The Future of Moral Science

[Pup]

That's correct. Nobody has disputed that science can tell us about how humans have evolved. The mistake is when you think that what our Paleolithic ancestors did, as a product of evolution, necessarily translates as morality. Are you of the opinion that we cannot do any better than our Paleolithic ancestors when it comes to morality?

Can you explain what you mean by "do any better"? I know what you mean of course (at least I think so). If we decide that slavery is bad and try to eliminate it, we're doing better than our ancient, or not-so-ancient, ancestors who thought slavery was just fine. And I think that's a good thing, of course.

But it seems a tautology. We're doing better than our ancestors because we're enforcing behavior that's more like what we think is good instead of what they thought was good. Why is that better? Because we think it's good.

But why are our morals better than their morals? How do we know that?

I'll offer my personal answer. I'd say it's like any evolutionary thing. If giraffes' necks get longer each generation, they're more successful, but not because long necks are intrinsically better. They just happen to fit the environment better. If the environment were to change dramatically, long necks would no longer be good and their necks might get progressively shorter.

We've been in a fairly stable environment for humans, for innumerable generations. Kindness, fairness, freedom, equality, etc. keep working in this environment, so the ancestral primate who had a basic sense that fairness helps group cooperation was on the right track, just as the giraffe with the slightly longer neck was on the right track.

The main difference is that physical evolution just is. We don't tend to have angst over why we have two legs. But self-conscious creatures want some explanation for the feelings that drive instinctual stuff like a desire for fairness, so they label it morality and try to explain it with gods, philosophy, etc..

I can't picture an environment for humans where cooperation wouldn't be a good thing, but it's surely theoretically possible. Or maybe not, and we're more like cockroaches instead of dinosaurs, and this adaptation will be successful forever.

Even so, I think it's only an illusion that morality has improved over time, because it's arbitrarily setting our morality as a standard and then saying people have been improving because they've been getting more like us.

 

[angrysoba]

Can you explain what you mean by "do any better"?¹ I know what you mean of course (at least I think so). If we decide that slavery is bad and try to eliminate it, we're doing better than our ancient, or not-so-ancient, ancestors who thought slavery was just fine. And I think that's a good thing, of course.

But it seems a tautology. We're doing better than our ancestors because we're enforcing behavior that's more like what we think is good instead of what they thought was good. Why is that better? Because we think it's good.

But why are our morals better than their morals? How do we know that?²
I'll offer my personal answer. I'd say it's like any evolutionary thing. If giraffes' necks get longer each generation, they're more successful, but not because long necks are intrinsically better. They just happen to fit the environment better. If the environment were to change dramatically, long necks would no longer be good and their necks might get progressively shorter.

We've been in a fairly stable environment for humans, for innumerable generations.³ Kindness, fairness, freedom, equality, etc. keep working in this environment, so the ancestral primate who had a basic sense that fairness helps group cooperation was on the right track, just as the giraffe with the slightly longer neck was on the right track.

The main difference is that physical evolution just is. We don't tend to have angst over why we have two legs. But self-conscious creatures want some explanation for the feelings that drive instinctual stuff like a desire for fairness, so they label it morality and try to explain it with gods, philosophy, etc..

I can't picture an environment for humans where cooperation wouldn't be a good thing, but it's surely theoretically possible. Or maybe not, and we're more like cockroaches instead of dinosaurs, and this adaptation will be successful forever.

Even so, I think it's only an illusion that morality has improved over time, because it's arbitrarily setting our morality as a standard and then saying people have been improving because they've been getting more like us.⁴

1. My point is that the basic human instincts that Paleolithic humans had are the same as our own. But simply labelling those instincts "moral" and then assuming it is all explained is silly, because those of us alive today generally consider that we have made moral progress since then. I am refuting the idea that if science can tell us what our instincts are, then science has revealed normative morality. Paleolithic man probably raped and treated his children badly, killed his neighbours etc...

2. I don't know that we do know that. But trying to determine first principles might be a good start rather than just making it up as we go. Now, I understand there is a fashionable view around - subscribed to, in particular by Haidt - who argues that almost all we do is instinctive and then given a rationalization after the fact. Maybe that's what many people do. That's why some philosophers such as Rawls and others try to come up with thought experiments that remove ourselves or our interests prior to coming up with moral codes or bases for society - if we had no idea what status we would have in a society, how would we devise a society we would be happy to live in?

3. Innumerable? Who's been living in this society?

4. Surely you are making the mistake of assuming these moral questions are agreed upon by everyone. You also seem to be assuming that the societies in which people live today just happen, as if inexorably, and instead of what actually happened which is that generations of people argued for, and fought for particular rights to be treated equally, to have the vote, for heredity power to be reduced, for gender, racial and sexual orientation to have equal rights. We can see that philosophers had been arguing for these for a long time, and then these Johnny Come Lately guys Harris and Shermer after the battles have been won and argue that science can tell us those philosophers were right.

 

[Stee]

Can you explain what you mean by "do any better"? I know what you mean of course (at least I think so). If we decide that slavery is bad and try to eliminate it, we're doing better than our ancient, or not-so-ancient, ancestors who thought slavery was just fine. And I think that's a good thing, of course.

It is pretty clear to me that not being a slave is better than being one and I also think you could find a parallel between increased happiness and not being a slave if such a test were possible. I would argue that we have become more moral over time in link to my comments below.

1. My point is that the basic human instincts that Paleolithic humans had are the same as our own. But simply labelling those instincts "moral" and then assuming it is all explained is silly

I think here for me the point is that it was early instincts that caused a lack of morality, if you are so concerned with just managing to survive, the most basic instinct we have, then you are less concerned about treading on your fellow human to do so.

Society has advanced due to better technology and more comfortable living conditions for the most part at least in the west as it were. When your immediete concerns are no longer just survival and you can see there is a better way to live I think humans have tended to strive for that. It is not always the case though we are not all built the same. I have no doubt there are plenty of people around today who would happily have slaves working for them if they could.

I feel that having joined this thread late I am straying from the point, I am struggling personally to subscribe to the idea 'that values, themselves, can be determined by science' (quoted from opening post).

 

[angrysoba]

I think here for me the point is that it was early instincts that caused a lack of morality, if you are so concerned with just managing to survive, the most basic instinct we have, then you are less concerned about treading on your fellow human to do so.

Society has advanced due to better technology and more comfortable living conditions for the most part at least in the west as it were. When your immediete concerns are no longer just survival and you can see there is a better way to live I think humans have tended to strive for that. It is not always the case though we are not all built the same. I have no doubt there are plenty of people around today who would happily have slaves working for them if they could.

I feel that having joined this thread late I am straying from the point, I am struggling personally to subscribe to the idea 'that values, themselves, can be determined by science' (quoted from opening post).

Indeed, which is why I think that an understanding of evolution adds nothing of moral value. It may indeed explain why we care for our children more than people who are starving in Third World Countries, which is useful knowledge of course. But science does not then say unto us Thou Shalt Alleviate The Suffering of The Stranger As a Fellow Member of The Species!

Of course, we already knew long, long ago that we care for our kin and tribe more than for those outside our kin and tribe.

 

[dlorde]

I feel that having joined this thread late I am straying from the point, I am struggling personally to subscribe to the idea 'that values, themselves, can be determined by science' (quoted from opening post).

Yes, I'm inclined to agree with Bertrand Russell, in that we can apply science to identify, implement, and measure the success of various means for achieving the moral or ethical goals implied by our values; but that, ultimately (if you keep asking 'why?'), they resolve to opinions of what is good in and of itself, i.e. without arguable contributory reason. It may be that everyone, or a sufficient majority would agree that certain things are good in and of themselves, but it seems to be an emotional rather than a scientific choice.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Well, we are wrong, because it is a scientific fact that survival of the species is what evolution is about or rather...

...

Really! The Genus Homo has been around c 2,500,000 years, Modern humans have been around c. 500,000 years and fully anatomically modern humans’ for c. 200,000 years.

ALL have been social species requiring universal cooperation for the maintenance of social cohesion in order for the species to survive. So what’s your point about evolution taking place “within a species” again? You know not of which you speak.

...

So never mind sexual selection and natural selection within a species. We as humans because we are social animals require "universal cooperation for the maintenance of social cohesion in order for the species to survive". That is a scientific fact apparently and it has nothing to do with the fact that Homo Sapiens Sapiens not once in history has achieved universal cooperation. It is a scientific fact, because we can observe that it is so apparently.

 

[Tassman]

Same old nonsense from you Tassman.

Same old ignoring of what you can’t deal with soba. I’m still waiting for you to answer the question: “Where else would our moral code come from if not from our evolved instincts - thin air? God?“

So, let's get this straight, you now concede that science cannot answer normative moral questions but can tell us about human instincts.

I’m saying more than that, namely that normative moral questions are irrelevant. E.g. Science can tell us that the world is at risk of a global epidemic, but it cannot make a normative moral argument that this is a bad thing and that we should do something about it. But do something we will, based upon the reasonable inference that millions may be wiped out if we don’t. That’s how the real world functions; not isolated in an ivory tower hair-splitting moral academic arguments.

That's correct. Nobody has disputed that science can tell us about how humans have evolved. The mistake is when you think that what our Paleolithic ancestors did, as a product of evolution, necessarily translates as morality. Are you of the opinion that we cannot do any better than our Paleolithic ancestors when it comes to morality?

I’m saying that the decision-making process is in principle essentially the same for us as it was for our Paleolithic ancestors given that our biological make-up is essentially the same.

No, of course I don't.

And yet our Paleolithic ancestors managed to arrive at notions of good and bad behaviour without the academic necessity to argue a case for normative morality. So what has philosophy added to what we as a species have always done?

I expect they did. Are you arguing now that there has been no moral progress since Paleolithic times?

I’m arguing that in principle our moral codes have been arrived at in the same way as our Paleolithic ancestors. And what do you mean by “moral progress”?

I think it is Utilitarianism, yes. But not derived from science because there is no scientific evidence for the truth of Utilitarianism. It is an assumption that morality should be based on that which is for the greater good or happiness or welfare, and against that which causes misery. As I pointed out, Jeremy Bentham came up with this in the 18th Century, Sam Harris did not discover it by science! Ha ha if you believe that!

Also, don't just babble at me when I told you to prove an assertion you made and which I think is false, namely:



No, I am not aware of this. I agree that it is Utilitarian and I have been saying this over and over again, just as Kevin_Lowe has been saying it. What I want from you is not your words, I want his words.

Where does he acknowledge this? Quote him!

I overstated Harris’ position. In ‘Moral Landscape’ Harris says: “…morality should promote the general well-being of conscious creatures” I took this recognition of utilitarian ideals as a form of neo-utilitarianism. But you are correct, this is stretching it a bit, although he is obviously sympathetic to the spirit of these ideals.

Oh, and a yes, or no please. Is Sam Harris in favour of torture?

I repeat that this is a loaded question and doesn’t admit of a simple “yes/no” answer. But one notes that, for you, attempting to blacken Harris’ name constitutes an argument against his views. Whatever it takes, I guess.

I ask this because I already showed you that Harris and Shermer have positions which Jeremy Bentham, founder of Utilitarianism, opposed. So what progress do Harris and Shermer bring with them?

As it happens, Utilitarianism has been improved on by philosophers down the ages, notably by J.S Mill, later by thinkers such as Derek Parfitt and Peter Singer. But Utilitarianism is not a position arrived at by science. So for Sam Harris to make it the evaluative premise in his theory of moral science means that he has smuggled in the very thing at issue without justifying it scientifically.

I keep trying to point this out to you. Sometimes you blithely agree, sometimes you pretend it is a scientific conclusion, sometimes you waffle on about irrelevant things such as evolution, or Aristotle's Four Elements (which seems to be a particular favourite topic of yours despite nobody else having any interest in it), or the morals of Paleolithic man, which only goes to show that whatever our survival instincts are they are pretty insufficient as a basis for morality.

To quote your own inimitable style: “You’re babbling again”.

And I demonstrated beyond any doubt that you misrepresent Sam Harris. Harris explicitly denies that his idea of normative morality is evolutionary ethics, and explicitly argues that while science can tell us about our evolutionary moral inheritance, which is something I completely agree with, this is distinct from what we ought to do. I agree with that too. Where I disagree with him is where he says science can do that too.

Harris specifically argues that the ‘is-ought distinction’ is fundamentally unhelpful and that “normative” as opposed to “descriptive” morality is merely semantics – as I’ve noted several times. For Harris science is to be broadly interpreted to the extent that it incorporates reason and logic and proper justification for beliefs. Obviously it does. So, when evaluating Harris’s scientific arguments, this encompassing view of science must be kept in mind.

 

[Tassman]

Well, we are wrong, because it is a scientific fact that survival of the species is what evolution is about or rather...


So never mind sexual selection and natural selection within a species. We as humans because we are social animals require "universal cooperation for the maintenance of social cohesion in order for the species to survive". That is a scientific fact apparently and it has nothing to do with the fact that Homo Sapiens Sapiens not once in history has achieved universal cooperation. It is a scientific fact, because we can observe that it is so apparently.

“Universal” in the sense of “relating to or done by all people or things in the world or in a particular group; applicable to all cases” (Online Dictionary) although, admittedly I should have been more specific re the bolded.

Initially universal application was restricted to tribal units which expanded over the millennia to the point that we are getting close to an international form of tribalism – as is evidenced by the notion of universal human rights and the concept of crimes against humanity.

 

[Tassman]

Addressed to angrysoba:

Can you explain what you mean by "do any better"? I know what you mean of course (at least I think so). If we decide that slavery is bad and try to eliminate it, we're doing better than our ancient, or not-so-ancient, ancestors who thought slavery was just fine. And I think that's a good thing, of course.

But it seems a tautology. We're doing better than our ancestors because we're enforcing behavior that's more like what we think is good instead of what they thought was good. Why is that better? Because we think it's good.

But why are our morals better than their morals? How do we know that?

I'll offer my personal answer. I'd say it's like any evolutionary thing. If giraffes' necks get longer each generation, they're more successful, but not because long necks are intrinsically better. They just happen to fit the environment better. If the environment were to change dramatically, long necks would no longer be good and their necks might get progressively shorter.

We've been in a fairly stable environment for humans, for innumerable generations. Kindness, fairness, freedom, equality, etc. keep working in this environment, so the ancestral primate who had a basic sense that fairness helps group cooperation was on the right track, just as the giraffe with the slightly longer neck was on the right track.

The main difference is that physical evolution just is. We don't tend to have angst over why we have two legs. But self-conscious creatures want some explanation for the feelings that drive instinctual stuff like a desire for fairness, so they label it morality and try to explain it with gods, philosophy, etc..

This is the point I’ve been trying to make throughout. The instinctive behaviours, such as the desire for fairness, came first; they are the origin of our codes of good and bad behaviour, not philosophy. We even see the precursors of such behaviour among the non-human primates and other social creatures.

I can't picture an environment for humans where cooperation wouldn't be a good thing, but it's surely theoretically possible. Or maybe not, and we're more like cockroaches instead of dinosaurs, and this adaptation will be successful forever.

It would be a contradiction in terms for a social species such as us. But, if ever cooperation became harmful to the species then I guess it would go extinct - as have 99% of species on Earth gone extinct over the course of five massive extinctions changing conditions.

Even so, I think it's only an illusion that morality has improved over time, because it's arbitrarily setting our morality as a standard and then saying people have been improving because they've been getting more like us.

Not so much “improved over time” perhaps, but expanded as the world increasingly develops into a single “global village” with common values such as altruism, reciprocity and fairness etc spreading worldwide.

 

[Pup]

...because those of us alive today generally consider that we have made moral progress since then. I am refuting the idea that if science can tell us what our instincts are, then science has revealed normative morality. Paleolithic man probably raped and treated his children badly, killed his neighbours etc...

Concerning the bit I've highlighted... And yet, in your point #4, you say I make the mistake of assuming moral questions are agreed on by everyone, but you're doing the same thing here. I'm merely following your lead of simplifying and generalizing about "us" in first-world countries. If you want to break it down in more detail, we can do that.

I do not think science can reveal normative morality. I don't think that normative reality can be revealed because it doesn't exist. All that exists is our belief that it exists and that our morality is the one true morality, or that a true morality can be discovered which is close to ours (whatever that may be).

I think we have such beliefs because a sense of morality is so strong that it's easy for humans to assume it's a force greater than us, coming from out there somewhere, with eternal principles.

That's why some philosophers such as Rawls and others try to come up with thought experiments that remove ourselves or our interests prior to coming up with moral codes or bases for society - if we had no idea what status we would have in a society, how would we devise a society we would be happy to live in?

I think the question could be taken much further than that. Why limit it to human society? One could start with any sort of goal besides welfare within a human society and figure out what behavior would lead to that goal. We tend toward definitions that include benefiting humans because we're human, with a few exceptions of course from people who think humans are a blight upon Gaia or whatever.

4. Surely you are making the mistake of assuming these moral questions are agreed upon by everyone. You also seem to be assuming that the societies in which people live today just happen, as if inexorably, and instead of what actually happened which is that generations of people argued for, and fought for particular rights to be treated equally, to have the vote, for heredity power to be reduced, for gender, racial and sexual orientation to have equal rights. We can see that philosophers had been arguing for these for a long time, and then these Johnny Come Lately guys Harris and Shermer after the battles have been won and argue that science can tell us those philosophers were right.

The first sentence I replied to above. As far as the other part... It seems to rest upon the assumption that our current morality is the goal, and innumerable people have worked to achieve it. In an emotional, poetic, metaphoric sense, I agree. It feels wonderful to think how far we've come and how much individuals have struggled to get us here and how much better it is to live in a world where (generalizing again about what "we" believe) slavery, oppression of women and other races, animal cruelty, etc. are considered wrong.

But in a detached, unemotional sense, I have a niggling suspicion that it sounds too close to the 19th century anthropologists who pointed out how white people were the goal of all those years of evolution, and every other color of humans not to mention the lower animals could be arranged in a heirarchy below.

How can we be sure we're not making that same mistake when we declare our morals to be the goal of all those prevous benighted generations who didn't immediately see it our way?

 

[angrysoba]

Concerning the bit I've highlighted... And yet, in your point #4, you say I make the mistake of assuming moral questions are agreed on by everyone, but you're doing the same thing here. I'm merely following your lead of simplifying and generalizing about "us" in first-world countries. If you want to break it down in more detail, we can do that.

I do not think science can reveal normative morality. I don't think that normative reality can be revealed because it doesn't exist. All that exists is our belief that it exists and that our morality is the one true morality, or that a true morality can be discovered which is close to ours (whatever that may be).

I think we have such beliefs because a sense of morality is so strong that it's easy for humans to assume it's a force greater than us, coming from out there somewhere, with eternal principles.



I think the question could be taken much further than that. Why limit it to human society? One could start with any sort of goal besides welfare within a human society and figure out what behavior would lead to that goal. We tend toward definitions that include benefiting humans because we're human, with a few exceptions of course from people who think humans are a blight upon Gaia or whatever.



The first sentence I replied to above. As far as the other part... It seems to rest upon the assumption that our current morality is the goal, and innumerable people have worked to achieve it. In an emotional, poetic, metaphoric sense, I agree. It feels wonderful to think how far we've come and how much individuals have struggled to get us here and how much better it is to live in a world where (generalizing again about what "we" believe) slavery, oppression of women and other races, animal cruelty, etc. are considered wrong.

But in a detached, unemotional sense, I have a niggling suspicion that it sounds too close to the 19th century anthropologists who pointed out how white people were the goal of all those years of evolution, and every other color of humans not to mention the lower animals could be arranged in a heirarchy below.

How can we be sure we're not making that same mistake when we declare our morals to be the goal of all those prevous benighted generations who didn't immediately see it our way?

I think we are drifting too far from the main point I was trying to make, which is not to say that things are much better now than ever before (even if both of us happen to agree that they are), but it is enough to show that ideas about morality have differed so much over the ages that to posit some evolutionary argument in which what is good is what our (humans) instincts tell us are good for they have enabled survival is demonstrably false. Unless, of course, we see survival as some moral good in and of itself regardless of other ways in which we, as humans, may treat each other. But to say that removes any distinction between humans and any other animals, leaving us to assume that animals that exist now are more moral than animals which no longer exist. To me that just sounds stupid, and I very much doubt that when people usually talk about morals what they mean is doing what it takes to survive.

If someone is pointing to Paleolithic man and saying, "Ha ha! Were they doing philosophy then? Ha ha!" and claiming that their instincts were sufficient for what we call normative morality then we should expect to see similar morals today. And of course, such a person would be making the mistake of confusing empirical facts of evolution with the human process of actually doing science, otherwise I could ask the same "Ha ha! Were they doing science then? Ha ha!"

 

[phiwum]

I’m saying more than that, namely that normative moral questions are irrelevant. E.g. Science can tell us that the world is at risk of a global epidemic, but it cannot make a normative moral argument that this is a bad thing and that we should do something about it. But do something we will, based upon the reasonable inference that millions may be wiped out if we don’t. That’s how the real world functions; not isolated in an ivory tower hair-splitting moral academic arguments.

Let me see if I understand what you're claiming above.

(1) Science can not justify normative moral claims, since science cannot determine which fundamental moral principles, if any, are valid.

(2) Science can, in principle, determine the moral values which tend to motivate human actions.

(3) Science can give an evolutionary account for the tendency of humans to act according to such moral principles.

Does that summarize your position?

If so, I think that almost everyone here agrees with (1) and (2). Principle (3) is a bit trickier, since it's not obvious that such hypotheses are really testable, but at least I'd think that science can probably give a plausible such account.

 

[Tassman]

Let me see if I understand what you're claiming above.

(1) Science can not justify normative moral claims, since science cannot determine which fundamental moral principles, if any, are valid.

(2) Science can, in principle, determine the moral values which tend to motivate human actions.

(3) Science can give an evolutionary account for the tendency of humans to act according to such moral principles.

Does that summarize your position?
If so, I think that almost everyone here agrees with (1) and (2). Principle (3) is a bit trickier, since it's not obvious that such hypotheses are really testable, but at least I'd think that science can probably give a plausible such account.

No, this is a parody of my position which, I suspect, was the intention.

My position is that normative moral questions are irrelevant. The ‘is/ought distinction’ is fundamentally unhelpful in that “normative” morality, as opposed to “descriptive” morality, is basically a semantic argument - as I’ve said several times.

It is science that tells us about how the world functions, how life evolved, how we evolved and our place in the scheme of things as social, intelligent primates. It is from this knowledge that we, as a society, draw the inferences of what constitutes the good and bad behaviour we think of as morality. In short, scientific knowledge provides the starting point of a moral argument, not philosophy, although the latter is an important adjunct.

Of course, as Harris argues, science used this way needs to interpreted in the broadest possible terms and incorporate reason and logic and proper justification for beliefs. But then, as he notes, science has always done this. It's never functioned in a vacuum.

 

[Tassman]

Addressed to Pup.

I think we are drifting too far from the main point I was trying to make, which is not to say that things are much better now than ever before (even if both of us happen to agree that they are), but it is enough to show that ideas about morality have differed so much over the ages that to posit some evolutionary argument in which what is good is what our (humans) instincts tell us are good for they have enabled survival is demonstrably false.

“Ideas about morality” have not “differed so much over the ages”, only the means of implementation. The end goal of survival for social creatures such as us via social cohesion remains the same and our rules of behaviour are instinctively directed towards this end.

Unless, of course, we see survival as some moral good in and of itself regardless of other ways in which we, as humans, may treat each other.

Survival of the species certainly isn't a moral good in and of itself; it’s a characteristic of Natural Selection, nothing more. The survival instinct just is.

But to say that removes any distinction between humans and any other animals, leaving us to assume that animals that exist now are more moral than animals which no longer exist. To me that just sounds stupid, and I very much doubt that when people usually talk about morals what they mean is doing what it takes to survive.

Morality has nothing to do with it. There are numerous reasons why many species no longer exist such as comet strikes (as per the dinosaurs), geological transformation of the Earth's crust and major climatic oscillations, as well as species interactions.

If someone is pointing to Paleolithic man and saying, "Ha ha! Were they doing philosophy then? Ha ha!" and claiming that their instincts were sufficient for what we call normative morality then we should expect to see similar morals today.

We do see similar morals today inasmuch as the end goal is the same, namely social cohesion even though the means of obtaining this goal has changed given that, unlike the other primates, our intelligence has enabled us to learn, grow and develop.

And of course, such a person would be making the mistake of confusing empirical facts of evolution with the human process of actually doing science, otherwise I could ask the same "Ha ha! Were they doing science then? Ha ha!"

Yes "they were doing science then", albeit in its most basic form namely acquiring knowledge of the material world via observation, trial and error and experimentation.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Hi Tassman

Can you explain how we using science can tell if tribal cooperation is better or worse than the idea of universal cooperation for all of humanity?

 

[phiwum]

No, this is a parody of my position which, I suspect, was the intention.

Not at all!

My position is that normative moral questions are irrelevant. The ‘is/ought distinction’ is fundamentally unhelpful in that “normative” morality, as opposed to “descriptive” morality, is basically a semantic argument - as I’ve said several times.

Surely, this entails claim (1), repeated below.

(1) Science can not justify normative moral claims, since science cannot determine which fundamental moral principles, if any, are valid.

Now, maybe you'd like to add

(1a) No normative moral principles are valid.

But, of course, there is no scientific argument for (1a) that I can see, so we'd end up with what you call a "semantic argument" (for reasons which elude me).

In any case, you do agree that science doesn't discover normative moral claims, right?

It is science that tells us about how the world functions, how life evolved, how we evolved and our place in the scheme of things as social, intelligent primates. It is from this knowledge that we, as a society, draw the inferences of what constitutes the good and bad behaviour we think of as morality. In short, scientific knowledge provides the starting point of a moral argument, not philosophy, although the latter is an important adjunct.

Of course, as Harris argues, science used this way needs to interpreted in the broadest possible terms and incorporate reason and logic and proper justification for beliefs. But then, as he notes, science has always done this. It's never functioned in a vacuum.

If you think that (2) and (3) are not apt summaries of your claims, fine. We'll give them up. I can see now how I might have misread you.

But as long as you argue that science doesn't derive moral norms, then that's one fewer disagreements. At some point, nonetheless, norms are introduced, whether by philosophy or culture or instinct or whatnot, else we would have no motive for action. We can dispute whether those norms are objectively justifiable, but we cannot dispute, I think, that men act in terms of what they believe to be right on many occasions, and rightness is a normative concept.

So, in the end, science provides data for our reasoning about what to do (prudential or moral), but the norms we apply cannot come from science itself, since science does not discover ought statements.

I doubt you agree with the last two paragraphs, but perhaps you should tell me why not.

ETA: Perhaps I should say what I mean when I use the term "norm". Any "ought" statement is a norm. Any statement which expresses the desirability or necessity of an action is a norm. When we debate over what actions to take, we are therefore debating over which norm has the greatest weight (or something like this).

Norms can be specific (On this occasion, I ought to move my pawn thus.) or general (Always treat others with respect.). Specific norms are typically derived from general norms with the addition of certain facts about the situation (such facts may, of course, be discovered through science).

 

[tsig]

Not at all!



Surely, this entails claim (1), repeated below.

(1) Science can not justify normative moral claims, since science cannot determine which fundamental moral principles, if any, are valid.

Now, maybe you'd like to add

(1a) No normative moral principles are valid.

But, of course, there is no scientific argument for (1a) that I can see, so we'd end up with what you call a "semantic argument" (for reasons which elude me).

In any case, you do agree that science doesn't discover normative moral claims, right?



If you think that (2) and (3) are not apt summaries of your claims, fine. We'll give them up. I can see now how I might have misread you.

But as long as you argue that science doesn't derive moral norms, then that's one fewer disagreements. At some point, nonetheless, norms are introduced, whether by philosophy or culture or instinct or whatnot, else we would have no motive for action. We can dispute whether those norms are objectively justifiable, but we cannot dispute, I think, that men act in terms of what they believe to be right on many occasions, and rightness is a normative concept.

So, in the end, science provides data for our reasoning about what to do (prudential or moral), but the norms we apply cannot come from science itself, since science does not discover ought statements.

I doubt you agree with the last two paragraphs, but perhaps you should tell me why not.

ETA: Perhaps I should say what I mean when I use the term "norm". Any "ought" statement is a norm. Any statement which expresses the desirability or necessity of an action is a norm. When we debate over what actions to take, we are therefore debating over which norm has the greatest weight (or something like this).

Norms can be specific (On this occasion, I ought to move my pawn thus.) or general (Always treat others with respect.). Specific norms are typically derived from general norms with the addition of certain facts about the situation (such facts may, of course, be discovered through science).

In order to have any group the first rule has to be "Don't kill each other on sight".

From that follows the other ones "Don't steal because it causes killing" and others.

 

[phiwum]

No, this is a parody of my position which, I suspect, was the intention.

In my experience, by the way, most people don't ask for confirmation when they're parodying someone else's position. In fact, I'm not sure what the point might be.

Just a thought.

 

[angrysoba]

Let me see if I understand what you're claiming above.

(1) Science can not justify normative moral claims, since science cannot determine which fundamental moral principles, if any, are valid.

(2) Science can, in principle, determine the moral values which tend to motivate human actions.

(3) Science can give an evolutionary account for the tendency of humans to act according to such moral principles.

Does that summarize your position?

If so, I think that almost everyone here agrees with (1) and (2). Principle (3) is a bit trickier, since it's not obvious that such hypotheses are really testable, but at least I'd think that science can probably give a plausible such account.

Yeah, looks like Tassman's conceded the point that science cannot answer moral questions. That's progress of a kind I suppose.

However, who knows where he is going with the new stuff about normative questions being irrelevant.

I think that science can probably give a pretty good account of how we devised certain moral intuitions. This is where Peter Singer and Sam Harris, and I agree. Also where we agree is that this does not translate as normative statements.

In fact, for the most part, our normative morals are about trying to overcome certain desires and prejudices that are products of evolution such as a tendency to favour our kin over others, or the male evolutionary strategy of trying to impregnate as many women as possible to further our genes.

Some of this stuff may still be controversial, of course, but they are, as Sam Harris might say, in principle discoverable. But of course that tells us nothing about what we ought to do.

Interesting is that Michael Shermer seems to give what I think of as a pseudoscientific justification for placing the individual at the centre of his moral science argument:

When I talk about a moral arc of progress, I mean an improvement in the survival and flourishing of individual sentient beings. I emphasize the individual for four reasons: (1) Natural selection operates on individual organisms, not groups (see Steven Pinker’s dismantling of group selection arguments here.). (2) It is the individual who is the primary moral agent—not the group, tribe, race, gender, state, nation, empire, society, or any other collective—because it is the individual who survives and flourishes, or who suffers and dies. It is individual sentient beings who perceive, emote, respond, love, feel, and suffer—not populations, races, genders, groups, or nations. (3) Historically, immoral abuses have been most rampant, and body counts have run the highest, when the individual is sacrificed for the good of the group. It happens when people are judged by the color of their skin—or by their X/Y chromosomes, or by whom they prefer to sleep with, or by what accent they speak with, or by which political or religious group they belong to, or by any other trait our species has chosen to differentiate among members—instead of by the content of their individual character. (4) The rights revolutions of the past two centuries have focused almost entirely on the freedom and autonomy of individuals, not collectives—on the rights of persons, not groups. Individuals vote, not races or genders.

Shermer is right that evolution by natural selection operates on individuals (or at least, I think it usually does), but that is irrelevant as to whether we should place individuals at the centre of our moral choices. Shermer is violating the naturalistic fallacy here.

His other justifications seem to be question-begging in most cases, or arguments from tradition, or special pleading. But then, I don't consider Shermer to be a stellar thinker unless his thinking is to cash in on a fashionable topic.

 

[angrysoba]

Shermer is violating the naturalistic fallacy here.

By "violating" the naturalistic fallacy, I of course meant "committing" the naturalistic fallacy.