After I reply to the quoted comment, I will respond to other points that have been made.
And to avoid confusion or outright falsehoods, the Minority Report text is here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/keefe.html
I'm guessing you did not bother to read the article before you posted this comment. Actually, every page-number reference for the quoted sections from the minority report is linked to the entire minority report.
Also, the link you provide is not the link for the minority report--it's the link for Congressman Frank Keefe's "Additional Views" addendum.
Now, to respond to other points that have been made:
* I seriously doubt that Jacobsen's article Grogan's bearings does not "demolish" or "destroy" the evidence that they were obtained from signals from the task force. I will obtained and read Jacobsen's article. To explain away Grogan's bearings, Jacobsen will need to explain the evidence presented by Farago, Hill, Wilford, and Toland. He will need to explain why Japanese fishing ships in Japanese home waters would have been using repeat-back transmissions and how Grogan could have heard those transmissions when he heard them. He will also need to explain the evidence from USN reports, including from Station Hypo, that indicates Grogan was indeed tracking the task force.
* If I were to use Gawdzilla's approach toward evidence, I would simply summarily dismiss Jacobsen's article, since Jacobsen was a traditionalist and thus his writings are traditionalist sources.
* When I cite sources that contain evidence that substantiates my statements, some folks, such as Gawdzilla, automatically reject them because they are "CT" sources. A fact is a fact regardless of the source in which it is stated. To simply wave aside serious, scholarly books and articles because their authors hold a different viewpoint from yours suggests that those doing the rejecting are perhaps overly biased and not open to persuasion.
* My initial reference that the 12/6 message from the Alaska Defense Command put the task force within aircraft striking distance of Hawaii was mistaken.
* Some of the replies about my comments regarding DFing in relation to signal strength and signal characteristics assume arguments I have not made. I did not say Grogan used DFing to determine that the signals he was hearing were low power. I'm guessing that the folks who are making these arguments still have not read Hill and Wilford's article on the
Lurline DF bearings.
* We should not be too shocked that FDR would have allowed an aerial attack on Pearl Harbor when we know for a fact that he--through Marshall, Stimson, etc.--misled MacArthur into thinking that defense of the Philippines was a top priority and that reinforcements would be there soon. We now know that, contrary to what he was telling MacArthur, FDR had no intention of strongly defending the Philippines, as Dr. George Victor and others have documented in detail.
* Regarding the repeated challenge that I produce a map showing how Grogan's bearings would have been triangulated, is that really necessary? Is it so hard to understand that multiple bearings taken over the space of several days on a huge, slow-moving target would essentially, roughly enable triangulation?
You have a huge ocean liner with pretty good DF equipment for that day taking numerous bearings over the space of several days on a huge, slow-moving target. Now, granted, with DF technology back then, you did not know from just a single bearing from which direction the signal was coming. But, with numerous bearings taken over several days on a target that was a group of ships, you could quickly and easily determine the general direction from which the signals were coming.
You would know where you had been when you took the previous bearings, and you would have numerous bearings taken over several days with which to work.
* Finally, the argument that the bomb plot messages were of little value or importance ignores their content, ignores the fact that the Japanese sought those data only about Pearl Harbor and no other harbor, and that a number of intelligence officers recognized the importance of those messages and tried very hard to inform Kimmel and Short about them.