you are choosing throughout this discussion. If it is the former, I would have to disagree, as I do not believe our experience is necessary for reality or an outside world to exist.

{shrugs} Then give some arguments which vindicate your belief. What is this mysterious unexperienced world like? Is it similar to our experiences of it? If so how do you know? Or is this mysterious reality like what certain scientists depict?

If it is the latter, then I agree, and as Stimpy has stated

Stimpy is an idiot and I have no interest in what he states.

it is an axiom of science that through inferences based on our experience we can get at objective reality.

What absolute crap! Why doesn't anybody ever get a clue about what science does or does not imply???

Personally, I agree with this axiom and choose to use it to understand the world. Whether or not you do as well is unclear to me.

Well allow me to make myself quite clear. No I don't!

 

[BillyJoe]

I knew I'd finally get a chance to make an important contribution to this thread........

Edit: For formatting, and I can't seem to get rid of the "Dennett: Dennett in italics at one spot in this post. I don't know what happened there, so ignore it please.

Well, I had no trouble at all......

Ian, it seems to me that you are using words which have a specific definition to you and applying them to a small slice of an entire book in order to judge it - an act you repeatedly commit throughout this post. If you could, please define the word "sensation" and "perception" and "experience" in a manner where they denote unrelated ideas and/or objects.



I thought your argument was based upon the supposition that everything that exists is based upon a subjective experience, or a shared consensus of subjective experiences, an intersubjective experience, if you will. If that is not the case, please remind me as to what your position is then.

I deleted the bit in italics that used to be here

The quantified formula that Dennett is referring to is the question "Are pains real?" This questions whether the statement (S) "If x is a pain, then x is real" is true or false.



I admit, Dennett's writing here could be clarified. From what I gather it is a proposition along the lines of 'S is true' or 'S is false.'



It could quite possibly have nothing to do with you. However, if you're advocating the proposition "All that is real is human experience" or "Our perceptual experiences are the external world" without providing us with a coherent, logical argument that prove these statements, then all you have is a "slogan."



The labor in finding and advocating the best "slogan" possible, I assume. Again, this could possibly be left out, but I believe Dennett is basically advocating the usage of creating coherent scientific theories instead of a nice catchphrase.

Anyways, I wouldn't do anyone the injustice of making judgements upon a single paragraph from the appendix of their work without reading the rest of the piece. Taking anyone's words out of context and attacking them on these grounds is a disservice to them.

I can appreciate your views, and from what I can understand of them, this long thread has arisen out of what you yourself identify as "diametrically opposed views." I believe that you are are using as an axiom Descartes' "I think, I am," and using it to extrapolate upon the world. I'm not sure what you define as "real" outside of some statements to the effect that reality is somehow founded upon or defined by our subjective or intersubjective experiences.

I don't know which one you are choosing throughout this discussion. If it is the former, I would have to disagree, as I do not believe our experience is necessary for reality or an outside world to exist. If it is the latter, then I agree, and as Stimpy has stated it is an axiom of science that through inferences based on our experience we can get at objective reality. Personally, I agree with this axiom and choose to use it to understand the world. Whether or not you do as well is unclear to me.

Edit: For formatting, and I can't seem to get rid of the "Dennett: Dennett in italics at one spot in this post. I don't know what happened there, so ignore it please.

So, what was the problem?

BillyJoe.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

Scientists believe that their restrictions have succeeded, too much.

Based solely on their having reached conclusions inconsistent with yours, or did you wish to present other evidence to support this naked assertion?

You do not logically go through a simulation

I think some interesting questions can be raised about the degree to which the intrinsic inferences which form the basis of our simulations are based on logic. For instance, if subitizing is something different than counting, do the low-level details of how that works reflect a logical (or formal or rigorous or algorithmic) alternative method of arriving at an answer, or does it depend on something like luck?

After we all get done muddying up this subject, maybe we can go out and freeze some ice, maybe set some lava on fire.
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Too boring.

Would you like me to explain the joke?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

it is not possible to explain consciousness. It is a basic ontological existent.

I find that I cannot reject this view out of hand. One way of expressing it is that even when such things as attention, control, reportability, etc., are explained, (which Dennett, btw, does not claim to have accomplished) there will still remain something unexplainable -- what Chalmers calls "The hard problem". Dennett's solution to this, basically, is: "No problem". He describes himself as "a sort of teleofunctionalist" (depending on how you choose to define 'functionalism'.) Whether or not you feel that he would 'explain consciousness away' depends a lot on how flexible your definition of 'consciousness' is.

Surely every person has at least some rudimentary ideas about what consciousness is and how it works. These ideas are viciously circular; assumptions about what consciousness is inevitably lead to certain types of explanations of how it works, and any significant alterations to explanations of how it works automatically redefine what it is.

It seems to me that in a perfect world, definitions would always follow explanations, and never the other way around; we would follow the evidence in a completely unbiased way, adjusting our terms accordingly. In practice, what we do is leap from one preconception to another, testing a posteriori each piece of ground we land on to see if it provides a stable enough platform to serve as a launching pad (or stepping-stone) for the next leap.

That test phase is an awkward situation. Since we are on new ground, our frame of reference is one leap behind; we first try to force our new findings to fit within the old conceptual boxes, creating new ones only when those efforts fail (an example is 'punctuated equilbria', currently being discussed on another thread -- there is little controversy around whether or not such a phenomenon exists; what has been hotly debated is whether it is a radically new way of looking at evolution, or an idea easily absorbed by mainstream neo-Darwinism).

What I think is especially interesting is what happens when we are forced to create new definitions. Initially, those definitions are drawn out of the explanations we are forming for the phenomena we are observing -- they follow the explanations. But once a definition is in place, it determines the new categorical boundaries within which any further fleshing-out of the explanations must be made to fit. The only alternative would seem to be the unimaginably awkward practice of completely avoiding definitions, replacing every reference with a fully detailed explanation.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Regardless of how far we go in understanding consciousness, there will always be the personal experience of consciousness that allows us to say "Yes, but you still haven't gotten to the essence of my concsiousness." I'm not sure, though, that it will be fair to say that it is impossible to explain consciounsess. And if it is fair, then it is just as fair to say that it is impossible to explain what it is like to be a rock.

~~Paul

 

[Suggestologist]

Finally, something we can agree upon!

Again you quibble on meanings. Are your memories part of your reality? In one sense, absolutely (and so your statement is undeniably correct). In another, perhaps more common colloquial sense, no. Your memories are of your past, your reality is of your present. It is that sense which I meant at the time. I'm sorry I did not split every hair in the definition. I was too busy changing my kids' diapers--no, wait, that was 10 year ago. Sorry, I so often confuse the past and the present, since all reality is the same.

Your memories influence your present reality. We do not have to deal with memories-as-reflexion-on-the-past; we can stay with memories-as-influences-on-the-present (precontextualizers), or as I would prefer: past-experiences-as-influences-on-present-experience.

Ah, yes, kitties playing with yarn. I hope Yahweh is reading this. The use of hallucination in this example makes perfect sense from an idealist's point of view--there is a platonic ideal kitty-playing-with-yarn, and any deviation from that is a hallucination (or an hallucination, for folks who prefer that).

I do not appeal to an idealist, platonic point of view. I simply rely on the relativism between hallucinations, and the assumption by each person that the other person has hallucinated in the same way as they themselves have hallucinated the sentence.

This illustrates the invalidity of Wittgenstein's idea about the word "hallucination" as proof of the idea that we know what some other person means (hallucinates) when they refer to internal experiences like "hallucination".

The exchanges between Ian and Stimpson in this thread also illustrate the point well. And I alluded to that.

That may well be your world view, I have given up the attempt to guess. In my world view, there is a real world (or there isn't and my senses fool me into thinking there is, but with no practical difference between the two, it is as if there is a real world, so we act as if there is) which is sensed, imperfectly, by the creatures in it. It is also remembered imperfectly, and (for those creatures who happen to be verbal) talked about imperfectly. One person will talk about a kitty, and another will listen and get an imperfect notion of what the first person spoke about. To the extent that the imperfect notion is close enough for the first person to get what he or she wants from the second, language works. Language is a tool with a specific function (to get others to do what we want them to do--the rest is gravy), and it need not be perfect to accomplish that.

Your near-sighted view of the functionality of language, does not do it justice. Much of the time, the listener hallucinates differently from the way the speaker hallucinates the listener hallucinating; which causes disagreement and argument. And it often leads to the assumption that the other person harbors negative intent toward them or the conversation.

Now, the astute reader will note the word "imperfect" as having had quite a role to play in the previous sentence. Imperfection, variability, randomness...variety is the spice of life, no? Does this variability necessitate the use of the word "hallucination"? I would not have thought so, but I am learning that it depends on your world view.

It depends on personal experience. To someone who views "hallucination" as indicative of mental pathology or drug use, how strange does it seem to see that the same thing occurs when someone fasts, or when someone intends to hallucinate of some particular idea, or when their own recollections constitute the same form as any other hallucination. Presupposing "involuntariness" in the definition can cause this result. Presupposing a class of "valid" causes for "hallucinations", can cause the same.

His fundamental assumptions (which he has explicitly stated) are different from yours (which you have not, if memory serves. Of course, memory is imperfect, or a hallucination, take your pick.) Given his assumptions, his world view is not circular. Yours may be. Given your assumptions, perhaps his is and yours is not. Why not tell us yours, and we can figure this out?

That discussion does not concern me at this time. Circularity can work, but denying circularity when it exists, cannot.

 

[Suggestologist]

Suggestologist,

I believe that "scientism" has been used by Huston Smith in books such as Forgotten Truth where he uses it to delineate between "scientists" and "technicians." The former (from what I can recall) were those who practiced the scientific method and applied it to all hypotheses, while the latter were those who looked at science as a source of "ultimate truth," a truth not to be questioned, and I suppose could be considered part of a "cult of scientism" (I'm not sure if he actually used this phrase, so I will attribute it to you )

Sounds good to me.

In regards to your usage of the word "hallucination," I would prefer to use the words subjective experience (although, I'm sure, many would prefer me not to). This is, by definition, unique and "un-knowable" to another, which relativizes notions such as "normal" or "the man with the yellow umbrella." You seem to be supporting the notion that science is only able to explore, at best, an intersubjective experience, one that may or may not have anything to do with "true reality."

Well, perhaps you have misunderstood the context in which I used "hallucination". I meant it to mean the "re-presentation" of experience (in either eidetic/echoic or some constructed form). To the extent people simultaneously "re-present" their current experience; I agree with you, but no further.

However, I am not sure if this is what you mean, and I do not want to put words in your mouth. Personally, I although I can agree with such distinctions on some level, I prefer to think of this in terms of a scientific theory. The concept of a holographic universe seems to provide a theory that encompasses your assertions, as I understand them to be. According to such a model (again, as I understand it), there are two "orders" to the universe, the "explicate" and the "implicate," which can be compared to the image of a hologram and the holographic film itself, respectively. The explicate order is the one where we experience different, categorized "things," i.e., oranges, cats, windows, the sun, black holes, Mars, space-time, and the man in with the yellow unbrella. The implicate order, on the other hand, is the whole of this, an "unbroken plenum" or the whole interconnected universe, that can be used to explain the EPR effect and other quantum phenomena.

Sure: "The map is not the territory" -- Korzybski.

Anyways, not to muddy the waters further (as it seems that any contribution to this thread seems to do in one manner or another ), but insofar as you are stating that science is imperfect in its explanation's of the explicate order, this may be due in part to this explicate order being an imperfect projection of the implicate order that everything is a part of and where everything is enfolded in each part.

No. My general position has stated that we cannot trust science without personal verification, as its constituency comprises a society -- with all of the internal politics and social truths that all societies usually involve -- not the scientific methodology it aspires to invoke.

Ugh ... it seems I've made a worse mess of things than anything else. Basically, I suppose that I'm trying to state that the Measurement Problem and other quantum phenomena that are unable to be reconciled with Relativity Theory may be exhibiting the issues you bring up with your allusions to subjective experience and our inability to accurately describe "reality." However, perhaps there is a scientific way to understand this through concepts such as the Implicate Order Theory put forth by David Bohm and other physicists and philosophers like him.

The possibility that scientists have approved the wrong presuppositions to explain events, have made linguistic/conceptual distinctions where those specific distinctions have no relevancy to the specific subject of the underlying reality as observed in Quantum Physical experiments -- they should look there.

Books by David Bohm: On Creativity (the one I've read) and Wholeness and the Implicate Order.

Links to Articles: Edit: Seems link wasn't working. Access this article "An ontological basis for the quantum theory" in Physics Reports, Volume 144, Issue 6, January 1987, Pages 321-375 by D. Bohm, B. J. Hiley and P. N. Kaloyerou at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journals
Ugh, seems you have to pay now for access to these articles, I wonder when that happened. Sorry all, it used to be that you could get knowledge for free, seems that's not the case anymore.

Eillusive Freedom.

 

[Suggestologist]

Based solely on their having reached conclusions inconsistent with yours, or did you wish to present other evidence to support this naked assertion?

Yes. Based on reaching conclusions inconsistent with mine, but not soul-ly.

I think some interesting questions can be raised about the degree to which the intrinsic inferences which form the basis of our simulations are based on logic. For instance, if subitizing is something different than counting, do the low-level details of how that works reflect a logical (or formal or rigorous or algorithmic) alternative method of arriving at an answer, or does it depend on something like luck?

Subitizing has a lower capacity than counting. Subitizing works at nearly 100% accuracy with up to about 4 or 5 items; but it fails with large counts.

 

[Rayn]

Interesting Ian,

A sensation meaning the collective term to refer to pains and the like. Obviously one cannot further define "pain". A perceptual experience refers to qualia.

So do you reject any definitions of pain based upon the nervous system and the processes that can "cause" pain? What about the "missing limb" phenomena where people who have lost appendages still "feel pains" in their missing limbs? I suppose we will have to disagree as to the irreducibility of a concept such as "pain." Also, your second sentence is a mere tautology, please elaborate if you could.

Everything that "physically" exists yeah. What's the problem?

Well, I am pretty sure that my subjective experience also includes hopes, emotions, thoughts and memories. I believe that these can be described "physically," and I also believe that such a description does not in any way take away their import or value. Wilder Penfield's experiments do not mean that my memories of my grandmother are any less important to me, their localization in the temporal lobe (these views are changing constantly) does not make them any less amazing and valuable. I place great subjective worth upon them, whereas someone else may wish to reduce it to a few neurons exchanging processes in order to understand it. If they choose this route to attempt to understand how memories function and how they are valued they may, but this does not take anything away from me, and I believe that knowledge gained in this fashion may prove valuable in understanding such diseases of the subjective experience like Alzheimer's.

Not in this thread I'm not. I'm talking about primary and secondary qualities. This has nothing to do with the nature of the self.

I thought our subjective experience, which I believe is extremely important to the nature of the self, was your basis of reality and in this way I believe such a discussion of self would be quite relevant to a discussion of primary and secondary qualities. Please show me the flaw of my reasoning here.

I'll skip past some ad hominem remarks you make, and get to what is at the heart of the issue.

it is an axiom of science that through inferences based on our experience we can get at objective reality.

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What absolute crap! Why doesn't anybody ever get a clue about what science does or does not imply???

Can you give me a clue as to what science does or does not imply then? I came here to discuss and learn, not be yelled at for my admitted ignorance on many topics. If we cannot agree on the axiom I stated, then of course I would be unable to make any cogent argument as to an objective reality outside of personal experience and what this objective reality is like. Perhaps if you can provide a shared ground in the implications of science, then maybe I will be able to, but as it stands we are merely talking past one another. I hope you don't take any disrespect from my post Ian, as it was never meant to be there, I just want to talk about what I find to be an interesting topic. Thanks in advance for your reply.

 

[Rayn]

BillyJoe



Thanks for the help BillyJoe. When I tried to get rid of the damned thing, it just didn't appear in the text of my message. Must have fallen through a gap in the code, or my experience of the code, or my experience of the experience of the code. Anyways, glad to provide a problem which your contributions could easily vanquish.

 

[Rayn]

Suggestologist,

Well, perhaps you have misunderstood the context in which I used "hallucination". I meant it to mean the "re-presentation" of experience (in either eidetic/echoic or some constructed form). To the extent people simultaneously "re-present" their current experience; I agree with you, but no further.

I'm not exactly sure what you're getting at here, could you please clarify for me? It seems that you are saying that people "re-present" experience to both themselves and the outside world, but I'm not sure exactly where the eidetic/echoic and constructions come into play. I'm aware of eidetic (photographic)memories, but I suppose I'm not familiar with the term outside of that context. Anyways, sorry for my inability to grasp what you're saying, hope you can help me out.

No. My general position has stated that we cannot trust science without personal verification, as its constituency comprises a society -- with all of the internal politics and social truths that all societies usually involve -- not the scientific methodology it aspires to invoke.

I see. So you have issues with the "anthropology" of science, as opposed to the methodology. Of course, I can agree with this point to the extent that there are always factors that come into play with the scientific community, not the least of which are the monetary awards and competitions necessary to get funding for your laboratory. I am very much against the "cult of scientism" as you have formulated and as Huston Smith has also expounded upon, but I would not take this so far as to discount verifiable experiments and analyses based upon them. Perhaps this is a "faith" in the people who are carrying out these experiments to a degree, but I believe it is as informed as I personally can make it, and I always attempt to be skeptical in the conclusions I take as "true."

The possibility that scientists have approved the wrong presuppositions to explain events, have made linguistic/conceptual distinctions where those specific distinctions have no relevancy to the specific subject of the underlying reality as observed in Quantum Physical experiments -- they should look there.

I believe they are making the effort to do so. However, language is a necessary tool in order to communicate the complex ideas involved, and as General Semantics makes evident, it is imperfect and of course problems can arise out of such categorizations. Staying vigilant in using specifically defined terminology is necessary, and hopefully you will help us in this discussion. As far as the wave/particle duality and such paradoxes as Schrodinger's Cat, this is obviously evidence of the linguistic frailty that exists in science, but it does not discredit the work, instead forces it to re-evaluate itself (as well as provide some nice materials for good novels, Robert Anton Wilson anyone?). Anyways, this is all just a long way of saying I agree, but I don't plan on performing every experiment ever thought up in order to verify my beliefs in science.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Interesting Ian,

So do you reject any definitions of pain based upon the nervous system and the processes that can "cause" pain?

Yes.

What about the "missing limb" phenomena where people who have lost appendages still "feel pains" in their missing limbs?

Well it's interesting. I'm not sure what you want me to say about it though.

I suppose we will have to disagree as to the irreducibility of a concept such as "pain." Also, your second sentence is a mere tautology, please elaborate if you could.

No I can't. Consciousness and its attributes ie pains, fears, perceptual experiences etc are undefinable.

Well, I am pretty sure that my subjective experience also includes hopes, emotions, thoughts and memories. I believe that these can be described "physically,"

Anything physical is itself just certain perceptual experiences. How can emotions etc be described in terms of perceptual experiences? Obviously they can't be. Emotions can only be understood by actually experiencing them. Love is love is love. A physical process is a physical process is a physical process. One cannot describe one in terms of the other because they are utterly different. No commonality whatsoever.

and I also believe that such a description does not in any way take away their import or value. Wilder Penfield's experiments do not mean that my memories of my grandmother are any less important to me, their localization in the temporal lobe (these views are changing constantly) does not make them any less amazing and valuable.

Neither consciousness or any of its attributes has a location. How can my memory of a certain night out a year ago actually have a location? It is simply nonsensical.

I place great subjective worth upon them, whereas someone else may wish to reduce it to a few neurons exchanging processes in order to understand it. If they choose this route to attempt to understand how memories function and how they are valued they may, but this does not take anything away from me, and I believe that knowledge gained in this fashion may prove valuable in understanding such diseases of the subjective experience like Alzheimer's.

You're talking about the physical correlates of memory, not memory itself. There is nothing to be understood about memory. It is the basic attribute of the essential self. Processes within the brain don't create memories, rather I suspect they "filter" them. Without our brains I speculate we would have unimpeded memory to everything that has ever happened to us.

I thought our subjective experience, which I believe is extremely important to the nature of the self, was your basis of reality and in this way I believe such a discussion of self would be quite relevant to a discussion of primary and secondary qualities. Please show me the flaw of my reasoning here.

I'm sorry but I don't see how it is. I have written extensively in these forums about the nature of the self already. For eg see the Pam Reynolds thread in the paranormal forum (near the end of the thread).

Can you give me a clue as to what science does or does not imply then?

Elsewhere I have said that it is not the task of science to explain the experiencer (the self or consciousness) which experiences, nor the ontological character of the experiences themselves, but rather the patterns exhibited by the sub-branch of experiences represented by our sensory experiences. This is acheived by building mental representational models patterning and ordering these experiences (or qualia).

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Consciousness and its attributes ie pains, fears, perceptual experiences etc are undefinable.

Amazing how much discussion an undefinable concept can generate. My tendency would be to label an undefinable concept as incoherent, but what do I know?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian said:
Amazing how much discussion an undefinable concept can generate. My tendency would be to label an undefinable concept as incoherent, but what do I know?

~~ Paul

I would have thought the opposite. If a thing is undefined how can it be incoherent? It's not as if you can say aspects of the definition are not in harmony.

 

[Loki]

Paul,

Amazing how much discussion an undefinable concept can generate. My tendency would be to label an undefinable concept as incoherent, but what do I know?

I find it somewhat disconcerting that Ian can apparently declare that consciousness is both :

(a) "Undefined and Undefineable"

and

(b) "Clearly not a physical process"

At the very least, I would have though Ian *must* admit that consciousness is partially definable, even if that definition is nothing more than "not a physical process".

Ian doesn't know what it is, but he does know what it isn't. Okay.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I believe that you are are using as an axiom Descartes' "I think, I am,"

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Not in this thread I'm not. I'm talking about primary and secondary qualities. This has nothing to do with the nature of the self.

I think it does, and I think you are talking about it.

Consciousness and its attributes ie pains, fears, perceptual experiences etc are undefinable.

They are undefinable only if certain assumptions about their nature are correct. It's not that these things get discussed a lot despite being undefinable -- we do have definitions for them; it's just that the traditional definitions tend give a whole bunch of unproven (in fact unspoken) assumptions a free ride -- the most popular one being the assumption that the 'qualia show' is for the benefit of 'the audience in the Cartesian theatre'. What happens to 'primary and secondary qualities' when you examine them in the absence of that notion?