The Trials of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito: Part 28

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I'm not sure what this means. Can you clarify?


Well hello again ac!

What it means is that the Italian SC and Constitutional Court have ruled that when the ECHR requires a remedy by the Italian State, and where the only applicable/appropriate remedy is aquittal (as will be the case if/when the ECHR rules in Knox's favour on the criminal slander conviction....), this should be dealt with by the Italian courts by means of an acquittal under Section 630.
 
Well hello again ac!

What it means is that the Italian SC and Constitutional Court have ruled that when the ECHR requires a remedy by the Italian State, and where the only applicable/appropriate remedy is aquittal (as will be the case if/when the ECHR rules in Knox's favour on the criminal slander conviction....), this should be dealt with by the Italian courts by means of an acquittal under Section 630.

Hi LJ. Watching the Cup? Is this England's year?

So is this saying that upon receiving an ECHR ruling some court will just routinely issue a 630 acquittal?
 
Hi LJ. Watching the Cup? Is this England's year?

So is this saying that upon receiving an ECHR ruling some court will just routinely issue a 630 acquittal?

No, there is a procedure specified in Italian law under which revision (a retrial for a finally convicted person) may be requested following certain formalities.

Only the convicted person (or that person's next of kin) and/or the General Public Prosecutor attached to the Court of Appeal in the district where the conviction occurred (that is, Perugia) may file a request for a revision. The law specifying who may apply for revision is CPP Article 632.

The form of the request for revision is specified in CPP Article 633. The request must include the specific reason(s) that are alleged to justify the revision, as well as documentation of the evidence that supports these reasons. This request form must be submitted to the Clerk's office of the Court of Appeal of the district where the conviction occurred or such district as otherwise provided by law.

In accordance with CPP Article 631, the arguments underlying the request for revision must be such as to prove, if ascertained, that the convicted person must be dismissed under one of the following Italian laws: CPP Article 529 (prosecution should not have been initiated or continued), CPP Article 530 (the arguments satisfy one or more of the five specifications for acquittal), or CPP Article 531 (the crime was extinguished by the statute of limitations). If the arguments do not satisfy this provision, the Court of Appeal is to rule the request inadmissible.

The only reasons that are accepted as justification for a revision review hearing are the four listed in CPP Article 630 and the one falling under Constitutional Court judgment number 113 of 2011. That Constitutional Court judgment requires that revision be accepted for a revision review hearing when the justification is that the ECHR has issued a final judgment that the judicial proceedings should be reopened. This Constitutional Court judgment is what Amanda Knox and her lawyers will be relying on to seek a revision review hearing following an ECHR (final) judgment that her conviction for calunnia against Lumumba was the result of an unfair trial.

In accordance with CPP Article 636, if the Italian Court of Appeal accepts Knox's submission of a request for revision, there will be a revision review hearing. The hearing will be a retrial by the Court of Appeal based upon those provisions of Italian law that apply, and limited in consideration to the reason(s) specified in the request for revision. The retrial determines whether the arguments underlying the request for revision indeed prove the claim(s) of the request.

In accordance with CPP Article 637, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is delivered according to the applicable Italian laws for trials. If the Court of Appeal rules in favor of the revision request, then the Court revokes the judgment of conviction and orders the dismissal of the case, specifying the cause in the operative part of the judgment. The Court shall not order the dismissal solely on the basis of a different evaluation of the evidence gathered in the previous trial. If the Court rules against the revision request, the private person who has submitted the request shall be subject to payment of court costs.

In accordance with CPP Article 639, if the Court of Appeal rules in favor of the request for revision, it shall order the refunding of all sums paid by the convicted person including any damages paid to a civil party. Thus, in the Knox case, the damages owed to Lumumba would be dismissed, if the Court found in her favor.

In accordance with CPP Article 640, the judgment delivered at the revision trial may be appealed to the Court of Cassation. That means that either the convicted person or the prosecutor may appeal.

In accordance with CPP Article 643, anyone dismissed at a revision trial, without having caused miscarriage of justice by intentional misconduct or gross negligence, is entitled to compensation proportional to the duration of the sentence served and to the personal and family consequences resulting from the conviction.
 
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Well hello again ac!

What it means is that the Italian SC and Constitutional Court have ruled that when the ECHR requires a remedy by the Italian State, and where the only applicable/appropriate remedy is aquittal (as will be the case if/when the ECHR rules in Knox's favour on the criminal slander conviction....), this should be dealt with by the Italian courts by means of an acquittal under Section 630.

As a clarification, CPP Article 630 does not provide reasons for acquittal, but the list of exclusive reasons, prior to Italian Constitutional Court judgment 113 of 2011, potentially allowing a (finally) convicted person to petition for (request) a retrial.

It may be useful to think of CPP Article 630 as a list of factors that may make a trial resulting in final conviction unfair; for example, one such factor is described in Article 630.1(C): if new evidence is found or discovered after the final conviction and, either independently or with already assessed evidence, would prove that the convicted person must be acquitted or otherwise dismissed.

But the above would be only a claim justifying a new trial. An actual acquittal after final conviction under Italian law is dependent upon an evaluation during the revision trial of the claim(s) brought under Article 630.

The Constitutional Court, in its judgment 113 of 2011, declared CPP Article 630 unconstitutional, because it is incomplete.

Under the Italian Constitution, Article 117, and the treaty obligations the Italian government assumed in 1949 and 1955 (membership in the Council of Europe and in the formation of the European Court of Human Rights, respectively), the Italian judicial system must conform to the European Convention of Human Rights and to the final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and case-law.

Thus, if the ECHR issues a final judgment that a conviction was the result of an unfair trial, Italy must allow the possibility of a retrial (revision trial) to satisfy the ECHR judgment, according to the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court.

Acquittals are covered in Italy under CPP Article 530; there are also dismissals for other reasons, as covered by CPP Articles 529 and 531. Under CPP Article 605, an appeal court judge may confirm or amend the appealed ruling without specifically mentioning the article of dismissal, but the specification must be published in the short form judgment and the reasoning explained in the motivation report.
 
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Numbers, I'm sure Vixen will be around soon to correct you on this. The ECHR will "most certainly", "without a doubt", and "obviously" find in Italy's favor.
 
As a clarification, CPP Article 630 does not provide reasons for acquittal, but the list of exclusive reasons, prior to Italian Constitutional Court judgment 113 of 2011, potentially allowing a (finally) convicted person to petition for (request) a retrial.

It may be useful to think of CPP Article 630 as a list of factors that may make a trial resulting in final conviction unfair; for example, one such factor is described in Article 630.1(C): if new evidence is found or discovered after the final conviction and, either independently or with already assessed evidence, would prove that the convicted person must be acquitted or otherwise dismissed.

But the above would be only a claim justifying a new trial. An actual acquittal after final conviction under Italian law is dependent upon an evaluation during the revision trial of the claim(s) brought under Article 630.

The Constitutional Court, in its judgment 113 of 2011, declared CPP Article 630 unconstitutional, because it is incomplete.

Under the Italian Constitution, Article 117, and the treaty obligations the Italian government assumed in 1949 and 1955 (membership in the Council of Europe and in the formation of the European Court of Human Rights, respectively), the Italian judicial system must conform to the European Convention of Human Rights and to the final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and case-law.

Thus, if the ECHR issues a final judgment that a conviction was the result of an unfair trial, Italy must allow the possibility of a retrial (revision trial) to satisfy the ECHR judgment, according to the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court.

Acquittals are covered in Italy under CPP Article 530; there are also dismissals for other reasons, as covered by CPP Articles 529 and 531. Under CPP Article 605, an appeal court judge may confirm or amend the appealed ruling without specifically mentioning the article of dismissal, but the specification must be published in the short form judgment and the reasoning explained in the motivation report.

So, as you see it. The ECHR rules in Amanda's favor saying that Italy didn't even follow it's own laws and Knox should have been provided an attorney for questioning. What then happens? Amanda's lawyer files the appeal and then another review trial? Do they often contest or appeal these? Isn't there some mechanism for a summary judgment? I mean it seems as if this just goes on forever. The acquittal was over 3 years ago and the appeal to the ECHR predated that. God only knows when the ECHR will rule. Could this whole affair go on for another 3 to 7 years? Assuming Amanda will file for the appeal after the ECHR ruling..and possibly an appeal by the prosecutors and then Amanda asking for compensation.
 
So, as you see it. The ECHR rules in Amanda's favor saying that Italy didn't even follow it's own laws and Knox should have been provided an attorney for questioning. What then happens? {1.} Amanda's lawyer files the appeal and then another review trial? {2.} Do they often contest or appeal these? {3.} Isn't there some mechanism for a summary judgment? I mean it seems as if this just goes on forever. The acquittal was over 3 years ago and the appeal to the ECHR predated that. God only knows when the ECHR will rule. {4.} Could this whole affair go on for another 3 to 7 years? Assuming Amanda will file for the appeal after the ECHR ruling..and possibly an appeal by the prosecutors and then Amanda asking for compensation.

You pose some darn good questions.

1. After an ECHR judgment in Amanda's favor, finding that Italy violated the Convention in convicting her of calunnia, her lawyer would indeed file a request for revision on that basis, in accordance with Italian Constitutional Court judgment 113 of 2011 and the procedure specified in the CPP.

2. I have no idea how frequently revisions are requested or how often they are opposed by the prosecution. We have seen that Guede requested a revision claiming a conflict in court judgments, which would fall under CPP Article 630.1(A), but this was opposed and rejected by the Court of Appeals and, on appeal, by the Court of Cassation (CSC). Thus, Guede did not receive a revision trial. I believe that this rejection of Guede's request was correct and lawful.

3. I'm not aware of an "ordinary" mechanism for a summary judgment. The revision request, if granted, is followed by what apparently is meant, under Italian law, to be a very short trial, which focuses on the specific issues argued in the revision request. In Amanda's case, I believe that would entail arguments verifying that the only evidence relating to her calunnia was inadmissible under Italian law and that she had no intent to commit calunnia. Furthermore, the ECHR judgment would (one hopes) make it clear to the Italian courts that those arguments were correct. So the revision trial, under those ideal conditions, would be very short.

4. If the Italian courts respond to the potential revision request wrongfully, with the dysfunction they sometimes (often?) show, then the calunnia case could go on for a very long time, with the potential of another Knox v. Italy ECHR case relating to the revision request or retrial. This kind of situation (I am avoiding the use of a phrase beginning with "cluster") has occurred a few times in ECHR cases I have read.
 
You pose some darn good questions.

1. After an ECHR judgment in Amanda's favor, finding that Italy violated the Convention in convicting her of calunnia, her lawyer would indeed file a request for revision on that basis, in accordance with Italian Constitutional Court judgment 113 of 2011 and the procedure specified in the CPP.

2. I have no idea how frequently revisions are requested or how often they are opposed by the prosecution. We have seen that Guede requested a revision claiming a conflict in court judgments, which would fall under CPP Article 630.1(A), but this was opposed and rejected by the Court of Appeals and, on appeal, by the Court of Cassation (CSC). Thus, Guede did not receive a revision trial. I believe that this rejection of Guede's request was correct and lawful.

3. I'm not aware of an "ordinary" mechanism for a summary judgment. The revision request, if granted, is followed by what apparently is meant, under Italian law, to be a very short trial, which focuses on the specific issues argued in the revision request. In Amanda's case, I believe that would entail arguments verifying that the only evidence relating to her calunnia was inadmissible under Italian law and that she had no intent to commit calunnia. Furthermore, the ECHR judgment would (one hopes) make it clear to the Italian courts that those arguments were correct. So the revision trial, under those ideal conditions, would be very short.

4. If the Italian courts respond to the potential revision request wrongfully, with the dysfunction they sometimes (often?) show, then the calunnia case could go on for a very long time, with the potential of another Knox v. Italy ECHR case relating to the revision request or retrial. This kind of situation (I am avoiding the use of a phrase beginning with "cluster") has occurred a few times in ECHR cases I have read.

So if we 'assume' the ECHR rules in her favor, and given she win the slander suit filed by the police, it would seem to me there is nothing left for which Italy could use to argue calunnia was committed. So, from where I sit there seems to be only two options - either Italy accepts reality and overturns the conviction (without even bothering with the formality of a trial) or Italy ignores the realities of an ECHR ruling against them and denies the revision trial. What other options are possible?
 
So if we 'assume' the ECHR rules in her favor, and given she win the slander suit filed by the police, it would seem to me there is nothing left for which Italy could use to argue calunnia was committed. So, from where I sit there seems to be only two options - either Italy accepts reality and overturns the conviction (without even bothering with the formality of a trial) or Italy ignores the realities of an ECHR ruling against them and denies the revision trial. What other options are possible?

First, we must remember that the Italian courts show a relatively high level of dysfunction, sometimes (often?) ignoring or blatantly misinterpreting Italian laws and the Italian Constitution.

So here's a brief list of what could happen when and if the ECHR judges that Italy violated Amanda's right to a fair trial under the Convention, and that to restore her rights to what they were before the violation, she is entitled to request a retrial held in conformance with the Convention:

1. The Italian courts will indeed follow the laws of Italy, including the ECHR case-law, grant the revision request, hold a brief trial finding that all the alleged evidence of calunnia was inadmissible and that there was never any evidence of any intent to commit calunnia. The case is dismissed under CPP Article 529 (should never have been started) or 530 (acquittal), and Amanda's criminal record in Italy is cleared. Eventually, she is compensated by Italy for the miscarriage of justice and time wrongfully detained.

2. The Italian courts decide that the Italian Constitutional Court judgment 113 of 2011 simply doesn't apply to Amanda's case, because they don't want it to. They provide some obviously specious reasoning as justification. (This possibility may be unlikely.)

3. The Italian courts examine Amanda's request for revision, but use a less obviously specious reasoning as justification to deny a revision trial or hold the revision trial and decide that despite the ECHR judgment, Amanda has not proven that the case of calunnia against her should be dismissed under Article 529 or 530. For example, the revision court could adopt a fabrication of the trial record, such as that apparently used in the Marasca CSC panel, to claim that Amanda had accused Lumumba before the GIP in her arrest hearing. Or, the revision court could (wrongly) argue that deciding the admissibility of evidence was merely a re-evaluation of evidence, and thus the law did not allow a dismissal in accordance with CPP Article 637.3 (which states that the judge cannot order a dismissal solely on the basis of a re-evaluation of the evidence).

Following a final decision under a scenario such as #2 or #3, Amanda could then launch a new ECHR case against Italy and, after some considerable time, win another ECHR judgment. By then, some years from now, there would be new judges to consider a revision request.
 
First, we must remember that the Italian courts show a relatively high level of dysfunction, sometimes (often?) ignoring or blatantly misinterpreting Italian laws and the Italian Constitution.

So here's a brief list of what could happen when and if the ECHR judges that Italy violated Amanda's right to a fair trial under the Convention, and that to restore her rights to what they were before the violation, she is entitled to request a retrial held in conformance with the Convention:

1. The Italian courts will indeed follow the laws of Italy, including the ECHR case-law, grant the revision request, hold a brief trial finding that all the alleged evidence of calunnia was inadmissible and that there was never any evidence of any intent to commit calunnia. The case is dismissed under CPP Article 529 (should never have been started) or 530 (acquittal), and Amanda's criminal record in Italy is cleared. Eventually, she is compensated by Italy for the miscarriage of justice and time wrongfully detained.

2. The Italian courts decide that the Italian Constitutional Court judgment 113 of 2011 simply doesn't apply to Amanda's case, because they don't want it to. They provide some obviously specious reasoning as justification. (This possibility may be unlikely.)

3. The Italian courts examine Amanda's request for revision, but use a less obviously specious reasoning as justification to deny a revision trial or hold the revision trial and decide that despite the ECHR judgment, Amanda has not proven that the case of calunnia against her should be dismissed under Article 529 or 530. For example, the revision court could adopt a fabrication of the trial record, such as that apparently used in the Marasca CSC panel, to claim that Amanda had accused Lumumba before the GIP in her arrest hearing. Or, the revision court could (wrongly) argue that deciding the admissibility of evidence was merely a re-evaluation of evidence, and thus the law did not allow a dismissal in accordance with CPP Article 637.3 (which states that the judge cannot order a dismissal solely on the basis of a re-evaluation of the evidence).

Following a final decision under a scenario such as #2 or #3, Amanda could then launch a new ECHR case against Italy and, after some considerable time, win another ECHR judgment. By then, some years from now, there would be new judges to consider a revision request.

Thanks Numbers. If I had to guess, I would expect some variant of #3. But I'd also expect Amanda, at that point, would leave it there.

I just wish the ECHR would hurry up... I'm impatient.
 
Thanks Numbers. If I had to guess, I would expect some variant of #3. But I'd also expect Amanda, at that point, would leave it there.

I just wish the ECHR would hurry up... I'm impatient.

One point on this:

The only significant financial cost for bringing an ECHR case is that of the lawyers the applicant employs (there may also. in some cases, be some costs for translations). And, if the ECHR finds that a state has violated the applicant's rights, and the applicant requests compensation for those legal costs, the state is obligated to pay those costs.

The costs to reimburse the lawyers is much lower than in the typical civil or criminal trial, since the majority of the work is review of documentation and relatively short responses to ECHR queries.
 
I suspect that the remaining PGP diehards will simply implode if they can no longer claim Amanda is a "convicted felon" in Italy. But they may reject that reality just as they reject the fact that she is not a convicted felon in the U.S.
 
I suspect that the remaining PGP diehards will simply implode if they can no longer claim Amanda is a "convicted felon" in Italy. But they may reject that reality just as they reject the fact that she is not a convicted felon in the U.S.

They don't even believe the 2015 final acquittal was an acquittal. They also don't believe the failure of Mignini to have Sollecito and Gumbel convicted of defamation for "Honor Bound" was a disaster for Mignini. They still think that Sollecito and Gumbel admitted to everything in exchange for offering a heartfelt apology.

One that Quennell said would come within the week, but is still absent months' later.

LondonJohn used to equate these nutters with Baghdad Bob.
 
One of the key Italian court decisions that I believe that the ECHR may look at in Knox v. Italy is the Gemelli CSC motivation report, where the Court of Cassation acknowledges that one or more Italian laws were broken by the police and prosecutor during the interrogation of Knox and the obtaining of her "spontaneous" statement, so that her statements could not be used against her for the murder/rape trial. Yet, because Knox had written - while she was, in violation of Italian law, deprived of a lawyer following her interrogation and "spontaneous" statement - a defensive document (in which she essentially accused the police of coercing her statements during the interrogation) - the Gemelli CSC panel decided that she could be prosecuted for calunnia against Lumumba.

Since ECHR case-law states, in general, that the use of a statement obtained from a suspect who is deprived of a lawyer during interrogation or, by extension, detention, that is used against them without their consent to secure a conviction is a violation of the Convention, the ECHR judgment regarding these Italian judicial decisions will, I am confident, find the calunnia conviction a violation of the Convention.
 
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I agree, Numbers.

Over on TJMK they are so desperate for filler for their dying website that they're recycling all the "lies" story Knox allegedly told by posting parts of her trial testimony and then proclaiming that because these things were not discussed n her book, this is evidence her testimony was lies. For example, because Amanda doesn't mention in her book about her lamp being found in MK's room, it's evidence her court testimony about it was a lie. I can smell their desperation from here and it reeks.
 
I agree, Numbers.

Over on TJMK they are so desperate for filler for their dying website that they're recycling all the "lies" story Knox allegedly told by posting parts of her trial testimony and then proclaiming that because these things were not discussed n her book, this is evidence her testimony was lies. For example, because Amanda doesn't mention in her book about her lamp being found in MK's room, it's evidence her court testimony about it was a lie. I can smell their desperation from here and it reeks.

The guilters were always desperate because they never had any valid, reasonable arguments to support their claims.

For example, a guilter posting on this forum claimed that in Italy, calunnia - false accusation - was an especially serious crime, and that is why the CSC (Gemelli CSC panel) had ruled that Amanda's statements from the interrogation could be used against her for the charge of calunnia against Patrick Lumumba, but not for the charges of murder/rape of Meredith Kercher.

At the same time, that poster also maintained that Knox was not a suspect during the interrogation.

However, when one examines the ruling of the Gemelli CSC panel, a different rationale than that of the guilter poster is revealed, a CSC rationale that appears self-contradictory and not at all related to the alleged severity of a charge of false accusation under Italian law.

The Gemelli CSC panel acknowledged that Knox was a suspect during the interrogation and that the police and prosecutor had violated CPP Article 63 in the course of the interrogation and obtaining the "spontaneous" statement.

Thus, none of Amanda's statements could be used against her for the murder/rape charges.

However, the Gemelli CSC panel noted that Amanda had written a "defensive" statement in English after the interrogation. They stated that her writing of this statement - which she had produced without the assistance of legal counsel, unlawfully denied to her at that point contrary to the provisions of CPP Article 63 and other Italian laws - essentially allowed for consideration of the charge of calunnia.

Here's the relevant Italian text with Google translation (with my assistance):

Gemelli CSC Report on Defense Request to recognize violations of rights: violation of CPP Article 63

4. Avverso la citata ordinanza ha proposto ricorso per cassazione, tramite i difensori di fiducia, Amanda Marie Knox, la quale, anche mediante una memoria difensiva, denuncia:

b) violazione dell'art 350, comma settimo, e 357, comma secondo, c.p.p., essendo state poste a fondamento dell'ordinanza di custodia cautelare e del successivo provvedimento del Tribunale del riesame, quali elementi indizianti, le dichiarazioni rese dalla Knox il 6 novembre 2007 ore 1,45, senza la garanzie difensive, le "spontanee dichiarazioni" rese in pari data alle ore 5,45, non qualificabili come tali, attesta la veste processuale nel frattempo assunta, atti tutti inutilizzabili in quanto assunti in palese violazioni dell'art. 63 c.p.p.;

c) violazione di legge, carenza e manifesta illogicita della motivazione con riferimento al quadro di gravita indiziaria, avuto riguardo: a) alla personalita dell' indagata, giovane straniera incensurata, con una percezione della realta alterata dall'uso della cannabis indica, sostanza idonea a influenzare anche i suoi comportamenti eccessivi e onirici; b) al carattere gravemente lacunoso della traduzione di brani del memoriale autografo dell'indagata, analizzato in modo parziale; c) alla lettura non univoca del contenuto della conversazione ambientale del 17 novembre 2007 intercorsa tra l'indagata e i genitori dentro il carcere; d) al carattere non probante delle tracce di DNA rinvenute sul coltello sequestrato, delle macchie di sangue dell'indagata trovate sul tappetino e nel lavandino del bagno piu piccolo del'appartamento, occupato, tra gli altri, dalla vittima e dalla Knox;
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2. Con riferimento alla seconda censura difensiva la Corte osserva che le dichiarazioni indiziati sono caratterizzate da un differente regime di utilizzabilita sotto il profilo soggettivo. Nel caso in cui esse provengano da persona a carico della quale gia sussistevano indizi in ordine al medesimo reato ovvero a reato connesso o collegato con quello attribuito al terzo le stesse non possono essere utilizzate, oltre che contra se, neppure dei confronti dei coimputati dello stesso reato (o degli imputati di reati connessi o collegati).

Il regime di inutilizzabilita assoluta di cui all' art. 63, comma secondo, c.p.p. e, invece, da escludere nell' ipotesi in cui il dichiarante sia chiamato a rispondere, nello stesso o in altro processo, per un reato o per reati attribuiti a terzi, che non abbiano alcun legame processuale con quello per cui si procede, rispetto ai quali egli assume la qualifica di testimone.

Infatti, mentre nel primo caso, in forza dell' intima connessione e interdipendenza tra il fatto proprio e quello altrui sorge la necessita di tutelare anche il diritto al silenzio del dichiarante, nel secondo caso, invece, la posizione di estraneita e di indifferenza del dichiarante rispetto ai fatti causa lo rende immune da eventuali strumentalizzazioni operate da parte degli organi inquirenti (Cass., Sez. Un. 13 febbraio 1997, Carpenelli).

Alla stregua di questi principi, le dichiarazioni rese da Amanda Marie Knox alle ore 1,45 del 6 novembre 2007, all' esito quali il verbale venne sospeso e la ragazza venne messa a disposizione dell' Autorita giudiziaria procedente, emergendo indizi a suo carico, sono utilizzabili solo contra alios, mentre le "dichiarazioni spontanee" delle ore 5,45 non sono utilizzabili ne a carico dell' indigata ne nei confronti degli altri soggetti accusati del concorso nel medisimo reato, in quanto rese senza le garanzie difensive da parte di una persona che aveva gia formalmente assunto la veste di indagata.

Al contrario, il memoriale in lingua inglese dalla Knox e tradotto in italiano e pienamente utilizzabile, ai sensi dell' art. 237 c.p.p., poiche si tratta di documento proveniente dall' indagata, che ne e stata spontanea autrice materiale a scopo difensivo. La disposizione in esame consented di attribuire rilevanza probatoria al documento non solo in quanto tale e per il suo contenuoto rappresentativo, ma anche in forza del particolare legame che lo lega all' indigato (o imputo), cosi lumeggiando il sindacato di ammissibilita che il giudice e tenuto a operare.


4. Against that order {of detention} an appeal was lodged with the Supreme Court by the defenders of trust {the lawyers} of Amanda Marie Knox, which, by means of this defense brief, complains {charges}:

b) violation of CPP Articles 350.7 and 357.2, in that the precautionary custody order and the subsequent ruling of the Court of Review accepted as evidence the statements made by Knox on November 6, 2007 at 1.45 hours, {which were made} without the {legally required} defensive guarantees, and the "spontaneous declarations" made on the same date at 5.45, which can not be classified as such, {but all of which were} meanwhile assumed certified {as usable, admissible evidence} in procedural appearance, are {in fact} all not usable {inadmissible} because they were obtained in clear violation of CPP Article 63;

c) violation of the law, lacking or obviously illogical reasoning with reference to the gravity of the circumstantial evidence, regarding: a) the personality of the suspect, a young foreigner with no criminal record, with a perception of reality altered by the use of cannabis indica, a substance able to have affected her behavior to be high and dreamlike; b) the seriously flawed character of the translation of excerpts of the memorial written by the suspect, analyzed partially; c) the non-unique interpretation of the content of the {secretly audio-recorded} environmental conversation of 17 November 2007 exchanged between the suspect and her parents inside the prison; d) the non-probative character of traces of DNA found on the knife seized, {and} of the suspect's blood stains found on the mat {sic} and in the sink of the smaller of the apartment's bathrooms, used, among others, by the victim and by Knox;
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2. With reference to the second defense complaint, the Court notes that the suspect's statements are characterized by a different regime of usability subjectively. In the event that they come from the person against whom there were already indications {clues or evidence} regarding the same offense or offenses linked to or connected with the one attributed to the third, the statements can not be used against himself, nor against the co-accused of the same crime (or one accused of related to or connected crimes).

The absolutely unusable regime referred to in CPP Article 63.2 excludes cases where the declarant is called to respond in the same or in any proceedings {trial}, for a crime or crimes attributed to third parties, which have no connection with the trial for the case for which he takes the status of witness.

In fact, while in the first case, by virtue of the intimate connection and interdependence between the fact itself and that of others is the need to also protect the right to silence of the declarant, in the second case, however, the extraneousness {or strange} position and indifference {or apathy} of the declarant with respect to the facts in the declaration makes it immune from any possible exploitation by the investigative bodies (Cass., Sec. A. 13 February 1997, Carpenelli).

In the light of those precepts, the statements made by Amanda Marie Knox at 1.45 on 6 November 2007, resulted in the minutes being suspended, and she was placed at the disposal of' the judicial Authority {prosecutor} concerned, since {the statements included} evidence that had emerged against her, and therefore are usable only contra alios {against others}, while the "spontaneous declarations" of 5.45 hours can not be used against the suspect nor against other people accused of complicity in the same crime, as there were no defensive guarantees given to the person who had already formally assumed the role of a suspect.

On the contrary, the memorial in English from Knox and translated into Italian is fully usable, according to CPP Article 237, since it is a document coming from the investigated (suspect), and it is spontaneously written defensive material. The provision in question allows the attribution of evidential significance to the document not only as such, and for its representative content, but also by virtue of the special bond that ties it to the suspect (or accused), so heightening the scrutiny of admissibility that the judge is required to perform.
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Brief notes on CPP articles mentioned:

Article 63 has two paragraphs.

Paragraph 1 provides that if a person who was not a suspect or accused makes an incriminating statement (one that raises a suspicion of guilt in view of the authorities) before the judicial authority or police, the examination (questioning) shall stop, he shall be warned that investigations on him may now be carried out, and he shall be advised to appoint a lawyer. Such statements shall not be used against the person who has made them {there is no exclusion for allowing charges of false accusations to be used against the person in the text of the law}.

Paragraph 2 states that if the person should have been heard as an accused or a suspect from the beginning, his statements shall not be used at all.

Article 237 provides for the gathering as evidence of any document originating from the accused. {However, one should consider the difference between a defensive document, produced without a lawyer - access to the lawyer being illegally denied by the authorities - after a coercive interrogation, and where the accused was not informed her right to remain silent or right to a lawyer, and one produced under other circumstances.}

Article 350, paragraph 7, states that the police may receive spontaneous statements from the suspected person, but their use is not allowed at trial, except for rebuttal of earlier testimony.

Article 357, paragraph 2, provides for the thorough documentation of interrogations, searches, and seizures of property, of suspects and accused. {This law was ignored by the police in this case.}
 
I suspect that the remaining PGP diehards will simply implode if they can no longer claim Amanda is a "convicted felon" in Italy. But they may reject that reality just as they reject the fact that she is not a convicted felon in the U.S.

So are you back in super-flushing USA?

You weren't wrongly arrested and interrogated for 53 days by Italian tag teams of twelve from Rome, who changed every hour, and without food or drink and gestapo like screaming that you were a liar?
 
So are you back in super-flushing USA?

Yes. Thanks for asking...and recognizing that the toilets in the US aren't plagued by the Italian toilet peculiarity I encountered. Swiss and German toilets were super-flushing, too. No wonder they have such good reputations for efficient engineering. Like the joke goes, you know you're in heaven if the cooks are Italian and the engineering is German. If it's the other way around you're in hell.

You weren't wrongly arrested and interrogated for 53 days hours by Italian tag teams of twelve from Rome, who changed every hour, and without food or drink and gestapo like screaming that you were a liar?

Nope. But I never came back to my apartment/hotel to find anyone murdered, either. Good job of describing Amanda's situation, though, despite the "typo" (FIFY) and silly Nazi reference.

By the way, Raffaele's and Gumbel's big admission of lying about what was in Honor Bound and their apology to Mignini were all over the Italian media. Huge headlines everywhere! (Not really, but I thought I might give you a few seconds of happiness)
 
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I agree, Numbers.

Over on TJMK they are so desperate for filler for their dying website that they're recycling all the "lies" story Knox allegedly told by posting parts of her trial testimony and then proclaiming that because these things were not discussed n her book, this is evidence her testimony was lies. For example, because Amanda doesn't mention in her book about her lamp being found in MK's room, it's evidence her court testimony about it was a lie. I can smell their desperation from here and it reeks.



I especially love their "logic" that Knox would somehow have to have mentioned something about her lamp not being in her own (Knox's) room on the morning after the murder! Notwithstanding the fact that, in an innocent-Knox scenario, had the lamp actually not been there on that morning (for example, if Kercher had borrowed Knox's lamp the previous day), there's no reason why Knox necessarily would have had to notice this..... there's also the very clear possibility that Knox's lamp indeed WAS in Knox's room on the morning after the murder - and that it was moved into Kercher's room some time in the afternoon by the police/paramedics who were attending the scene (and they already have "form" in not owning up to their practices during this time period if they didn't conform properly to the required protocols......).
 
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