Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[Piggy]

While this is true, by the same token if wishes were fishes we'd all cast nets, and if your auntie had balls she'd be your uncle.

You have still not replied to any of the polite requests for you to explicate how you get from a series of "is" statements to an "ought" statement. You clearly believe that there are some meaningful "ought" statements to observe, but how do you get to them?

Merely asserting that it is so obvious to you than you cannot explain it is not an argument, it's a cop-out.

Then perhaps we should walk through an example?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Then perhaps we should walk through an example?

Feel free.

 

[Kuko 4000]

This should be interesting:

Length: 1 hour 47 minutes.

On Oct. 7, 2010, the Center for Inquiry in New York City hosted Sam Harris for a public lecture about his new book, "The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values." The event was held at the New York Society for Ethical Culture. This is the full video, including both the talk and question-and-answer session.

In "The Moral Landscape," Harris argues against the notion that good and evil, and right and wrong, are unanswerable by science. Harris posits that science can -- and should -- be an authority on moral issues, shaping human values and setting out what constitutes a good life.

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

Been done upthread.

When men force women to wear burkas, they are giving themselves power and freedom not granted to women, and they are constraining their liberty in a very basic way, and indirectly removing a great deal of control over their reproductive choices.

Science tells us that human beings don't much care for unequal power arrangements maintained by force, don't enjoy having their freedom restricted, don't enjoy being forced into a lower social status, and that women especially want to have control over their reproductive choices.

The Old Book says that this arrangement is justified.

A scientifically-informed morality finds no justification for it.

By definition all unequal power relationships are maintained by the threat or display of force or sanction. Do you think the other male gorillas or lions are content that they're not the alpha male? Is the existence of mods on this forum immoral because members whine about them sometimes?

One could make an argument based on science that giving women more power has resulted in the breakdown of the family in the West.

<snip>

Science, however, reveals that the differences among us are superficial. Basically, we're all the same.

<snip>

In your world science does that. In mine science is probing ever deeper into our biology to determine the differences between individuals which result in some developing breast cancer, heart disease, ADHD, Autism, etc..

 

[Roboramma]

Been done upthread.

When men force women to wear burkas, they are giving themselves power and freedom not granted to women, and they are constraining their liberty in a very basic way, and indirectly removing a great deal of control over their reproductive choices.

Science tells us that human beings don't much care for unequal power arrangements maintained by force, don't enjoy having their freedom restricted, don't enjoy being forced into a lower social status, and that women especially want to have control over their reproductive choices.

The Old Book says that this arrangement is justified.

A scientifically-informed morality finds no justification for it.

No, your characterization of science* only shows that women don't want to wear burkas, not that their wearing of burkas is wrong.

How do you go from there to show that what people don't like is wrong?

* I word it like this only because I don't necessarily accept that the facts you present are accurate, but don't want to get into that.

 

[Beth]

It depends on the questions.

From the point of view of someone who still clings to the theory of the cosmic ether, straightforward answers from an adherent of relativity will seem nonsensical.

At this point, I've explained my position well enough that it should be perfectly intelligible.

So I'm done explaining, unless I'm asked to explain.

If you continue posing questions to me which come from the point of view of someone who feels that the issue of intrinsic and instrumental good is a necessary step in approaching moral decisions -- despite the fact that I've amply explained why a bio-sci approach can dispense with such concerns -- then you're going to get answers back which will make no sense from your frame of reference.

If you want to return to the fundamental issue of why your supposed requirement is superfluous, we can go there, too.

Could you summarize your argument for me? Because I don't follow your previous posts about how you can get by without defining an intrinsic good at some point.

 

[fls]

I'll try taking a new tack, and see if that explains the point better. The point hasn't changed though, so please bear that in mind.

Philosophers are very much concerned with watertight, inescapable conclusions. That's why all of the logical fallacies they have canonical names for are fallacies: because the premises in a fallacious argument do not inescapably lead to the conclusion.

An appeal to authority is a fallacious argument not because authorities are necessarily wrong - often, very often in some cases, authorities are right. It is fallacious because it does not inescapably lead to a correct conclusion, because every now and then authorities are wrong.

In moral philosophy fallacies like the naturalistic fallacy, one Piggy falls into gleefully, are again fallacious because they do not lead inescapably to consistent or useful conclusions. It's natural for people to not want to be tortured, and almost every useful and consistent moral philosophy will say that torture is immoral a lot of the time or all of the time, but it's also natural for people to want to rape, rob, beat, murder, torture and enslave. So just because it's natural for people to want something does not get you inescapably to the conclusion that it's morally right for them to do what they want or get what they want.

I understand that philosophers are concerned with these things. But as Harris points out, by this standard, philosophy is incapable of recognizing the usefulness of something so demonstrably useful as science. It's not a matter of explaining why philosophy is interested in logical coherence, it's a matter of explaining why we should only be interested in logical coherence given that it doesn't reflect how we answer important questions when it comes to science.

Your position at the moment seems to be something like "The only meaningful moral statements are statements about what people think is moral, because anything else lacks an external referent, and statements lacking external referents are meaningless. Therefore if morality exists, morality is what people think is moral".

The problem with that conclusion is that you've just defined morality out of existence as a useful concept, because as Piggy points out at length (under the mistaken impression that it's news to anyone at the JREF forums) lots of people think horrible things are in fact highly moral, and lots of people have mutually contradictory or even self-contradictory moral ideas.

Exactly. If we treat morality as a question which can be answered by reference to statements which which follow inescapably from our premises, the process becomes meaningless because it necessarily depends upon these non-existent 'ought' premises. And so it makes more sense to me to stick with logically coherent and consistent, but ground it empirically instead, and avoid such exquisite sensitivity to premises which (as has been amply demonstrated) we're not all that good at forming beyond the most simple.

So what do we do if we value consistency, and we want our conclusions to follow inescapably from our premises?

Admit that this isn't a practical strategy for anything other than mathematics?

The only way forward anyone has ever found is to try to construct consistent systems of thought that start with clearly-stated, non-factual ought statements and reason forward from there. They perform a function a bit like axioms do in mathematics. They are convenient starting points arrived at purely by fiat, and we judge them on the basis of whether or not they lead somewhere useful.

Do you consider this a description of the scientific process?

Linda

 

[Piggy]

Feel free.

Cool.

I have to be out of state this weekend, leaving tonight.

When I get back, I think it might be interesting to use an example and walk through a sci-bio approach to the is/ought/should process as it would work from that point of view. And while I'm at it, compare that to other approaches (Bundy? Taliban? I won't presume to run thru a philo approach, will leave that to the experts.)

By is/ought/should, I mean this:

How do we determine what the situation is?

How do we determine what the situation ought to be?

How do we determine what we should do, given the gap (if any) between is and ought?

Should be fun. I'll try to work that up for this coming Tuesday.

 

[Piggy]

By definition all unequal power relationships are maintained by the threat or display of force or sanction. Do you think the other male gorillas or lions are content that they're not the alpha male? Is the existence of mods on this forum immoral because members whine about them sometimes?

One could make an argument based on science that giving women more power has resulted in the breakdown of the family in the West.

Gorilla morality is not likely to be identical to human morality.

If gender equality is changing the dynamic of the family, which it's bound to, then that's certainly something to consider in the equation.

The ideal role and responsibilities of mods on this forum is certainly open to debate.

 

[Piggy]

In your world science does that. In mine science is probing ever deeper into our biology to determine the differences between individuals which result in some developing breast cancer, heart disease, ADHD, Autism, etc..

Yup, mine, too.

 

[Piggy]

No, your characterization of science* only shows that women don't want to wear burkas, not that their wearing of burkas is wrong.

How do you go from there to show that what people don't like is wrong?

Well, if you really want to know, I actually don't think in terms of "right" and "wrong" at all, although I use those terms in casual conversation, and I do have some gut feelings that things are "just wrong" -- but those gut feelings don't necessarily drive my decisions and actions.

I don't find the terms useful.

We can answer questions like "What should we do?" without them, and I believe we come to better decisions when we do.

The question is not whether a thing is "right" or "wrong".

The issue is simply that we come to different (superior) conclusions when we apply science to moral questions than when we do not.

And that's at the heart of Harris's claim that the wall of separation is illusory, just as the wall between science and religion is illusory.

Since we do come to different conclusions when science informs our moral decisions, it makes no sense to say that science cannot tell us what we ought to value.

Anyway, more on this Tuesday.

 

[Piggy]

Could you summarize your argument for me? Because I don't follow your previous posts about how you can get by without defining an intrinsic good at some point.

I'll elaborate on Tuesday, but essentially you simply jettison the notion of intrinsic good (whatever that may be) and begin instead with the known facts about human nature and the world, as applicable to the situation.

A thumbnail: I'm hungry. I have no food and no money. That lady is piling a load of groceries -- including lots of luxury items -- into her Mercedes. Should I ask her for food? Should I steal food from her?

There's a method of answering these questions that simply doesn't bother with any abstract notions of intrinsic good. It's a matter, instead, of focusing on the reality of human nature (our drives, for example, and what makes us suffer), the situation (e.g., her potential response, the responses of others), and outcomes (what's likely to happen in each scenario).

The foundation for all of this is not any abstract notion of good or of right/wrong, but rather a recognition of the shape, so to speak, of human nature. And fundamental to that is the drive to avoid suffering, and to satisfy basic needs.

ETA: We also have to get rid of this notion of any ultimate answer that we can apply to anyone and everyone. That's an abstract ideal that doesn't exist. People who take different approaches reach different answers: e.g., My gut says this so I'll do it; The Bible tells me this so I'll do it; My scientific worldview tells me this so I'll do it.

The point is not to search for a method that everyone agrees on. There is no such thing. The question is to examine how each of these approaches works, and (for this OP) to ask whether the science-informed approach is valid, even best.

 

[Tapio]

I understand that philosophers are concerned with these things. But as Harris points out, by this standard, philosophy is incapable of recognizing the usefulness of something so demonstrably useful as science. It's not a matter of explaining why philosophy is interested in logical coherence, it's a matter of explaining why we should only be interested in logical coherence given that it doesn't reflect how we answer important questions when it comes to science.

^^THIS^^

Thanks, Linda.

After watching Kuko's link it seems all the more clear to me that Harris is essentially trying to get philosophical pondering out of the heads and more into the hands, so to speak.

Actions speak a lot louder than words, and yell compared to thinking.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I understand that philosophers are concerned with these things. But as Harris points out, by this standard, philosophy is incapable of recognizing the usefulness of something so demonstrably useful as science. It's not a matter of explaining why philosophy is interested in logical coherence, it's a matter of explaining why we should only be interested in logical coherence given that it doesn't reflect how we answer important questions when it comes to science.

Whoah, he actually said that?

The idea philosophy is incapable of recognizing the usefulness of science is just so *********** bizarre that I struggle to see how anyone who knew anything about it could make such a claim.

Also, I think I must have said a few times now that coherent moral claims require facts and value judgments, whereas science is solely concerned with facts. So complaining that philosophers worry about logical coherence and facts when they are doing moral philosophy is completely specious. You cannot approach the subject any other way, whatever idiocy Harris is coming up with.

Exactly. If we treat morality as a question which can be answered by reference to statements which which follow inescapably from our premises, the process becomes meaningless because it necessarily depends upon these non-existent 'ought' premises. And so it makes more sense to me to stick with logically coherent and consistent, but ground it empirically instead, and avoid such exquisite sensitivity to premises which (as has been amply demonstrated) we're not all that good at forming beyond the most simple.

There's just a teensy problem there: You can't do that. You can't get to ought statements from empirical statements.

If you want to make any moral claims at all, they have to start from value judgments.

Admit that this isn't a practical strategy for anything other than mathematics?

It's the only strategy there is for this particular problem, so that's just tough.

Do you consider this a description of the scientific process?

This appears to me to be a total non sequitur. The only ways I can make sense of it are by assuming you know absolutely nothing about science, or by assuming you think I know absolutely nothing about science.

 

[Beth]

I'll elaborate on Tuesday, but essentially you simply jettison the notion of intrinsic good (whatever that may be) and begin instead with the known facts about human nature and the world, as applicable to the situation.

As I understand the term, an intrinsic good is anything you want just because you want it. No justification for wanting it other than simply wanting it is required. For example fairness, equality under the law, and justice would be examples of what I consider intrinsic goods.

A thumbnail: I'm hungry. I have no food and no money. That lady is piling a load of groceries -- including lots of luxury items -- into her Mercedes. Should I ask her for food? Should I steal food from her?

Isn't this assuming that food - or perhaps more abstractly - survival is an intrinsic good? Now, I don't have any illusions about survival and food being near-universal intrinsic goods for all living creatures, but that doesn't mean it isn't an intrinsic good. I'll look forward to your response on Tuesday, but I don't see how you're going to be able to jettison the notion of intrinsic good. It seems to me, like Mr. Lowe is indicating, you are simply skipping formal recognition of defining intrinsic goods and moving directly into how do we decide how to achieve those goals.

There's a method of answering these questions that simply doesn't bother with any abstract notions of intrinsic good. It's a matter, instead, of focusing on the reality of human nature (our drives, for example, and what makes us suffer), the situation (e.g., her potential response, the responses of others), and outcomes (what's likely to happen in each scenario).

The foundation for all of this is not any abstract notion of good or of right/wrong, but rather a recognition of the shape, so to speak, of human nature. And fundamental to that is the drive to avoid suffering, and to satisfy basic needs.

Yes, I happen to agree that science can tell us a great deal about how to best accomplish those things with the resources we have available. But that doesn't mean that you are jettisoning the idea of intrinsic goods with your statement that we want to avoid suffering and satisfy basic needs. You are simply accepting those things as being intrinsically valuable and proceding from that point.

I'll look forward to reading the new book.

 

[amused]

This should be interesting:

Length: 1 hour 47 minutes.

He seems to be holding back, maybe to get people to buy his book. But I don't think he made much progress in making his case here. The proposal about starting from a place where everybody is suffering the maximum amount, then acknowledging that there is a continuum of better and better, is his best talking point. I was waiting for more follow through on that.

 

[Piscivore]

The proposal about starting from a place where everybody is suffering the maximum amount,

I don't have an hour 47 to watch this right now... what is " the maximum amount" of suffering? Is it the same for everyone?

 

[Tapio]

I don't have an hour 47 to watch this right now... what is " the maximum amount" of suffering? Is it the same for everyone?

I don't think this needs to be nitpicked about. Of course it can't be the same for everyone. "Maximum amount of suffering" says it all. It's the maximum amount of suffering, period.

ETA: How would you go about comparing the experience of suffering anyway?

 

[AlBell]

I don't have an hour 47 to watch this right now... what is " the maximum amount" of suffering? Is it the same for everyone?

Some difference between sadists & masochists, I'd guess.

Aside: I find it mind-boggling that a couple folks here can't seem to understand what an intrinsic good is, and why one chosen as such will never be scientifically validated.

Estimations of the results of "intrinsic good" choices can be examined using the scientific method; no quibble there.

 

[amused]

I don't have an hour 47 to watch this right now... what is " the maximum amount" of suffering? Is it the same for everyone?

It's a hypothetical situation where misery is maximized. It's a thought experiment to plant one end of 'well being' in the worst place possible.* Then he says: And once you acknowledge that there is a range of better places to be, it becomes possible to make objective decisions about how to proceed toward better.

He touches that again at the very end in answer to the last question (timecode 1:43:25) but since it's so basic to his proposal I think he should spend a lot more time on it.

*Edit: One way to think of it would be if the entire planet was like the worst failed state in Africa.