Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[Earthborn]

It generally boils down to "But this stuff is obvious!"

Of course it's obvious. How could it be otherwise?

I didn't say it is obvious. My point can be more accurately summarised by "But this stuff obviously isn't (universal)." How can someone for example claim that it is a "human universal" that "men are more prone to lethal violence" when most men under most circumstances are not at all prone to lethal violence?

But when you really consider it, especially considering what's excluded, it turns out to be quite powerful.

Can you give an example of something that is excluded? It seems to me that whoever made that list tried to include pretty much everything including vagaries, prejudices, contradictions, and stuff that is not "universal" in any shape or form.

 

[Piscivore]

It's a hypothetical situation where misery is maximized. It's a thought experiment

Ah, so "completely imaginary", "tailored to reflect the outcome he likes", and "no relation to reality". This is meaningful... why?

to plant one end of 'well being' in the worst place possible.*

*Edit: One way to think of it would be if the entire planet was like the worst failed state in Africa.

That's just what some people consider "the worse place possible". Beleive it or not, some people do quite well for themselves in those situations, to the point of making sure the situation does not change.

How does he propose that "science" is going to determine what "the worse place possible" is?

Then he says: And once you acknowledge that there is a range of better places to be, it becomes possible to make objective decisions about how to proceed toward better.

That just takes us back to "science can help us get what we value, but it can never tell us what we ought to value."

Except it is more factually accurate to replace "acknowledge" with "decide".

 

[Piggy]

Isn't this assuming that food - or perhaps more abstractly - survival is an intrinsic good?

Nope. It's assuming that people are evolved to crave food and to want to survive. Which is not even an assumption, since it's amply attested to by evidence.

I'll post more when I get back, but I can't emphasize this point enough: A sci-bio approach entirely dispenses with notions like intrinsic good, just like relativity entirely dispenses with the cosmic ether (and for the same reason).

 

[Kuko 4000]

Just thinking aloud for a moment, please correct me if there's any obvious mistakes here.


Example of morality:

I'm pointing a gun at my friend's head.

He will die if I pull the trigger.

He will stay alive if I will NOT pull the trigger.

This is the way things are = IS.​

Going purely by "IS" (the way things are), there is no right or wrong, or better or worse, answer to the question: Should I pull the trigger?

If the aim is to kill my friend, I should pull the trigger.

If the aim is to NOT kill my friend, I should NOT pull the trigger.

The correct action to take to reach the desired outcome = SHOULD / OUGHT.​

Example of science:

Scientist are programming a manned space shuttle.

Using math and physics gets the manned space shuttle to the Moon.

Using random guessing gets the manned space shuttle to some random place.

This is the way things are = IS.​

Going purely by "IS" (the way things are), there is no right or wrong, or better or worse, answer to the question: Should I choose math and physics over random guessing?


It is only when we say that we want this or that to happen can we choose rationally from these two options. By itself, choosing to go with science has no greater intrinsic value compared to random guessing, just as with the example of morality. The point I think Harris is making here is that many people seem to require higher (and as we can see from the examples above, impossible) standards from the science of morality than from the science of physics, for example. In this light, the whole IS / OUGHT problem seems meaningless to me.

I could be wrong about his intentions, but I enjoy thinking and talking about these things (much more than writing about them), and would appreciate any specific reading tips about morality and ethics, not just "read philosopher X or Y". In any case, whether he is wrong or right about anything, I think it's great that someone speaks so visibly and openly about cultural relativism and the problems that come with it. I hope this will at least increase the public discussion about these important issues.

 

[Piggy]

I find it mind-boggling that a couple folks here can't seem to understand what an intrinsic good is, and why one chosen as such will never be scientifically validated.

For the same reason that some folks can't seem to understand what the cosmic ether is. Which, btw, will also never be scientifically validated.

 

[Piggy]

How can someone for example claim that it is a "human universal" that "men are more prone to lethal violence" when most men under most circumstances are not at all prone to lethal violence?

Well, for precisely the same reason that we can say that men are more prone to die from prostate cancer than women are, even though most men will not die from prostate cancer.

 

[Piggy]

Can you give an example of something that is excluded? It seems to me that whoever made that list tried to include pretty much everything including vagaries, prejudices, contradictions, and stuff that is not "universal" in any shape or form.

These are universals of human cultures. They are features of all known societies. Which includes all sorts of stuff, including prejudices.

Because these universals are found in all societies, they are considered to arise from our biology, rather than our cultural differences.

This does not mean that every individual exhibits each universal at all times, however.

And we learn as much from what's missing as from what's there.

Conservative and liberal politics, for example, are absent. (Although some form of that division may turn out to be a universal, if recent studies are any indication.)

So is base-ten math, interestingly. (The Sora, it was recently discovered, have a hybrid base-12 and base-20 system -- their word for 93 is "four-twenty twelve-one".)

The list is a continual work-in-progress, and its expansion and clarification will give us increasing insights into what "universal human nature" is, and what it is not.

 

[Piggy]

Ah, so "completely imaginary", "tailored to reflect the outcome he likes", and "no relation to reality". This is meaningful... why?

For the same reason that Einstein's infinite elevator is useful.

 

[AlBell]

Nope. It's assuming that people are evolved to crave food and to want to survive. Which is not even an assumption, since it's amply attested to by evidence.

"Survival" is an intrinsic good; food an instrumental good needed to do so.

I'll post more when I get back, but I can't emphasize this point enough: A sci-bio approach entirely dispenses with notions like intrinsic good, just like relativity entirely dispenses with the cosmic ether (and for the same reason).

You may eventually discover, and admit, you are wrong.

The relationship of cosmic aether and relativity are irrelevant.

 

[amused]

How does he propose that "science" is going to determine what "the worse place possible" is?

That's not the point. The point is that there *could* be a situation where misery is maximized for everyone. His hypothesis then, is that there would be objective ways to decide how to move toward better. Which, he is asserting, can be applied to any situation where there is *any* misery.

He's attempting to establish a Science of Morality from the ground up. There are likely to be some false starts. One goal is to provide an alternative to religion as a basis for morality.

 

[Piggy]

"Survival" is an intrinsic good

The only reason "survival" is important to this question is because we are hard-wired (if we're neurologically normal) with a very strong desire to survive.

For people with severe depression, however, that desire can be severely or entirely muted, and this changes everything about their lives.

If we were to build a conscious robot, but didn't explicitly build a survival urge into it, presumably it wouldn't care at all whether it kept running or were shut off and scrapped.

You notice how the abstract notion of "good" never enters into the picture here? That's because it doesn't have to.

Calling survival an "intrinsic good" is certainly something you can do if you're interested in abstract philosophy, but if you're using a sci-bio approach to morality, that step is completely superfluous.

That's why I compare it to the cosmic ether, another concept which, in a worldview informed by relativity, is entirely superfluous and therefore dispensed with altogether as useless.

We simply don't need it, so we discard it.

 

[Dani]

Sorry for the delay.

But it always ends up at biology because we are our biology. Biology underlies our cultural evolution (if we were different animals, it would be different as well) and the choices we tend to make.

And this doesn't bring light to an objective morality.

Q: Why do we prefer what we prefer?

A: Because we're people, not cats, dolphins, stonefish, eagles, or marmots.

The question is "what do we prefer" not "why do we prefer what we prefer"? Science can explain the variety of answers to the first question, but can't tell us objectively "what do we prefer" to any moral question.

What makes you think that we are free to do that? Why do you believe that "we" set those preferences?

I didn't imply that and it's irrelevant. What makes you think that you are free to think the way you do? Irrelevant.

 

[AlBell]

You notice how the abstract notion of "good" never enters into the picture here? That's because it doesn't have to.

Say what? Intrinsic means 'of the thing in itself', that is has value in and of itself.

Calling survival an "intrinsic good" is certainly something you can do if you're interested in abstract philosophy, but if you're using a sci-bio approach to morality, that step is completely superfluous.

Note that it was a choice, and you don't complain because it's your choice also, but does it actually have intrinsic value?

Is survival an intrinsic good for an 8 1/2 month fetus? A 4-month-at-birth baby?
You, 85, in pain, and on the heart-lung machine?

We simply don't need it, so we discard it.

At the moment you seem to think so.

 

[Piscivore]

That's not the point. The point is that there *could* be a situation where misery is maximized for everyone.

That's what he imagines, but that doesn't make it so. Humans are adaptive and occasionally ruthess female-progenitor-copulators. No matter how "bad" the misery, some of them will find a way to adapt. If he's got some kind of science showing otherwise, he needs to show it, otherwise he's just arguing from assertion.

This characteristic of humans is one of the reasons I stopped believing in Hell, incidentally.

His hypothesis then, is that there would be objective ways to decide how to move toward better. Which, he is asserting, can be applied to any situation where there is *any* misery.

And this is true, even without postulating some imaginary baseline "worst". Another characteristic of humans is that no matter how good someone has it, quite a lot of them are never going to be satisfied... there will always be a "better".

And yes, while there is something science can say about how to get to "better", there still isn't anything for science to say about what "better" should be.

He's attempting to establish a Science of Morality from the ground up. There are likely to be some false starts.

Unless the nature of science chages dramatically, there cannot be anything else.

One goal is to provide an alternative to religion as a basis for morality.

There are plenty. Humanism is one. Personal enrichment is a popular one. Good old-fashioned tribalism is probably the biggest, and arguably the one that underlies most "religious" foundations of morality.

 

[Earthborn]

Well, for precisely the same reason that we can say that men are more prone to die from prostate cancer than women are, even though most men will not die from prostate cancer.

I don't think anyone has ever claimed that it is a human universal "to die of prostate cancer". And one cannot claim that it is a human universal "for men to be more prone to die of prostate cancer" either, because such a statement explicitly denies universality.

These are universals of human cultures. They are features of all known societies.

Except of course for the ones that don't. Genderqueer, transgender and some feminist groups for example do not use "sex (gender) terminology" that is "fundamentally binary". Communities of prosopagnosics do not use facial recognition. A group of left handed people does not have "right-handedness as a population norm".

Even if there is anything on that list that no society has ever lacked, all I need to do make it non-universal is to assemble a group of people who are willing to join me in not doing that thing. "Hey guys, let's not use colour words for black and white. Let's just call it "bright grey" and "dark grey", and suddenly it is no longer a feature of all known societies.

That's because concepts such as "society" and "culture" are not bounded concepts where there is an identifiable demarcation between one society or culture and another. Any group of people is a society, any learnt behaviour shared among them is a culture, and a person can belong to many of them at once. If you want to claim that something is "universal" to all cultures, you will have to show that it is also universal to every subculture, because all cultures have subcultures, and all subcultures are themselves cultures. Since the smallest possible culture is shared among two individuals, any claim that about universality among all cultures has to be a claim of universality in individuals.

Because these universals are found in all societies, they are considered to arise from our biology, rather than our cultural differences.

Why not consider the possibility that it arises from our common cultural heritage? Memes can have a lot of staying power, and can often spread more effectively than our biological traits.

The list is a continual work-in-progress, and its expansion and clarification will give us increasing insights into what "universal human nature" is, and what it is not.

What it is not: a meaningful scientifically definable term. What it is: a sky-hook to hang one's moral philosophy on.

 

[Beth]

Nope. It's assuming that people are evolved to crave food and to want to survive. Which is not even an assumption, since it's amply attested to by evidence.

Um...how does this statement, which I agree with BTW, indicate that you are not assuming that survival and/or food are intrinsic goods?

I'll post more when I get back, but I can't emphasize this point enough: A sci-bio approach entirely dispenses with notions like intrinsic good, just like relativity entirely dispenses with the cosmic ether (and for the same reason).

I don't see this analogy as being very applicable to the idea of intrinsic goods.

"Survival" is an intrinsic good; food an instrumental good needed to do so.

Food can be either. Meeting our basic nutritional needs is an instrumental good relative to survival. Cherry cheesecake and chocolate ice cream, OTOH, are intrinsic goods.

The only reason "survival" is important to this question is because we are hard-wired (if we're neurologically normal) with a very strong desire to survive.

For people with severe depression, however, that desire can be severely or entirely muted, and this changes everything about their lives.

Right. So even something as basic as survival cannot be considered as a universal 'intrinsic good'. It's value is dependent on the individual. Which I think is the whole point of the exercise in defining intrinsic goods and instrumental goods. I think science can be really helpful in figuring out what human beings, on the whole, consider intrinsically valuable, which I think is what you are talking about.

You notice how the abstract notion of "good" never enters into the picture here? That's because it doesn't have to.

Calling survival an "intrinsic good" is certainly something you can do if you're interested in abstract philosophy, but if you're using a sci-bio approach to morality, that step is completely superfluous.

You've settled on something noncontroversial like survival as being the intrinsic good you are wish to obtain. That is not the same as superfluous. Avoiding calling it by the name "intrinsic good" doesn't mean you bypassed the step of defining what an intrinsic good is for the approach being proposed.

I can avoid multiplication by just adding numbers up repeatedly. That doesn't make multiplication superfluous.

That's why I compare it to the cosmic ether, another concept which, in a worldview informed by relativity, is entirely superfluous and therefore dispensed with altogether as useless.We simply don't need it, so we discard it.

I suspect that the concept of intrinsic good is as fundamental to an ethical system as the concept of numbers are to mathematics. But I'm not a philosopher. That's just my impression.

 

[amused]

And yes, while there is something science can say about how to get to "better", there still isn't anything for science to say about what "better" should be.

That's what he is arguing, that science can say something about what "better" should be. He's doing so by proposing that science can point toward a direction along a range of possible shoulds, rather than saying that science will be able to precisely pinpoint one particular should.

He uses this photo as an example:

He's arguing that we can use science to measure the difference in well being between those two extremes, determine the direction of movement from the lefthand situation toward "better", and objectively measure when we've arrived at "better" in comparison to the situation shown in the lefthand picture.

His TED talk is pretty much the same as the long video above, but done in 18 minutes:

Sam Harris at TED

 

[Dani]

The issue is simply that we come to different (superior) conclusions when we apply science to moral questions than when we do not.

And that's at the heart of Harris's claim that the wall of separation is illusory, just as the wall between science and religion is illusory.

In answer to the first sentence: isn't it obvious? I don't think there's much disagreement about that.

In answer to the second sentence: no, the wall of separation is not illusory, and Harris himself acknowledges the fact that science is not able to answer every moral question. Who does answer those questions then?

Again, I think Harris is arguing against a strawman or making an incoherent discourse. Maybe both. He seems to be worried that we don't judge the taliban morality as, let's say, inconvenient. Well, surprise... I do, and I'm using my own moral judgements (values) and a rational (facts) approach to come to my conclusion about the taliban morality. He's worried about the distinction between values and facts, and it looks like he thinks this distinction leads to extreme moral relativism. Well, it doesn't.

When we examine facts about the world, we assume that there's an absolute truth (reality) and we make science to arrive at scientific truths. We know, by the Law of excluded middle that either a proposition or its negation has a correspondence with the absolute truth (with reality) and we know that between two rivaling theories, not more than one can be true. It seems obvious to me that a value judgement doesn't make a description of reality, and therefore isn't scientifically wrong unless there are some assumptions that imply facts that are scientifically testable. Many times, from a scientific point of view, value judgements can be proven wrong, and that's because we usually deal with a certain amount of facts when we make the judgement. It's the facts, not the values, what we can scientifcally examine as corresponding with the objective truth.

 

[AlBell]

[qimg]http://i18.photobucket.com/albums/b113/tomwood2/online/samharrisrange.png[/qimg]

He's arguing that we can use science to measure the difference in well being between those two extremes, determine the direction of movement toward "better", and objectively measure when we've arrived at "better" in comparison to the situation shown in the lefthand picture.

How did he decide the righthand picture is "better"?

The woman/child to the left -- and a fair number of other people -- could well disagree.

 

[fls]

Whoah, he actually said that?

I was referring to this:

"One of my critics put the concern this way: “Why should human wellbeing matter to us?” Well, why should logical coherence matter to us? Why should historical veracity matter to us? Why should experimental evidence matter to us? These are profound and profoundly stupid questions. No framework of knowledge can withstand such skepticism, for none is perfectly self-justifying. Without being able to stand entirely outside of a framework, one is always open to the charge that the framework rests on nothing, that its axioms are wrong, or that there are foundational questions it cannot answer. So what? Science and rationality generally are based on intuitions and concepts that cannot be reduced or justified."

As another example (not said by Harris, but an example of what I'm referring to), the "problem of induction" is treated as though it represents a serious threat to any claim we may make about knowledge which is the product of science.

The idea philosophy is incapable of recognizing the usefulness of science is just so *********** bizarre that I struggle to see how anyone who knew anything about it could make such a claim.

Well, to be honest, I've felt much the same way when anyone mentions the "problem of induction".

Also, I think I must have said a few times now that coherent moral claims require facts and value judgments, whereas science is solely concerned with facts. So complaining that philosophers worry about logical coherence and facts when they are doing moral philosophy is completely specious. You cannot approach the subject any other way, whatever idiocy Harris is coming up with.

Actually, I was complaining that philosophers seemed overly concerned with logical coherence, given that your only reference to the use of facts was to provide starting premises for a chain of fallacy-free inductions/deductions. And we seemed to be in agreement that this was a fairly hopeless exercise. My point was that the process of science, which doesn't treat facts only as starting premises (nor does it distinguish between different kinds of information a priori), seemed a more robust method to approach problems any more complicated than the formation of a system of arithmetic.

There's just a teensy problem there: You can't do that. You can't get to ought statements from empirical statements.

Fortunately, this would become irrelevant, as ought statements would no longer be necessary or even all that useful.

If you want to make any moral claims at all, they have to start from value judgments.

It's the only strategy there is for this particular problem, so that's just tough.

This appears to me to be a total non sequitur. The only ways I can make sense of it are by assuming you know absolutely nothing about science, or by assuming you think I know absolutely nothing about science.

Well, I just can't tell what you were describing with this:

"The only way forward anyone has ever found is to try to construct consistent systems of thought that start with clearly-stated, non-factual ought statements and reason forward from there. They perform a function a bit like axioms do in mathematics. They are convenient starting points arrived at purely by fiat, and we judge them on the basis of whether or not they lead somewhere useful."

It doesn't really sound like science to me, but on the other hand, it does kinda sound like something a philosopher might say about science. You are free to presume I know nothing about science if it means you'll answer my question.

Linda