The Future of Moral Science

[Tassman]

Not at all!

OK.

Surely, this entails claim (1), repeated below.

(1) Science can not justify normative moral claims, since science cannot determine which fundamental moral principles, if any, are valid.

Now, maybe you'd like to add

(1a) No normative moral principles are valid.

You’re confusing a 'valid argument' with a ‘sound argument', i.e. one in which all of its premises are true. One cannot have a true conclusion without a true premise. Philosophy cannot establish a true premise because its premises are based upon untested assumptions, often referred to as "self-evident truths".

But, of course, there is no scientific argument for (1a) that I can see, so we'd end up with what you call a "semantic argument" (for reasons which elude me).

For reasons which have been stated by Harris (and others) and articulated by me several times in this thread. See later in this response for an example.

In any case, you do agree that science doesn't discover normative moral claims, right?

We can and do arrive at our moral positions based upon inferences drawn from the verified knowledge establish by the natural sciences. I would suggest that this is what we mostly do when we determine what is right and wrong – despite the pretensions of philosophy.

If you think that (2) and (3) are not apt summaries of your claims, fine. We'll give them up. I can see now how I might have misread you.

But as long as you argue that science doesn't derive moral norms, then that's one fewer disagreements. At some point, nonetheless, norms are introduced, whether by philosophy or culture or instinct or whatnot, else we would have no motive for action. We can dispute whether those norms are objectively justifiable, but we cannot dispute, I think, that men act in terms of what they believe to be right on many occasions, and rightness is a normative concept.

So, in the end, science provides data for our reasoning about what to do (prudential or moral), but the norms we apply cannot come from science itself, since science does not discover ought statements.
I doubt you agree with the last two paragraphs, but perhaps you should tell me why not.

Again, as per Harris, it is merely a semantic difference between: “One ought to be cooperative so as to maintain social harmony” (prescriptive) and “Cooperation is a demonstrably effective means of maintaining social harmony” (descriptive). From the latter one can infer that it is best to remain cooperative. The end result is the same.

ETA: Perhaps I should say what I mean when I use the term "norm". Any "ought" statement is a norm. Any statement which expresses the desirability or necessity of an action is a norm. When we debate over what actions to take, we are therefore debating over which norm has the greatest weight (or something like this).

Norms can be specific (On this occasion, I ought to move my pawn thus.) or general (Always treat others with respect.). Specific norms are typically derived from general norms with the addition of certain facts about the situation (such facts may, of course, be discovered through science).

Certainly, but this does not impact on the above.

Addressed to: phiwum

In order to have any group the first rule has to be "Don't kill each other on sight".

From that follows the other ones "Don't steal because it causes killing" and others.

As you say from this follows all our rules of behaviour in order to maintain the "group" - essential for our survival as a social species.

 

[angrysoba]

I wonder if Shermer's going to debate the theme of his book. I can't wait to see him get creamed!

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

...
We can and do arrive at our moral positions based upon inferences drawn from the verified knowledge establish by the natural sciences. I would suggest that this is what we mostly do when we determine what is right and wrong – despite the pretensions of philosophy.
...

What do you mean by the highlighted words?

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

What international scientific standard measuring unit is right and wrong measured in?
What scientific law covers morality and what are its formulas?
How do you conduct a scientific experiment, which measures right and wrong?

Come on, Tassman!!! Show us the science textbook, so we can learn to use science to determine right and wrong.

 

[Tassman]

What do you mean by the highlighted words?

Inference: “1. A conclusion reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning: ‘researchers are entrusted with drawing inferences from the data'”. Oxford Online Dictionary.

Determine: “1. Cause (something) to occur in a particular way or to have a particular nature: it will be her mental attitude that determines her future'”. Oxford Online Dictionary.

What international scientific standard measuring unit is right and wrong measured in?
What scientific law covers morality and what are its formulas?
How do you conduct a scientific experiment, which measures right and wrong?

Come on, Tassman!!! Show us the science textbook, so we can learn to use science to determine right and wrong.

It would be less misleading if you responded to the whole post, not just cherry-pick one paragraph out of several pages of argument.

In science, an inference refers to reasonable conclusions or hypotheses drawn from the available data. When it comes to 'right & wrong' behaviour, i.e. morals, they are inferred from our demonstrably instinctive need for self-preservation and procreation and are a consequence of natural selection. Science tells us that they are naturally built into us, because such a moral code was beneficial to the breeding and survival of our species as social animals.

Most people are aware that very many highly productive scientific theories are based upon induction and inference. But, as Harris says, when it comes to "determining" morality, science needs to be interpreted in the broadest possible terms and incorporate reason and logic and proper justification for beliefs, as stated several times. Hence your sarcasm (hilited) is misplaced.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Inference: “1. A conclusion reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning: ‘researchers are entrusted with drawing inferences from the data'”. Oxford Online Dictionary.

How do you observe right or wrong?

Determine: “1. Cause (something) to occur in a particular way or to have a particular nature: it will be her mental attitude that determines her future'”. Oxford Online Dictionary.

So someone who thinks/feels that rape is right is doing something true and right? It is a fact that rape is right and good?

It would be less misleading if you responded to the whole post, not just cherry-pick one paragraph out of several pages of argument.

In science, an inference refers to reasonable conclusions or hypotheses drawn from the available data. When it comes to 'right & wrong' behaviour, i.e. morals, they are inferred from our demonstrably instinctive need for self-preservation and procreation and are a consequence of natural selection. Science tells us that they are naturally built into us, because such a moral code was beneficial to the breeding and survival of our species as social animals.

Most people are aware that very many highly productive scientific theories are based upon induction and inference. But, as Harris says, when it comes to "determining" morality, science needs to be interpreted in the broadest possible terms and incorporate reason and logic and proper justification for beliefs, as stated several times. Hence your sarcasm (hilited) is misplaced.

So there is right and wrong and "right and wrong". The same goes for determining and "determining".
The problem is that you can't use science to determine whether tribal behavior or universal human rights behavior are right or wrong. Both are natural behaviors and observable as behaviors. What you do is that you decide which one you like and declare the one right and the other wrong. That is not science, because you can't observe which you should choice. That is something you do based on how you feel/think.

We are back to the problem that you can't observe right or wrong and you can't based on observation determine nor infer whether tribal morality or universal human morality are right or wrong. What you don't get is that right and wrong are based on how you think/feel and the same is the case for everybody else, including those who think/feel that rape is right and good.

There is no scientific standard possible for right or wrong, because they are subjective and depend on how a given individual thinks/feels.
Tassman, you have to learn to differentiate between observation and thinking/feeling. They are not the same and you can't use science to determine right and wrong, because you can't observe neither right nor wrong. What you in fact do here in this thread is nothing but tell us how you think/feel, but that is not science and it can't be used to determine though science what is either right or wrong.

 

[phiwum]

You’re confusing a 'valid argument' with a ‘sound argument', i.e. one in which all of its premises are true. One cannot have a true conclusion without a true premise. Philosophy cannot establish a true premise because its premises are based upon untested assumptions, often referred to as "self-evident truths".

Honestly, it is darling that you take the time to tell me about the difference between validity and soundness of arguments. I could learn a lot from you. Certainly, the highlighted claim is news to me. (Just to be clear, the highlighted claim is poppycock.)

But I'm sorry to say that the confusion is entirely your own. Indeed, I wasn't speaking of arguments at all. I was speaking of validity of moral principles. I used the term "validity" because it is somewhat standard in the art -- some people balk at the notion that an ought statement is truth-bearing, and so use the terms "valid" or "correct" rather than "true" in these contexts.

(For myself, I tend to think that ought statements are the sort of claim that can be true or false, but I sometimes choose "valid" in order to avoid a controversy which is beside my point.)

We can and do arrive at our moral positions based upon inferences drawn from the verified knowledge establish by the natural sciences. I would suggest that this is what we mostly do when we determine what is right and wrong – despite the pretensions of philosophy.



Again, as per Harris, it is merely a semantic difference between: “One ought to be cooperative so as to maintain social harmony” (prescriptive) and “Cooperation is a demonstrably effective means of maintaining social harmony” (descriptive). From the latter one can infer that it is best to remain cooperative. The end result is the same.

Let's look at this carefully. I want to distinguish between the following three statements.

(1) One ought to be cooperative so as to maintain social harmony.

(2) Cooperation is a demonstrably effective means of maintaining social harmony.

(3) One ought to be cooperative.

Let's pay attention to (1) for a moment. There are two interpretations I see:

(1a) If one wants to maintain social harmony, then one ought to be cooperative.

(1b) One ought to be cooperative, because this maintains social harmony and maintaining social harmony is desirable[1].

I will grant you that (1a) can be derived from (2), but obviously (1b) cannot be so derived, because it includes a claim ("maintaining social harmony is desirable") which cannot be infered from (2). More importantly, (1a) is not what people mean when they refer to moral norms (it is, in Kant's terminology, a Hypothetical Imperative).

Now, (3) on the other hand is a moral norm. It may be derivable from (1b), but it is not derivable from (1a) or (2).

So, the purported equivalence between (1) and (2) is a no-brainer, if we interpret (1) as a hypothetical imperative, but irrelevant if we're speaking of moral norms. You cannot determine what one ought to do, just by analyzing means-end relations, without reference to any values (subjective or objective). That doing A may bring about X is irrelevant to whether we ought to do A -- unless we already recognize that X is desirable. And desirability (especially of the objective variety) is not something that science can determine.

Let us be clear on your claims now. Is science capable of deriving a proposition of the form (3)? Or (1b)?

[1] NOTE: Not desirable for this or that purpose, but desirable full stop.

 

[Tassman]

How do you observe right or wrong?



So someone who thinks/feels that rape is right is doing something true and right? It is a fact that rape is right and good?



So there is right and wrong and "right and wrong". The same goes for determining and "determining".
The problem is that you can't use science to determine whether tribal behavior or universal human rights behavior are right or wrong. Both are natural behaviors and observable as behaviors. What you do is that you decide which one you like and declare the one right and the other wrong. That is not science, because you can't observe which you should choice. That is something you do based on how you feel/think.

We are back to the problem that you can't observe right or wrong and you can't based on observation determine nor infer whether tribal morality or universal human morality are right or wrong. What you don't get is that right and wrong are based on how you think/feel and the same is the case for everybody else, including those who think/feel that rape is right and good.

There is no scientific standard possible for right or wrong, because they are subjective and depend on how a given individual thinks/feels.
Tassman, you have to learn to differentiate between observation and thinking/feeling. They are not the same and you can't use science to determine right and wrong, because you can't observe neither right nor wrong. What you in fact do here in this thread is nothing but tell us how you think/feel, but that is not science and it can't be used to determine though science what is either right or wrong.

You appear to be quite unaware of what‘s gone before in this thread. This stuff has been covered over and again. We are genetically predisposed towards cooperation, reciprocity, altruism and observance of the social rules of the group. Such attitudes are instinctive. As well we are socially acculturated into notions of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, i.e. right and wrong – including rape as being unacceptable behaviour, to answer your question above.

 

[Tassman]

Honestly, it is darling that you take the time to tell me about the difference between validity and soundness of arguments.

I’m good like that.

But an “expert” like you should have known that a “valid argument” is not necessarily a “sound argument”.

I could learn a lot from you. Certainly, the highlighted claim is news to me. (Just to be clear, the highlighted claim is poppycock.)

Certainly one can accidentally have a true conclusion without a true premise, just as a broken clock with tell the correct time once a day. But one cannot be certain of a true conclusion without a true premise, which was the point being made, and a “true premise” cannot be reliably based upon an assumption (i.e. a so-called ‘self-evident truth’) as is the case in a philosophical deductive argument.

But I'm sorry to say that the confusion is entirely your own. Indeed, I wasn't speaking of arguments at all. I was speaking of validity of moral principles. I used the term "validity" because it is somewhat standard in the art -- some people balk at the notion that an ought statement is truth-bearing, and so use the terms "valid" or "correct" rather than "true" in these contexts.

(For myself, I tend to think that ought statements are the sort of claim that can be true or false, but I sometimes choose "valid" in order to avoid a controversy which is beside my point.)

Given that only a philosophical argument (as opposed to a scientific one) can arrive at an “ought” statement you have no certainty that the premise of such an argument is ‘true’, let alone its conclusion (see above) and certainly not “truth-bearing”. Typical of the ivory-tower approach of so much philosophy!

Let's look at this carefully. I want to distinguish between the following three statements.

(1) One ought to be cooperative so as to maintain social harmony.

(2) Cooperation is a demonstrably effective means of maintaining social harmony.

(3) One ought to be cooperative.

Let's pay attention to (1) for a moment. There are two interpretations I see:

(1a) If one wants to maintain social harmony, then one ought to be cooperative.

(1b) One ought to be cooperative, because this maintains social harmony and maintaining social harmony is desirable[1].

I will grant you that (1a) can be derived from (2), but obviously (1b) cannot be so derived, because it includes a claim ("maintaining social harmony is desirable") which cannot be infered from (2). More importantly, (1a) is not what people mean when they refer to moral norms (it is, in Kant's terminology, a Hypothetical Imperative).

Now, (3) on the other hand is a moral norm. It may be derivable from (1b), but it is not derivable from (1a) or (2).

So, the purported equivalence between (1) and (2) is a no-brainer, if we interpret (1) as a hypothetical imperative, but irrelevant if we're speaking of moral norms. You cannot determine what one ought to do, just by analyzing means-end relations, without reference to any values (subjective or objective). That doing A may bring about X is irrelevant to whether we ought to do A -- unless we already recognize that X is desirable. And desirability (especially of the objective variety) is not something that science can determine.

Let us be clear on your claims now. Is science capable of deriving a proposition of the form (3)? Or (1b)?

[1] NOTE: Not desirable for this or that purpose, but desirable full stop.

Well I’m just dazzled by your brilliance.

But none of it addresses the fact that it is science, not philosophy, which factually demonstrates the human animal to be a social species with specific instincts of self-preservation, procreation and the maintenance of a cohesive society.

And it can be readily inferred that our moral code, (i.e. good and bad behaviour) derives from these instincts and that they are (ultimately) a consequence of natural selection. They were naturally built into us, because such a moral code was beneficial to the breeding and survival of our species as social animals. This is the bottom line, the rest is window-dressing

Of course, as Harris says, when it comes to morality, science needs to be interpreted in the broadest possible terms and incorporate reason and logic and proper justification for beliefs”. But this applies to the application of science in all areas.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

You appear to be quite unaware of what‘s gone before in this thread. This stuff has been covered over and again. We are genetically predisposed towards cooperation, reciprocity, altruism and observance of the social rules of the group. Such attitudes are instinctive. As well we are socially acculturated into notions of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, i.e. right and wrong – including rape as being unacceptable behaviour, to answer your question above.

So how do you explain the occurrence of rape?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Honestly, it's not worth engaging with Tassman's posts.

His position is incoherent, which is why discussions with him keep going around in circles.

Why do I say his position is incoherent? Well, to begin with he's stuck trying to simultaneously argue (1) that Tassmanism represents a great leap forward in moral thinking and (2) that Tassmanism's moral prescriptions are just exactly the same ones we already have from welfare utilitarianism. He can't have it both ways. Even if his position were coherent it would also be trivial, because it offers absolutely nothing new.

He's also trying to simultaneously argue (1) that Tassmanism represents a great leap forward in moral thinking and (2) that that Tassmanist scientists can discern what is morally right by looking at what people are already doing as a result of genes and culture. So Tassmanist science says that the one true scientific morality is to keep doing what we were doing anyway - thanks Tassmanism! What would we do without you?

Of course for exactly the same reason the entire exercise is an extended wallow in the naturalistic fallacy, or an extended failure to grasp the is/ought distinction. However I think those rebuttals, while complete, are probably too sophisticated.

The bottom line is that Tassman is playing the "stone soup" game. He's bringing absolutely nothing to the party but a rock, and trying to take credit for what everyone else has done.

 

[Tassman]

Honestly, it's not worth engaging with Tassman's posts.

His position is incoherent, which is why discussions with him keep going around in circles.

Why do I say his position is incoherent? Well, to begin with he's stuck trying to simultaneously argue (1) that Tassmanism represents a great leap forward in moral thinking and (2) that Tassmanism's moral prescriptions are just exactly the same ones we already have from welfare utilitarianism. He can't have it both ways. Even if his position were coherent it would also be trivial, because it offers absolutely nothing new.

He's also trying to simultaneously argue (1) that Tassmanism represents a great leap forward in moral thinking and (2) that that Tassmanist scientists can discern what is morally right by looking at what people are already doing as a result of genes and culture. So Tassmanist science says that the one true scientific morality is to keep doing what we were doing anyway - thanks Tassmanism! What would we do without you?

Of course for exactly the same reason the entire exercise is an extended wallow in the naturalistic fallacy, or an extended failure to grasp the is/ought distinction. However I think those rebuttals, while complete, are probably too sophisticated.

The bottom line is that Tassman is playing the "stone soup" game. He's bringing absolutely nothing to the party but a rock, and trying to take credit for what everyone else has done.

So bitter!

 

[Tassman]

So how do you explain the occurrence of rape?

Our instincts predispose us to certain behaviours but we are not slaves to our instincts. E.g. it is instinctive for a mother to nurture her young, but careless mothers do exist. The social group regards them as “bad mothers” – an example of morality being derived from our naturally evolved instincts.

But overall, for a social species like us, being a part of an altruistic group is far more advantageous than individualism; hence we are predisposed to obey the rules of the group and acculturated to restrain individual selfishness (e.g. the urge to rape) in favour of more cohesive social groups. Furthermore we penalise those who disobey the rules of the group.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

So bitter!

Please with logic, reason and proper justification give evidence using the scientific methodology that your claim is true. I am currently unable to replicate your finding as it seems to be a first person subjective emotion and attempt to avoid answering the post.

 

[angrysoba]

Stone soup is a good analogy. The one I thought of was of the mice in Bagpuss who claim to make chocolate biscuits in a mill out of bread crumbs and butter beans. However Professor Yaffle is suspicious and discovers that the mice keep shoving in the same bread crumbs and butter beans and sliding the same chocolate biscuit out the chute. In other words nothing is being produced. This argument is the same; you can't claim you have used science to discover morals if the morals existed independently of the science and nothing is produced by the argument.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Stone soup is a good analogy. The one I thought of was of the mice in Bagpuss who claim to make chocolate biscuits in a mill out of bread crumbs and butter beans. However Professor Yaffle is suspicious and discovers that the mice keep shoving in the same bread crumbs and butter beans and sliding the same chocolate biscuit out the chute. In other words nothing is being produced. This argument is the same; you can't claim you have used science to discover morals if the morals existed independently of the science and nothing is produced by the argument.

It seems that some people are unable to understand that you can't use science since you can't observe neither right nor wrong.

• You can observe that people use words like right and wrong and explain that using science.(A fact)
• You can observe right or wrong and thus use science as science.(Not a fact)

It appears some people conflate the two and can't understand the all forms of experience are not a result of observation through sight; i.e. you can't see feelings and emotions.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

It seems that some people are unable to understand that you can't use science since you can't observe neither right nor wrong.

• You can observe that people use words like right and wrong and explain that using science.(A fact)
• You can observe right or wrong and thus use science as science.(Not a fact)

It appears some people conflate the two and can't understand the all forms of experience are not a result of observation through sight; i.e. you can't see feelings and emotions.

Based on angrysoba's previous posts I think they know that quite well.

I think their point was that even if Tassman was right that science could observe right and wrong, that wouldn't get him anywhere if all they were observing was the subjective rightness/wrongness of things which we already believe are right/wrong.

Of course in addition to that problem, as you say, science just can't observe right and wrong.

Tassman's ideas exhibit what I have seen referred to as fractal wrongness: Examine any one part of his ideas, and that part is just as wrong as the whole.

 

[tsig]

Please with logic, reason and proper justification give evidence using the scientific methodology that your claim is true. I am currently unable to replicate your finding as it seems to be a first person subjective emotion and attempt to avoid answering the post.

Do you agree that humans as a social species are genetically predisposed for cooperation?

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Do you agree that humans as a social species are genetically predisposed for cooperation?

Too vague. Depending you what you mean by genetically predisposed humans might also be genetically predisposed for violence and what not and then we are back to square #1. What should we opt for in what appears to be a mix of a lot different genetically predisposed traits/instincts and what not?

 

[phiwum]

I’m good like that.

But an “expert” like you should have known that a “valid argument” is not necessarily a “sound argument”.

Know what? Just to keep the conversation on track, I'm going to pretend you made a point here, despite the fact that I never mentioned "valid argument".

So, good point. I stand "corrected". Let's move on.

Certainly one can accidentally have a true conclusion without a true premise, just as a broken clock with tell the correct time once a day. But one cannot be certain of a true conclusion without a true premise, which was the point being made, and a “true premise” cannot be reliably based upon an assumption (i.e. a so-called ‘self-evident truth’) as is the case in a philosophical deductive argument.



Given that only a philosophical argument (as opposed to a scientific one) can arrive at an “ought” statement you have no certainty that the premise of such an argument is ‘true’, let alone its conclusion (see above) and certainly not “truth-bearing”. Typical of the ivory-tower approach of so much philosophy!

I see nothing here I need to respond to, since I haven't said anything about the ability of philosophy to derive ought statements. I'd rather focus on our current point of contention.


Perhaps I read too hastily. My apologies.

The highlighted part does seem to answer my question. You state quite clearly there that science cannot "arrive at" an ought statement. You stand by that, I presume?

If so, let us see the consequences. Morality, by its nature, consists of norms, that is, focuses on what one ought to do. This is the primary content of a moral theory (or, if you prefer, a morality).

And thus, it seems, science does not actually arrive at moral claims, by what you have said here.

Well I’m just dazzled by your brilliance.

So dazzled that you forgot to respond to my questions. Did you mean (1) to be interpreted as (1a) or (1b)? Are you arguing that (1b) or (3) can be derived from (2)? Are you arguing that (1b) or (3) can be discovered using the scientific method?

NOTE: That last question is a stand-in for our original question: Are you arguing that science can discover moral norms[1]?

I omit the rest of your post, since it does not address what I wrote. And, to remind you of context, I include here my original text.

Let's look at this carefully. I want to distinguish between the following three statements.

(1) One ought to be cooperative so as to maintain social harmony.

(2) Cooperation is a demonstrably effective means of maintaining social harmony.

(3) One ought to be cooperative.

Let's pay attention to (1) for a moment. There are two interpretations I see:

(1a) If one wants to maintain social harmony, then one ought to be cooperative.

(1b) One ought to be cooperative, because this maintains social harmony and maintaining social harmony is desirable[2].

I will grant you that (1a) can be derived from (2), but obviously (1b) cannot be so derived, because it includes a claim ("maintaining social harmony is desirable") which cannot be infered from (2). More importantly, (1a) is not what people mean when they refer to moral norms (it is, in Kant's terminology, a Hypothetical Imperative).

Now, (3) on the other hand is a moral norm. It may be derivable from (1b), but it is not derivable from (1a) or (2).

So, the purported equivalence between (1) and (2) is a no-brainer, if we interpret (1) as a hypothetical imperative, but irrelevant if we're speaking of moral norms. You cannot determine what one ought to do, just by analyzing means-end relations, without reference to any values (subjective or objective). That doing A may bring about X is irrelevant to whether we ought to do A -- unless we already recognize that X is desirable. And desirability (especially of the objective variety) is not something that science can determine.

Let us be clear on your claims now. Is science capable of deriving a proposition of the form (3)? Or (1b)?

[1] "Discover moral norms" here means "discover what people, morally, ought to do", not "discover that people think they ought to act thus."

[2] NOTE: Not desirable for this or that purpose, but desirable full stop.

Now that I see I overlooked your earlier explicit statement that science does not arrive at ought statements, I take it that you agreed with my assessment above? You didn't say, and I suppose we needn't focus on it, since my real interest is that point which you explicitly stated.