Radiation and the atomic bombing of Japan.

There is really only one piece of evidence necessary to end the argument about whether or not the atomic bombing led to Japan's unconditional surrender (either by itself or in conjunction with other factors such as the Soviet Union's declaration of war upon Japan) and that is the Imperial Rescript on Surrender:

To Our Good and loyal subjects:

After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.[1]

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors, and which We lay close to heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to secure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandisement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by every one -- the gallant fighting of military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people, the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb,[2] the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects; or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers....[cont.d]
 
"the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage"

I've read the Imperial Rescript several times over the years. Every time this phrase makes me wonder where Hirohito took his lessons in British understatement.
 
From Wikipedia:

"Nearly 500,000 Purple Heart medals (awarded for combat casualties) were manufactured in anticipation of the casualties resulting from the invasion of Japan; the number exceeded that of all American military casualties of the 65 years following the end of World War II, including the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In 2003, there were still 120,000 of these Purple Heart medals in stock.[61] There were so many in surplus that combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan were able to keep Purple Hearts on-hand for immediate award to soldiers wounded on the field.[61]"
 
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The problem was how long would it take, and would there have been a weakening of the political will to demilitarise Japan, meaning another war in a few decades.


Post-war investigation by the USSBS suggested that it would have been sooner rather than later, but of course at the time no one could have known that with any degree of certainty.
 
Never ceases to amaze...


Between my reading of Shattered Sword and Fire in the Sky (about the aerial campaign in the South Pacific theatre) what comes across is just how much Japan was effectively its own worst enemy during the war. Much of its own military strategy and tactics directly helped the Allied cause. Between the intense animosity between the IJA and IJN, the military ethos focusing on attack to the exclusion of almost any other consideration, and learning all the wrong lessons from its war in China, it all led to Japan taking actions which hastened its own defeat. Yet in spite of that it managed to hold on as long as it did.

One wonders how different the war might have gone had Japan had sensible and pragmatic military leadership. Instead of expending its forces uselessly in futile attacks, it withdrew them when the situation made it appropriate to do so. Instead of the army and navy bickering incessantly, they co-operated to pursue a joint strategic plan. Instead of disregarding the vital importance of support efforts such as air transport, merchant shipping, and air base construction, it pursued them. Instead of viewing pilots as replaceable, expendable commodities it regarded them as valuable assets to be protected wherever possible. Instead of viewing enemy shipping as targets not worthy of the effort, it had unleashed its submarines against Allied merchant vessels. And so on and so forth.

In such as case, defeating Japan would likely have been far more costly than it was historically.
 
Post-war investigation by the USSBS suggested that it would have been sooner rather than later, but of course at the time no one could have known that with any degree of certainty.

The USSBS was commissioned by "Hap" Arnold to prove the Air Force could win any war alone. Take anything in there with a Yamato-sized grain of salt.
 
Between my reading of Shattered Sword and Fire in the Sky (about the aerial campaign in the South Pacific theatre) what comes across is just how much Japan was effectively its own worst enemy during the war. Much of its own military strategy and tactics directly helped the Allied cause. Between the intense animosity between the IJA and IJN, the military ethos focusing on attack to the exclusion of almost any other consideration, and learning all the wrong lessons from its war in China, it all led to Japan taking actions which hastened its own defeat. Yet in spite of that it managed to hold on as long as it did.

One wonders how different the war might have gone had Japan had sensible and pragmatic military leadership. Instead of expending its forces uselessly in futile attacks, it withdrew them when the situation made it appropriate to do so. Instead of the army and navy bickering incessantly, they co-operated to pursue a joint strategic plan. Instead of disregarding the vital importance of support efforts such as air transport, merchant shipping, and air base construction, it pursued them. Instead of viewing pilots as replaceable, expendable commodities it regarded them as valuable assets to be protected wherever possible. Instead of viewing enemy shipping as targets not worthy of the effort, it had unleashed its submarines against Allied merchant vessels. And so on and so forth.

In such as case, defeating Japan would likely have been far more costly than it was historically.
To cap it off nicely, read Eri Hotta's Japan: 1941. I really want a Japan: 1945 from this author.
 
The USSBS was commissioned by "Hap" Arnold to prove the Air Force could win any war alone. Take anything in there with a Yamato-sized grain of salt.


Granted. Though I'd say what it contains wasn't determined until intensive investigation after the war was over. Making the same case in early August of 1945 would have been very difficult as the evidence simply wasn't available.


To cap it off nicely, read Eri Hotta's Japan: 1941. I really want a Japan: 1945 from this author.


Copies available in the library system here. Might have to put in a request. :)
 
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When it comes to books about the bombing of Japan, the elephant in the room is Richard Rhodes The making of the Atomic Bomb (1986). Much of it is concerned with the discovery that a chain reaction was possible and could lead to the manufacture of a devastating bomb. However, it covers in some detail the ethical dilemma the bomb posed and the decision processes within the American and Japanese governments.
I thought I'd better mention it as no one else has and it is the "go-to" book on the subject.
 
When it comes to books about the bombing of Japan, the elephant in the room is Richard Rhodes The making of the Atomic Bomb (1986). Much of it is concerned with the discovery that a chain reaction was possible and could lead to the manufacture of a devastating bomb. However, it covers in some detail the ethical dilemma the bomb posed and the decision processes within the American and Japanese governments.
I thought I'd better mention it as no one else has and it is the "go-to" book on the subject.


Glad you did. Great book, as is Fire in the Sky that Corsair mentioned.
 
Between my reading of Shattered Sword and Fire in the Sky (about the aerial campaign in the South Pacific theatre) what comes across is just how much Japan was effectively its own worst enemy during the war. Much of its own military strategy and tactics directly helped the Allied cause. Between the intense animosity between the IJA and IJN, the military ethos focusing on attack to the exclusion of almost any other consideration, and learning all the wrong lessons from its war in China, it all led to Japan taking actions which hastened its own defeat. Yet in spite of that it managed to hold on as long as it did.

One wonders how different the war might have gone had Japan had sensible and pragmatic military leadership. Instead of expending its forces uselessly in futile attacks, it withdrew them when the situation made it appropriate to do so. Instead of the army and navy bickering incessantly, they co-operated to pursue a joint strategic plan. Instead of disregarding the vital importance of support efforts such as air transport, merchant shipping, and air base construction, it pursued them. Instead of viewing pilots as replaceable, expendable commodities it regarded them as valuable assets to be protected wherever possible. Instead of viewing enemy shipping as targets not worthy of the effort, it had unleashed its submarines against Allied merchant vessels. And so on and so forth.

In such as case, defeating Japan would likely have been far more costly than it was historically.
True. Poor strategic decisions, poor cooperation between services, duplication of effort and more. Though a Japan more accepting of the strategic realities would probably have chosen cooperation with the US and a major regional power rather than provoking the war.
You mentioned the misuse of submarines, but there was endemic wasteful duplication of effort (from aircraft development to atomic energy projects) and poor choices down to small arms (poor designs, multiple cartridges). For example they were the only country to develop a cheap, mass produced sub-machine gun.


The USSBS was commissioned by "Hap" Arnold to prove the Air Force could win any war alone. Take anything in there with a Yamato-sized grain of salt.
True, it's important to put it into the political context about the post-war independence of the USAF and the development of SAC.
 
Missing "not"?
Ah ◊◊◊◊. I've a bad habit of missing stuff like that recently.

Yes, Japan was one of the few combatants, and the only major one, to fail to produce a decent SMG in large numbers. Particularly bad idea given their utility in jungle warfare and the generally poor Japanese light machine guns.
 
To cap it off nicely, read Eri Hotta's Japan: 1941. I really want a Japan: 1945 from this author.

Never read her work before, but I know of the Anlgo-Dutch author Ian Buruma who is her husband. He wrote an interesting book called The Wages of Guilt which explored the different ways in which Germany and Japan (and the Netherlands) approach World War Two and what they ought to feel guilty about including an interesting piece about Azuma Shiro whom he met in the nineties.

Buruma also had an interesting exchange in which he intellectually demolished Gore Vidal then opining some conspiracy about Pearl Harbor.

However, I would also be interested in reading this piece by Ian Buruma about the Nanking atrocity, partly because in recent days some oik has made an insinuating question towards me suggesting that I denied it happened. I denied denying the Nanking massacre but I found the very question so disgusting that I asked him in return if he was a paedophile. He has yet to deny he is one.
 
"the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage"

I've read the Imperial Rescript several times over the years. Every time this phrase makes me wonder where Hirohito took his lessons in British understatement.

It may be the greatest understatement of all time.
 
Ah ◊◊◊◊. I've a bad habit of missing stuff like that recently.

Yes, Japan was one of the few combatants, and the only major one, to fail to produce a decent SMG in large numbers. Particularly bad idea given their utility in jungle warfare and the generally poor Japanese light machine guns.

As ably proven by the Australian Bren Gunners in New Guinea and the British Bren Gunners in Burma.
 

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