It does. It provides an example of the difference between a prescriptive argument and a descriptive argument and demonstrates that the only substantive difference is a semantic one.
Let us review, and I'll show you the big difference between the two arguments.
I want the hut to be habitable.
The hut will not be habitable unless I heat it.
Therefore, I ought to heat the hut.
I want the hut to be habitable,
The hut will require heating in order be habitable.
Therefore, I will heat the hut.
The first argument is valid. It cannot be the case that the premises are true unless the conclusion is also true. The second argument is invalid. It may be the case that the premises are true -- indeed, I may even
know that the premises are true -- and yet I will not heat the hut.
Clearly, the sentences "I ought to do X" and "I will do X" mean different things. They have different truth conditions. I still am puzzled what you mean when you insist that the difference is merely semantic.
Please tell me what that means.
I ignored them on the basis of your erroneous assumptions underlying them. But, if you insist:
That’s not the argument.
Okay, so "ought" and "will" are not interchangeable. Good.
It is not necessarily so. Again you’re mischaracterizing the argument.
Okay. Perhaps I wouldn't be mischaracterizing the argument if you would tell me what the conclusion means.
True.
Not really. This claim only applies to a deductive philosophical argument. And the problem is philosophy’s inability to arrive at a testable true premise from which to deduce a true conclusion. This has resulted in some bizarre moral theories throughout history, especially when deities have been involved. E.g. Peter Abelard's theory of the atonement in the 12th century, whereby he he makes an impeccably valid philosophical argument. Just that it's all nonsense.
In your haste to go on a diatribe about philosophy, which I will not respond to, you failed to actually give an argument that I was wrong about the heart of moral theory. Let me give a brief argument that moral theories are essentially normative.
Morality, I take it, distinguishes good action from bad. It asserts that some acts or ends are to be pursued while others shunned. Fundamentally, moral theories are about values regarding human action, i.e., they are normative.
When a value is involved, there is a correspondingly appropriate motivation. It is appropriate to pursue that which is good, to avoid that which is bad. In such situations, the appropriateness of an attitude towards a value is expressed by an "ought". The connection between values and ought statements is so intimate, that we refer to ought statements as "norms".
Any moral theory which fails to distinguish good and bad ends, or to proscribe certain actions, is not fundamentally a moral theory at all. Moral theories are about what one ought to do.
Now, could you explain what you mean when you say "moral theory", if it does not consist of proscriptions?
Ah, the big finish.
What science
does discover are testable premises upon which rules of behaviour (i.e. moral theories) can be reasonably inferred.
"Rules of behaviour". Are these rules imperative ("Don't murder") or more like scientific rules, without exception? I'm sure you'll agree they are imperative.
But imperative rules are normative in nature. To say that there is a moral rule, "Don't murder," is equivalent to saying that murder is morally wrong, one ought not to murder. These statements have no difference in meaning that I can see.
As soon as you say that a moral theory involves proscriptive rules of behavior, you have agreed that moral theories are fundamentally about what one ought to do.
