Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[Piscivore]

You're in two entirely different frames of reference.

If evolution is arbitrary or not, doesn't matter.

The fact is, our biology is what it is. The fact of our biology is a non-arbitrary standard because we are our biology, regardless of the arbitrariness or purposefulness of the processes that formed it.

No, it still isn't, because despite our biology we still don't value other humans' "well-being" equally.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Been done upthread.

When men force women to wear burkas, they are giving themselves power and freedom not granted to women, and they are constraining their liberty in a very basic way, and indirectly removing a great deal of control over their reproductive choices.

This only makes any difference to people who have made value judgments like "one ought not to give oneself power over others", or "one ought not constrain the liberty of others", or "one ought not restrict another's reproductive choices".

None of those "ought" statements can be arrived at by any chain of scientific "is" statements.

Science tells us that human beings don't much care for unequal power arrangements maintained by force, don't enjoy having their freedom restricted, don't enjoy being forced into a lower social status, and that women especially want to have control over their reproductive choices.

However science also tells us that some people very much enjoy having power, exercising force, restricting the freedom of others, having higher social status and dictating the reproductive choices of women.

So whose enjoyment ought to matter more? That too is a question science simply cannot answer.

A scientifically-informed morality finds no justification for it.

On the contrary, I just showed you one that did, in your terms. If two groups of people (men and women) want two different things, you cannot reach a conclusion about who ought to get what they want with any number of "is" statements.

You need to make some kind of factually-unsupported "ought" claim to do that.

If you don't want to do that, that's just fine, philosophically speaking. You're a moral nihilist, and that's a perfectly consistent position (although one almost no moral nihilists seem to apply consistently and rationally).

If you want to do that, that's just fine too, philosophically speaking. You can make up some factually-unsupported value judgment like "everyone ought to be allowed the maximum amount of positive liberty consistent with an egalitarian distribution of positive liberty", which cannot be scientifically proven to be true but may well lead to outcomes you prefer, and then you're able to make a variety of other consistent value judgments.

Where philosophers will pull you up is if you try to smuggle "ought" statements in implicitly with "is" statements, which is exactly what you are trying to do here. You make "is" statements like "When men force women to wear burkas, they are giving themselves power and freedom not granted to women, and they are constraining their liberty in a very basic way, and indirectly removing a great deal of control over their reproductive choices" and you smuggle in the implicit "ought" statement "men ought not to do that, because I have the strong intuition that it is bad".

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

What we ought to value.

I'll try taking a new tack, and see if that explains the point better. The point hasn't changed though, so please bear that in mind.

Philosophers are very much concerned with watertight, inescapable conclusions. That's why all of the logical fallacies they have canonical names for are fallacies: because the premises in a fallacious argument do not inescapably lead to the conclusion.

An appeal to authority is a fallacious argument not because authorities are necessarily wrong - often, very often in some cases, authorities are right. It is fallacious because it does not inescapably lead to a correct conclusion, because every now and then authorities are wrong.

In moral philosophy fallacies like the naturalistic fallacy, one Piggy falls into gleefully, are again fallacious because they do not lead inescapably to consistent or useful conclusions. It's natural for people to not want to be tortured, and almost every useful and consistent moral philosophy will say that torture is immoral a lot of the time or all of the time, but it's also natural for people to want to rape, rob, beat, murder, torture and enslave. So just because it's natural for people to want something does not get you inescapably to the conclusion that it's morally right for them to do what they want or get what they want.

Your position at the moment seems to be something like "The only meaningful moral statements are statements about what people think is moral, because anything else lacks an external referent, and statements lacking external referents are meaningless. Therefore if morality exists, morality is what people think is moral".

The problem with that conclusion is that you've just defined morality out of existence as a useful concept, because as Piggy points out at length (under the mistaken impression that it's news to anyone at the JREF forums) lots of people think horrible things are in fact highly moral, and lots of people have mutually contradictory or even self-contradictory moral ideas.

So what do we do if we value consistency, and we want our conclusions to follow inescapably from our premises?

The only way forward anyone has ever found is to try to construct consistent systems of thought that start with clearly-stated, non-factual ought statements and reason forward from there. They perform a function a bit like axioms do in mathematics. They are convenient starting points arrived at purely by fiat, and we judge them on the basis of whether or not they lead somewhere useful.

 

[Piggy]

What a ridiculous list.

I've come to expect that response.

It generally boils down to "But this stuff is obvious!"

Of course it's obvious. How could it be otherwise?

But when you really consider it, especially considering what's excluded, it turns out to be quite powerful.

 

[Piggy]

No, it still isn't, because despite our biology we still don't value other humans' "well-being" equally.

That turns out to be a matter of scope. People tend to view their in-group as significantly different from the out-group -- those who are less human, or less deserving, or less feeling, or less favored by God, or fundamentally different from us in some way or another.

Science, however, reveals that the differences among us are superficial. Basically, we're all the same.

Our history, by and large, is a history of widening the scope of groups we consider fully human, fully deserving of the same benefits we want for ourselves.

Morality remains the same. What changes is our opinion of who is deserving of it.

 

[Piggy]

This only makes any difference to people who have made value judgments like "one ought not to give oneself power over others", or "one ought not constrain the liberty of others", or "one ought not restrict another's reproductive choices".

None of those "ought" statements can be arrived at by any chain of scientific "is" statements.

Funny, then, how those societies most accepting of science, and least accepting of tribalism and religion, are consistently those which are most inclined to recognize universal human rights.

Just a coincidence, I suppose.

 

[Piggy]

However science also tells us that some people very much enjoy having power, exercising force, restricting the freedom of others, having higher social status and dictating the reproductive choices of women.

So whose enjoyment ought to matter more? That too is a question science simply cannot answer.

Finally you are starting to understand.

When you crack that second question, you'll almost be there.

 

[Piggy]

On the contrary, I just showed you one that did, in your terms. If two groups of people (men and women) want two different things, you cannot reach a conclusion about who ought to get what they want with any number of "is" statements.

You need to make some kind of factually-unsupported "ought" claim to do that.

That depends.

Are these groups of men and women interested in a world-view informed by science?

Or are they instead content with a world-view informed by superstition, tribalism, and other such means of viewing the world?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Funny, then, how those societies most accepting of science, and least accepting of tribalism and religion, are consistently those which are most inclined to recognize universal human rights.

Just a coincidence, I suppose.

So correlation is not only causation now, but it's also proof of an "ought" relationship? That's nonsense on stilts.

Finally you are starting to understand.

When you crack that second question, you'll almost be there.

When you have a logical response that you can actually state clearly, as opposed to one you can hint at but not make clear, you'll almost be somewhere.

That depends.

Are these groups of men and women interested in a world-view informed by science?

Or are they instead content with a world-view informed by superstition, tribalism, and other such means of viewing the world?

This question seems to be based on the aforementioned confusion between correlation, causation, and proof of "ought" statements.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I've come to expect that response.

It generally boils down to "But this stuff is obvious!"

Of course it's obvious. How could it be otherwise?

But when you really consider it, especially considering what's excluded, it turns out to be quite powerful.

I am unable to find any interpretation of your words in which they are a meaningful response to Earthborn's point.

 

[Piggy]

So correlation is not only causation now, but it's also proof of an "ought" relationship? That's nonsense on stilts.

Indeed it would be.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Indeed it would be.

Bearing in mind that someone who claims to have a sensible argument but who will not post it is indistinguishable to outside observers from someone who has no sensible argument but is pretending otherwise, are you going to post a sensible argument soon?

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

The argument goes:

Science cannot answer moral questions because I can make statements which have no real world correlates.

I want to understand how one gets from the first part to the second.

Linda

What is "no real world correlates"? Are you simply talking about hypothetical cases?

Values in science are determined by what they are relative to. Moral values need "relative to" to complete the equation. But so does "how hot" something is. Absolute energy is one 'relative hot', fever or not fever is a different 'relative hot'.

 

[Piggy]

I am unable to find any interpretation of your words in which they are a meaningful response to Earthborn's point.

Well, all right, then.

 

[Piggy]

Bearing in mind that someone who claims to have a sensible argument but who will not post it is indistinguishable to outside observers from someone who has no sensible argument but is pretending otherwise, are you going to post a sensible argument soon?

In response to what, exactly?

As long as you've got your nose firmly embedded in abstract-land, then we're bound to be talking, to a certain extent, at cross-purposes.

 

[Piggy]

This question seems to be based on the aforementioned confusion between correlation, causation, and proof of "ought" statements.

Actually, it's based on the simple fact that, even if we do establish an objective (science-based) approach to morality, and moral questions, this does not in any way force anybody to recognize it, much less abide by it.

There are, after all, people who believe the moon landing was faked, despite conclusive evidence to the contrary.

 

[Piscivore]

That turns out to be a matter of scope. People tend to view their in-group as significantly different from the out-group -- those who are less human, or less deserving, or less feeling, or less favored by God, or fundamentally different from us in some way or another.

Science, however, reveals that the differences among us are superficial. Basically, we're all the same.

Our history, by and large, is a history of widening the scope of groups we consider fully human, fully deserving of the same benefits we want for ourselves.

Morality remains the same. What changes is our opinion of who is deserving of it.

That's far, far too simplistic. If this were true, then there wouldn't be any crime or other moral infractions within a group.

 

[Piggy]

That's far, far too simplistic. If this were true, then there wouldn't be any crime or other moral infractions within a group.

I never said this was the only force in operation.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Actually, it's based on the simple fact that, even if we do establish an objective (science-based) approach to morality, and moral questions, this does not in any way force anybody to recognize it, much less abide by it.

While this is true, by the same token if wishes were fishes we'd all cast nets, and if your auntie had balls she'd be your uncle.

You have still not replied to any of the polite requests for you to explicate how you get from a series of "is" statements to an "ought" statement. You clearly believe that there are some meaningful "ought" statements to observe, but how do you get to them?

Merely asserting that it is so obvious to you than you cannot explain it is not an argument, it's a cop-out.

 

[Piggy]

Bearing in mind that someone who claims to have a sensible argument but who will not post it is indistinguishable to outside observers from someone who has no sensible argument but is pretending otherwise, are you going to post a sensible argument soon?

It depends on the questions.

From the point of view of someone who still clings to the theory of the cosmic ether, straightforward answers from an adherent of relativity will seem nonsensical.

At this point, I've explained my position well enough that it should be perfectly intelligible.

So I'm done explaining, unless I'm asked to explain.

If you continue posing questions to me which come from the point of view of someone who feels that the issue of intrinsic and instrumental good is a necessary step in approaching moral decisions -- despite the fact that I've amply explained why a bio-sci approach can dispense with such concerns -- then you're going to get answers back which will make no sense from your frame of reference.

If you want to return to the fundamental issue of why your supposed requirement is superfluous, we can go there, too.