As far as the danger of delusion or denial:
I'd think that some people suffering from addiction may already be used to coping by using those mechanisms. "One more won't hurt..." "I can quit tomorrow..." "I don't really drink that much more than other people..." "I'm not really an alcoholic because..."
That doesn't apply to every alcoholic, of course, and even those it does apply to may be able to separate one kind of denial from another, so they can reject "I'm not really an alcoholic despite all the evidence," for example, while accepting "There's a higher power in control despite the lack of evidence."
But if it's good for an alcoholic to face the truth without flinching, even if the evidence points to an uncomfortable conclusion, it seems contradictory to suggest at the same time that sometimes fooling oneself on important topics is okay.
Nice. That's one of the most reasonable arguments I've seen in this thread.
I would answer that where human thinking is concerned, contradiction is arguably more often the rule than the exception. Recovery-cliche references to the internal "committee" resonate with (preliminary) findings from the modern science of neurology: the function of the human brain is largely characterized by
modularity.
At various times in my life I have found myself "torn" over even trivial decisions, and, occasionally, deeply conflicted over important ones. I wish I could say that I was always successful at applying the solution you've just suggested: go with what works for you (even if it amounts to some form of denial) and reject what works against you -- but at those points where I made some of my worst mistakes, I
knew they were mistakes; they
felt like mistakes even as I was making them. If my internal dialogue was dominated by the sort of denial-speak you describe, it was probably not a legitimate or important part of an ongoing decision-making process; it was, just as you say, a
coping mechanism. The decision had essentially already been made, and what I was trying to cope with was the conflict that arose out of my deeply felt awareness that I was not acting in my own best interests. (I'm obviously not talking only about drinking here).
Whether the "disease" model of alcoholism is scientifically defensible or not, I find it useful as a metaphor. Call it a cognitive submodule, or a cluster of submodules. If I view internal denial-speak as among the potential
outputs of such a module, I may be in a better position to ignore those outputs (which is another way of saying that other modules may be in a better position to override those outputs -- within this admitedly ambitious framework). Whereas, "There's a higher power at work here" may be viewed as among the potential
inputs, though precisely what modules might receive and utilize them I haven't a clue. And I don't need to. No more than I need to concern myself with the details of how my stomach deals with the tuna sandwich I had for lunch.
One thing I feel certain of (though I would be hard-pressed to prove) is that cognitive submodules love
symbols -- and the nature of symbols is that they stand for something else; they are a (hopefully benign) form of "fooling yourself" by substituting one thing for another. It is no more necessary that every person employ the same symbols in communicating with their own cognitive submodules than it is that every person eat the same thing for lunch.