A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

I believe that you are are using as an axiom Descartes' "I think, I am,"

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Not in this thread I'm not. I'm talking about primary and secondary qualities. This has nothing to do with the nature of the self.
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I think it does, and I think you are talking about it.

I'm not interested in what you think.

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Consciousness and its attributes ie pains, fears, perceptual experiences etc are undefinable.
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They are undefinable only if certain assumptions about their nature are correct.

I make no assumptions in declaring they are not definable.

It's not that these things get discussed a lot despite being undefinable -- we do have definitions for them;

No we don't.

it's just that the traditional definitions tend give a whole bunch of unproven (in fact unspoken) assumptions a free ride -- the most popular one being the assumption that the 'qualia show' is for the benefit of 'the audience in the Cartesian theatre'.

I have no idea what a cartesian theatre is. If you're saying experiences can exist in the absence of experiencers, then just say so.

What happens to 'primary and secondary qualities' when you examine them in the absence of that notion? [/B]

I don't know. The rejection of an experiencer is your stupid notion, not mine. So you tell me

 

[Interesting Ian]

Paul,


I find it somewhat disconcerting that Ian can apparently declare that consciousness is both :

(a) "Undefined and Undefineable"

and

(b) "Clearly not a physical process"

At the very least, I would have though Ian *must* admit that consciousness is partially definable, even if that definition is nothing more than "not a physical process".

Ian doesn't know what it is, but he does know what it isn't. Okay.

Would you say that an elephant is partly defined if we say an elephant is not a biscuit?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I have no idea what a cartesian theatre is.

Cartesian means 'of Descartes.'

Cartesian dualism in its crudest form is simply the idea that one exists as a 'homunculus', a little man who lives in the brain. This is trivially easy to defeat, since the little man would require a brain of his own, with another little main inside it, etc.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Would you say that an elephant is partly defined if we say an elephant is not a biscuit?

Well, yes I would. But how do we determine that an elephant is not a biscuit? Let's look at the properties of a biscuit.

Start with this - "it can be eaten by a human". Based on this criteria, then perhaps an Elephant *is* a biscuit, since they both pass this test.

Try another - "Can be found in Africa". Again, they both pass.

Try another - "it can be be dunked in a cup of coffee". Well, unless we are using a faily generous definition of "cup of coffee" then an elephant fails this test, and so is not a buiscuit.

Have we defined elephant? Well, we've made a start -
1. An Elephant can be eaten by a human.
2. An Elephant can be found in Africa.
3. An Elephant cannot be dunked in a cup of coffee.

Not a terribly meaningful definition, but a beginning.

Now, are you going to persist with your assertion that consciousness is undefined and undefinable, yet clearly not brain processes?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Cartesian means 'of Descartes.'

I know.

Cartesian dualism in its crudest form is simply the idea that one exists as a 'homunculus', a little man who lives in the brain. This is trivially easy to defeat, since the little man would require a brain of his own, with another little main inside it, etc.

I repeat, does this amount to claiming any more that experiences are had by experiencers?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Now, are you going to persist with your assertion that consciousness is undefined and undefinable, yet clearly not brain processes? [/B]

Yes.

 

[BillyJoe]

THE CARTESIAN THEATRE

Ian,

The Cartesian Theatre is the idea that the various characteristics of the sensory input that have been descriminated in the various parts of the brain somehow come together again in some centre within the brain to produce a "picture" of external reality (oops, I'm already in trouble!). The problem with this concept is that the "picture" so formed would require someone or something to view it. For a Dualist, this role is played by the soul or mind-as-separate-from-the-brain. For the materialist this produces an infinite regress because the centre inside the brain that views this "picture" must now replicate exactly what the brain has already done all over again and so on and so on...

BillyJoe
[How am I doin' Rayn?]

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Billy said:

For the materialist this produces an infinite regress because the centre inside the brain that views this "picture" must now replicate exactly what the brain has already done all over again and so on and so on...

Huh? Why does the viewing mechanism have to replicate anything? It might be the operation of the viewing mechanism itself that is the qualia, as if it were summarizing its inputs. There might even be a meta-viewing mechanism to view the viewing mechanism, but it certainly doesn't have to be an infinite regress, because at some point we are no longer conscious of the viewing mechanism itself. If you insist that the operation of the viewing mechanism cannot produce "redness" without a meta-viewer, then simply have the viewing mechanism place its own outputs on the table and view them recursively.

My mind doesn't feel as if it's an infinite stack of nested experiences, nor does it feel as if it's an infinite stack of viewers of experiences.

This is not to say that I'm a proponent of the Theatre concept; I don't have the vaguest notion. Here's an interesting paper:

http://216.239.37.104/search?q=cach...cider8.rtf+"cartesian+theatre"&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: THE CARTESIAN THEATRE

The Cartesian Theatre is the idea that the various characteristics of the sensory input that have been descriminated in the various parts of the brain somehow come together again in some centre within the brain to produce a "picture" of external reality (oops, I'm already in trouble!). The problem with this concept is that the "picture" so formed would require someone or something to view it. For a Dualist, this role is played by the soul or mind-as-separate-from-the-brain. For the materialist this produces an infinite regress because the centre inside the brain that views this "picture" must now replicate exactly what the brain has already done all over again and so on and so on...

In a straightforward perusal this argument obviously fails. One might argue with as little cogency that anyone who claims that we need to see infra-red TV images in order to see things in the dark is committed to saying that we need to see other infra-red TV images in order to see the first ones. But this is an argument against dualism in any case. So even if the argument succeeded, it has nothing to do with my position.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Billy said:
Huh? Why does the viewing mechanism have to replicate anything? It might be the operation of the viewing mechanism itself that is the qualia, as if it were summarizing its inputs. There might even be a meta-viewing mechanism to view the viewing mechanism, but it certainly doesn't have to be an infinite regress, because at some point we are no longer conscious of the viewing mechanism itself. If you insist that the operation of the viewing mechanism cannot produce "redness" without a meta-viewer, then simply have the viewing mechanism place its own outputs on the table and view them recursively.

My mind doesn't feel as if it's an infinite stack of nested experiences, nor does it feel as if it's an infinite stack of viewers of experiences.

This is not to say that I'm a proponent of the Theatre concept; I don't have the vaguest notion. Here's an interesting paper:

http://216.239.37.104/search?q=cach...cider8.rtf+"cartesian+theatre"&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

~~ Paul

Paul,

BillieJoe was saying that substance dualism implies this not materialism But thanks for the link.

 

[Mercutio]

My mind doesn't feel as if it's an infinite stack of nested experiences, nor does it feel as if it's an infinite stack of viewers of experiences.

What and interesting sentence! You are rejecting multiple hypothetical layers, while presupposing one hypothetical layer ("my mind")! We are taught that seeing, feeling, remembering, etc. are all things accomplished via our mind, and so you (not you in particular, PCA, but the majority of folk as well) have no problem invoking the concept of "mind" in this context. It is absolutely basic to our world-view--so much so that the existence of mind (or of qualia as "things") is not even thought of as an assumption; it just is (I think Ian used the term "self-evident" in another thread; if not, the term still captures the idea). Of course it does not feel like a stack of nested experiences--but then there's always the expression "the mind's eye." Where does the mind's optic nerve lead?

We see. Some of us assume there is something out there that we see. Others assume that the "sight" of the tree (our tree-qualia) is what is real. Both are assumptions. Both are so fundamentally self-evident that we have a hard time comprehending any other view. We kick stones to refute Berkely, or call the holder of the other view an idiot with incomprehensible views. But we start not with anything self-evident--we start with implicit, learned, assumptions.

 

[Interesting Ian]

We see. Some of us assume there is something out there that we see. Others assume that the "sight" of the tree (our tree-qualia) is what is real. Both are assumptions. Both are so fundamentally self-evident that we have a hard time comprehending any other view. We kick stones to refute Berkely, or call the holder of the other view an idiot with incomprehensible views. But we start not with anything self-evident--we start with implicit, learned, assumptions. [/B]

Well I'm willing to consider the existence of "free floating" experiences without a self experiencing them. This is the only other alternative is there not? I mean if one rejects the existence of a unified self where everything comes together so to speak and which has experiences. Presumably you would say the "self" is nothing over and above the simple summation of particular experiences? But does it make sense to talk about experiences without an experiencer?

Or is your point something entirely else which I'm failing to understand?

 

[69dodge]

Re: Re: Interesting Ian,

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Anything physical is itself just certain perceptual experiences.
[...]
Processes within the brain don't create memories, rather I suspect they "filter" them. Without our brains I speculate we would have unimpeded memory to everything that has ever happened to us.

You are confusing me terribly.

Brains, since they fall into the category of "anything physical," do not, according to you, really exist, in the sense that a materialist would understand the term "exist." The word "brain" simply refers to some experiences that are experienced by brain surgeons and medical students and investigators of particularly bad car crashes. So how can you talk about brains filtering our memories, or indeed having any effect at all on what is truly real, namely conscious beings and their perceptions and memories, if brains do not have an independent existence "out there in the material world," but are merely part of those very perceptions and memories?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

One might argue with as little cogency that anyone who claims that we need to see infra-red TV images in order to see things in the dark is committed to saying that we need to see other infra-red TV images in order to see the first ones.

I would argue that we do rely on additional devices to see the first images; we call them eyes.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Interesting Ian,

You are confusing me terribly.

Brains, since they fall into the category of "anything physical," do not, according to you, really exist, in the sense that a materialist would understand the term "exist." The word "brain" simply refers to some experiences that are experienced by brain surgeons and medical students and investigators of particularly bad car crashes. So how can you talk about brains filtering our memories, or indeed having any effect at all on what is truly real, namely conscious beings and their perceptions and memories, if brains do not have an independent existence "out there in the material world," but are merely part of those very perceptions and memories?

I think it might be useful to reiterate my position here just so that everyone is absolutely clear where I'm coming from. As I stated earlier in the thread, for me, imagining an external world existing wholly independently of any perception of it is rather like imaging a grin existing in abstraction from a cat. In other words it's nonsensical. What the external world is, is nothing over and above our sensory experiences (of it).

But people obviously don't normally believe this. They hold that our sensory perceptions are "caused" or are due to a world which exists entirely independently of our perceptions of it. In other words they believe that the world exists unexperienced. But if the material world exists unexperienced then we cannot know of this world through experience. I mean we cannot experience that which is unexperienced.

Moreover what is this unexperienced world like? Is it identical to our sensory experiences so that it is really colored (colorE), and really consists of smells (smellE) and so on? Indeed is it in everyway similar to our sensory experiences? But then, how elaborate and unparsimonious is it to suppose there is a wholly unknowable unexperienced realm, additional, and in everyway similar to our sense experiences?? For a kick off, what is it for, if forevermore we can never experience it??

Alternatively, perhaps this unexperienced realm is like how the physicists envisage it? No colorsE, but simply certain particular wavelegths of electromagnetic radiation. No solidity to the world, but simply the electrical repulsion between the electrons in the tips of ones fingers and the electrons near the surface of the object touched, and so on. But in this case everything we ever experience is wholly unlike the world as "it really is". Our senses systematically deceive us as to the true nature of the world. In an approriate sense, everything we ever experience is a lie. Again this is not a plausible position to hold. Hence my espousal of subjective idealism which holds that the world just is our sensory perceptions.

Now to finally address your question! First of all you should now appreciate that I do not say brains, or anything else making up the external world, do not exist (incidentally, as an aside, by the "external" world I mean what we normally refer to as the "physical world". It's just that I hold the external world does not exist unexperienced, but it is still external because obviously I cannot manipulate it like I can my own thoughts). So brains and everything else making up the external world still exist, I'm merely denying that it makes any sense to ascribe them an unperceived existence (like a grin without a cat).

Now obviously the external world effects me in all sorts of ways. Why shouldn't it? The "physical" world is external to me meaning that it is not produced by my own thoughts, even if its existence is constituted by my experiences and other sentient beings (if you still don't understand this imagine for the sake of argument that telepathy exists. Now someone could project some image into my mind. Now I am therefore not the origin of that image, although clearly that image in my mind couldn't exist if my mind didn't exist. You see?)

So do you see why there is no problem in the external world (in the context of idealism) effecting me, anymore than if the world exists in abstraction from any perceptions of it effecting me? And, if the world can effect one when one looks at a glorious sunset, then there is no reason to suppose that manipulating ones brain in various ways cannot also effect one in various ways such as ones moods etc. The function of the brain, as I see it, is simply to focus our consciousness onto this empirical reality. It is my opinion that if it were not for our brains we would have unimpeded access to all other realities ("otherworldly" realities as we might put it).

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

everything we ever experience is a lie.

I would say that this is essentially correct, though loaded with unnecessary emotional baggage. We have a frame of reference. Just because none of the six blind men can lay hands on all the elephant's parts at once, that doesn't mean that what each of them percieves is a lie, and (to me) it certainly doesn't mean that the elephant doesn't exist. I think I understand your view, and though I am not ready to embrace it, I do find it a fascinating idea. It sounds very much like John Wheeler's 'Genesis by Observership'.

http://www.discover.com/search/index.html

But does it make sense to talk about experiences without an experiencer?

They are two ends of the same stick.

It makes a lot of sense to talk about ourselves as experiencers having experiences, because this is the way it feels. For the same reason, it also makes perfect sense to speak of the sun 'coming up' or the stars 'coming out', the findings of modern astronomy notwithstanding.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Now obviously the external world effects me in all sorts of ways. Why shouldn't it? The "physical" world is external to me meaning that it is not produced by my own thoughts, even if its existence is constituted by my experiences and other sentient beings (if you still don't understand this imagine for the sake of argument that telepathy exists. Now someone could project some image into my mind. Now I am therefore not the origin of that image, although clearly that image in my mind couldn't exist if my mind didn't exist. You see?)

I can't get a grip on what you're saying here. What do you think is the ontological status of the "external world"? Apparently you don't think it exists independent of you, yet it is separate from you. Did your mind create this external world and then lose control of it?

Again, I think that if you drop the nagging ontological questions of both your philosophy and mine, we'd end up with the same thing.

In other words they believe that the world exists unexperienced. But if the material world exists unexperienced then we cannot know of this world through experience. I mean we cannot experience that which is unexperienced.

I don't understand this at all. Just because the world might exist without any experiencers doesn't mean that experiencers aren't experiencing the world.

But then, how elaborate and unparsimonious is it to suppose there is a wholly unknowable unexperienced realm, additional, and in everyway similar to our sense experiences?? For a kick off, what is it for, if forevermore we can never experience it??

This question only makes sense if you assume that your sense experiences are not part of the world. If they are, then there is nothing additional, only a filtering process.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Mercutio said:

What and interesting sentence! You are rejecting multiple hypothetical layers, while presupposing one hypothetical layer ("my mind")! We are taught that seeing, feeling, remembering, etc. are all things accomplished via our mind, and so you (not you in particular, PCA, but the majority of folk as well) have no problem invoking the concept of "mind" in this context. It is absolutely basic to our world-view--so much so that the existence of mind (or of qualia as "things") is not even thought of as an assumption; it just is (I think Ian used the term "self-evident" in another thread; if not, the term still captures the idea). Of course it does not feel like a stack of nested experiences--but then there's always the expression "the mind's eye." Where does the mind's optic nerve lead?

I'm not at all sure what you're saying here, but if it clarifies things, I said that I don't feel as if there is an infinite stack of experiences. That makes me think that there is no need for an infinite stack of viewers in my brain.

The mind's optic nerve is connected back to the mind. That is why I cannot experience exactly what it is like to experience the highest level of my mind. That is why I cannot get a tight grip on what qualia really are: Nothing is viewing the qualia viewers.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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Now obviously the external world effects me in all sorts of ways. Why shouldn't it? The "physical" world is external to me meaning that it is not produced by my own thoughts, even if its existence is constituted by my experiences and other sentient beings (if you still don't understand this imagine for the sake of argument that telepathy exists. Now someone could project some image into my mind. Now I am therefore not the origin of that image, although clearly that image in my mind couldn't exist if my mind didn't exist. You see?)
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I can't get a grip on what you're saying here.

I spent some time and quite some considerable effort to explain myself. Now perhaps people can understand why I get rather brusque.

 

[69dodge]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Interesting Ian,

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Now obviously the external world effects me in all sorts of ways. Why shouldn't it? The "physical" world is external to me meaning that it is not produced by my own thoughts, even if its existence is constituted by my experiences and other sentient beings (if you still don't understand this imagine for the sake of argument that telepathy exists. Now someone could project some image into my mind. Now I am therefore not the origin of that image, although clearly that image in my mind couldn't exist if my mind didn't exist. You see?)

No, not really. The image in your mind couldn't exist without your mind, but the person who projected it could. You still are assuming that something exists independently of your perceptions of it; it's just that you don't mind assuming that here, because the independent something is a conscious person.

If the physical world can affect you like the telepathic person can, don't you have to assume that it too has an independent existence? Otherwise, you could only ever describe your experiences; you could never explain them in terms of effects of the physical world upon you. Your statement that your brain filters your memories certainly sounds like it's intended to be an explanation of why you sometimes forget things, in terms of the effects your brain has upon you, and not merely a description of the two wholly unrelated facts that (1) you have a brain, and (2) you sometimes forget things.

And a mostly unrelated question: If brain processes are so different from conscious experiences that you are sure conscious experiences cannot be explained in terms of them, are they not also so different that brain processes could not conceivably affect conscious experiences? If brains can't cause us to remember, how can they cause us to remember incorrectly?