Titus,
- That our intuitive conceptions of what consciousness is, are horribly flawed. That the definitions that are commonly given for consciousness, which are loaded with dualistic baggage, do not represent what we really are.
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Well, we're not talking about consciousness in any other sense than what we EXPERIENCE.
So this is not really a third option. It really is identical to my second option, namely that you claim that what all people understand by consciousness is flawed. It boils down to the position that consciousness would simply not exist in the qualitative or subjective sense.
If that is the case, then your conclusions about option two are not justified.
- A cognitive one, which would imply that the claim can be translated as:
"we only THINK that we are experients, but we really aren't". This claim could apriori be right as it doesn't contain an analytical inconsistency. However, it is in flagrant contradiction with all of our conscious experiences.
Either way, the claim that consciousness is an illusion does not lead to rational insights.
First of all, it is not in contradiction with our conscious experiences. It is a possible interpretation of them. All it is in contradiction with is our intuitive interpretation of our conscious experiences, and that is no problem, because we already know that our intuition is not reliable, and can often times mislead us.
Second, it
can lead to rational insights. This view of consciousness has led to all sorts of advancements in the field of psychology. More importantly, though, this view is a direct consequence of our scientific knowledge about neuroscience and psychology. Those fields of research are what lead to rational insights, one of which is that our intuitive preconceptions about consciousness and experiences, are flawed.
By the way, the other conceptions mentioned by you (and in fact held by myself) are not conceptions of what consciousness as such involves, but of the nature of the self. Though the two questions are closely related, they can still be distinguished. Let's not complicate things here more than is necessary.
If we could agree on some definitions for these terms, maybe we could. But you guys have usurped all of the words like consciousness, self, experience, and awareness, and given them dualistic meanings. Anytime anybody who disagrees with these dualistic assumptions says anything, they are immediately attacked as denying the existence of consciousness.
The question remains wether you accept that consciousness is irreducibly qualitative and subjective. That's not a matter of dualist or idealist ideology but simply of recognition of basic dimensions of consciousness which can only be denied by highly intelligent and at the same time shockingly misled philosophers or scientists (and their disciples).
It is very easy to assert that those who disagree with you are misled. Such assertions do not impress me.
A philosophy based on a denial of quality and subjectivity as basic, irreducible dimensions of consciousness cannot simultaneously hold that those dimensions would simply be dimensions of a 'conscious brain'. A matter of logic: a non-subjective brain as a ('objective') physical object cannot be irreducibly subjective and an entirely quantifiable brain as a physical system cannot be irreducibly qualitative.
I am not following your reasoning here at all. Why is it not possible for subjective experiences to be reducible to objective processes?
Logically sound ontological positions are:
- Solipsism
- Reductionism (in the ontological sense, i.e. eliminative materialism) Any non-eliminative materialism which acknowledges the irreducible subjective and qualitative existence of consciousness is not really a form of materialism.
However, if you follow the implications of reductionism, you will notice that real knowledge which would include its subjective aspects becomes impossible. If a reductionist implicitly sticks to a definition of knowledge as at least partially subjective, he would contradict itself. Reductionism has to be rigorous to be coherent. In the traditional sense of knowledge as something which can involve consciousness, reductionists must claim we can know nothing and shouldn't therefore believe in the existence of anything (ontological nihilism). As ontological nihilism and reductionism are not one and the same thing, this version of reductionism with a traditional concept of knowledge is hereby shown to be incoherent.
- Dualistic Interactionism
- Idealism
Empirically sound ontological positions are:
- Solipsism (though only for the person him- or herself)
- Dualistic Interactionism
- Idealism
I disagree with your assertions about reductionism. The framework of the scientific method provides a definition of knowledge, along with a method for obtaining and verifying it.
In any event, I see no point in mucking around with ontological positions at all. My position is a epistemological one. You can speculate about the Universe being a dream in the mind of God, or being composed of different interacting "substances", all you want. As long as the axioms of science are valid, my framework is valid, and the rest is blind speculation about stuff which, by definition, doesn't make any difference.
Ian,
-The conception of there being some immutable "self" that stays the same, even as every aspect of our personality and thought processes changes.
-The conception that this self is capable of making choices, unconstrained by any algorithmic processes (Libertarian free-will).
-The conception that the self is some sort of being, separate from the physical body, that experiences what the body is doing, and controls it, but is not actually a part of it.
That should do for starters.
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I agree that all 3 of these seem to be intuitively true. Let's take them one at the time.
a) If we do not have a self, or if we have a self which is in a continous state of change or flux, then we cannot say we are the same self as we were when we were 7 years old, or the same self as when we're drunk, or the same self when we are in a good mood as opposed to a bad mood. Indeed, from one moment to the next the self changes. But this means that what we think of as an enduring self, is simply a sequence of differing selfs, with each self ceasing to be and another self springing into being from one moment to the next.
That's one way to look at it. Another way to look at it is that the self changes over time. You grow, you learn, you change. I don't see why you would consider this a bad thing.
This then has the consequence that planning for the future has no purpose since it will not be literally you that will benefit from carefully laid out plans made now, but rather a differing self, indeed a self which might differ in quite a marked way from your current self.
If you don't place any value on the life, or quality of life, of the person you are going to become, then sure. I do.
If you deny this then you're still thinking in terms of an enduring continuous inner self which crucially makes you you.
Or I am placing value on the person I will become.
But this option you have already denied. Now although I cannot logically refute this position it nevertheless is an absolutely extraordinary position to hold.
A position for which there is substantial reliable supporting evidence. Frankly I don't see why this presents the problems you seem to think it does. For me, the realization that there was no immutable self had absolutely no bearing on the value I place on my future life and comfort. But even if it did, that is no justification for sticking my head in the sand and pretending that it isn't true.
b) At any given moment we can make choices ranging from trivial ones such as arbitrary moving parts of ones body eg picking ones nose, raising ones arms etc etc, to life changing decisions regarding the rest of your life. Now it seems as if to all the world, that at any given moment, I can genuinely either pick my nose or not pick my nose. That even if I do not pick my nose there was the genuine possibility that I could have. But in denying libertarian free will, such a possibility does not exist. All ones behaviour in the future is already mapped out. This is a very impoverished type of free will. I submit that your position is once again quite extraordinary
If by extraordinary you mean counter-intuitive, I agree. That has absolutely no bearing on whether it is true or not.
c) The third one is worst of all, for to assert the self is identical or reducible to a physical process seems to me not just to be an extraordinary assertion, but a stark denial of the facts. It is simply no good you declaring that "A" is really "B" simply because there is a correlation between "A" and "B". Especially as "A" and "B" are apparently so utterly characteristically unlike each other! Simply asserting that "A" is "B" or that "B" is reducible to "A" is simply not good enough just as me arbitrarily declaring that a chunk of cheese is identical or reducible to a can of coke is not good enough.
If I was just asserting it, you might have a valid point. But I am not. There is a mound of scientific evidence to support the claim that consciousness is a set of brain processes. Simply refusing to look at any of it, on the basis that your intuitive preconceptions tell you it cannot possibly be true, doesn't change the facts any.
Prima facie they do not appear to be the same, and for anyone who declares otherwise, we rightly demand to know what on earth they could possibly mean, and to demonstrate this outrageous assertion.
That is exactly what scientists have done. You simply refuse to even look at any of the work that has been done in this field, because you cannot believe that anything could possibly refute your intuitive preconceptions.
Besides which, it simply does not appear to be possible to show that consciousness is reducible to, or is identical to, physical processes. Physical processes are part of the publicly accessible realm. Subjective experiences are not.
I do not make this assumptions. It is an intuitive preconception, and nothing more.
Only I know what I experience. You cannot logically infer my experiences from the totality of physical facts because the totality of physical facts deals only with the third person objective realm. Therefore to say that conscious experiences are identical to, or is reducible to physical processes is a patently obvious falsehood.
Wonderful circular reasoning. Consciousness cannot be a brain process because it is not one. Your brilliance is stupefying.
It is also rather telling that I stated that those three positions were intuitive preconceptions, and you responded by defending those positions which entirely intuitive arguments.
Just give up Stimpy. You try to defend the undefensible and constantly contradict yourself in the process of doing so, not to mention the ludicrous statements and the constant twisting of common words to deliberately engender confusion and to cover the poverty of your position. It has become more than tedious.
You have given up. You have thrown your hands up in the air, and declared that it is possible to understand the nature of consciousness. Fortunately for mankind, others are not so quick to give up just because their intuitive preconceptions tell them they should.
Dr. Stupid
Simply asserting that "A" is "B" or that "B" is reducible to "A" is simply not good enough just as me arbitrarily declaring that a chunk of cheese is identical or reducible to a can of coke is not good enough. Prima facie they do not appear to be the same, and for anyone who declares otherwise, we rightly demand to know what on earth they could possibly mean, and to demonstrate this outrageous assertion.
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