What the Palestinians Really Want

Do you know what model of vehicle it was, then? I can't seem to find any better of a description than simply "armored tractor" (which even Michael Oren called it in his book).

I'm honestly curious, since I assumed it was a D9 based on the limited info I could find, but you know what they say about assuming...
The D9's, at least during '67 were open canopy, and they're referred to as bulldozers, as in with tank tracks, as opposed to tractors which have wheels. To my knowledge, the IDF didn't operate plated tractors as I doubt the IDF did much farming in hostile conditions.

The ones you've pictures are post '80 models.

D9s are used in combat engineering and owned by the IDF. I doubt the IDF has a civilian engineering core with a fleet of plated tractors though.

Well, it didn't seem like the Israelis were interested in actually farming anything, when they sent these vehicles (whatever they were) into the DMZ.
I guess not. A redrawing of the poorly formed armistice lines without full-blown war, sure. But I guess the Israelis weren't hammering the Arabs at this point, and thus, the UN didn't take notice and didn't bother stepping in.

All in all, a plated tractor is not a military vehicle which is all I wanted to state.
 
If a full scale military attack is an appropriate response to illegally ploughing a field, why is it inappropriate response to firing rockets at schools and other civilian targets week after week?

Eh? It wasn't a full-scale military attack. At least, not immediately.

The tractor trick was used often by the Israelis, and was generally met with small arms fire. Michael Oran's book attributes the tipping point towards war to an incident on April 7, 1967, where two armored tractors were met, not by the usual small arms fire, but by 37mm cannons. Israeli tanks then fired on those cannons, and the Syrians responded by firing mortars at Israeli settlements. This led to ever-escalating exchanges between the two sides, up to and including fighter jet dogfights.

The Syrians got creamed in this "mini-war" (as Oran calls it), and responded by ramping up their terrorist attacks inside Israel. A couple months of these intensified attacks, and Israel decided they had to prosecute a full-scale war against Syria.
 
The tractor trick was used often by the Israelis, and was generally met with small arms fire. Michael Oran's book attributes the tipping point towards war to an incident on April 7, 1967, where two armored tractors were met, not by the usual small arms fire, but by 37mm cannons. Israeli tanks then fired on those cannons, and the Syrians responded by firing mortars at Israeli settlements. This led to ever-escalating exchanges between the two sides, up to and including fighter jet dogfights.

how dare you blaim Israel for the wars with the Arabs!!!!!

:D
 
Last edited:
now now, you know better than to attack other members. :D
A failing at reading comprehension is now my fault?

Sorry, no.

Oh, I'm sure Dayan understood the very basic concept of attaining the high ground. As do I.

However, contrary to your amazing and highly decorated military career and experience, Dayan felt that Israel did not need to conquer the Golan, especially for any reasons of security.
If it was Syria all by itself, sure, maybe. Egypt and Jordan, however, stepped in which led to full-scale war. At this point taking the Golan Heights at gaining the higher ground was a requirement.

The whole bit about the DMZ and the tractors didn't translate into Dayan wanting to take the entire Golan Heights either, simply a redrawing of the DMZ lines.
 
Eh? It wasn't a full-scale military attack. At least, not immediately.

The tractor trick was used often by the Israelis, and was generally met with small arms fire. Michael Oran's book attributes the tipping point towards war to an incident on April 7, 1967, where two armored tractors were met, not by the usual small arms fire, but by 37mm cannons. Israeli tanks then fired on those cannons, and the Syrians responded by firing mortars at Israeli settlements. This led to ever-escalating exchanges between the two sides, up to and including fighter jet dogfights.

It was used often, but no tractor models have surfaced? Curious.

Also, what led to the 37mm's being used? Did small arms fire have little impact leading to Syria stepping up their game?

The usual small arms fire - was it able to repulse previous tractors, or did it have little impact?
 
how dare you blaim Israel for the wars with the Arabs!!!!!

:D

I fear I didn't make my point clearly.

The Israelis wanted a clear reason to strike at Syria, since they were disingenuously denying any responsibility for the attacks inside Israeli territory, enough so that there was a risk that without an obviously undeniable Syrian-connected attack, the Soviet Union would get involved on behalf of the Syrians to defend them from "unprovoked Israeli aggression". The Prime Minister at the time, Levi Eshkol, according to Oran wanted to "punish" the Syrians, but didn't want an actual war.

To get this clear casus belli for strikes, the Israelis, several time, sent tractors into the DMZ. When the Syrians attacked the tractors with machine-gun fire, the IDF would retaliate in kind. It was only the stronger cannon attack of the 7th that started spiraling too far, and the resulting escalation in Syrian terror attacks and the clear indications that the Syrians were trying to draw their UAC allies into the burgeoning shooting war with Israel (which these allies absolutely wanted, but they weren't quite ready yet) led to the IDF opening full military hostilities.
 
It was used often, but no tractor models have surfaced? Curious.

That's why I assumed it was a D9. Whatever it was, was "armored", but I can't find any better description than that.

Also, what led to the 37mm's being used? Did small arms fire have little impact leading to Syria stepping up their game?

The usual small arms fire - was it able to repulse previous tractors, or did it have little impact?

According to Oran, it was as I noted above - an effort to find ways to strike back at Syria that wouldn't get the Soviets involved (or activate the defensive alliance Syria had with Egypt). He says it just got out of hand on both sides, going from tit-for-tat small military strikes to a full-on war.
 
That's why I assumed it was a D9. Whatever it was, was "armored", but I can't find any better description than that.

*edit - Missed post 430. Thanks for the clarification.

According to Oran, it was as I noted above - an effort to find ways to strike back at Syria that wouldn't get the Soviets involved (or activate the defensive alliance Syria had with Egypt). He says it just got out of hand on both sides, going from tit-for-tat small military strikes to a full-on war.

While that may be the case, can Syria justify using artillery on a tractor in the DMZ? That sounds incredibly disproportionate, especially considering no lives were threatened at all by its presence.
 
Last edited:
The Syrians got creamed in this "mini-war" (as Oran calls it), and responded by ramping up their terrorist attacks inside Israel. A couple months of these intensified attacks, and Israel decided they had to prosecute a full-scale war against Syria.
Bit more to it than that. Shortly after all this drama was going on, where Syria didn't as much 'ramp up' their terror attacks using Palestinian fedayeen (as they did in the '70's and 80's), but merely continued via Jordan (to Hussein's dismay), Egypt pulled out the UN peacekeepers and replaced it with 100,000+ Egyptians infantry and arms, the Egypt-Jordan defense pact (pan-Arabism was to blame here), Jordan's shelling of J'lem, Egyptians sending arms and commandos to Amman, etc. etc. etc. led to the full-scale war.

The border clashes with Syria was merely a stepping stone, and apart from the fact that Israel didn't fully attack Syria first.
 
While that may be the case, can Syria justify using artillery on a tractor in the DMZ? That sounds incredibly disproportionate, especially considering no lives were threatened at all by its presence.

Especially since when Israeli tanks in turn fired on those guns, the Syrian response was not to attack the tanks, but to fire mortars at the nearby settlement.

Bit more to it than that. Shortly after all this drama was going on, where Syria didn't as much 'ramp up' their terror attacks using Palestinian fedayeen (as they did in the '70's and 80's), but merely continued via Jordan (to Hussein's dismay), Egypt pulled out the UN peacekeepers and replaced it with 100,000+ Egyptians infantry and arms, the Egypt-Jordan defense pact (pan-Arabism was to blame here), Jordan's shelling of J'lem, Egyptians sending arms and commandos to Amman, etc. etc. etc. led to the full-scale war.

The border clashes with Syria was merely a stepping stone, and apart from the fact that Israel didn't fully attack Syria first.

Well, I confess to not knowing in-depth (that's why I've been reading Oran's book), but he seems to trace a line from the Syrian terror attacks to the tractors to the miniwar to the escalation of the terror attacks to the resulting ever-increasing tensions between Israel and Syria to the Soviets falsely telling the Egyptians that the Israelis were going to invade Syria to the resulting Egyptian and Jordanian mobilizations and troop movements to the eviction of the UN forces to the closing of the Tiran Straits to Rabin's conclusion that war was inevitable and that Israel would be better position to execute a surprise attack rather than wait for the multi-front Arab assault to Eshkol's realization that Rabin was right, culminating in the Israeli strikes that opened the Six-Day War.
 
how about you back up this claim.
:rolleyes:
In the sparsely-populated mountain regions of Eastern Afghanistan, strategists have argued for holding the high ground—a tenet of classical mountain warfare as a necessary precondition for protecting the population. The argument suggests that if the counterinsurgent does not deny the enemy the high ground, then the guerillas will be able to attack and terrorize the population at will. In the Kunar and Nuristan regions US forces continue to pursue a hybrid style of COIN warfare, with its focus on the population, and mountain warfare, whereby the US forces seize and hold the high ground while protecting the geo-compartmented communities found in the sparse valleys.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mountain_warfare

See also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_ground

oh, and what does this mean to you?

Me: "Oh, I'm sure Dayan understood the very basic concept of attaining the high ground. As do I."

dude, if false-claims were a record, you'd be a DJ.
It means you made a cherry picked appeal to authority.
 
Well, I confess to not knowing in-depth (that's why I've been reading Oran's book), but he seems to trace a line from the Syrian terror attacks to the tractors to the miniwar to the escalation of the terror attacks to the resulting ever-increasing tensions between Israel and Syria to the Soviets falsely telling the Egyptians that the Israelis were going to invade Syria to the resulting Egyptian and Jordanian mobilizations and troop movements to the eviction of the UN forces to the closing of the Tiran Straits to Rabin's conclusion that war was inevitable and that Israel would be better position to execute a surprise attack rather than wait for the multi-front Arab assault to Eshkol's realization that Rabin was right, culminating in the Israeli strikes that opened the Six-Day War.
There's a connection no doubt. What I was referring to was that in April-May 1967 where all this was happening, all the countries surrounding Israel, and the mobilization in additional Arab countries not connected to Israel, all fingers pointed to full-out war.

If the situation in Syria would have been merely an isolated event, even with the shellings, dog fights, and the Palestinian fedayeen coming into Israel via Jordan, this all would have wound down eventually and would not have resulted into the war that it did, or even an invasion of the Golan Heights.

All in all, it would have been foolish to leave open the Syrian front during the 1967 war even when after the war, the more conservative assessment of Syria's preparedness and actual threat won out. Retroactive reasoning is usually infallible, but a luxury in war. Israel prepared for the worst and used past experience, ie 1948 war (Syrian and Iraqi troops in the Golan), to gain from past mistakes.

This ontop of the 1973 war, I don't see a reason why Syria should get the remaining 2/3rd of the Golan Heights (in addition to the trading of the Golan Heights in the first place during the French mandate period).
 
But, as you said, the Palestinians weren't a recognised party at the time. Egypt and Jordan were. They are not asked by UN242 to give up any land. Jordan has given up its claim to the West Bank, handing that to the PLO.

Both Jordan and Egypt gave up land in negotiated settlements with Israel.

Why should the Palestinians be required, under UN242, to give up land when the Jordanians were not?

This is a nonsensical question. We've already established that Palestinians were not addressed at all by UNSCR 242.

Talk all you like about wars of aggression. UN242 makes clear it is not admissable to acquire territory by force.

Which would apply to the Arabs too.
 
Last edited:
intentionally sending in an armored plow, in order to provocate a Syrian shelling, so that Israel can attack back with air force and artillery, is an interesting way of desiring peace with one's neighbors.

And an even more interesting way of recognizing that peace with one's numerically superior, heavily armed "neighbors" is unlikely, when one's "neighbors" are massing troops, evicting U.N. peacekeepers, and shelling.
 
And an even more interesting way of recognizing that peace with one's numerically superior, heavily armed "neighbors" is unlikely, when one's "neighbors" are massing troops, evicting U.N. peacekeepers, and shelling.

I think Israel has shown us, time & time again, that the size of a nation's population is irrelevant, when it comes to peace and/or military victory.
 
I think Israel has shown us, time & time again, that the size of a nation's population is irrelevant, when it comes to peace and/or military victory.

Yeah. Lucky them.

Just saying. In the same situation, I would have done the same thing. Strike preemptively, rather than sit still for the imminent assault.
 
Yeah. Lucky them.

Just saying. In the same situation, I would have done the same thing. Strike preemptively, rather than sit still for the imminent assault.

I would have attacked Egypt and left Jordan and Syria alone. But if they had struck back, destroy their military.

As far as occupying Gaza and ALL of the Golan and the Sinai? that was dumb.

the West Bank is a different story.
 

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom