The Future of Moral Science

[tsig]

Too vague. Depending you what you mean by genetically predisposed humans might also be genetically predisposed for violence and what not and then we are back to square #1. What should we opt for in what appears to be a mix of a lot different genetically predisposed traits/instincts and what not?

Let's Allemande Left to the ole left hand

Grab that meaning and turn it around


That's how we do the semantic square dance.

 

[phiwum]

Given that only a philosophical argument (as opposed to a scientific one) can arrive at an “ought” statement you have no certainty that the premise of such an argument is ‘true’, let alone its conclusion (see above) and certainly not “truth-bearing”. Typical of the ivory-tower approach of so much philosophy!

I'll point out here something that must be obvious to most readers. Tassman has a skewed view of a philosophical argument, pretending that such arguments cannot depend on observed facts (including those of scientific theories). This is, of course, a caricatured view, since philosophers quite freely refer to facts about the world in their arguments (aside, of course, from some historical approaches, including rationalism).

But he also, curiously, says that "only" a philosophical argument can arrive at an ought statement, which is quite surprising, since we seem to reason about what we ought to do all the time. That is, after all, what practical deliberation is.

So, perhaps for Tassman's benefit, let me give a sample of practical deliberation. I will use an example from von Wright (from memory, so apologies for errors in quotation).

I want the hut to be habitable.
The hut will not be habitable unless I heat it.
Therefore, I ought to heat the hut.
​

The first premise is the end to be satisfied. Such ends are the starting point of practical deliberation. It does not take a philosopher to determine what ends I have; so long as I can recognize that I desire something, I can deliberate how to achieve it.

The second premise asserts that there is a means to my end (a necessary means, in this case, the simplest sort of practical syllogism). This is, in essence, an assertion of a causal relation: doing such-and-such would realize my end (i.e., cause it to be true). Obviously, such causal relations can be found scientifically, though arguably the bulk of such assertions are found by non-scientific, informal observation. The former are, of course, better justified.

The conclusion asserts that a certain action must follow, or I will be practically irrational in this instance. So long as I aim to make the hut habitable, I must do what is necessary to make it so or else I am irrational.

So, a simple example of deriving an ought statement (of a non-moral sort) using facts of the world about us. (Many ought statements in morality also make use of facts of the world, of course, but this example should suffice for now.)

 

[phiwum]

In some ways, I have misrepresented von Wright above. Let me quote von Wright now, having taken the time to look up the reference.

The relevant form of the referenced syllogism is this.

I want to make the hut habitable.
Unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable.
Therefore I must heat the hut.
​

Compare to my previous summary.

I want the hut to be habitable.
The hut will not be habitable unless I heat it.
Therefore, I ought to heat the hut.​

The first premise of von Wright's stresses that the hut is not yet habitable and that I aim to do something to make it habitable. It expresses more than my first premise expresses, but I think this is inconsequential.

The second premises have the same meaning, more or less. (von Wright's second premise implicitly includes the fact that the hut is not currently habitable, but this is not really important.)

The conclusion is logically equivalent. In both cases, we are concerned with what von Wright calls "practical necessity".

 

[Tassman]

Stone soup is a good analogy. The one I thought of was of the mice in Bagpuss who claim to make chocolate biscuits in a mill out of bread crumbs and butter beans. However Professor Yaffle is suspicious and discovers that the mice keep shoving in the same bread crumbs and butter beans and sliding the same chocolate biscuit out the chute. In other words nothing is being produced. This argument is the same; you can't claim you have used science to discover morals if the morals existed independently of the science and nothing is produced by the argument.

And where do you suggest the morals are hiding as they await discovery? Morality is a code of behaviour, nothing more. They are devised to facilitate community living.

 

[Tassman]

Too vague. Depending you what you mean by genetically predisposed humans might also be genetically predisposed for violence and what not and then we are back to square #1. What should we opt for in what appears to be a mix of a lot different genetically predisposed traits/instincts and what not?

But humans are NOT “predisposed for violence” as a species. We are social animals and our evolved instincts predispose us towards social cohesion. Being a part of an altruistic group is far more advantageous than individualism.

Hence we are predisposed to obey the rules of the group and have been acculturated to restrain individual selfishness (e.g. violence within the group) in favour of more cohesive social groups - to the extent that we penalise those who disobey the rules of the group.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

But humans are NOT “predisposed for violence” as a species.

Can you please list some human societies which have had a murder rate of zero?

How about an assault rate of zero?

 

[Tassman]

Can you please list some human societies which have had a murder rate of zero?

How about an assault rate of zero?

Just as soon as you list some human societies which regard murder and assault within the group to be moral behaviour.

 

[Tassman]

I'll point out here something that must be obvious to most readers. Tassman has a skewed view of a philosophical argument, pretending that such arguments cannot depend on observed facts (including those of scientific theories). This is, of course, a caricatured view, since philosophers quite freely refer to facts about the world in their arguments (aside, of course, from some historical approaches, including rationalism).

Indeed they do. But philosophers must assume that the “facts” are accurate because it has no means to test them - should that necessity arise only science is equipped to test them.

But he also, curiously, says that "only" a philosophical argument can arrive at an ought statement, which is quite surprising, since we seem to reason about what we ought to do all the time. That is, after all, what practical deliberation is.

I’m actually right here phiwum, you can talk to me direct. There's no need to play to the gallery.

So, perhaps for Tassman's benefit,

Gee thanks.

let me give a sample of practical deliberation. I will use an example from von Wright (from memory, so apologies for errors in quotation).

I want the hut to be habitable.
The hut will not be habitable unless I heat it.
Therefore, I ought to heat the hut.
​

The first premise is the end to be satisfied. Such ends are the starting point of practical deliberation. It does not take a philosopher to determine what ends I have; so long as I can recognize that I desire something, I can deliberate how to achieve it.

The second premise asserts that there is a means to my end (a necessary means, in this case, the simplest sort of practical syllogism). This is, in essence, an assertion of a causal relation: doing such-and-such would realize my end (i.e., cause it to be true). Obviously, such causal relations can be found scientifically, though arguably the bulk of such assertions are found by non-scientific, informal observation. The former are, of course, better justified.

The conclusion asserts that a certain action must follow, or I will be practically irrational in this instance. So long as I aim to make the hut habitable, I must do what is necessary to make it so or else I am irrational.

So, a simple example of deriving an ought statement (of a non-moral sort) using facts of the world about us. (Many ought statements in morality also make use of facts of the world, of course, but this example should suffice for now.)

But, for the umpteen time a prescriptive argument is not required to achieve the same end, e.g.:

I want the hut to be habitable,
The hut will require heating in order be habitable.
Therefore, I will heat the hut.

In short, very similar to your later corrected (whoops) version.

This is the very point Harris is making, i.e. the difference between a prescriptive argument and a descriptive argument is merely semantics as I’ve repeatedly stated.

 

[phiwum]

Indeed they do. But philosophers must assume that the “facts” are accurate because it has no means to test them - should that necessity arise only science is equipped to test them.

Well, er, no. They don't assume them. They get them from whatever reliable sources are available (science comes to mind) and the resulting argument is as strong as its premises.

You do understand, I suppose, that these aren't really competing fiefdoms, jealously guarding their treasures? That is, philosophers are allowed to read what's happening in science and refer to such discoveries? Sometimes, philosophers even borrow from mathematics, the scamps! They are an irrepressible lot!

But, for the umpteen time a prescriptive argument is not required to achieve the same end, e.g.:

I want the hut to be habitable,
The hut will require heating in order be habitable.
Therefore, I will heat the hut.

In short, very similar to your later corrected (whoops) version.

This is the very point Harris is making, i.e. the difference between a prescriptive argument and a descriptive argument is semantics as I’ve repeatedly stated.

Actually, my corrected version was: "I must heat the hut" where "must" expresses practical necessity -- exactly as I was using "ought".

A descriptive account tells one what a person did. A prescriptive account (in the third person) tells one what a person ought to do. As we all know, what one ought to do and what one does can be different. A descriptive account cannot replace a prescriptive account.

So, if Harris thinks the difference between the two is merely "semantics", then he's all wet. And, indeed, if the difference between the two really were inconsequential, then why would you claim that science can provide a descriptive conclusion, but not a prescriptive conclusion?

And, finally, don't you agree that what persons refer to as morality is fundamentally prescriptive in nature? Surely, morality is about what one ought to do, independently of what one does.

ETA: Let me address your claim more clearly, perhaps.

You say the conclusion could just as easily be stated, "Therefore, I will heat the hut." But of course, it is not always thus. There are times when a person recognizes what he ought to do, and yet does not do it. Therefore, he draws the proper normative conclusion, but the action which you describe does not follow. You have, I imagine, seen such moments of irrationality in others.

Therefore, the prescriptive and descriptive are simply not interchangeable.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Just as soon as you list some human societies which regard murder and assault within the group to be moral behaviour.

So if I kill someone outside my group/society it is not covered by moral behaviour?

 

[angrysoba]

So if I kill someone outside my group/society it is not covered by moral behaviour?

I would say that the demand to find a society which considers murder to be moral, is demanding a contradiction, not a contingent empirical fact.

We know, for example, that societies have allowed dueling to the death - which is to kill people within the group, and in fact killing someone in a duel would be considered almost the height of morality.

But the term murder includes within it the idea that it is immoral so it is a trivial, if not question-begging point to say that society considers murder to be immoral.

 

[tsig]

So if I kill someone outside my group/society it is not covered by moral behaviour?

Not if we call it war.

 

[tsig]

Can you please list some human societies which have had a murder rate of zero?

How about an assault rate of zero?

There's always those who won't follow the rules, that doesn't mean the rules don't exist.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

I would say that the demand to find a society which considers murder to be moral, is demanding a contradiction, not a contingent empirical fact.

We know, for example, that societies have allowed dueling to the death - which is to kill people within the group, and in fact killing someone in a duel would be considered almost the height of morality.

But the term murder includes within it the idea that it is immoral so it is a trivial, if not question-begging point to say that society considers murder to be immoral.

Yes, hence I used kill and not murder

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Just as soon as you list some human societies which regard murder and assault within the group to be moral behaviour.

So what you actually meant was that humans are predisposed to violence, but also predisposed to condemn violence, sometimes, except if it's a duel, or a war, or killing an unfaithful spouse, or they said something about your mother. So we figure out what is moral not by looking at what we are predisposed to do, but at what we actually tend to do at a society-wide level in 2015, and oh look it's stone soup again.

We've gone on a nice big loopy path through bad evolutionary science and bad evolutionary psychology and we're all the way back to exactly where we started, believing all the things we believed already. Thanks Tassmanism!

 

[angrysoba]

Yes, hence I used kill and not murder

Indeed. I am not criticizing your post. Tassman seems to not understand the difference between a priori and a posteriori. Murder is, by definition, immoral so looking for societies which consider murder to be moral is like looking for societies where the law is not legal.

 

[Tassman]

Indeed. I am not criticizing your post. Tassman seems to not understand the difference between a priori and a posteriori. Murder is, by definition, immoral so looking for societies which consider murder to be moral is like looking for societies where the law is not legal.

Murder, except under specific circumstances as enumerated in part above, is by instinct universally considered immoral because it militates against social cohesion.

 

[Tassman]

So what you actually meant was that humans are predisposed to violence, but also predisposed to condemn violence, sometimes, except if it's a duel, or a war, or killing an unfaithful spouse, or they said something about your mother. So we figure out what is moral not by looking at what we are predisposed to do, but at what we actually tend to do at a society-wide level in 2015, and oh look it's stone soup again.

We've gone on a nice big loopy path through bad evolutionary science and bad evolutionary psychology and we're all the way back to exactly where we started, believing all the things we believed already. Thanks Tassmanism!

What we Homo sapiens “actually tend to do at a society-wide level in 2015”, is maintain complex social structures, just as we have instinctively always done as an evolved social species. This is the foundation of our moral code and I'm very glad that you have always believed this, although this hasn't always been apparent from your various pontifications.

 

[angrysoba]

I suppose that there are those that consider meat to be murder. We have, without doubt, evolved in such a way that we are adapted to eat meat, but this in itself does not mean that it is moral to eat meat. Indeed, it is an example, yet again, of where moral philosophers and others argue that evolutionary heritage cannot be relied upon for us to make moral decisions.

 

[phiwum]

This is the very point Harris is making, i.e. the difference between a prescriptive argument and a descriptive argument is merely semantics as I’ve repeatedly stated.

Could you please explain what this means? I'm not trying to be funny, but I don't seem to understand what you mean when you say "merely semantics".

Does the same thing hold for claims as for arguments? Is the difference between "He ought to do X" and "He will do X" merely semantics? Does that mean that these two claims are essentially the same?

If so, does that mean the moral law "It is wrong to do X" is the same as the observation "People do not do X"? Or at least, "People generally do not do X"?

Finally, can you please confirm that you agree with the following argument, which I raised a few posts back?

Science does not arrive at ought statements.
The heart of a moral theory is ought statements.
Therefore, science does not discover moral theories.

(We can discuss that second premise if you're not convinced, but I suppose we should first figure out what you're saying about "merely semantical" differences between norms and descriptions.)