The Future of Moral Science

[angrysoba]

The first review I can find of Shermer's book (okay, I went for a 3-star review on Amazon) sums up what I have seen so far of Shermer's "argument" and his style:

As a fan of critical thinking, an avid reader, and a bit of a skeptic myself, I fell for the promotional blurbs that accompanied the publication of this book. Most persuasive was the statement, "In The Moral Arc, Shermer will explain how abstract reasoning, rationality, empiricism, skepticism -- scientific ways of thinking -- have profoundly changed the way we perceive morality and, indeed, move us ever closer to a more just world."

Unfortunately, I was deeply disappointed. Instead of feeling enlightened by this 533 page work (439 pages of text followed by almost 90 pages of end notes, bibliography, and acknowledgements), I was stunned by its self-indulgence. The author gives us overviews of history, philosophy, religion, evolution, and everything else that pops into his mind – all through a clouded lens. Also thrown in, seemingly because no one could stop him, are anecdotal bits about his own family history (the sculptor aunt, his father on board the USS Wren during WWII, etc.), none of which enhance or advance the author's thesis.

And what about that thesis? It gets lost in the many surveys and overviews and in the overwhelming minutiae the author was too undisciplined to wisely excise. Shermer would have us agree with him – and perhaps many readers already do -- that "the arc of the moral universe is long but it bends toward justice," that we are living in "the most moral period in our species' history," and that this "moral progress" results from the development and application of reason and science on our world.

But the author does not carry his argument. He ignores his thesis for pages and when he picks it up again it is only to assert it in conclusory terms. When the going gets really tough, as it does many times but never more dramatically than in his discussion of our treatment of animals, he declares his unexamined, unreasoned, and nonscientific, personal preference and moves on to another subject.

And it seems Shermer brings his trademark rationalizations to the fore here with his discussion of animals and eating meat.

In discussing "A Moral Science of Animal Rights," he states, "At this point I have a confession to make: I am a speciesist -- I eat and wear members of other species. There are few foods I find more pleasurable than a lean cut of meat -- a trip-tip, a tuna or salmon steak, a buffaloburger." Now, understand that the author himself, several hundred pages earlier, defined food animals as “sentient beings” and stated that “the survival and flourishing of sentient beings is [his] starting point, and the fundamental principle of this system of morality.” He is "troubled by" documentary films that show the similarity between factory farms and Auschwitz. But he differentiates them according to the "motivation of the perpetrators," and then defines the "perpetrators" of factory farms as the farmers themselves, whereas a strong case can be made that consumers of factory farmed meats (among them, Shermer himself) are the true perpetrators, without whom the entire enterprise would be abandoned. Are science and reason leading the moral arc toward justice for the billions of such animals living in horrific conditions their entire lives only to be brutally killed at an unnaturally young age? Why was the author not able to discuss this issue with more insight and incisiveness, indeed, with more reason and science? Was giving up that tri-tip too hard to seriously contemplate?

Shermer then relates a story about his own assignment to gas to death lab rats who needed to be "disposed of." He states that "Today the treatment of lab animals is less loathsome," ignoring the ongoing instances of animal abuse in scientific laboratories that prove the contrary. And then he moves on. No reason. No science. No soaring moral arc.

I see this kind of thing time and time again.

You ask a question about how science can answer moral questions and you get a big grab-bag of the latest pop science, usually on the brain, sex, evolution - because they are sexy subjects, with the tacked on conclusion...

Hence morality!

Thus it's moral!

And that's science!


Reviews

I think I'll spend my money elsewhere. Cheers!

 

[angrysoba]

Just to add, I notice that Shermer's book title suggests a possible shift of tone. It is subtitled "How Science and Reason Lead Humanity toward Truth, Justice, and Freedom".

I suppose that the "and reason" part may suggest he is no longer making the strong, and false, claim that Sam Harris does that science determines right and wrong, but the idea that there has been progress towards, well, truth, justice and freedom. Although this is actually disputed by some thinkers, it seems a far more defensible position and one that very few people have had at some point, in one guise or another, from the so-called Whig School of History, to Peter Singer, to Steven Pinker with diversions into Marxism, Anarchism and Francis Fukuyama-style neo-conservativism along the way.

If his argument is similar to that of Singer and Pinker then I have little objection, providing he makes his case well (which I somehow doubt), although that is different from the claims that have been made that science can tell us about normative morality, and certainly not an original thesis.

 

[Dani]

As far as my experience goes, in these debates the whole "science can answer moral questions" is what Dan Dennett would call a deepity. A deepity is a claim that can easily have two interpretations: true, but trivial or earth-shattering, but false.

For some reason some people seem to think that every concept humankind came up with is amenable to empirical inquiry, no matter how said concept is related to the empirical world, if at all. It doesn't matter. "Science will eventually solve this. After all, who is better equipped for such a task than science?" Well, the problem is not exactly who is better equipped. The problem is that science is too rigorous for making stuff up, no matter how vivid it's in your brain and no matter how reasonable that stuff is. If there's not an empirical way, even in principle, to find whatever you're looking for, there's no scientific way to do it (as a reminder for those who might be tempted to defend the wrong side of the "science can answer moral questions" deepity, what you should be looking for is the empirical basis for an objective normative morality).

It's not so much that philosophy is better equipped than science to find moral axioms than the fact that we've come to agree that arriving at any sort of conclusion without at least a potential empirical foundation cannot be a scientific conclusion. It can be philosophical, it can be something more mundane, but it sure isn't science. The concept "philosophy" as we know it today came from a split that gave birth to modern science, which relegated philosophy to the non empirical realm. Some of the misguided arguments that appear again and again in these threads and from the likes of Harris and Shermer seem to amount to "science is the way, we just need to expand the meaning of science to include some philosophy, and voilà". It looks like some people really want to shoehorn science into normative morality to a point that they'd rather redefine science to suit their conclusion. That lack of rigor doesn't seem to have come from science.

Science doesn't tell us which is better or has more value, blue or yellow, Zappa or Miley Cyrus, a human or a virus. You're making the wrong question for such a rigorous enterprise designed to find empirical facts about the world. Please rephrase it properly so we don't have to expect science to make the decision for us. As Dragoonster said, science doesn't give a yarn about any human preference. It's construed in a way that forbids that, by definition.

But let's shed some light on the trivial part of this: if the arguments we've seen so far from the "science can answer moral questions" side were to convince the rest of us that, in fact, science can answer normative moral questions, I'd bet it wouldn't make any difference on how we put that in practice in the real world, The same moral dilemmas that are difficult to solve in a world in which science can't answer moral questions would be equally difficult to solve in a world in which science could. The reason why this would be so is because some principles or axioms that we now call unscientific but use anyway would be called scientific in that alternative world, while all the empirical facts we would need to pursue our goals would be scientifically answerable in exactly the same manner they are today. Yes, the most likely "paradigm shift" I can envision would be entirely semantic, because the alternatives are pure gibberish, and I don't see a "paradigm shift" that throws logic out the window more likely. It's no surprise that broadening the meaning of science is the last piece of land Harris is defending from his Moral Landscape. It's the trivial side of his deepity in his quixotic battle against moral relativism.

 

[Tassman]

Just to add, I notice that Shermer's book title suggests a possible shift of tone. It is subtitled "How Science and Reason Lead Humanity toward Truth, Justice, and Freedom".

I suppose that the "and reason" part may suggest he is no longer making the strong, and false, claim that Sam Harris does that science determines right and wrong, but the idea that there has been progress towards, well, truth, justice and freedom. Although this is actually disputed by some thinkers, it seems a far more defensible position and one that very few people have had at some point, in one guise or another, from the so-called Whig School of History, to Peter Singer, to Steven Pinker with diversions into Marxism, Anarchism and Francis Fukuyama-style neo-conservativism along the way.

If his argument is similar to that of Singer and Pinker then I have little objection, providing he makes his case well (which I somehow doubt), although that is different from the claims that have been made that science can tell us about normative morality, and certainly not an original thesis.

But, yet again, Harris does not make this absolute claim. His argument (as is Shermer’s AFAICT), is that morality arises out of a concern for the well-being of conscious creatures. And this claim is based upon the facts of how we evolved (as explained by science) and how we as conscious beings can flourish.

By “flourish” he seems to mean having all the essentials for survival such as sufficient food, shelter and positive, interactive community living. Given that ALL organisms arose via natural selection it goes without saying that ALL organisms have the natural instinct to survive and flourish. And their behaviour (and rules of behaviour in the case of the higher primates like us) has been based upon these instincts since the dawn of history. If they hadn't been they would not have lived long enough to reproduce.

 

[angrysoba]

But, yet again, Harris does not make this absolute claim. His argument (as is Shermer’s AFAICT), is that morality arises out of a concern for the well-being of conscious creatures. And this claim is based upon the facts of how we evolved (as explained by science) and how we as conscious beings can flourish.

By “flourish” he seems to mean having all the essentials for survival such as sufficient food, shelter and positive, interactive community living. Given that ALL organisms arose via natural selection it goes without saying that ALL organisms have the natural instinct to survive and flourish. And their behaviour (and rules of behaviour in the case of the higher primates like us) has been based upon these instincts since the dawn of history. If they hadn't been they would not have lived long enough to reproduce.

I think it is you who misunderstands Sam Harris.

The rest is word salad.

 

[Tassman]

As far as my experience goes, in these debates the whole "science can answer moral questions" is what Dan Dennett would call a deepity. A deepity is a claim that can easily have two interpretations: true, but trivial or earth-shattering, but false.

For some reason some people seem to think that every concept humankind came up with is amenable to empirical inquiry, no matter how said concept is related to the empirical world, if at all. It doesn't matter. "Science will eventually solve this. After all, who is better equipped for such a task than science?" Well, the problem is not exactly who is better equipped. The problem is that science is too rigorous for making stuff up, no matter how vivid it's in your brain and no matter how reasonable that stuff is. If there's not an empirical way, even in principle, to find whatever you're looking for, there's no scientific way to do it (as a reminder for those who might be tempted to defend the wrong side of the "science can answer moral questions" deepity, what you should be looking for is the empirical basis for an objective normative morality).

It's not so much that philosophy is better equipped than science to find moral axioms than the fact that we've come to agree that arriving at any sort of conclusion without at least a potential empirical foundation cannot be a scientific conclusion. It can be philosophical, it can be something more mundane, but it sure isn't science. The concept "philosophy" as we know it today came from a split that gave birth to modern science, which relegated philosophy to the non empirical realm. Some of the misguided arguments that appear again and again in these threads and from the likes of Harris and Shermer seem to amount to "science is the way, we just need to expand the meaning of science to include some philosophy, and voilà". It looks like some people really want to shoehorn science into normative morality to a point that they'd rather redefine science to suit their conclusion. That lack of rigor doesn't seem to have come from science.

Science has always included philosophy as a part of its reasoning process. But philosophy alone cannot satisfactorily answer the questions it asks because it does not have the means to test its conclusions. Science does.

Science doesn't tell us which is better or has more value, blue or yellow, Zappa or Miley Cyrus, a human or a virus. You're making the wrong question for such a rigorous enterprise designed to find empirical facts about the world. Please rephrase it properly so we don't have to expect science to make the decision for us. As Dragoonster said, science doesn't give a yarn about any human preference. It's construed in a way that forbids that, by definition.

Actually science is potentially in a position to tell you why certain things are preferred over and above other things. There have been considerable advances by cognitive neuroscientists, neuropharmacologists and neuroanatomists regarding why we make the choices we do and prefer one thing over another. Are you suggesting that philosophy is better equipped to do this? Please explain. How does philosophy tell you about human preference?

But let's shed some light on the trivial part of this: if the arguments we've seen so far from the "science can answer moral questions" side were to convince the rest of us that, in fact, science can answer normative moral questions, I'd bet it wouldn't make any difference on how we put that in practice in the real world, The same moral dilemmas that are difficult to solve in a world in which science can't answer moral questions would be equally difficult to solve in a world in which science could. The reason why this would be so is because some principles or axioms that we now call unscientific but use anyway would be called scientific in that alternative world,while all the empirical facts we would need to pursue our goals would be scientifically answerable in exactly the same manner they are today. Yes, the most likely "paradigm shift" I can envision would be entirely semantic, because the alternatives are pure gibberish, and I don't see a "paradigm shift" that throws logic out the window more likely. It's no surprise that broadening the meaning of science is the last piece of land Harris is defending from his Moral Landscape. It's the trivial side of his deepity in his quixotic battle against moral relativism.

The difference would be that the scientific answers to moral questions would be testable whereas, to quote you: “the principles or axioms that we now call unscientific” are not – for the very reason that they are not scientific.

I think it is you who misunderstands Sam Harris.

The rest is word salad.

Can’t answer huh!

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Science has always included philosophy as a part of its reasoning process.

While this is true to a very limited extent, your point is meaningless unless you think that philosophy is a subset of science, not a discipline which overlaps it slightly.

But philosophy alone cannot satisfactorily answer the questions it asks because it does not have the means to test its conclusions. Science does.

As has been repeatedly explained to you, absolutely nobody at any stage has ever said anything different. You keep repeating this nonsensical sound bite as if it were an argument.

Actually science is potentially in a position to tell you why certain things are preferred over and above other things. There have been considerable advances by cognitive neuroscientists, neuropharmacologists and neuroanatomists regarding why we make the choices we do and prefer one thing over another. Are you suggesting that philosophy is better equipped to do this? Please explain. How does philosophy tell you about human preference?

Science can tell you exactly what is going on in your brain when you post things like this. However science cannot by doing so tell whether you are making a logically sound argument or a fallacious one. You need philosophy for that.

The difference would be that the scientific answers to moral questions would be testable

No they wouldn't. The factual claims which underly the answer would be testable but the answer would not be.

 

[angrysoba]

Can’t answer huh!

Can't answer what?

You didn't ask a question.

What I find bizarre about your position is that if you are going to make everything about survival, and that which is moral is that which promotes survival then you end up with the silly conclusion that cockroaches are moral creatures, whereas the dodo was not.

Could you explain why it is that that which promotes survival is that which is moral?

 

[Tassman]

While this is true to a very limited extent, your point is meaningless unless you think that philosophy is a subset of science, not a discipline which overlaps it slightly.

My comment was not intended to stand alone. It was specifically in response to Dani’s sarcastic remark: “science is the way; we just need to expand the meaning of science to include some philosophy, and voilà".

As has been repeatedly explained to you, absolutely nobody at any stage has ever said anything different. You keep repeating this nonsensical sound bite as if it were an argument.

And has been repeatedly explained to you the argument is that a testable scientific hypothesis is preferable to an untestable philosophical premise. Because, while neither is necessarily foundationally true, science is better able to test its hypotheses and thus avoid the errors of say, Aristotle’s arguments based upon his untested premise of the four basic elements.

Science can tell you exactly what is going on in your brain when you post things like this. However science cannot by doing so tell whether you are making a logically sound argument or a fallacious one. You need philosophy for that.

Logic merely provides the glue that supports the scientific arguments and it can do this by ensuring self-consistency and the avoidance of false inferences. But philosophy alone cannot uncover new truths. So, while philosophy is a useful tool, it can do no more than reformulate the existing truths contained in science’s theories and laws. It is of limited application.

No they wouldn't. The factual claims which underly the answer would be testable but the answer would not be.

It amounts to the same thing. It’s the testable factual claims underlying such an answer which determine whether or not the answer is correct.

 

[angrysoba]

Whether science is about testing hypotheses whereas philosophy is not is neither here nor there if science makes no value claims, such as that this action is better than that action.

 

[Tassman]

Can't answer what?

You didn't ask a question.

You didn't respond to the argument.

What I find bizarre about your position is that if you are going to make everything about survival, and that which is moral is that which promotes survival then you end up with the silly conclusion that cockroaches are moral creatures, whereas the dodo was not.

Are you suggesting that cockroaches have less inherent worth than Dodo’s – based upon what moral philosophical argument?

Could you explain why it is that that which promotes survival is that which is moral?

See above #404. In brief, the prime instinct of survival has been, from the very beginning, what determines our codes of right and wrong behaviour - in short our morality is geared towards this end as social animals. Or do you think differently - that morality exists in its own right apart from our naturally selected instincts?

Whether science is about testing hypotheses whereas philosophy is not is neither here nor there if science makes no value claims, such as that this action is better than that action.

On what basis does philosophy make value claims?

 

[angrysoba]

What a bizarre hodgepodge of questions. As for cockroaches and dodos they don't have morality any more than they do literary flair. As for the argument, your argument is incoherent. Our capacity to make moral judgements evolved, obviously, but that does not mean that science tells us whether Action X is a moral action. Philosophy does not make value claims, rather philosophy is about asking what is valuable and why. Science is not.

 

[angrysoba]

You may as well be asking why we can't call carpenters brain surgeons. You can if you like, but that won't make any difference to the world.

 

[tsig]

What a bizarre hodgepodge of questions. As for cockroaches and dodos they don't have morality any more than they do literary flair. As for the argument, your argument is incoherent. Our capacity to make moral judgements evolved, obviously, but that does not mean that science tells us whether Action X is a moral action. Philosophy does not make value claims, rather philosophy is about asking what is valuable and why. Science is not.

In order to ask what is valuable you have to have already made a value claim as to what value is.

 

[Dani]

Science has always included philosophy as a part of its reasoning process.

Epistemic principles, yes. They frame the means by which science is done. Moral principles, since when? They're not epistemic. They don't frame the means by which we acquire knowledge. They frame goals.

But philosophy alone cannot satisfactorily answer the questions it asks because it does not have the means to test its conclusions. Science does.

Well, if that means that you first state the principle philosophically and then proceed to do the science to inform you of the better ways to achieve that principle, there's no disagreement. But if that means that this process is entirely scientific, then you're broadening the meaning of science to be able to say that "science can answer normative moral questions". It's just a semantic game to make a big claim. A deepity. I'm still not sure what you're defending because your arguments are ambiguous, so which is it?

Actually science is potentially in a position to tell you why certain things are preferred over and above other things. There have been considerable advances by cognitive neuroscientists, neuropharmacologists and neuroanatomists regarding why we make the choices we do and prefer one thing over another. Are you suggesting that philosophy is better equipped to do this? Please explain. How does philosophy tell you about human preference?

Take a look again at the bit you highlighted from my post. If your response is an objection to that part, we would observe an inconsistency between your argument and that part of the quote. But there is no inconsistency. You can state that highlighted part as true and then proceed to enumerate some of the considerable advances in different areas of science, as you did in your response. So are you agreeing or disagreeing? And if you are disagreeing, can you elaborate on your objection?

The difference would be that the scientific answers to moral questions would be testable whereas, to quote you: “the principles or axioms that we now call unscientific” are not – for the very reason that they are not scientific.

Well, my point exactly is that just demanding us to accept a broadened redefinition of the scientific method to include a moral axiom within it (special pleading) would only lead to a trivial semantic shift (that is, if we were to be convinced by such fallacious argument). It wouldn't improve our objective knowledge of the world, because that's just naming things differently.

The alternative way to try to convince us is through devising an experiment by which we could empirically distinguish right normative moral claims from wrong ones. That's the alternative I was describing as gibberish, but if you think you have an argument for that, please go ahead.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

My comment was not intended to stand alone. It was specifically in response to Dani’s sarcastic remark: “science is the way; we just need to expand the meaning of science to include some philosophy, and voilà".

Exactly. Although you don't exactly have a consistent position, one position you retreat to at your convenience is to say that science can solve moral problems, but only if you import moral philosophy into science and call it science. Defending this by pointing out that there is a teensy bit of overlap between science and philosophy is a silly argument unless you think that Kant and Singer are doing science.

Like all of your positions, once explicated it is trivial. Everybody knows that you can generate answers to moral problems using a combination of science and moral philosophy, because it's exactly what we already do.

And has been repeatedly explained to you the argument is that a testable scientific hypothesis is preferable to an untestable philosophical premise.

A: "I can define the location of a point in two dimensional space using only the x axis!".
B: "No, you can't, it's impossible".
A: "But if it's impossible, how can anyone ever define the location of a point in two dimensional space? By using a y axis? Ha ha ha! That's stupid!".
B: "Well, yes, using a y axis is in fact the only possible way to do that".
A: "Ha ha ha! That's even stupider! You think you can define the location of a point in two dimensional space using only the y axis? What kind of moron are you?".
B: "No... you need both axes. You can't do without either. This is not news to anyone."
A: "Well, maybe we have to use a tiny bit of y axis. But I think everyone agrees that the x axis is preferable, so my initial claim is still true."

It amounts to the same thing. It’s the testable factual claims underlying such an answer which determine whether or not the answer is correct.

"It amounts to the same thing! It's the x axis that determines the point's location in two dimensional space!".

 

[Tassman]

What a bizarre hodgepodge of questions.

…in response to a “bizarre hodgepodge” of assertions!

As for cockroaches and dodos they don't have morality any more than they do literary flair.

Obviously equating mere ‘survival’ with ‘morality’ is incorrect. I agree. This was a, typically, distorted misrepresentation of the argument – not the argument itself.

As for the argument, your argument is incoherent. Our capacity to make moral judgements evolved, obviously, but that does not mean that science tells us whether Action X is a moral action.

And you think philosophy can?

Our capacity to make moral judgements evolved certainly and so did our capacity to determine “good and bad behaviour” (i.e. morality) in the context of what best enables the survival of the species. Where else would our moral code come from - thin air? Some Platonic heaven of perfect abstract forms??

It is science, not philosophy, tells us what’s required to survive and the survival instinct is the foundation from which our morality arises. Why else would we have rules of behaviour if not to enhance the social cohesion required by us as a social species?

As for the “descriptive” and “prescriptive” argument this is really a semantic issue deriving from the days of gods laying down rules about right and wrong. As per Harris’ example: To say we “should” follow some of these paths and avoid others is just a way of saying that some lead to happiness and others to misery. “You shouldn't lie” (prescriptive) is synonymous with “Lying needlessly complicates people’s lives, destroys reputations, and undermines trust” (descriptive).

Philosophy does not make value claims, rather philosophy is about asking what is valuable and why. Science is not.

The “why” it is valuable can only be properly answered by science. See above.

The only real alternatives are religious prescriptions based upon divine revelation – many erroneously believe this is the only basis of true morality. Whereas others cite Natural Law, namely the use of reason to analyse human nature and arrive at universal moral truths. But without a true premise, which is only obtainable via science, no amount of pure reasoning can arrive at a certain true conclusion.

In order to ask what is valuable you have to have already made a value claim as to what value is.

Precisely!

 

[Tassman]

Exactly. Although you don't exactly have a consistent position, one position you retreat to at your convenience is to say that science can solve moral problems, but only if you import moral philosophy into science and call it science. Defending this by pointing out that there is a teensy bit of overlap between science and philosophy is a silly argument unless you think that Kant and Singer are doing science.

Like all of your positions, once explicated it is trivial. Everybody knows that you can generate answers to moral problems using a combination of science and moral philosophy, because it's exactly what we already do.



A: "I can define the location of a point in two dimensional space using only the x axis!".
B: "No, you can't, it's impossible".
A: "But if it's impossible, how can anyone ever define the location of a point in two dimensional space? By using a y axis? Ha ha ha! That's stupid!".
B: "Well, yes, using a y axis is in fact the only possible way to do that".
A: "Ha ha ha! That's even stupider! You think you can define the location of a point in two dimensional space using only the y axis? What kind of moron are you?".
B: "No... you need both axes. You can't do without either. This is not news to anyone."
A: "Well, maybe we have to use a tiny bit of y axis. But I think everyone agrees that the x axis is preferable, so my initial claim is still true."



"It amounts to the same thing! It's the x axis that determines the point's location in two dimensional space!".

Poor Kevin, you’re choking on your own cleverness.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Poor Kevin, you’re choking on your own cleverness.

Well, someone's choked.

 

[Tassman]

Epistemic principles, yes. They frame the means by which science is done. Moral principles, since when? They're not epistemic. They don't frame the means by which we acquire knowledge. They frame goals.



Well, if that means that you first state the principle philosophically and then proceed to do the science to inform you of the better ways to achieve that principle, there's no disagreement. But if that means that this process is entirely scientific, then you're broadening the meaning of science to be able to say that "science can answer normative moral questions". It's just a semantic game to make a big claim. A deepity. I'm still not sure what you're defending because your arguments are ambiguous, so which is it?





Take a look again at the bit you highlighted from my post. If your response is an objection to that part, we would observe an inconsistency between your argument and that part of the quote. But there is no inconsistency. You can state that highlighted part as true and then proceed to enumerate some of the considerable advances in different areas of science, as you did in your response. So are you agreeing or disagreeing? And if you are disagreeing, can you elaborate on your objection?




Well, my point exactly is that just demanding us to accept a broadened redefinition of the scientific method to include a moral axiom within it (special pleading) would only lead to a trivial semantic shift (that is, if we were to be convinced by such fallacious argument). It wouldn't improve our objective knowledge of the world, because that's just naming things differently.

The alternative way to try to convince us is through devising an experiment by which we could empirically distinguish right normative moral claims from wrong ones. That's the alternative I was describing as gibberish, but if you think you have an argument for that, please go ahead.

You seem to be getting confused. The argument is really very simple. Neither philosophy nor science can establish foundationally true premises or hypothesis upon which to arrive at a true conclusion - whether that conclusion be a normative moral claim or anything else. This has consistently been my position all along.

But, that said, science is in a far better position than philosophy to establish reliable premises because, unlike philosophy, it can test them and thus eliminate such fanciful notions as say, Aristotle’s “four elements” upon which the constitution and fundamental powers of everything were supposedly based.

Therefore, on this basis, whilst recognizing the importance of philosophy in science to ensure self-consistency, and help prevent errors of false inference, philosophy alone cannot generate new, testable truths about nature whereas science can. Hence, science is the senior discipline whilst philosophy is its, albeit important, handmaiden.